

J.S. Mill and John Paul II: *Utilitarianism* and *Loving Your Neighbour*

by

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**Author's declaration**

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners. I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.

## Abstract

Jesus Christ's Commandment to Love one's neighbour as one's self in Mark 12:28-31 plays a pivotal role in the social moral doctrine of nineteenth century philosopher John Stuart Mill's *Utilitarianism* and of twentieth century philosopher Pope John Paul II's *Love and Responsibility*. The difference between their respective interpretations is in each man's definition of *love*. Believing the human drive to obtain pleasure and to mitigate pain to be the moral arbiter of all consequence, Mill equates Christ's definition of *love* with utilitarian notions of pleasure, utility, and happiness. In response to such claims, and with a specific focus on how this mentality negatively affects marriage and family, John Paul II primarily argues that *love* does not necessarily beget pleasure, utility, happiness, or pain's mitigation, and that true love is not a feeling but an action, whereby one prizes another's innate dignity above such things.

Mill's moral order is rooted in happiness – an inherently personal, subjective, and therefore inconstant moral standard; social harmony is achieved by protecting and adding to one's own happiness and to the happiness of others, and by ensuring society's freedom from unhappiness. Conversely, JPII first subordinates concerns for personal happiness to God, in accordance with Christ's first Commandment, and thereby to the objective, unchanging and therefore constant nature of the human person. Social harmony is achieved by mirroring Christ's example of subtracting from his own life to serve others; thus, pleasure may be foregone and pain experienced in the interest of upholding human dignity and refraining from mere use of others. These differences are rooted in Mill's agnostic view that earthly happiness is life's primary purpose, and in JPII's Christian view that life's purpose is love through self-giving to the point of suffering, which in turn results in eternal joy through, with, and in God.

Despite these differences, both agree that serving others must be life's primary aim.

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## **Dedication**

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## Table of Contents

Author's declaration.....	ii
Abstract.....	iii
Acknowledgements.....	iv
Dedication.....	v
1: Utilitarians and Christians Define <i>Love</i> Differently.....	1
2: Comparative Overview.....	11
3: Prioritizing Utility and Pleasure, or Human Dignity.....	19
4: Mill's Subjective- and JPII's Objective-Moral Order.....	46
5: Two Opposing Interpretations of the Commandment to Love.....	53
6: Constants and Inconstants, Addition and Subtraction.....	71
7: Mill and JPII's Seeming Self-Contradictions.....	77
8: Impact of Mill's Agnosticism and JPII's Christianity.....	87
9: Conclusion.....	99
Bibliography.....	104
Primary Sources.....	104
Secondary Sources.....	105
Endnotes.....	106





J.S. Mill and John Paul II: *Utilitarianism and Loving Your Neighbour*

By Joseph McCullough



## **J.S. Mill and John Paul II: *Utilitarianism and Loving Your Neighbour***

One of the scribes, when he came forward and heard them disputing and saw how well he had answered them, asked him, “Which is the first of all the commandments?” Jesus replied, “The first is this: ‘Hear, O Israel! The Lord our God is Lord alone! You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, with all your mind, and with all your strength.’ The second is this: ‘You shall love your neighbor as yourself.’ There is no other commandment greater than these.”

Mark 12:28-31

### **1: Utilitarians and Christians Define *Love* Differently**

All people – regardless of the ethical doctrine to which they subscribe, regardless of the ‘selfless’ principles which they claim to uphold – ultimately form their moral doctrine to justify acting to experience the greatest amount of pleasure, and the least amount of pain.<sup>1</sup> As morally repugnant to some as this statement may have seemed, John Stuart Mill, revered agnostic, utilitarian philosopher, economist, and civil rights activist of nineteenth century Britain, championed this belief as the basis for his 1861 treatise in support of the philosophical doctrine, utilitarianism.<sup>2</sup> Ninety-nine years after its publication, this same claim was largely reaffirmed by young Polish Catholic bishop, Karol Wojtyła, in his critique of utilitarianism, found within his larger theological work on spousal love, marriage, family, and marital/sexual intimacy, *Love and Responsibility* – “utilitarianism is a characteristic property of contemporary man’s mentality and his attitude toward life. ... utilitarianism constitutes a perennial bedrock, as it were, on which the life of individuals and human collectives tends to flow”.<sup>3</sup> This same bishop, who affirmed Mill’s insight on this subject, would later become Pope John Paul II (whom henceforth shall be referenced as JP II).<sup>4</sup>

One might assume that philosophers of decidedly different religious persuasions would have different views on this subject. While these crucial similarities exist, however, they are irrevocably demarcated by each philosopher’s entirely separate understanding of Jesus Christ’s



Second Greatest Commandment, which JP II identifies as the Biblical Commandment to Love – “[t]he commandment formulated in the Gospel demands from man love for other people, for neighbours (*bliźni*)”, and which Mill identifies as “...the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, ... [t]o do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbour as oneself...”.<sup>5</sup>

In *Utilitarianism*, John Stuart Mill describes the end of utilitarianism as the greatest pleasure and the least pain for the greatest number, conditional on the Biblical Commandment to Love. To utilitarianism's detractors Mill states that honest self-reflection will reveal personal happiness as the basic motive for human conduct – proof that utilitarianism holds “the fundamental principle of morality, and the source of moral obligation”.<sup>6</sup> Mill argues that a social education in utilitarianism will harmonize public interest, ideally leading to *universal happiness*.<sup>7</sup>

Pope John Paul II responds that utilitarianism and the Biblical Commandment to Love are incompatible, primarily because Mill does not acknowledge the necessity of God in the Commandment's proper and effective application – “in its full reading, however, [the Commandment] demands love for persons. For God, whom the commandment to love names in the first place, is the most perfect personal being.”<sup>8</sup> While he acknowledges that utilitarian “mentalit[ies] and attitude[s] ... constitute] a perennial bedrock” of human life, he warns that the utilitarian outlook corrupts and divides society's core – that is, marriages and families – causing self-giving love between spouses to disintegrate into (mutual) use and consumerism – the like of which is not natural, but a fateful consequence of Adam and Eve's fall from grace, as detailed in Genesis.<sup>9</sup> He argues that for the proper function of marriage and family – this microcosmic expression of society – pleasure, utility, must be viewed as “something collateral, accidental”.<sup>10</sup> In the context of marital love, therefore, pleasure and utility must, above all, be *fully justified* by self-giving love, that is, *spousal love*, a love only achieved by honouring the First

Commandment of Christianity – that is, to love God with all thyself, and subsequently, to love thy neighbour as thyself.<sup>11</sup> This approach creates greater peace on earth, thereby cultivating greater earthly (and heavenly) social cohesion.<sup>12</sup>

Thus, Mill and JPII agree that pleasure is a good. Mill, however, accepts and champions this insight as the founding principle of morality. To justify his position, he tailors certain Christian teachings to suit his agnostic utilitarian doctrine, viewing each as complementary.<sup>13</sup> On the other hand, JPII tempers this insight with Christian teaching manifest in the First Commandment, and ultimately views utilitarianism and Christianity as incompatible doctrines.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, what appear as complementary philosophies to a utilitarian appear as contradictory to a Christian-Catholic. Here, therefore, are two separate interpretations of Christian teaching on pleasure.

The purpose of this essay is twofold. The first is to serve as a short accompaniment to both *Utilitarianism* and to JPII's critique of the utilitarian doctrine, found in *Love and Responsibility*, with a particular focus on "Chapter I: The Person and the Drive: Part One: Analysis of the Verb 'to use'". Large portions of this essay are dedicated to quoting, summarizing, and paraphrasing portions of each text so that the principles of *Utilitarianism* and *Love & Responsibility* might be compared side by side. Extracts have been simplified to achieve one of this paper's primary goals – to render Mill and JPII's work more accessible to 21st century Western readers and to younger audiences.

The second purpose is to examine each philosopher's interpretation of the Biblical Commandment to Love, and to help readers better understand how each philosopher views pleasure and its purpose. Because Christianity, the Commandment to Love, pleasure, and, most importantly, creating a stable, well-functioning society based on the highest moral virtue are

topics critical to each philosophy, the term *eden*, which etymologically translates to “fertile pleasure park”, will be used intermittently as a suitable allegory through which to examine each philosophy – for on a fundamental level, each philosopher proposes what they believe to be the best means of achieving an Edenic society.<sup>15</sup> Through Mill’s utilitarian-Christian lens, and through close examination of *Utilitarianism*, it would appear that, for Mill, Eden is ultimately achieved by focusing on one’s self – maximization of one’s personal experience of pleasure, minimization of one’s personal experience of pain. Through JP II’s Christian lens, Eden is achievable by first focusing on honouring God, which subsequently leads to honouring others – maximizing love, selfless giving, and community – not to ensure greater pleasure or less pain, but to ensure that the dignity of all is honoured and affirmed.

Hence, this paper expands on and extrapolates from JP II’s work, as seen in Chapter I, Part One of *Love and Responsibility* – that is, to understand the Commandment to Love from a Christian perspective, and to examine how a Christian would perceive a Mill-utilitarian’s understanding of the Commandment.<sup>16</sup> This essay also seeks to examine Mill’s *Utilitarianism* from a utilitarian’s perspective, and how someone of Mill’s persuasion would perceive a Christian view of the Commandment.

To further narrow our focus, this paper accepts JP II’s belief that society is only as strong as its smallest units, that is, marriage and family.<sup>17</sup> Thus, generally, each philosophy will be applied and examined in the context of practical marital and familial circumstances. Through this lens, this paper asserts that the aim of each philosophy is to ensure that marriages and families are properly equipped to work toward an Edenic state of happiness.

From these insights proceed the arguments of this paper.

The thesis – on matters of first principles, Mill and JII share some crucial insights; to the untrained eye, these may be perceived as synonymous. Each philosopher sees the value of pleasure, of utility, of happiness. Even JPII openly acknowledges that use, which is often framed in opposition to Christian love, is an unavoidable factor in (married) love. The key differential lies in each philosopher’s interpretation of the Commandment to Love.

Part 2 offers five opening statements. Firstly, despite differences in era and disciplinary background, both philosophers share the view that human beings are inclined toward utilitarianism. Secondly, JPII’s critique of utilitarianism applies mainly to hedonistic utilitarianism, but also to the incongruous nature of hedonistic and personalistic utilitarianism, which Mill champions. Thirdly, regarding first principles, according to Mill, all action and therefore all morality is oriented toward the Greatest Happiness Principle. In contrast, according to JPII, in human relationships, all are called to subordinate a desire for pleasure and for pain’s mitigation to the protection of each person’s inalienable dignity.<sup>18</sup> From this conclusion, one can assert that, fourthly, each philosopher conceives of the mind’s limits differently. For Mill, people cannot reason beyond considerations for pleasure and pain; for JPII, people can reason beyond these considerations and can prioritize human dignity.

Fifthly, both Mill and JPII believe that humans are geared toward social communion, but each hold different views on how humans should achieve social communion. While Mill explains what people should do with this inclination, JPII explains the source from which this inclination stems; in accounting for this source, JPII then addresses the ‘what’. Sixth and finally, Mill strongly rebukes the moral elasticity of Kant’s *first principle*, as expressed in his *Metaphysics of Ethics*, whereas JPII strongly values the moral rightness of Kant’s *elementary*

*principle*, as expressed in Kant's *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*.<sup>19</sup> Each use their respective interpretations of Kant's primary principle to prove and or build their philosophies.

Parts 3 and 5 explore each philosopher's view and or interpretation of pleasure, utility, human dignity, and the Commandment to Love. On the one hand, Mill equates love with pleasure. For Mill, the 'Commandment to Love' translates to the 'Commandment to Pleasure'. To achieve an Edenic society, one must ensure that the greatest number of people secure the greatest amount of life's pleasure. In marriage, therefore, and in marital intimacy, one's focus must be to maximize personal pleasure, and, more importantly, one's spouse's pleasure. Selfless acts are fundamentally motivated by fear of pain and harm. On the other hand, JPII states that love and pleasure are entirely separate realities. For JPII (and indeed, for the Church), the Commandment to Love is the Commandment to Self-Sacrifice. To achieve Eden, one must affirm the innate dignity and worth of each human person. This experience may involve a great amount of pleasure – and or pain – for the doer and receiver of the (potential) action. In marriage, therefore, specifically in marital intimacy, the aim is to affirm one's spouse's dignity and worth by focusing on the person, not the accompanying feelings. Truly selfless acts are fundamentally motivated by a desire to serve and sacrifice for others by honouring others' innate, God-imaging dignity. This act in turn honours God, and therefore fulfills the call of Christianity's First Commandment.

Part 4 examines the objective and subjective structures supporting each moral order. On the one hand, Mill offers an objective moral order rooted in the subjective standard of personal happiness. What a person is inclined toward achieving, that is, pleasure, freedom from pain, determines who the human person is and what the moral standard is, which in turn determines what a human person should do. On the other hand, JPII offers an objective moral order rooted

in objectivity (rooted in the human person's unique, unrepeatable, distinct, rational identity, possessing free will, and endowed with self-determination). Therefore, who a human person is defines what they should do and how they should interact with others. Mill considers the objective-subjective nature of his philosophy to be a strength, for subjective standards ensure that a person's personal liberty is justly respected. JPII considers the objective-objective nature of his philosophy to be a strength, for it ensures consistent respect for all people's innate and equal dignity. Mill believes that objective-objective standards, that is, constant standards, *general propositions* and *axiomatic truths* as he calls them, lead to false conclusions and society's disintegration; on the other hand, JPII believes that objective-subjective standards, that is, inconstant standards of that which constitutes pleasure and pain corrupted by fallen human nature, lead to false conclusions and harm of the human person.<sup>20</sup>

Part 6 examines the basic 'mathematical' and 'economic' principles undergirding each philosopher's view of the Commandment and of pleasure. The first of two arguments – the constant value in Mill's equation is 'experience' – that is, an experience of pleasure or of pain. Given that no two experiences are alike, Mill's 'constant' is, by nature, inconstant. The constant value in JPII's 'equation' is the innate dignity of the human person, which is not situationally dependent or subject to change, but ever-present. Therefore, JPII's constant value is, by nature, constant. The second of two arguments – Mill's focus is addition, that is, adding to personal pleasures by giving of one's life, which in turn leads to happiness. On the other hand, JPII's focus is subtraction – giving of oneself, losing one's life, not because it is pleasurable but because others should have their dignity affirmed regardless of the pleasure or pain involved; the (personal) fulfilment resulting thereof must be considered collateral and not made the purpose of a person's choice to behave benevolently. Despite the usual positive connotations associated



with constancy and addition, and despite the usual negative connotations associated with inconstancy and subtraction, each philosopher considers their own philosophy's 'mathematical' foundation to be a strength, a positive life-force, in their philosophical 'equation'.

Part 7 examines some extra-textual views of each philosopher to provide added insight into their core principles. On the one hand, Mill holds that happiness must be found *by the way*.<sup>21</sup> Practically speaking, this requires that one make it their ideal end to make others happy (as opposed to oneself), the consequence of which is one's own personal happiness. The Mill-utilitarian goal, therefore, is not personal happiness – rather, it is to ensure others' happiness; in living for others' fulfillment, so too is one's own happiness assured. Similarly, JP II holds that people are both *made* and *rightly thirst* for happiness, but that *true happiness* comes from suffering for the sake of another, forgoing concerns for one's own pleasure and mitigation of pain to strengthen relationships, create new life, allow others to determine their own ends, and to affirm another's dignity.<sup>22</sup> Therefore, the ideal end is the human person, not personal happiness, nor necessarily the happiness of others. This principle is rooted in Christ's invitation to his followers to take up their Cross, to accept and to bear the sufferings to which he calls each individually, and to follow him through to the resurrection, which in turn leads to eternal union with God; through the Cross, through dying to selfishness and committing to give, humanity is reunified with its *final end*, the Creator.<sup>23</sup> Thus, JP II holds that God is Love, and that spousal love is an eternal act of self-gift imaged in marriage and family. Continuing Christ's mission to spread peace in this way is the world's best chance at achieving greater social harmony.<sup>24</sup>

Finally, Part 8, which examines each philosophy's conception of the supernatural, argues that the degree to which one values one philosophy over another is dependent on their belief in the existence of the Christian God. On the one hand, Mill seeks to achieve the greatest amount

of social unity on earth as possible. Given his agnosticism and his appreciation for some Christian principles, he is skeptical of God's existence and of heaven's. He believes it possible to appropriate religious values, to apply them effectively, without 'God' and without 'grace', each of which, to Christians, are required without question for genuine application of the Commandment. On the other hand, JPII echoes Christ's call to "store up treasures in heaven" rather than on earth because he is certain of both God's and heaven's existence – he therefore teaches the value of forsaking mere inclination toward the utilitarian mentality.<sup>25</sup> At the heart of JPII's philosophy, therefore, is firm belief in God and in Catholic-Christian teaching, for God and love are synonymous. To love one's neighbour is to "God one's neighbour", therefore, God is inseparable from the Commandment to Love. The Second Commandment cannot exist or occur without the First.

There are two practical reasons for investing time in reading this paper. Firstly – utilitarianism and Christianity are philosophies fundamental to Western thought. Each bear great relevance in an age where, generally speaking, Christian values, beliefs, attitudes, and terminology either slip into the subtext of cultural and social morality, or are subsumed in the undercurrent of a utilitarian mentality, reinterpreted through secular lenses, and lose their original Christian resonance. While a Westerner may believe that they are applying a somewhat 'universal' and objectively true definition of love to their spousal and familial relationships, they are likely applying either a utilitarian mindset or a Christian mindset – not a melding of the two, as Mill proposes, but actually two entirely separate understandings of Christian teaching – hence mass marital breakdown.<sup>26</sup>

Secondly – few scholars have written extensively on Mill's *Utilitarianism* in specific relation to JPII's *Love and Responsibility* with this particular topic in mind. This is unfortunate

because the coexistence of these two contrasting, if not opposing, philosophies cause great social tension. Many a Christian or utilitarian-Christian believe that they are working toward the same goal under a similar doctrinal domain, when in truth, they are working toward opposite goals, driven by separate motivations. These misconceptions and miscommunications are, of course, silent, lethal impediments to both understanding and agreeing on a range of important subjects of moral and ethical debate. It is critical that subscribers to each philosophy understand the moral implications of applying the fundamental principles one philosophical mindset over the other – for as each philosopher attests, there are hugely positive or hugely negative social ramifications for misunderstanding, misapplying, and or discounting either philosophy. Thus, for the good of society, this problem necessitates further examination and social education.

Generally, this essay begins by introducing insights from Mill's *Utilitarianism* in a similar order to their original presentation and follows with counterarguments and insights derived from JPII's *Love and Responsibility*, with a specific focus on JPII's critiques of the utilitarian doctrine. This structure is in place for the following two reasons. Firstly, *Love & Responsibility* was published after and in response to the writings of famous utilitarians, including Mill's *Utilitarianism*. This sequencing respects and accounts for chronology. Secondly, though no less thoughtful or well-argued, and although *Love and Responsibility* is much larger than *Utilitarianism*, the space that JPII specifically devotes to his critique of utilitarianism is much smaller than Mill's *Utilitarianism*. In this way, the text with the greater amount of content has been given organizational primacy.

## 2: Comparative Overview

On first principles, John Stuart Mill and John Paul II's philosophies share some crucial insights that may seem synonymous. Both see the value of pleasure, of utility, of happiness; JP II even acknowledges that utility, which is often framed in opposition to love, is an unavoidable factor in married love. The most important difference, however, is their differing interpretation of the Biblical First and Second Commandments, the Second of which JP II terms the Commandment to Love (and which Mill refers to in the well-known term, "The Golden Rule").

On the one hand, Mill's *Utilitarianism* comes from the philosophical tradition – deductive reasoning, abstractions, and utilitarianism with a strong Benthamite influence, along with the added influence of economics, politics, and the sciences.<sup>27</sup> On the other hand, JP II's *Love and Responsibility* stems from the Biblical literary and philosophical tradition. His arguments are founded in Christ's and the Church's teachings, Biblical logic, experiential knowledge, science, psychology, anthropology, theology. Despite different disciplinary backgrounds and the texts being published a hundred years apart, Mill and JP II's definitions of utilitarianism are similar, as are their views on humankind's propensity toward it. Mill argues that regardless of their protestations, people of all moral backgrounds ground their *lived* moral doctrine in Happiness theory; utility is humankind's principle motivation, whether knowingly, unknowingly, or denyingly.<sup>28</sup> Similarly, JP II characterizes utilitarianism as a "certain theoretical notion in ethics as well as a practical program in conduct" whose lifestyle, *attitude*, and *mentality* have existed since the dawn of man.<sup>29</sup> Thus, despite the dissimilar influences of both time period and disciplinary backgrounds, each hold similar definitions of utilitarianism and conclude that humanity is naturally inclined toward the utilitarian mentality. (There is, however, a grave difference between *concluding* and *condoning*, as this paper will discuss).

As to the particular versions of utilitarianism to which each philosopher refers, JP II's *Love and Responsibility* is not a direct critique of Mill's *Utilitarianism* – rather, it examines classical or *hedonistic* forms of utilitarianism in general “insofar as [they allow] treating the human person instrumentally and reductively”, that is, as a mere means to a useful and pleasurable end.<sup>30</sup> Additionally, *Love and Responsibility* does not concern *personalistic* utilitarianism, which treats the person as an end in and of themselves.<sup>31</sup> This is, in part, what renders comparison of *Love and Responsibility* to *Utilitarianism* most interesting – for Mill does not strictly qualify as a hedonistic utilitarian. Instead, his denomination falls under several different branches of utilitarianism, including act utilitarianism, ideal-hedonistic utilitarianism, normative utilitarianism, and, most notably, personalistic utilitarianism.<sup>32</sup> By Mill's standards, this synergetic mix is complementary. By JP II's standards and as he states in his critique, pairing hedonism and personalism qualifies as a peculiar impossibility, for “a morally good act requires the goodness of all its sources together, namely of the object, of the end, and of the circumstances, including the consequences”, an ethical belief quite contrary to that of Mill's.<sup>33</sup> For JP II, all parts preceding, including, and following an action - *attitude, intention*, “action in conformity with conscience”, and consequence, possess moral value.<sup>34</sup> Therefore, JP II's critique of utilitarianism applies namely to hedonistic utilitarianism, but also to the incongruous nature of hedonistic and personalistic utilitarianism, which Mill champions.

The opening pages of *Utilitarianism* mark Mill's purposes in writing. First, he intends to end centuries of ethical debate over which moral theory holds reality's one, almighty, objective moral standard. Second, he will examine how humans of varying moral and ethical persuasions perceive truth; third, he will differentiate between right and wrong, and fourth, he will establish the singular motivation driving human action under which all other motivations fall. Beginning

with the assertion that all actions are oriented toward achieving a certain end, Mill concludes that “[happiness and the mitigation of pain is], according to the utilitarian opinion, the [ultimate] end of [all] human action”, and that as the ultimate end, it is therefore “the standard of morality”; he further argues that global adoption of this principle, whereby each work to ensure others’ happiness, will result in universal happiness.<sup>35</sup> Mill labels human orientation toward happiness and the mitigation of pain as the *Greatest Happiness Principle*.

JPII’s general aim is similar in so far as he outlines an objective moral order for the proper function of marriages and families, the microcosmic expression of society at large, for it is his belief that “as the family goes, so goes the nation, and so goes the whole world in which we live.”<sup>36</sup> He further argues that because *conjugal morality*, the topic of *Love and Responsibility*, is a facet of *sexual morality*, and that because sexual morality is a key facet of male-female *interaction* and *coexistence*, so too do these principles benefit the *fundamental good* of humanity.<sup>37</sup> Therefore, according to *Love and Responsibility*’s core argument as it relates to the *Second Commandment*, wherever the human person is concerned, all are called by God to subordinate themselves to upholding the inalienable dignity of others above self-focused considerations.<sup>38</sup>

JPII’s argument regarding the harmful nature of classical, hedonistic utilitarianism, however, does not lie with Mill’s assertion that actions are oriented toward a specific end – rather, JPII challenges Mill’s notion that human actions are always oriented toward happiness, and that they cannot be oriented any other way. While Mill uses human behaviour to deduce the objective moral order, JPII precedes all discussion of human behaviour with a theological, ontological anthropology of the human person; this he uses to establish an objective moral order. He states: man, both subject and object of action, is distinctly human in either case.<sup>39</sup> More



specifically, man, being human, is dignified as a unique, unrepeatable, distinct, rational, objective subject, possessing an interior (spiritual) life that is fully equipped with “the power of self-determination”.<sup>40</sup> Thus, in being fully human and inherently dignified, and in being the subject of others’ actions, man must be treated according to certain moral principles.<sup>41</sup> It is within humanity’s power to treat a person in accordance with these principles, which also means that it is possible to orient one’s actions toward ends other than happiness. For JP II, this general principle applies to the realm of sexual intercourse, whereby the woman and the man are constant objects of each others’ actions.<sup>42</sup> Thus, “[t]o present precisely this structure of man, of a man and a woman, within the totality of their vocation to reciprocal love, is the main task of [*Love and Responsibility*].”<sup>43</sup>

By contrasting these two aims, we discover that each philosopher conceives of the mind’s limits in different ways. In Mill’s view, it is not possible to act in any way unrelated to or to be motivated by something other than (personal, group) happiness and a desire to be free from pain. In contrast, JP II holds that the mind possesses the creative potential to prioritize the innate dignity of the human person above one’s desire to obtain (personal, group) happiness and freedom from pain. Thus, Mill argues that all things are accountable to Happiness theory, and JP II argues that the mind is both capable of rising above feeling and of prioritizing human dignity and self-sacrifice over Happiness theory. These conceptions of humanity’s creative limitations colour each philosopher view of human potential, human motives, human action, the consequences resulting from them, and the moral implications thereof. Brief though this insight may be, its impact is far-ranging, as this section seeks to demonstrate.

On human relationships and society, Mill believes that human reasoning, whether inductive or deductive, is responsible for determining the moral order. He also holds that

humans possess a socially conditioned, natural desire to be in communion.<sup>44</sup> He does not, however, explain why humans are capable of being molded to harbour this socially constructed, inborn tendency; he only explains how human beings become aware of this need, and how they are trained to value it. In contrast, JPII's philosophy does explain where this need comes from by nature of the fact that he relies on Christian teachings on human, natural and supernatural realities. Ontologically speaking, JPII asserts that humanity is created for a certain purpose, that is, community, for "man, being an image of God, cannot find himself unless through a sincere gift of self in the communion of persons."<sup>45</sup> In this way, each philosopher holds that humans innately value social communion – Mill explains what people should do with this inclination, and JPII explains both where this inclination comes from and what should be done with it.

It would be imprudent to close Part 2 without briefly addressing the major impact of Immanuel Kant's work on each philosophy. Though Kant's name is mentioned sparingly throughout each text, his insights act as a catalyst for each philosophy's formation. While Mill held Kant in high regard, finding him to be an *illustrious* and *remarkable man*, whose genius would range far beyond the era in which he wrote, he disliked Kant's work very much, and did not shy from communicating his distaste in the earliest chapter of *Utilitarianism*.<sup>46</sup> In Mill's view, it was the weakness of popular philosophies like those of Kant and *a priori* moralists that necessitate the utilitarian doctrine.<sup>47</sup> Quoting from Kant's *Metaphysics of Ethics* (otherwise known as *Metaphysics of Morals*), Mill states: Application of Kant's *universal first principle*, "So act, that the rule on which thou actest would admit of being adopted as a law by all rational beings", does not discourage society from embracing an immoral doctrine which will lead to the most morally illicit "rules of conduct" ever beheld.<sup>48</sup> In discrediting Kant and like philosophers, Mill proposes Happiness theory as a replacement.<sup>49</sup> In Chapter 5 of *Utilitarianism* Mill even

goes so far as to revise Kant's *universal first principle* to the following: "[W]e ought to shape our conduct by a rule which all rational beings might adopt *with benefit to their collective interest*."<sup>50</sup> In reshaping Kant's work to suit his iteration of the utilitarian doctrine, Mill argues that Kant's universal law, which benefits doers to the displeasure or harm of those impacted, is wrong, and that one must always have the greater good in mind – again, a bold argument for his time, given Kant's popularity.<sup>51</sup>

In contrast, JPII held both Kant and Kant's work in high esteem, so high in fact that he too reshapes Kant's moral imperative to suit his own philosophy. The main difference, however, is that JPII used Kant's work as a foundational aspect of his philosophy, in contrast to Mill's disparaging and discrediting it. Interestingly, assuming that JPII's term *elementary principle of the moral order* is equivalent to Mill's term *first principle*, it would appear that each philosopher perceives of Kant's core principle differently.<sup>52</sup> Using Kant's *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, as opposed to Kant's *Metaphysics of Morals*, the text from which Mill quotes, JPII aims to correct the *perennial* utilitarian mentality to establish "the natural moral order".<sup>53</sup> He leads with the following assertions: each person, possessing both free will and the ability to think, is naturally and interiorly (spiritually) capable of determining their own end.<sup>54</sup> Therefore, a person "can undertake, without harm to himself, a role of, or even serve unknowingly a function of 'a means to an end'".<sup>55</sup> This end must be "truly good, for striving for evil ends is contrary to the rational nature of the person."<sup>56</sup> However, the end of the other person in this interaction must in every case be good and honourable, and "put the person's inalienable value before [the] end [s/he] strives for".<sup>57</sup> In contrast, to use another solely or *merely* as a means to an end obstructs their *natural right* and thus violates "the nature of the person" – this must not be done.<sup>58</sup>

From these conclusions, JP II revises Kant's *elementary principle* from, “Act in such a way so that the person is never a mere means of your action, but always an end”, to –

Whenever the person is an object of action in your conduct, remember that you may not treat him merely as a means to an end, as a tool, but [you must] take into account that the person himself has or at least should have his end.” This principle thus formulated stands at the basis of every properly comprehended freedom of man, especially freedom of conscience.<sup>59</sup>

This revised edition of Kant's *elementary principle* is what JP II uses to discredit and expose the incompatibility of personalistic and utilitarian ethics (see Part 5 for analysis).<sup>60</sup> Given that this reshaped iteration of Kant's *elementary principle* plays a most significant role in the formulation of JP II's own core principles and his critique of utilitarianism, and given that Kant's work acts as a driving force behind Mill's creation of *Utilitarianism*, it is important to note that this key source of inspiration for each philosopher is rooted in two very different interpretations of the core of Kant's moral doctrine. Mill's understanding of Kant's moral imperative results in society's collapse; JP II's understanding of Kant's revised moral imperative results in society's betterment. This apparent discrepancy merits further research and could very well constitute its own research paper with an aim to determine the philosopher who had 'rightly' interpreted Kant, or the reasons behind their two different understandings of his work. For the purpose of this thesis, however, this discussion has been limited to the following conclusions: firstly, JP II strongly values the moral rightness of Kant's elementary principle; secondly, Mill strongly rebukes the moral elasticity of Kant's first principle; thirdly, each use Kant's 'first' principle to build on and or prove the necessity of their arguments. Such is the extent of our analysis of Kant's impact on each text.

The major conclusions of this section, therefore, are as follows: firstly, neither the time period nor the disciplinary background from which each philosophy stems affect either

philosopher's definition of utilitarianism, nor their argument that human beings are inclined toward utilitarianism. Secondly, JP II's critique of utilitarianism applies primarily to hedonistic utilitarianism, but also to the incongruous nature of hedonistic and personalistic utilitarianism, which Mill champions. Thirdly, Mill holds that all action and therefore all morality is oriented toward the Greatest Happiness Principle – in contrast, in accordance with the (Second) Commandment to Love, JP II holds that in human relationships, all are called to subordinate a desire for pleasure and pain's mitigation to the protection of each person's inalienable dignity.<sup>61</sup> From this conclusion, fourthly, each philosopher conceives of the mind's limits differently – for Mill, people cannot think outside concerns related to happiness and unhappiness, and for JP II, the human person and the human mind is made in God's image and is therefore capable of subordinating concerns for feelings and experiences to the principle of human dignity.

Fifthly, both Mill and JP II believe that humans are inclined toward social communion. While Mill explains what people should do with this inclination, JP II explains the source from which this inclination stems (God); in accounting for the source, he then proposes how humans should act in accordance with God's laws. Sixth and finally, Mill strongly rebukes the moral elasticity of Kant's *first* principle, as expressed in Kant's *Metaphysics of Ethics*, whereas JP II strongly values the moral rightness of Kant's *elementary* principle, as expressed in Kant's *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Each use their respective interpretations of Kant's primary principle to build on and or prove their philosophies.

To lay the groundwork for the remainder of this paper, and, in preparation for analyzing each philosopher's different understanding of Christ's Commandment to Love, and the impact of the First Commandment on the Second, one must begin by analyzing each philosopher's conception of utility, pleasure, dignity, and the role that each play in human relationships.

### **3: Prioritizing Utility and Pleasure, or Human Dignity**

Human dignity is to JPII what pleasure and utility are to Mill, that is, sacred to society's effectual, morally licit function. By defining and comparing what each of these terms – pleasure, utility, and human dignity – mean to both philosophers, the role that these realities play in constructing their respective moral orders, and their practical implications in human relationships, what is brought to light are the differences in their opposing interpretations of the Commandment to Love, and thus the implications for following one philosophical roadmap toward a more Edenic state of social unity over the other.

In Mill's case, because pleasure, the moral arbiter of all consequence, independent of all qualification, is inherently moral, human dignity, which is also a moral good, is complementary to pleasure. More specifically, higher pleasures and (personal) happiness cannot conflict with or fail to uphold and respect the sanctity of human dignity. Additionally, a person's sense of dignity is measurable based on the kinds of pleasures in which they choose to engage, therefore, a person's sense of dignity and their innate dignity are subject pleasure (happiness, utility) for their moral value. For JPII, however, in the context of human relationships, pleasure is not the moral standard. In reverse of Mill's perspective, pleasure is subject to human dignity. A given pleasure's moral quality depends on its ability to affirm human dignity, thus, while the desire for pleasure and utility, at times, complement human dignity, and at other times, they are at total odds with it. Therefore, what Mill holds to be both morally righteous and compatible in all cases by way of the pleasure principle, JPII holds that instances of complementarity are case dependent, whose moral quality is determined based on Christian notions of human dignity. To each other, each would consider the other to be missing elements critical to living a socially respectable and beneficial, morally upstanding existence.



We begin by analyzing Mill's definition of happiness, found at the opening of *Utilitarianism's* Chapter 2, which gives readers a clear and practical understanding of Mill's definition of moral rightness. For Mill, happiness, the prime moral virtue, is the first principle on which all actions depend upon for their moral value. An object's usefulness and the pleasures it provides – including enjoyment of beauty, ornament, amusement, and the satisfaction of momentary pleasures – in conjunction with exemption from pain, are all critical components of Happiness Theory.<sup>62</sup> Mill follows with the utilitarian creed:

The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure.<sup>63</sup>

Here, the terms *moral*, *utility*, and *the Greatest Happiness Principle* are used to describe the term *utilitarian*. Hence, *utilitarian* becomes somewhat synonymous with not only *Happiness Theory*, but also with *morality*, *utility*, and *the Greatest Happiness*. To that end, to live as a utilitarian is to pursue *the Greatest Happiness*, to have gained utility, to be moral, to be happy and to seek happiness, as well as to mitigate pain, unhappiness, the loss of utility, and immorality.

Mill further defines *happiness* and *unhappiness* according to the utilitarian doctrine: “By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure”.<sup>64</sup> In this way, happiness is equated with pleasure, and unhappiness is equated with pain. One is happy if they are experiencing pleasure, and one is unhappy if they are experiencing pain. It is not possible to be happy while experiencing pain, and it is not possible to be unhappy while experiencing pleasure, for “pain is always heterogeneous with pleasure.”<sup>65</sup> Morally speaking then, experiencing intellectual, physical (or even spiritual), pleasure would constitute a moral good. Experiencing intellectual, physical, or spiritual pain would constitute a

moral evil. Thus, happiness, which is moral, is always equal to pleasure, and unhappiness, which is immoral, is always equal to pain.

To achieve happiness, Mill recommends actions that *promote* or *produce* pleasure, and not pain.<sup>66</sup> Given that happiness is equated with what is moral, and unhappiness with what is immoral, an action must therefore depend upon its consequence to derive its morally licit or illicit nature; a consequence must be pleasurable for utility to be gained, and, for the act to be morally right.<sup>67</sup> Additionally, the action must not result in pain; pain must be absent from the outcome to ensure pleasure, happiness, and moral rightness.<sup>68</sup> Thus, a certain feeling, a certain consequence, felt by the recipient of the action, qualifies as moral or immoral. Therefore, to be utilitarian or to live well as a utilitarian, is to have pursued *the Greatest Happiness*, to have achieved this happiness, to have gained utility, to have experienced pleasure, and to have experienced the least pain and unhappiness possible; together, this constitutes the most morally righteous and only desirable experience for anyone to champion, pursue, and achieve.<sup>69</sup> In sum, Happiness theory holds that people are innately oriented toward that which is good, and are opposed to that which is evil. Happiness is, therefore, the moral arbiter of good and evil.

Few definitions of right and of wrong, of pleasure and of pain could ever be more specific than those that Mill provides in the following excerpt. For Mill, that which constitutes pleasure and pain depends on each person's personal tastes: "what things it includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure; and to what extent this is left an open question."<sup>70</sup> This leaves a great deal of interpretation, (moral) elasticity, and personal liberty to utilitarians. In this way, each may form the utilitarian doctrine in whatever way they wish, in whatever manner suits their specific, personalized, customizable needs and wants. Thus, the doctrine of utilitarianism is, in practice, a

self-made, self-gearred, and self-directed morality, subject to personal sensibilities, tastes, and practices. Good and evil are therefore somewhat open to an individual's interpretation.

As detailed in subsequent pages, what follows are statements which run quite contrary to JPPII's ethics as discussed in *Love and Responsibility's* Chapter I, Part One under the subheading "Critique of Utilitarianism". Mill plainly states "that pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends", a statement which, on a sensory level, makes practical sense in and of itself, but which is reinforced when one considers that, according to Mill, pleasure is equal to moral good, and pain to moral evil.<sup>71</sup> Mill emboldens the separation between right and wrong by stating that pleasures and pains are ranked in proportion to the degree that they cause (or help to cause) pleasure, and or mitigate (or help to mitigate) pain.<sup>72</sup> To illustrate the importance of effectively anticipating the moral quality of an action's outcome (that is, the pleasure gained and pain mitigated), Mill argues that in even in extreme cases, heroes and martyrs must sacrifice their lives for the greater happiness of a greater number of persons (or, to ensure that none will ever ensure the same pain again), and that sacrifices for any other reason are wasteful and unnecessary.<sup>73</sup> Thus, that which is (or leads to) a pleasant experience, a pleasant feeling, a pleasant consequence of an action, preferably the most pleasurable of outcomes, and only that which prevents (or leads to the prevention of) a pain-free experience, feeling, or consequence, preferably the least painful of outcomes, constitute both desirable and morally righteous consequences.

As Chapter 2 of *Utilitarianism* dives deeper into addressing the differences between good and evil, pleasure and pain, the topic of human dignity begins to emerge amongst Mill's discussion of what this paper terms the *pleasure hierarchy*. While the topic of human dignity plays a heavy role in the formation of JPPII's philosophy and is the very factor that causes JPPII to

take grave issue with the utilitarian (hedonistic) mindset, for Mill, this topic is discussed very little. In fact, the term *dignity* is mentioned only once throughout all of *Utilitarianism*. While Mill's use of this term is not an exact match to JPII's – for Mill speaks of people's *sense* of personal dignity as opposed to humans possessing an innate dignity independent of one's conscious knowledge of it – this difference accomplishes this paper's purpose in keenly distinguishing between each philosophy, for as is later demonstrated, JPII expresses grave concern that dignity is a sorely neglected consideration of the hedonistic utilitarian mentality.<sup>74</sup>

Building on his previous statements regarding pleasure's inherent morally righteous quality, Mill leads by asserting that pleasures should be ranked according to the quality of the experience; a *caveat* to this decision making process is that the ranking must be established regardless of one's *moral obligation*.<sup>75</sup> By Mill's own admission therefore, it would seem that this ranking has the potential to be immoral (according to non-utilitarian standards), a concession which, as will soon be discussed, presents a very thick philosophical, theological barrier between Mill's *Utilitarianism* and JPII's *Love and Responsibility* on the subject of human dignity.

With these parameters set, Mill proposes that humans are innately inclined to choose higher, intellectual pleasures over lower, sensate, animalistic, hedonistic pleasures, thus defying categorization as a strictly hedonistic utilitarian.<sup>76</sup> He further asserts that a quality pleasure is always chosen over a large quantity of pleasure, and that no sane or intelligent individual, having tasted the higher, and having comparing it to the lower, would willingly settle for “a lower grade of existence” (this with the exception of those experiencing such severe unhappiness that any slightly less painful existence is preferable).<sup>77</sup> In this way, Mill argues that the human capacity to rationalize will, in any normal case, always lead to choosing a greater good over a lesser good – thus, those who know what is good and better, truer, more pleasurable, and more valuable,

cannot help but choose it. Simply put, humanity is instinctively predisposed toward choosing what is a 'greater good'.<sup>78</sup> Therefore, Mill holds that the pleasures complement human rational and do not degrade or defile it, and that higher pleasures more strongly complement it than those that are lower.

As for the reasons compelling a person to choose one particular good (pleasure) over another, these vary. Mill states that higher pleasure may be chosen out of pride, or *love of liberty*, or power or excitement – the chief reason that the higher are chosen, however, is born out of an innate “sense of [one’s own human] dignity”, for that which is desirable is only so if it affirms that dignity, thus, Mill’s belief that dignity and higher pleasures, which are most moral, are innately compatible.<sup>79</sup> Mill states:

...but its most appropriate appellation is a sense of dignity, which all human beings possess in one form or other, and in some, though by no means in exact, proportion to their higher faculties, and which is so essential a part of the happiness of those in whom it is strong, that nothing which conflicts with it could be, otherwise than momentarily, an object of desire to them.<sup>80</sup>

In this way, for Mill, those with a strong sense of dignity – a sense which, generally speaking, is more accessible to those who are of greater intelligence – do not choose to engage in lower pleasures that do not as strongly affirm this sense. (Lower pleasures, therefore, are not immoral – they are, however, less refined and dignified). The obvious qualification Mill makes is that a person’s “sense of dignity” corresponds to their level of intelligence: “a sense of dignity, which all human beings possess in one form or other, and in some, though by no means in exact, proportion to their higher faculties...”.<sup>81</sup> Given that one’s sense of dignity corresponds to intelligence, Mill states, the being of an inferior intellect (those possessing a lower sense of personal dignity), will be easily satisfied, while the being with the superior intellect (those who have a greater sense of dignity) will find every happiness somewhat wanting due to their greater

wisdom, understanding, and knowledge of, for example, all the pleasures to be had.<sup>82</sup> In sum, a person's sense of dignity and the pleasures in which they choose to engage correspond to their level of intelligence. It is better to be wise, to be rational, to have a deeper sense of dignity, and to be empty of fulfillment, than to be an ignorant, satiated pig, with a shallow sense of dignity – “better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.”<sup>83</sup> In connection with this section's discussion of moral good and moral evil, once the more pleasurable, dignity-affirming good is chosen over the lower good, so too is the greater moral good chosen, and thus one's dignity more greatly honoured. Therefore, those with a greater sense of dignity also have a greater understanding of moral good and moral evil, and act in accordance with their inclination toward what is ‘good’. (Consequently, they also have a deeper understanding of what it means to “love one's neighbour as oneself” – more on this in Part 5).

For JP II, however, dignity is not a small topic of discussion, but the basis for the moral maxims he presents to remedy what he considers to be utilitarianism's failings. From *Love and Responsibility's* outset, and as established in Part 1 of this paper, JP II argues that human beings are, without question and in every instance, innately dignified – unique, unrepeatable, distinct, rational, objective subject, possessing an interior (spiritual) life fully capable of *self-determination* – conclusions that set a stark contrast to Mill's primary focus on pleasure being the moral arbiter and affirmer of goodness.<sup>84</sup> Expanding on Christian teaching, JP II states that each human person, fully dignified, necessitates respect regardless of intelligence, regardless of one's personal tastes, disposition toward pleasure and pain, and so forth.<sup>85</sup> Therefore, interacting with another human person, becoming the subject of their actions or vice-versa, requires a moral code – not one that is open to interpretation or customizable to personal tastes and sensibilities.<sup>86</sup>

This, he argues, is particularly pertinent where people become subjects of action in the sexual realm, particularly in marriages and families, the microcosmic expression of society.<sup>87</sup>

JPII demonstrates sympathy for aspects of utilitarianism. To start, he acknowledges that the utilitarian standard (where one seeks pleasure, avoids pain, and ranks pleasures and pains according to their personal tastes), *seems* morally *right, attractive*, rational, and compatible with human instinct.<sup>88</sup> Like Mill, JPII also holds that people are oriented toward what is good – “[S]triving for evil ends is contrary to the rational nature of the person. ... The point is precisely to seek true ends, that is, true goods as ends of action, and to find and show ways for their realization.”<sup>89</sup> Despite somewhat similar positions on these points, in direct contrast to an act utilitarian such as Mill, JPII argues that all parts preceding, including, and following an action – that is, *attitude, intention*, “action in conformity with conscience”, and consequence – possess moral value.<sup>90</sup> While a utilitarian judges what can be seen to determine moral quality, God judges what is unseen – “God does not see as human beings see; they look at appearances but Yahweh looks at the heart.”<sup>91</sup> Therefore, for JPII, not only do good and evil exist outside the realm of human action and human consequence, they also exist outside the realm of human beings and human consciousness. Moreover, negative and positive consequences can occur without their ever having a known pleasurable or painful effect on any human person or any sentient being. Thus, for JPII, immoral behaviour exists beyond the known or unknown consequences of human action. In this way, JPII’s definitions of *good, evil*, and all they encompass are far different than Mill’s.

On the subject of good and evil, and in contrast to Mill, JPII does not consider pleasure to be the moral standard. Rather, he holds Happiness theory to be an illogical means of ascertaining right from wrong, for as he states, pleasure “in its essence is something collateral,

accidental, something that may occur when acting”, therefore, “undertaking to act for the sake of pleasure itself as the *exclusive* or *highest* end naturally clashes with the proper structure of human acts.”<sup>92</sup> Surprisingly, despite what JPII holds to be a human inability to accurately forecast the moral quality of an outcome, he also argues that this does not make actions or wants associated with pleasure or pain’s mitigation to be inherently immoral, nor is it immoral to want or act to achieve pleasure or mitigate pain.<sup>93</sup> Rather, he states that pleasure is not the *only good* unto which all other goods, including morality and human action, are subordinate, for some morally conscionable deeds require *pleasure’s* mitigation and an experience of pain.<sup>94</sup> All this, including JPII’s assertion that pleasure, being *rather elusive*, and resulting from some *concrete act*, is incalculable before acting, leads him to conclude that pleasure and the mitigation of pain not only cannot logically be but “[are] not the final criterion for [one’s] rational conduct.”<sup>95</sup>

Here, we reach JPII’s primary critique of utilitarianism. By comparing JPII’s altered version of Kant’s apparent *moral imperative* to Mill’s understanding of Kant’s apparent moral imperative, we begin to understand why a Christian such as JPII would hold personalistic and utilitarian ethics to be incompatible.<sup>96</sup> Summarizing, JPII states: because all morals and actions are subordinate to happiness, it becomes impossible to honour people as ideal ends in and of themselves.<sup>97</sup> This is because happiness is not a person – it is an experience and a feeling.<sup>98</sup> If the only good and moral thing is an experience of *positive emotional-affective* moments, then to be moral, one has no choice but to use another person to achieve this feeling.<sup>99</sup> Thus, all things, including oneself, become a means to maximize pleasant mood-feelings.<sup>100</sup> With this attitude, there is a high risk that one will transgress against the dignity of another for the sake of pleasure, be it higher or lower; this can be done with or without the other’s consent.<sup>101</sup> It is even possible to transgress against oneself for the sake of pleasure.<sup>102</sup> JPII takes grave issue with (hedonistic)



utilitarianism because he does not consider such actions to be ‘good’ and moral ways of interacting with other human beings. Mill’s iteration of utilitarianism would be no exception. To JP II, one may feel as though their sense of dignity has been honoured by achieving a lower or (preferably) a higher pleasure for oneself or for another. By virtue of the Greatest Happiness Principle being a poor judge of moral good and evil, however, the doer or receiver’s innate, God-given dignity may well have been dishonoured.

By combining the logic of Mill’s *Utilitarianism* and of JP II’s *Love and Responsibility* (as discussed on pages 10, 11, 23 and 24 of *Love and Responsibility*), JP II’s understanding of the utilitarian mentality is simply summarized: pleasure, a subjective experience and feeling, motivates human action. Therefore, pleasure is also the moral standard, a standard to which all human persons are subject. In this way, human persons cannot be ideal ends in and of themselves and are reduced to mere tools for the amusement of others and oneself.<sup>103</sup>

If a person’s sense of dignity is accountable to pleasure, would Mill hold that a person’s innate dignity is also accountable to pleasure? Because JP II critiques hedonistic utilitarianism in general as opposed to Mill’s *Utilitarianism* specifically, and because Mill’s utilitarian brand is a blend of hedonism, personalism (and so forth), to determine the degree to which similarities and differences exist between Mill and JP II’s valuation of *human dignity*, one must extrapolate from Mill’s definition of a person’s *sense of dignity* to determine his probable opinion on this matter. Using several of Mill’s axiomatic statements about truth and the way that humans operate, one can surmise the following: Mill has stated that “*actions* are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.”<sup>104</sup> An action’s moral quality is therefore accountable to happiness theory. Innate dignity is, however, not an action. So, while a person’s sense of dignity is accountable to Happiness Theory – that is,

measurable based on the kinds of pleasures in which they engage – a person’s innate dignity exists independent of action and is therefore in no way subject to Happiness Theory. This, however, is a flawed conclusion.

To achieve Mill’s aim of creating a unified society, human interaction must occur. For human interaction to occur, people must act on each other. In acting on each other, a person’s innate dignity would either be affirmed or defiled. If humans only act to achieve happiness and to mitigate pain, it therefore follows that dignity-affirming actions would result in positive, happy-inducing, pleasurable outcomes, and dignity-defiling actions would result in negative, pain-inducing outcomes. Because the end of an action can only be oriented toward feelings of greater happiness and or less pain, everything in between, including the human person, becomes subject to the Greatest Happiness Principle.<sup>105</sup> Thus, for Mill, while (higher) pleasures are complementary to and affirm human dignity, dignity must be subject to pleasure, to Happiness theory, in an effort to live in and unify society, because people cannot be unified without moral – that is, pleasurable – action. Pleasure is the moral standard, therefore, for Mill, pleasure outranks dignity in terms of importance.

In sum, while Mill’s bottom-up approach focuses on how a person’s level of self-awareness of their dignity determines the kind of moral behaviour in which they choose to engage, JPPI’s top-down approach focuses on how a person’s innate dignity determines the moral behaviour in which they should engage. Thus, for Mill, pleasure informs dignity, and for JPPI, dignity informs pleasure. Furthermore, in Mill’s case, as this paper postulates, a person’s innate dignity is also accountable to the Greatest Happiness Principle. Additionally, contrary to Mill, JPPI does not consider pleasure (or higher pleasures, whatever that means to the specific people assessing them), to be automatically compatible with human dignity.

In sum, it is this same top-down approach that JPPII uses to dismantle the utilitarian argument that pleasure is inherently moral and, with human compliance, capable of social unification. According to JPPII, when everything is subordinated to pleasure (again, be it higher or lower, and despite a person ‘feeling’ as though their sense of dignity has been honoured), every person is reduced to mere subjects of action, objects of use, and none are granted respect for their inherent dignity, which they so rightly deserve, given that they are dignified, and, given that they are images of God Himself, the source from which this dignity flows.<sup>106</sup> In dishonouring the (Second) Commandment to Love, therefore, so too is its source, the (First) Commandment to love God above all else, dishonoured.

Given *Love & Responsibility*’s keen focus on marriage and family life, JPPII offers sexual relations as a prime example of a realm in which another’s dignity is often dishonoured. Contrary to Mill’s appreciation for and prioritization of pleasure above all else, JPPII argues that, when one’s end is only happiness and pleasure, only use and egoism can occur between the man and woman – never love and *authentic altruism*.<sup>107</sup> JPPII provides two reasons for this. The first – pleasure (happiness) is temporary by nature, “belonging solely to a given subject – it is not a supra-subjective or transsubjective good. As long as this good is considered to be the complete basis of the moral norm, there can be no way of transcending what is *good only for me*” – therefore, in accordance with JPPII’s logic any ‘benevolent’ attempt of Mill-type utilitarians to “love [or pleasure] their neighbour as themselves” would be disingenuous, failing to truly demonstrate Christ-like selflessness and charity.<sup>108</sup>

Thus, the second reason JPPII provides – though ensuring the greatest pleasure for the greatest number may look *altruistic*, it is actually still *egoism*, and would not result in the unified society for which Mill aims.<sup>109</sup> Summarizing, JPPII states that those who harbour this mentality

act in others' interest not because it "it brings [them] pleasure that somebody else feels pleasure".<sup>110</sup> When it no longer does, however, their commitment to others' pleasure "ceases to be... binding, something good, and may even become something evil", something painful.<sup>111</sup> In this way, one becomes either *indifferent* to or attempts to thwart others' pleasure-attainment.<sup>112</sup> It therefore follows that none could hope to achieve the higher, most moral and customizable 'dignity-affirming' pleasures for which Mill aims, others would either be opposed to or fail to support opposed to an individual's happiness. Thus, the happily unified society for which Mill aims could not be achieved.

This difficulty, JP II states, is not resolved by the sexual *harmonization* of two egoisms, for as the aforementioned conclusion argues, 'love' of this kind views the opposite sex merely as "mutually useful and mutually advantageous."<sup>113</sup> Once the mutual usefulness and advantage cease, nothing remains from this whole harmony."<sup>114</sup> In this way, what appeared as love reveals itself as mere *reciprocal use*, and treats the person as means to a subjective end – "[l]ove is then nothing in the persons and nothing between them."<sup>115</sup> Such an outcome is undesirable, even to a (hedonistic) utilitarian, for the fallout causes much unhappiness and pain.<sup>116</sup>

In summary of JP II's argument and perspective, when pleasure – a personal, subjective reality, a feeling – is held to be the *only good*, a person becomes incapable of altruism.<sup>117</sup> Therefore, utilitarianism in its hedonistic form (or hedonistic-personalistic blend, as in the case of Mill), cannot help but be self-focused, egoistic, and therefore opposed to moral goodness. Despite each philosopher having a shared interest in social unification, JP II holds that any such personalistic aims of Mill's doctrines, could never be fully realized, an outcome antithetical to Mill's purpose. Moreover, not even Mill's goal of attaining higher, morally elevated pleasures could be achieved, for to focus solely on happiness results in selfish attitudes that are either

indifferent to or hostile toward others' happiness, which in turn means that none are happy. Thus, for true altruism and 'goodness' to be achieved, feelings – both others' and one's own experience of pleasure and pain – must be accountable and subject to the dignity of the person.

From a Christian perspective, when one considers a Mill-type argument in light of JP II's focus on marriage, family, and human relationships, Mill's aim to ensure the greatest happiness and the least pain for the greatest number translates to the following: if something, or someone, does not suit one's subjective, personal pleasure-preference and practices, then they are not desirable.<sup>118</sup> They are therefore useless and morally valueless to the judge, for "pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends".<sup>119</sup> By default, they become pain-inducing entities, moral evils, that should be abhorred.

The fact that a person's worth might also be determined and tested without care for *moral obligation* simply adds to the gravity of JP II's admonishment of utilitarianism, as expressed throughout *Love and Responsibility*, beginning on page twenty.<sup>120</sup> By this standard, after having tested multiple human persons to determine whether their moral value suits 'the tester's' personal tastes, it follows that one person might become a greater good than another person; this translates to the following mentality: some people make me happy, and some do not. Some cause me some form of pleasure, and some cause me some form of pain – therefore, the former are of value, and the latter are not. Some people are good, and others are not; some are moral righteous entities, and others are not. Additionally, some people pleasure me more than others, and are therefore of greater moral value (to me). All this is ranked using the pleasure hierarchy, which is beholden to that which best suits me personally, regardless of morality. Therefore, I treat others according to their worth as they relate to my personal preferences. Clearly,

according to JP II's logic, this valuation of the human person requires obstruction of their inborn right to self-determination, and thus their dignity.<sup>121</sup>

In this way, JP II holds that ranking the value of human life on this basis is morally wrong, for human dignity will always outrank the value of a feeling and of a pleasant or painful experience. It is wrong and evil, for instance, to rank the quality of a human life based on their intelligence, to merely use them in an effort to derive 'lower-grade pleasures', or the degree to which their intelligence is of use to or pleases 'me'. According to the marital-spousal lens through which JP II critiques utilitarianism, it is also wrong to rank the quality of a human life based on their ability to please 'me' sexually, to make 'me' feel good physically. Instead, JP II advocates for limitless love – love that lasts regardless of pleasure and pain involved, even regardless of how morally righteous or sinful another person may be. This unconditional love, which lies at the heart of Christianity, is the same love that Christ exhibits when he lays down his life for all humanity regardless of reciprocation.

We love him along with his virtues and vices, in a sense independently of the virtues and despite the vices. The greatness of this love is manifested the most when this person falls, when his weakness or even sins come to light. One who truly loves does not then refuse his love [out of mere reaction to loss of affectivity, sensuality, etc.], but in a sense loves even more – he loves while being conscious of deficiencies and vices without, however, approving of them. For the person himself never loses his essential value.<sup>122</sup>

When contrasting Mill and JP II's views on their separate valuations of pleasure, utility, and human dignity, one may be compelled to ask: are utility and use inherently immoral to JP II? Is it morally wrong for one human person to be of use to another, or for one to derive utility from an experience of pleasure? Does JP II believe that this qualifies as harming, dishonouring, and trespassing on another person's innate dignity and worth? Is it possible to uphold human dignity while also deriving utility and enjoyment from human relationships and marriage? Moreover, is

it possible to love someone selflessly and to completely avoid using them, or to completely avoid deriving utility from them? If one were to rely solely on popular notions of Christian-Catholic teaching on human sexuality in unison with an improper understanding of JPPII's teaching on human sexuality and utilitarianism, many would be inclined to believe that, from a Christian standpoint, use, utility, and pleasure are inherently morally evil.

Nothing could be further from the core ethics of *Love and Responsibility*.<sup>123</sup>

To properly understand JPPII's argument, one must make clearer distinctions between use, utility, pleasure, moral rightness, etc. For while Mill (more or less) marks these as synonymous entities under the umbrella of Happiness theory, JPPII takes great care to distinguish each from the other. He begins by separating *usefulness* into two categories.

The first meaning of *usefulness* for JPPII is “to employ [and subordinate] some object of action [for the sake of the actor, and purely] as a means to [a specific and desirable] end.”<sup>124</sup> Practically speaking, this means that the object of use is *servile*, or, used instrumentally, when subordinated to the end and to the *acting subject*.<sup>125</sup> JPPII states that to subordinate a person to use in this manner is perfectly moral when affirming the value of a person, and when accompanied by a mentality of justice, moderation, reverence, gentleness, stewardship, and respect for the dignity inherent in both animate and inanimate nature (especially when the object in use is “capable of suffering”).<sup>126</sup>

The complexity of respectful subordination occurs when another human person is concerned, and is doubly complicated when applied to the realm of sexual intercourse, if one envisions their spouse as merely “a means...to attain various [sexual] ends”.<sup>127</sup> According to JPPII, people are ends in and of themselves, but, a person can subject themselves to use provided that the other person with whom they are in relationship prizes their dignity above the

honourable end for which they strive.<sup>128</sup> God neither created man to be used *merely* instrumentally, nor does he use them merely instrumentally – therefore, man must also refrain from using his fellow man merely instrumentally.<sup>129</sup> Incidentally, in loving another as God commands, so too is God honoured.

JPII defines the second meaning of the verb ‘to use’ as deriving pleasure from both action and *the object of action* (another human person).<sup>130</sup> Here, “the person becomes a proper source of variously coloured pleasure or even delight.”<sup>131</sup> Although such moods and feelings (be they pleasurable or painful), are separate entities from action, they are nonetheless linked experientially to action, and affect how a person perceives the opposite sex – that is, “the source of lived-experiences”, their *equal object* and “‘partner’ of action” – in the context of relationships and relations.<sup>132</sup> In this way, since “personhood and rationality generate morality”, it follows that people need sexual ethics – an understanding of “the proper relation of the person in the context of sexual pleasure” – so that they do not become dominated and used.<sup>133</sup>

Based on this conclusion, JPII characterizes (marital conjugal) pleasure in the following way: firstly, pleasure is a temporary, subjective, non-transferable experience.<sup>134</sup> It is not bad.<sup>135</sup> It is not inherently morally evil.<sup>136</sup> It is not, however, the prime moral virtue – “[p]leasure itself is a specific good”; it must, however, be placed in a hierarchy, for “it is not the *only* good”.<sup>137</sup> Pleasure must be *fully justified*, properly ordered, and raised above “mere sexual self-giving [...to the level of] self-giving of the person”; this fosters both spousal community and the proper attitude toward the person with whom one is in relationship.<sup>138</sup> In this way, pleasure must be treated as a fruit, a biproduct, of the self-giving of one’s person to another, not as the end or aim of one’s action as hedonistic utilitarianism proposes.<sup>139</sup> This hierarchy ensures the honouring of the personalistic norm.



Thus, “I desire to experience pleasure, to fulfill a need in me” – an interior mentality that often masquerades as true love, becomes “I desire to honour and affirm my spouse’s right to self-determination and their inherent, God given dignity as a person, made in his image. I will [strive] for [their] true good, for union in the true common good’; I will do so by dying to myself, by giving myself wholly to my spouse. I will seek the person, rather than merely experience.”<sup>140</sup> This act of true love, of true self-giving, of laying down one’s life for one’s friend, can occur in many areas of marriage, including the conjugal union. Conjugal intercourse *produces much fruit* – one of which is pleasure.<sup>141</sup> Therefore, conjugal pleasure is not evil, but it must result from self-giving, spousal love, and it must be accountable to human dignity, otherwise, it does not ascend from the level of mere use of another human person. Thus, another clear demonstration that Mill and JPII swap pleasure (utility) and human dignity in terms of priority and importance.

Beyond Chapter I, Part One of *Love and Responsibility*, JPII discusses the major barrier inhibiting man from harbouring an inborn orientation toward action subordinate to and respectful of another person’s innate dignity – that is, the Christian notion of Original Sin (first introduced in the story of Adam and Eve’s fall from grace, found in Genesis). He begins by addressing any non-Christian, Manichean, misinterpretations of his work, acknowledging humanity’s inborn struggle to maintain purity of heart and mind. He states: man’s spontaneous reaction of concupiscence of the flesh, sensuality and “even ... affectivity” are a result of Original Sin; to experience these things is not to sin, however, “for sin can only be what proceeds [with *consent*] from the will”:<sup>142</sup>

This attitude of sensuality, which ‘hinders the lived-experience of beauty, even bodily sensual beauty [by introducing] a consumer relation to the object’ is spontaneous, instinctive. In this form, however, it is *not*, above all, *something morally evil*, but is above all something *natural*.<sup>143</sup>

JPII adds to this discussion of humanity's fallen, natural inclination toward pleasure in Chapter III, The Person and Chastity – Part One: The Person and Chastity; here he also addresses the Christian view of the state of these human inclinations before the fall:

The truth about original sin explains this elementary and at times prevailing evil, namely, that when encountering a person of the other sex, man does not know how to “love” simply and spontaneously, but his whole approach to this person becomes interiorly disturbed by the desire to “use,” which at times rises above “loving” and deprives love of its proper essence while often keeping up only its appearance.<sup>144</sup>

In this way, JPII argues that human beings are bound within a pre-existing, fallen orientation toward pleasure that cannot be overcome.<sup>145</sup> Christianity holds that although humanity is responsible for bringing this fallen human nature upon themselves through an act of free will, there is no way to undo this spontaneous, fallen, natural inclination – only God's Second Coming will redeem this brokenness.<sup>146</sup> In the meantime, hope for redemption is found in what can be overcome, for despite the fact that the spontaneous reaction is followed by a choice – an opportunity to actively will and do something different than that to which these inclinations incline a person.<sup>147</sup> Summarizing, though “all have sinned and are deprived of the glory of God”, through choice to rise above sin that can be overcome, and in union with God's grace, humans are equipped to bring about a moral good despite the oppressive boundaries of their Original fallen human nature.<sup>148</sup>

Thus, “the threshold of sin lies” between one's fallen, spontaneous, uncontrolled reaction to their loved one's sexual value alone, and the choice that follows.<sup>149</sup> The choice is to love one's loved one, to sacrifice concerns for personal pleasure, even for one's spouse's pleasure, to ensure that the mentality accompanying the action is honourable and respects the other as an autonomous being worthy of pure, noble, gentle, considerate action, not a mere outlet for consumption and discarding. Instead of allowing the pleasure of spontaneous concupiscence,

sensuality and affectivity to be the moral arbiters of an experience as Mill would propose – that is, pleasurable emotions and experiences that come without effort and that can dishonour others when not properly tamed – one must work to elevate them to the level of self-giving, spousal love – man “cannot acknowledge them as love, but only must bring love out of them.”<sup>150</sup> As JP II states, echoing the words of Saint Paul in Romans Chapter 7, a certain pain accompanies this “rejection of spontaneity, an effort which requires *self-mastery*.”<sup>151</sup>

So I find this rule: that for me, where I want to do nothing but good, evil is close at my side. In my inmost self I dearly love God's law, but I see that acting on my body there is a different law which battles against the law in my mind. So I am brought to be a prisoner of that law of sin which lives inside my body.<sup>152</sup>

The struggle against evil toward goodness, fought within the mind – the hidden place where intention and motivation reside and where choices are made – is the better part above mere use of another person for one’s own personal, non-transsubjective nor supra-subjective satisfaction.<sup>153</sup> For in consenting to act on mere sensuality, affectivity, and or concupiscence of the flesh, one determines a non-consensual, dishonourable end for the person on whom they act, therefore “[threatening the other’s] natural power of self-determination” and thus their dignity.<sup>154</sup>

JP II adds that this approach is not only an affront to another’s dignity, it is also an affront to relationship. True love of the person is jeopardized when a relationship is based solely on *emotional-affective reactions*, for when these reactions eventually *pass away*, *disappointment* ensues, and *affective love* for the person becomes *affective hate*.<sup>155</sup> (Such pain-inducing outcomes are undesirable even to the utilitarian, particularly to one like Mill, whose wish is to unite society). This argument further affirms JP II’s argument that man, created by a God who gives and creates and loves unconditionally, “finds himself ... through a sincere gift of self [elevated to the level of true love within] the communion of persons.”<sup>156</sup> Thus, while JP II may

appreciate Mill's aim to unify society, he considers it a great sorrow that hedonism would derail this good and moral aspiration.

For Christians of JP II's persuasion, the aim, therefore, is not to repress or reject these feelings or reactions, but to choose to *elevate* them to the level of love, love of another.<sup>157</sup> Any use, utility, and sexual pleasure derived from actions and experiences of another person becomes "subordinat[e] to love".<sup>158</sup> In simpler terms, while it is true that the sexual inclination toward pleasure 'just kind of happens' without human consent, what follows are many available paths for action that do require consent, free choice, and responsibility (though morally culpable individuals exclude those with "a faulty recognition of the structure of the person-recipient" who therefore commit unintended "act[s] of anti-love").<sup>159</sup> In practical terms, to negate the possibility of (mere) use, including those instances of "secret sin" unbeknownst even to the action's doer, the role must suit the relationship, and spouses must have a common end, specifically children, family, the strengthening of their spousal relationship.<sup>160</sup> Therefore, contrary to Mill's proposal to leave pleasure as the moral arbiter of experience, JP II argues that there is a level of human decency that exists above feeling which must be accessed for social harmony and respect for persons to be achieved.

It is noteworthy to close with one added insight regarding Catholic family planning, addressed in *Love and Responsibility's* Chapter One, Part Two: Interpretation of the Drive. The preceding discussion of JP II's views on marriage, sex, and family relate to use of one's spouse as a means to a pleasurable end, which JP II characterizes as the utilitarian-type, Freudian *libidinic interpretation* of the drive; this mentality during conjugal intercourse is oriented toward sexual *delight*, and children (as opposed to pleasure) are viewed as accidental, collateral

properties of this union.<sup>161</sup> This is, of course, a reversal of JP II's establishment of the moral order.

Interestingly, however, while children and family are one of two crucial common ends of marriage and the conjugal union, the Pope states that “the Creator wills not only the preservation of the species through sexual intercourse, but also its preservation based on love that is worthy of persons”, meaning that a woman, or a man, are not used as a means to an end merely to create children.<sup>162</sup> In the same way that the first century Church denounced the Manicheanism, so too does JP II denounce both these views as well as the following *rigoristic and puritan notions* of human sexuality that apply a *useful* utilitarian attitude to conjugal intercourse:

[M]arriage and sexual intercourse are good only when they serve procreations. Hence, a man acts well when he uses a woman as an indispensable means for producing offspring. ... Evil is only the use according to the second meaning, that is, seeking pleasure in sexual intercourse ... a component that is in itself ‘unclean,’ some *sui generis* necessary evil.<sup>163</sup>

Contrary to popular notions of Catholic views on marriage and family, viewing the body as evil and pleasure as evil, as well as the procreation of children as the only purpose of the conjugal union, also runs contrary to the core ethics of Christianity. JP II states that “[t]he only way to overcome this *uti* is to receive beside it the second, fundamentally distinct possibility that St. Augustine calls *frui*. For there exists a joy that is in conformity with the nature of the sexual drive and is at the same time adapted to the level of persons.”<sup>164</sup> This clarification is important, for while some may conclude that the Church detests pleasure in all its forms, and that only those who enjoy this fruit of an action are immoral, so too does JP II untwist a skewing of Christian truth existing at the opposite side of the spectrum.

While Mill's views on pleasure are simpler and more straightforward, JP II chooses to

make distinctions between moral goods and evils related to pleasure at various junctions so that human dignity might be consistently prioritized above it.

Therefore, according to JP II, utility, pleasure, use – each are distinct entities and must be treated as such, and yet, it is not possible to separate the derivation of some utility, some use, some pleasure from human interaction. This is the nature of human relationships – that one will receive when they give (even though giving to receive is not their goal). One must remember, therefore, that any use, utility, and pleasure derived from an experience of happiness must be tied to the person. The key is to allow the person with whom one is in relationship to determine their own end, not for the doer to determine their end for them, as in the case of a spouse who reduces their partner as a mere means to their personal pleasure; affirming the other's dignity in this way, placing the person, the relationship, and children above the use and pleasure derived in the experience of the marital embrace, constitutes true love and true respect. This is how JP II envisions pleasure's proper place in marriage and family, and with respect to human dignity. Though Mill and JP II share an interest in achieving an Edenic sort of social cohesion, JP II's vision for pleasure's place in this plan is much more moderated than Mill's.

In summary of this section, both philosophers value utility and pleasure, and both philosophers see it as a good, but the moral weight and importance attributed to them, the way in which one achieves them, and the mindset present when deriving them, whether through thought, action, or consequence – on these subjects, each have very different answers, as demonstrated in the moral weight that they attribute to human dignity.

Mill and JP II agree that people are oriented toward what is good. This simple statement, marks where similarities cease to exist, however, for each philosopher's definition of 'good' varies strongly. While Mill argues that because people act to obtain happiness, happiness must

also be the standard of moral goodness, and proceeds to form a moral order on this simple, straightforward basis, JPII takes great care to pause on this first principle and to slowly deconstruct the various reasons why this moral standard could, in his view, never achieve the social cohesion for which it aims, for it would require the obstruction of a person's innate dignity (and thus their subsequent harm), an outcome quite contrary to what is good.

Mill's discussion of pleasure centers on the following conclusions: to be a utilitarian is to pursue the Greatest Happiness, to have gained utility, to be moral, to be happy and or to seek happiness, to mitigate pain, unhappiness, the loss of utility, and immorality, for pain is heterogeneous with pleasure. Therefore, because pleasure and pain are the outcome of action, the moral quality of an action depends on the consequence. That which specifically constitutes happiness is open to interpretation – for happiness is a broad term applied to ensure that each can customize their pleasurable experiences to their specific tastes, sensibilities, practices. With these customizations available, one must recall that pleasures according to the pleasure hierarchy – quality (higher, intellectual pleasures), outrank quantity (lower, sensate pleasures). Thus, in the same way that happiness is open to individual interpretation, so too are moral goodness (which is synonymous with pleasure) and moral evil (synonymous with pain).

By comparing JPII's work with that of Mill, we can conclude that the term *dignity* would likely have two different applications for Mill. On the one hand is a person's *sense of dignity*, and on the other a person's 'innate dignity' as JPII would say. Mill holds that person's sense of dignity is measurable based on the types of pleasures in which they choose to engage.

Willingness to engage in higher pleasures likely means a higher level of intelligence, and therefore a greater personal sense of dignity. The opposite is true for those who engage in lower grade pleasures. Additionally, higher pleasures complement a person's dignity and do not defile

it. Thus, once the more pleasurable, dignity-affirming good is chosen over the lower good, so too is the greater moral good chosen. Therefore, those with a greater sense of dignity also have a greater understanding of moral good and moral evil, and act in accordance with their inclination toward the good. In the same way that a person's sense of dignity is dependent on pleasure for its measurable quality, so too is a person's innate dignity accountable to pleasure.

In contrast to Mill, JP II adamantly argues that what is 'good' is not necessarily happiness-, pleasure-, or utility-inducing, nor is it necessarily what Mill would term *higher pleasures*. More simply, morality is not one that is open to interpretation or customizable to a person's unique tastes and sensibilities. Pleasure is a good, but not the only good, for pain is, at times, required to do what is right and good. That, in addition to his argument that a doctrine which seeks to determine a consequence's moral quality based on attempts to forecast an action's pleasurable or painful outcomes is both illogical and impractical, leads JP II to conclude that Happiness theory cannot be the standard of morality. On this standard he continues, but with specific reference to human relationships. JP II argues that subordinating all things to happiness, a feeling, means that people become a means to happiness where human relationships are concerned. This obstructs a human's dignity, that is, their innate ability to self-determination. Therefore, though one may sense that their dignity has been honoured in choosing pleasure over pain, or in selecting higher pleasures over lower, because the Greatest Happiness Principle is a poor judge of moral good and evil, the doer or receiver's innate, God-given dignity may well have been dishonoured.

JP II continues – because happiness is not transsubjective nor suprasubjective, subjecting morality, all things, and all people to happiness cannot foster truly altruistic forms of community, an outcome which runs contrary to the personalistic utilitarian's aim. Moreover, *harmonizing*



the interests of an egoistic community of persons also leads to fallible forms of community, for when community is no longer pleasurable to its participants, none thereafter will participate. In the wake of the community's breakdown, these same people with attitudes of egoism either neglect others' wellbeing or will seek others' harm. In this way, according to JP II, Mill-type utilitarianism creates an opportunity for people to become a means to an end, rated within a pleasure hierarchy that is subject to each person's personal tastes. Even attempts to affirm one's own dignity with higher pleasures customized to suit a person's personal tastes could not be achieved, for each may well be opposed to others' happiness. Therefore, JP II advocates for a love and respect that outlasts others' virtue, vice, and sin.

Using marriage as the foundation of his example, JP II states that utility and pleasure are not evil, and that humanity's natural inclination to pleasure is also not evil. Though inclination toward pleasure alone is not a sin, however, it is a result of Original Sin, and humans must be trained to respond properly to this fallen inclination. Therefore, to refrain from using the person with whom one is in relationship as a mere means to an end, JP II states that one must prioritize a person's ability to self-determine their own end. Evil is born when pleasure and the mitigation of pain alone is *chosen* (or *willed*) above a sincere gift of self made for the good of the other. Therefore, for JP II, and as stated in God's first decree to humanity as detailed in Genesis, the ideal end of the microcosmic society of marriage is for spouses to be fruitful, to multiply, and (not or) to strengthen the spousal relationship.<sup>165</sup> Pleasure and utility fully justified in this way honours others' dignity and grants them the respect naturally owed to them. This way of married life must be supported by society and for society's proper function.

In layman's terms, and as this section demonstrates, Mill's utilitarian motto is as follows: do not repress your enjoyment of pleasure, rather, enjoy it freely, this with a mind for the social

ramifications of your actions. This is the end toward which humans naturally work, therefore, it is also the moral standard, and the standard by which society must operate for the fullest possible realization of the Greatest Happiness Principle to be achieved. Such an outlook complements a person's dignity, which is subject to pleasure. In contrast, strictly on the level of persons, JPPII's Christian motto is to enjoy the person continually, to elevate pleasure to the level of love and self-gift, and, in reverse of Mill, to subordinate pleasure to the person. Furthermore, honour a person's dignity, treat and enjoy pleasure as a byproduct of a relationship. Let the person be the source of enjoyment during both pleasurable and painful times, no matter who they are, what they've done, and regardless of what happens. Seek the person as an ideal end in and of themselves. The mentality that solely seeks pleasure is the end toward which Original Sin predisposes humanity, but where humans are concerned, the Christian-moral doctrine detailed in *Love and Responsibility* is the end that humans should work toward. This is the end that will result in the realization of one's full potential, the respect and honouring of God's eternal plan, and of each person's innate dignity, and in each person's earthly – and eternal – fulfilment.

#### **4: Mill's Subjective- and JPII's Objective-Moral Order**

From this analysis, and based on the specific excerpts examined in this section, we can argue that, on the one hand, Mill offers an objective moral philosophy rooted in happiness. Happiness is an inherently subjective standard, in that, to be measured, it relies on what an individual subjectively feels and desires, and how their subjective feelings and desires for happiness and minimal pain impact their response to their surroundings and behaviour toward others. On the other hand, JPII offers an objective moral philosophy rooted in objectivity. His moral code relies on the objective, elemental properties of the human person, or, who man is as an objective entity, and from this, how his own distinct nature and that of his fellow man impacts how he must relate and behave toward others. To this he adds the flourish of Christian influence in asserting that all are equally and inherently dignified by way of being images of God.

In simpler terms, Mill offers a moral code based on his belief that the person is a being who is driven to obtain happiness and to mitigate pain. The key thing to remember here, therefore, is that Mill's definition of a person's purpose depends on what they do – "A test of right and wrong must be the means, one would think, of ascertaining what is right or wrong, and not a consequence of having already ascertained it."<sup>166</sup> In other words, what the human person does defines who the human person is, which in turn determines what they should do. We see this expressed in Mill's definition of the moral order: "[feeling happy and mitigating feeling pain], being, according to the utilitarian opinion, the end of human action [what a person does], is necessarily also the standard of morality [defines the moral standard and therefore humanity's innate purpose]"; global adoption of this principle, whereby each work to ensure or mitigate others' experience of certain feelings (which a person should do), will result in universal happiness.<sup>167</sup> This principle can be distilled to "Happiness is the ultimate standard of morality

because working toward one's own happiness is the most enjoyable, most convenient, most obvious thing for anyone to do – therefore, we must also work toward others' happiness to ensure social harmony.”

On the other hand, JPII offers a moral code not based on what a person does but based on their *objective structure* predating action.<sup>168</sup> Therefore, who the human person is objectively – that is, a rational, objective creature, capable of self-determination, who is also made in God's image, and therefore dignified – defines what a human person should do to unto them, that is, prize their dignity above feelings and a desire for pleasure and for pain's mitigation. This principle can be distilled to “The human person is objectively dignified. Therefore, I must not decide my fellow man's end for him – rather, I must give him what is her/his *natural right*, and treat her/him in a way that respects their personhood – their uniqueness, their unrepeatable nature, their distinctiveness, rationality, and objectivity, their interior life, their ability to determine their own ends.<sup>169</sup> This, in accordance with Christian notions of self-sacrificial love, will support greater social harmony.”

In terms of the order of the biological maturation of a human being, the physical, psychological (and spiritual) growth of the human person precedes a person's ability to have motives or exhibit behaviours that dispose them toward the utilitarian attitude. Chronologically and scientifically speaking, JPII's argument for the objective moral order ‘pre-dates’ that of Mill's, in that it first deals with the objective nature of man as opposed to the subjective feelings, desires, motivation, action, that springs forth from man, the objective being. Therefore, on the one hand, Mill offers objective truth through a subjective lens, and on the other hand, JPII offers objective truth through an objective lens.

If I, the author, may venture make this assertion, in a modern Western context it is generally assumed that the more objective a moral standard, the higher the degree of truth to be found in it – the further removed a moral standard is from its objective root, the less truth there is to be found in it. By this standard, it could be said that JP II's moral order is further rooted in truth than Mill's moral order, which is based on the subjective feelings and desires of an objective being. Though one could argue that, on the one hand, JP II's doctrine is subjective, in that, according to his Christian understanding, honouring the Second Commandment is not truly, fully possible without also honouring the First, on the other hand, his objective anthropology and psychology of the human person holds true regardless of his religious views; these are truths on which *Love and Responsibility* is founded, hence, there is a greater degree of objectivity to be found in it.

JP II demonstrates this same mindset in the "Author's Introduction to the First Polish Edition (1960)" of *Love and Responsibility*, where he states that proving the practical necessity of Christian principles and morality is one of the primary aims of his book:

This book was born principally from the need to substantiate the norms of Catholic sexual ethics – and to do so as definitively as possible while appealing to the most elementary and undeniable moral truths and to the most fundamental values or goods. Such a good is the person, and the moral truth most closely connected to the world of persons in particular is the "commandment to love" – for love is the good proper to the world of persons. And therefore the most fundamental grasp of sexual morality is to grasp it on the basis of "love and responsibility" – hence the title of the whole book.<sup>170</sup>

In this way, although JP II's philosophy is undeniably and firmly grounded in Christianity, belief in God, and in a desire to fully honour the First and Second Commandments, a good deal of the logic he uses to prove their necessity is grounded in scientific fact on the nature of the human person. This is how JP II substantiates the objectivity inherent at the foundation of these Christian principles.

Further evidence of this claim regarding the objective-objective lens through which JP II forms his ethics is found in the sequencing of his arguments. By detailing the objective nature of the human person and presenting arguments in defence of a person's right to respect, dignity, and self-determination before presenting his critique of utilitarianism, JP II undercuts the utilitarian argument. This ordering's potential implication is that the objective moral law cannot be deduced from nor subject to the inconsistent standards of humanity's corruptible nature; rather, one must first address those objective properties that precede and exist outside of the corruptible mind to arrive at morally lucid conclusions. This argument is echoed in JP II's "Critique of Utilitarianism", where he states that because pleasure is an *elusive* and therefore incalculable result of a concrete action, pleasure and the mitigation of pain not only cannot be but "[are] not the final criterion for [one's] rational conduct."<sup>171</sup> Therefore, for JP II, in deducing the objective moral order, considerations for objective reality must precede those for subjective tastes and sensibilities.

Mill holds a far different perspective. Firstly, according to *Utilitarianism*, this issue of chronology would be negligible. Utilitarianism is predicated on the belief that "[happiness and the mitigation of pain], being, according to the utilitarian opinion, the end of human action, is necessarily also the standard of morality."<sup>172</sup> Through this statement, another aspect of Mill's morality comes to light – that good and evil only exist because sentient beings capable of experiencing consequences of their actions. In this way, morality is dependent on sensory input, and how a person personally categorizes the positive or negative feelings they associate with this experience; as such, morality does not exist outside the realm of sentience. Thus, morality only exists in the realm of the human consciousness and interaction, for all morality is subject to the feeling of happiness, and morality is only ever determined in relation to a consequence's

happiness-inducing, pain-mitigating, or pain-inducing effect on another sentient being. All moral considerations are subject to human feeling – feelings of pain, and feelings of pleasure.

Mill also holds that his argument regarding objective truth, which is rooted in subjective standards, is a strength of his philosophy. We must extrapolate from *Utilitarianism* to arrive at this conclusion. The subjective standard is personal happiness. Personal happiness is only attainable when one is given the liberty to pursue it. Mill's *On Liberty* expands on this idea when Mill states that, within reason, freedom to pursue all that one desires ensures society's proper function –

The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.<sup>173</sup>

Thus, true freedom lies in individuality, obtaining the good one desires in whatever way it may be obtained without depriving or impeding others from theirs, and in doing so, causing them to meet an immoral end in harm, pain, loss of utility, unhappiness, etc. Ensuring others' pleasure, giving them what is justly, lawfully theirs, is the prime moral goal.<sup>174</sup> This rule of law ensures society's proper function. This statement from *On Liberty* complements those at the close of *Utilitarianism*'s "Chapter 5. On the Connexion Between Justice and Utility" concerning the most basic requirement for just human conduct:

The moral rules which forbid mankind to hurt one another (in which we must never forget to include wrongful interference with each other's freedom) are more vital to human well-being than any maxims, however important, which only point out the best mode of managing some department of human affairs.<sup>175</sup>

Freedom from harm, and freedom from impediment of one's personal pursuits, is, therefore, Mill's most basic requirement for just human conduct.

Let us now synergize both quotations to deduce Mill's logic. Freedom to pursue one's own good, and freedom from pain and *wrongful interference*, are facets of justice. Justice, being the most vital subset of social utility, is therefore the most important form of personal happiness.<sup>176</sup> This notion of freedom is rooted in a doctrine of subjectivity, for each have their own personal versions of what causes them happiness and pain. Infringing on a person's moral right to subjective happiness is morally wrong because it infringes on a person's social liberty. Therefore, Mill's subjective standards regarding objective truth are a moral strength of his argument, in that they ensure personal liberty and thus society's proper function. In Mill's case, and, contrary to JP II's implied argument regarding the ascertainment of objective truth, the more subjective a moral standard, the higher the degree of objective truth to be found in it.

This statement is supported by Mill biographer Jose Harris' summary of key arguments presented in Mill's *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive* regarding the falsities of *axiomatic truths*. Harris states:

For Mill general propositions (other than those that were purely syllogistic) were deductions, themselves initially derived by inference from induction, without reference at any stage to categorical ideas. The latter he portrayed as having throughout history seduced human minds into the error of believing that there were universal 'substances', over and above the sum of the specific cases which such categories were supposed to represent. Substances were the sirens that lured unwary logicians to their doom, down false trails such as animism, mysticism, the Platonic theory of forms, linguistic and mathematical essentialism, the Christian doctrine of human nature ... and the idealism of Kant. ... Even concepts relating to objects imperceptible in nature, such as perfect circles and lines without breadth, could ultimately be traced back, not to axiomatic truths, but to a mental process of neutralizing non-relevant sense-data.<sup>177</sup>

Therefore, *general propositions* or *axiomatic truths*, like those of Kant's and of Christianity, determined by "neutralizing non-relevant sense-data", *seduce human minds* into believing falsities regarding the objective order of the universe.<sup>178</sup> It could be argued that Mill would view JP II's *Love and Responsibility* in the same light, for at the core of its teaching is a Christian



outlook which holds not only that Christ is “the Way, the Truth, and the Life”, “the Alpha and the Omega, the First and the Last, the Beginning and the End”, but also that “Christ [alone] sets us free”.<sup>179</sup> These principles and assertions, for Mill, rely on mere induction to derive their ‘truth’. This quotation offers further evidence of Mill’s implicit argument – that objective truth rooted in the subjective standards of human happiness is, contrary to expectation, a strength of the utilitarian doctrine.

In summary of this section, Mill offers an objective moral order rooted in the subjective standard of personal happiness. What a person is inclined toward achieving (pleasure, freedom from pain), determines who the human person is and what the moral standard is, which in turn determines what a human person should do. On the other hand, JP II offers an objective moral order rooted in objectivity (based on the fact that a human being is unique, unrepeatable, distinct, rational, possessing free will, and endowed with self-determination). Therefore, who a human person is defines what they should do and how they should interact with others, this with the added influence of Christian teaching on the First and Second Commandment. Mill considers the objective-subjective nature of his philosophy to be a strength, for subjective standards ensure that a person’s personal liberty is justly respected. JP II considers the objective-objective nature of his philosophy to be a strength, for it ensures both God’s honouring and consistent respect for all people’s innate and equal dignity. Thus, Mill believes that objective-objective standards – constant standards, *general propositions* and *axiomatic truths* – lead to false conclusions and society’s disintegration; JP II believes that objective-subjective standards – inconstant standards of that which constitutes pleasure and pain corrupted by fallen human nature – lead to false conclusions and harm of the human person.

## 5: Two Opposing Interpretations of the Commandment to Love

Each philosopher's conception of the Second Commandment, that is, the Commandment to Love, plays a pivotal role in distinguishing each philosophy. As this essay's introduction states, Mill equates love with pleasure. Therefore, for Mill, the Commandment to Love is the Commandment to Pleasure. To achieve an Edenic society – that is, greater social harmony – society must ensure the greatest pleasure for the greatest number of people and as little pain for the least number as possible. According to JP II's logic, in marriage, specifically in marital intimacy, the utilitarian's focus would be to maximize personal pleasure, and more importantly, to maximize one's spouse's personal pleasure. Additionally (and as later discussed), this drive to pleasure-seek and to pain-mitigate is fundamentally motivated by fear of harm and pain.

Conversely, JP II states that love and pleasure are completely separate entities. For JP II (and for the Church), the Commandment to Love, which “demands love for persons”, is the Commandment to Self-Sacrifice.<sup>180</sup> To achieve an Edenic society, one must affirm the innate dignity and worth of each human person. This experience may involve a great amount of pleasure for the doer and the receiver of the (potential) action – it may also involve a great amount of pain. In marriage, therefore, specifically in marital intimacy, the focus is to affirm one's spouse's dignity and worth by making the person the ultimate end of one's action, and not pleasure, or pain's negation. Truly selfless acts are fundamentally motivated by a desire to serve and sacrifice for others, and to honour God by honouring others' innate, God-imaging dignity.

Mill's address of the Commandment begins near the start of Chapter 2. After writing on the meaning of utility, pleasure, happiness, moral rightness, pain, unhappiness, etc., Mill begins his religious appropriation of the Commandment to Love. He leads with four critical conclusions. Firstly, at reality's most basic level, all experience results in either happiness or

unhappiness. No mode of experience falls under any other category, for “pain is always heterogeneous with pleasure.”<sup>181</sup> Nothing but happiness is desirable, for without it, each would seek their own demise. Therefore, all things are accountable to Happiness theory.

Secondly, reciprocity will result in universal happiness; in practice, this requires that each person nobly, affectionately, and benevolently works toward the majority’s happiness, without care for the personal benefits derive thereof.<sup>182</sup> Mill anticipates that a concerted, consistent effort over several generations would endow all people with the greatest amount of happiness, the richest, highest pleasures, and the least pain – the full realization of a utilitarian society.<sup>183</sup>

Thirdly, all actions must be oriented toward procuring happiness. Heroics and martyrdom – that is, losing one’s own life and happiness – to ensure both greater happiness for a greater number of persons, and that none thereafter will be subjected to the same pain, is the only noble end of such sacrifice.<sup>184</sup> Sacrifices made for any other reason, namely for mere virtue, where none benefit from either greater happiness nor lesser pain, are *wasted* deeds better left undone – here, abstinence is perfectly moral.<sup>185</sup> Virtuous sacrifices must be made for happiness’ sake.

Fourthly, sacrificing one’s life for another to ensure their continued happiness is not only the most noble and virtuous of deeds, it is also a means of realizing the full extent of happiness – “I will add, that in this condition of the world, paradoxical as the assertion may be, the conscious ability to do without happiness gives the best prospect of realizing such happiness as is attainable.”<sup>186</sup> In this way, one must cultivate a happiness, a *tranquility*, that transcends every pain, and that can weather any storm.<sup>187</sup> Those resilient individuals who “[resolve] to find happiness *by the way* rather than to make it a *principal object*” cultivate lasting contentment.<sup>188</sup>

Therefore, pleasure and pain are the moral arbiters of all experience; secondly, generations of individuals willing to give without care for personal benefits reaped will result in

universal happiness; thirdly, to be of any use, virtuous sacrifices must be made for happiness' sake, or for pain's mitigation; fourthly, a willingness to sacrifice one's own life and happiness for others cultivates lasting contentment. These statements support Mill in adopting the Commandment to Love as the heart of utilitarianism; to be a true utilitarian, one must become

strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbour as oneself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality. As the means of making the nearest approach to this ideal, utility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should place the happiness, or (as speaking practically it may be called) the interest, of every individual, as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole; and secondly, that education and opinion, which have so vast a power over human character, should so use that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of the whole. especially between his own happiness and the practice of such modes of conduct, negative and positive, as regard for the universal happiness prescribes: so that not only he may be unable to conceive the possibility of happiness to himself, consistently with conduct opposed to the general good, but also that a direct impulse to promote the general good may be in every individual one of the habitual motives of action, and the sentiments connected therewith may fill a large and prominent place in every human being's sentient existence.<sup>189</sup>

Thus, to do unto others and to love as one loves one's self in true, disinterested benevolence, each must be taught to equate their own happiness with others' happiness. This *direct impulse* will ensure that any attempt to make one's self happy will, in effect, be an attempt to make others happy.

Though subtle, Mill's interpretation of the Commandment to Love is far different from JPII's. To pinpoint the differences inherent in each, one must first note Mill's admission that his is "the nearest [possible] approach to this ideal" made through a utilitarian lens. This technique of appropriation and alteration is further employed when Mill, in distinguishing between higher, intellectual pleasures and lower, sensory pleasures, states that such principle must be tempered with "many Stoic, as well as Christian elements", to create sound moral teaching.<sup>190</sup> Mill

biographer Jose Harris notes that such alterations “reflected [Mill’s general] goal of higher synthesis between conflicting doctrines”; his aim, therefore, was “not to subvert Christian belief but to strengthen [and ‘improve’] it, by offering the possibility of an alliance with ‘good ethics and good metaphysics’”, as in the case of *Utilitarianism*’s synthesis between Kantianism, utilitarianism, and the New Testament.<sup>191</sup> His purpose, therefore, was not to entirely disprove nor wholly discredit Christianity, rather, to create one, holistic, objective moral order with which all humanity might agree and by which all might benefit.

Mill continues to employ this technique in *Utilitarianism*, Chapter 3, when discussing external and internal sanctions. The external sanctions that Mill affords utilitarianism are quite diverse. As long as they align with utilitarianism’s core principles, external sanctions can be appropriated from any other belief system.<sup>192</sup> These may include: belief in and *love and awe* of God, the desire to be rewarded, the fear of be punished and of suffering the eternal consequences of one’s immoral actions.<sup>193</sup> With this, Mill reiterates that people desire both happiness and that others would confer happiness on them, regardless of moral or religious motivations or standards.<sup>194</sup> In this way, though utilitarianism’s external sanctions can be appropriated from most any morality, one must always recall that a person’s innate desire to acquire happiness at all moral cost is, in truth, their top priority.

Mill believes that the many external sanctions at utilitarian’s disposal are what makes it far superior to any other doctrine, for not only does it incorporate external sanctions approved by one man’s doctrine, it incorporates more – in fact, the most: thus, utilitarianism is more moral and advanced than any other doctrine, a claim with which the greatest number would agree (though a Christian of JP II’s persuasion would not be among this number). That utilitarianism’s subscribers are self-honest about being motivated by happiness, whether that of their own, or of

others, further elevates the doctrine's superiority. In this way, all other doctrines are diluted in believing that they could act out of any primary motivation other than happiness. Utilitarians are not deluded. Thus, for a society working toward constant improvement and a truer understanding of the objective moral order, utilitarianism's advanced external sanctions and honest nature make it the perfect moral doctrine for a truth-seeking, progressive society.

Utilitarianism's internal sanctions are much more complex. These are embodied in a person's disinterested sense of duty, which "is the essence of Conscience...derived from sympathy, from love, and still more from fear; from all the forms of religious feeling; from the recollections of childhood and of all our past life; from self-esteem, desire of the esteem of others, and occasionally even self-abasement."<sup>195</sup> In this way, Mill reminds his audience that the seemingly *mystical* and "mysterious law[s]" of the conscience are merely a product of the human mind and experience, and that these internal sanctions are responsible for one's sense of *moral obligation*.<sup>196</sup> To resist their influence is no small feat, for it involves trespassing on "a mass of [personal] feeling", an act usually followed by regret.<sup>197</sup>

Summarizing, Mill refutes the notion of conscience as a supernatural moral compass, attributing one's sense of disinterested moral duty to a mere product of feeling, memory, ethical teachings, self-adulation and self-deprecation, and a desire to be liked by others. In doing so, Mill advances his argument that there exists no more righteous and scientific moral doctrine than utilitarianism – those moral orders that place a large emphasis on the supposed mystical, morally righteous influence of conscience on their actions are diluted, thus their principles arbitrary. To achieve true understanding, humanity must accept that happiness and the mitigation of pain, whether for oneself or for others, are the only true motives of human conduct.

From this, Mill asserts that because conscience, *the ultimate sanction* of morality, is merely *subjective feeling*, it follows that all moral codes are equal, for their ultimate sanctions are, of course, to do right by one's fellow man.<sup>198</sup> This feeling is universal – although some subscribe only to external sanctions, Mill concludes that it is equally possible to form a strong 'conscience' through utilitarianism as with any other moral doctrine.<sup>199</sup> Therefore, conscience, being a *subjective feeling*, is amenable to any moral code, including utilitarianism.

Building on the preceding arguments, Mill states that "the [utilitarian's] sanction of that particular standard [...] is the same as of all other moral standards—the conscientious feelings of mankind", thus reasserting his belief that all moral standards are equal.<sup>200</sup> For in asserting that "morality of any kind has no hold but through the external sanctions", and that all internal moral feeling is a product of experience, Mill places all morality on a level plain, that is, on the plain of seeking utility, thus rendering all moral doctrines equally effective.<sup>201</sup>

These conclusions, in addition to Mill's synergizing of Christianity, personalism, and hedonistic utilitarianism, will appear insidious to those believing their religion to hold objective truth, and to those who agree with JPII that personalism and hedonism are incompatible. For Mill, however, his aim is not to deceive readers, but to free them from an oppressive morality that lacks transparency and proper cohesion between principle and human action. By exposing the first principle of all human action – that all act to achieve happiness, therefore, happiness is moral – Mill aims to effect self-honesty in his readers, and to free them of the unnecessary guilt and remorse that stop them from examining their underlying inclinations and intentions toward happiness. Simply put, Mill hopes to reform those poorly formed, poorly educated, ignorant consciences of his readers (though not necessarily willfully ignorant).

This insight is crucial. It would be easy to say from a strictly stoic viewpoint that Mill is attempting to pervert the Christian doctrine, much as do utilitarian's detractors, as Mill mentions "Chapter 1: General Remarks". Even if Mill's appropriation of the Commandment were a purposefully devious, outright distortion, however, it would do readers well to refrain from approaching Mill's work with this mindset, for the purpose of this paper is to help readers understand each philosopher from their own standpoint. To understand Mill's meaning from a perspective other than as a distortion of Christian teaching, it must again be emphasized that his desire is to *strengthen* and *improve* Christianity – not merely for his own private purpose, but, as his philosophy attests, for the betterment of society and for the good of humankind.<sup>202</sup> Thus, in Mill's view, this expression of the Commandment is not exactly an alteration or a perversion of Christian teaching; rather, it constitutes the real truth of Christian teaching according to a utilitarian's understanding of the objective moral order, and or the strengthening of Christian teaching, purer and truer in its realization of life's natural moral standard, all for the betterment of society.

Without a proper understanding of the truly Christian meaning of the word *love*, and in lieu of Mill's willingness to incorporate as many internal and external sanctions from how every many doctrines into utilitarianism to ensure society's proper function, it would be easy to question how Mill's personal iteration of the Commandment could ever constitute a distortion of Christianity. Indeed, by Mill's own admission, it appears that he harbours a great respect for Christianity's moral principles, and for all doctrines' moral principles. In this way, one might be prompted to ask – is not Mill advocating for the kind of benevolent love that JPII claims is inherent in the philosophy of *Love and Responsibility*? Is this not the same love that Jesus commands of his followers?



The difference between Mill's utilitarian-Christian hybrid and Christianity's version of the Commandment is complex. To those of Mill's persuasion, the truth of this difference may seem trivial. To those of JP II's persuasion, this difference makes all the difference.

The most crucial insight to be derived from Mill's version of the Commandment is his equating love with happiness. For Mill, love is equal to pleasure, and love can only cause pleasure. Moreover, love cannot equal pain, and love cannot cause pain – for “pain is always heterogeneous with pleasure.”<sup>203</sup> Lastly, given that the means or conduit to happiness are also good, and, given that happiness and unhappiness are opposed, it follows that pain cannot lead to happiness, and that pleasure cannot lead to unhappiness. To put it another way, pain cannot lead to love, and love cannot lead to pain. Love, happiness, pleasure, utility, use, goodness – these are morally right. Anything other than these, and anything that leads to ends opposite to these, is a moral wrong. Summarizing, love – that is, pleasure, happiness, utility – is both opposite to and cannot in any way involve pain and unhappiness.<sup>204</sup> According to Mill, love is happiness.

This analysis would not be complete without Mill's adamant addition that the most perfect application of the utilitarian doctrine requires that all subscribers equate their own personal happiness with the happiness of the whole.<sup>205</sup> This call, Mill argues, is stoked by humanity's *natural* desire for community. He states – by nature of existing in a society, people are conditioned to consider themselves as “a member of a body” – the outgrowth being that people depend on and “desire to be in unity with [their] fellow creatures”. This “social state is at once so natural, so necessary, and so habitual to man, that, except in some unusual circumstances or by an effort of voluntary abstraction, he never conceives himself otherwise than as a member of a body”.<sup>206</sup> From this conclusion emanates another – because society is both naturally

desirable and desirable because of social conditioning, people begin to regard others' interests as something to which they should attend:

Society between equals can only exist on the understanding that the interests of all are to be regarded equally. ... In this way people grow up unable to conceive as possible to them a state of total disregard of other people's interests. ... He comes, as though instinctively, to be conscious of himself as a being who of course pays regard to others.<sup>207</sup>

Thus, humans are motivated to act in the interest of others because they are socially conditioned toward valuing community by virtue of the fact that they live in community.

With the right sort of education, a natural, *binding* feeling of social sympathy, which constitutes a benevolent sort of care for supporting others' interests, begins to develop.<sup>208</sup>

From these conclusions, Mill asserts that to be the truest, most morally righteous utilitarian, to truly love, to truly achieve happiness, pleasure, and utility, is to help the greater good achieve greater happiness. Simply put, happiness is achieved by helping others. In this way, for Mill, the Commandment to Love translates to either "Pleasure and ensure the happiness of your neighbour in the same way that you ensure pleasure or happiness for yourself", or "Pleasure and ensure the happiness of your neighbour to the same degree that you ensure pleasure or happiness for yourself" (the former variant meaning that you pleasure your neighbour according to your personal subjective tastes, the latter meaning that you pleasure your neighbour to the same degree that you pleasure yourself and according to their subjective tastes. Both iterations have been included, for it is unclear which iteration Mill intends). Other probable iterations of this principle include: "Ensure that the least harm and pain come to your neighbour as you do for yourself", "Your happiness is your neighbour's happiness", and "There is no greater happiness [says the Lord] than to ensure the happiness of your neighbour", or "to lay

down your happiness in the interest of your neighbour's happiness." Such is the mindset of the truest, most noble, righteous, benevolent, disinterested, and affectionate utilitarian.

With Mill's iteration of the creed comes both provisions and evidence substantiating its effectiveness and validity, each of which either build on or run entirely contrary to Christian teaching. Firstly, though it is everyone's moral and social Duty to exhibit disinterested, benevolent, 'Christ-like' actions toward others in accordance with the Commandment, an action's motivation – which is a separate concern entirely – does not impact an action's moral quality, and can therefore stem from entirely separate interests.<sup>209</sup> Secondly, for the average person, responsibility for the happiness of the whole refers only to those living in one's immediate community; that said, immoral acts are those that, if *generally practiced*, would harm society at large (the wider community) – otherwise, "private utility, the interest or happiness of some few persons, is all [one] has to attend to."<sup>210</sup>

Thirdly, contrary to the flawed understanding of Christianity's followers, it is entirely defensible to postulate that God reveals his divine plan through utilitarianism, or through any other moral doctrine really, given that God wants his creation to be happy – whether or not this is actually the case, however, Mill states that such questions are "superfluous here to discuss; since whatever aid religion, either natural or revealed, can afford to ethical investigation, is as open to the utilitarian moralist as to any other."<sup>211</sup> Fourth and final, whether through use of first or second principles, the utilitarian's efforts to calculate the potential happy (loving, pleasurable, useful, morally righteous) or unhappy (hateful, painful, useless, morally problematic) consequences of an action are as entirely practical and instinctive as for Christians to judge their actions by Biblical law without directly referencing scripture.<sup>212</sup> In this way, Mill hypothesizes that God's plan is open to interpretation, and that all religious or philosophical roads, as long as

they adhere to the happiness morality, have the potential to lead to God. Therefore, an action's motivation holds no moral value, *the greater good* refers to one's immediate community, God (if he exists) may reveal his divine plan through utilitarianism, and anticipating the pleasure or pain of an action by way of calculations is entirely practical.

JPII's perspective on this Christian principle is quite opposite to Mill's and is clearly a direct address to what Christians would consider a misunderstanding of the Commandment.

To begin, for a Christian, the moral worth or quality of a person, thing, experience, least of all the sacrifices of heroes and martyrs who lay down their life, for example, for the sake of Christian teaching, are not accountable to pleasure and to pain's mitigation. Secondly, JPII's philosophy is not limited to one's immediate community, rather, the dignity of each human person and the moral code he establishes thereof extends to all persons everywhere. Thirdly, while Christians believe that self-giving free of expectation of reciprocation is core to Christian teaching, Christians do not believe that this sustained, concerted effort on the part of humans will result in an earthly paradise, for sin and Original sin cannot be overcome without the redeeming power of Christ, his suffering on the cross, and his Second Coming (more on this in Part 8: Impact of Mill's Agnosticism and JPII's Christianity). Lastly, the assertion that self-sacrifice and a willingness to do without happiness cultivates lasting contentment does not altogether run contrary to Christian teaching.

Before introducing the differences between Mill's iteration of the Commandment and its original Christian meaning, JPII differentiates between love and use (that is, treating a person as a mere means to a pleasurable end); he states: love has the power to remedy mere mutual use in human relationships.<sup>213</sup> When freely chosen by its participants, love purifies intention, prevents obstruction of a person's dignity, unites people in action *from within*, makes equal its

participants, and strives toward a *common* and honourable end.<sup>214</sup> The phrase *freely chosen* is key, for as JPII states, love “is not something readily available. Love is [firstly] a principle or an idea” which, in being freely chosen and acted on by its participants, “liberate[s] it from a [using,] utilitarian, i.e., consumer...attitude toward other persons”.<sup>215</sup>

This conscious focus on the common good, where each person subordinates themselves and orients their actions toward an honourable common end, “gradually eliminate[s]” the possibility of use.<sup>216</sup> Because common goods transcend the subjective reality of pleasure and of happiness, when this “objective common good” or *objective reality* is discovered, love – “a union of persons” – becomes possible.<sup>217</sup> In marriage, therefore, the common end conjugal intercourse is “procreation, progeny, the family” and spousal relationship *maturation*.<sup>218</sup> With this, JPII adds that this end, though benevolent, is not solely capable of preventing mere use – to further negate this possibility, the role must suit the relationship, and, again, spouses must have children, family, the strengthening of their spousal relationship as their common end.

In simple terms – do not enter marriage to derive pleasure from the union. Do not enter society expecting to be pleased. Have community, family, the strengthening of relationships, the affirmation of the dignity of the person, as your goal. This choice may or may not result in a happy feeling – this, however, is not the purpose for which one acts. Rather, one must act lovingly regardless of pleasant or unpleasant feelings caused by or experienced as a result of these actions. Simply put, focus on the fully dignified person worthy of your attention, not the feelings that accompany this focus. Allow the person to determine their own end, and therefore to consent to a common end with you, an end in the interest of affirming your relationship, and, in creating a wholesome, strong community (family) of persons.

From here, JPII introduces Christian views on the Commandment to Love, Mill-type misunderstandings of the Commandment, and how this Commandment interacts with the personalistic norm. JPII states: The Commandment to Love “demands love for persons[, not pleasant feelings]. For God, [who is Love, and] who the commandment to love names in the first place, is the most perfect personal Being.”<sup>219</sup> He continues: persons are Love’s most dignified creatures because they are made in Love’s image. (Hedonistic) utilitarianism chooses to image use, which is unable to love, specifically, transcending subjective mutual, pleasurable use toward an objective common good between two persons. Where happiness is an inherently isolated experience, love is a community of persons. Therefore, because the human person is created by Love and for Love, humans oppose their truest nature by choosing to use others or to be used; moreover, without love, it becomes impossible to be united with God and fellow man and to achieve greater social harmony. As inability to be truly unified to one’s fellow man is, for JPII, a true travesty, for human beings are made for community. Thus, according to the personalistic norm – “the person is a kind of good to which only love constitutes the proper and fully-mature relation.”<sup>220</sup>

Clearly, JPII’s Christian ethics starkly contrast those of Mill’s. For while Mill aims to unite humankind through Happiness Theory and an altered version of the Commandment, JPII undercuts his methodology by stating that the principle of utility requires use of persons, which is not only harmful to them, but also obstructs their ability to define their own end and therefore obstructs their dignity. In JPII’s view, therefore, Mill’s aim is undone by his own core principle.

From here, JPII briefly addresses the difference between the Commandment to Love, and the personalistic norm, which treats the human person as an end in and of themselves.<sup>221</sup> *Strictly speaking*, he states, the Commandment originates from the norm, as in the case of a secondary

principle emanating from the first.<sup>222</sup> Utilitarianism's first principle does not align with the personalistic norm, for the person's value, which "is incompatible with using", transcends pleasure's value – "therefore the person cannot be subordinated to pleasure; he cannot serve as a means to the end which is pleasure".<sup>223</sup> Generally speaking, however, the norm and the Commandment can be viewed as synonymous, in that the second is supported by and falls under the first, and, both call for love of persons.<sup>224</sup> Because the personalistic norm supports the Commandment, both can be viewed as separate and or the same principle(s) – therefore, for JP II, neither the Commandment, personalistic ethics, love, nor the fostering of true community are compatible with the utilitarian mentality.<sup>225</sup> In this way, where Mill hastily exists a discussion regarding God's apparent choice to reveal himself through the utilitarian doctrine, deeming it "superfluous ... to discuss", arguing that God's plan is open to interpretation, and that all religious or philosophical roads, as long as they adhere to the happiness morality, have the potential to lead to God, JP II argues quite opposite, and makes a strong point of reproving Mill's claim.<sup>226</sup> Therefore, for JP II, God cannot reveal his divine plan through utilitarianism.

To further demonstrate why JP II holds the utilitarian and Christian view of the Commandment as opposing, it is helpful to reference 1 Corinthians Chapter 13's practical definition of love, self-giving, honouring a person, and allowing them to choose their own end without force. This excerpt demonstrates Christianity's core teaching that love requires effort:

Love is patient, love is kind. It is not jealous, [love] is not pompous, it is not inflated, it is not rude, it does not seek its own interests, it is not quick-tempered, it does not brood over injury, it does not rejoice over wrongdoing but rejoices with the truth. It bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things. Love never fails.<sup>227</sup>

In the context of this analysis regarding love between persons, patience requires that a person prioritizes the schedule and immediate needs of another over their own. Kindness requires a

giving and welcoming approach to others. To refrain from jealousy requires curbing one's desire to obtain what is not one's own and to rejoice in the gifts that are bestowed on others. To refrain from pride is to choose to be humble. Etcetera, etcetera. Each of these requirements of love involve choice, action, effort beyond impulse, effort toward self-giving – giving of time, of friendship, giving up pride, inclinations toward unkind comments, *forgiving*, and so forth.

This Christian view of love – that is, love as action, as opposed to love as a feeling – contrasts very strongly with Mill's utilitarian-Christian synthesis of love, as demonstrated in the below, edited version of love's definition, per the utilitarian mentality:

Pleasure is patient, pleasure is kind. It is not jealous, [pleasure] is not pompous, it is not inflated, it is not rude, [pleasure] does not seek its own interests, it is not quick-tempered, it does not brood over injury, it does not rejoice over wrongdoing but rejoices with the truth. [Pleasure] bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things. Pleasure never fails.<sup>228</sup>

One might interchange the word *love* with *utility* or *use* as well, given that, as previously established, each of these words are, for Mill, synonymous. With this practical example, from a Christian standpoint, this analysis conveys even more strongly that love and pleasure are not synonyms as Mill attests, for pleasure and happiness are feelings, whereas love is action, action that prioritizes another's needs and dignity above one's own.

Therefore, according to the Commandment's original intent, love is not a pleasant feeling of happiness, nor is it an experience of pleasure or an instance where utility is gained. Moreover, while true love is always moral, one can be happy while experiencing pleasure and still be in sin. In other terms, it is possible to be happy while engaging in immoral conduct. Love, therefore, is a choice. A choice to love someone, a concrete being, not to experience something, an emotion, that will fade with a passing moment – “[a]fter all, the sexual value somewhat imposes itself, whereas the value of the person awaits affirmation and choice.”<sup>229</sup> This act of love is meant to



endure in both one's immediate and extended community during both pleasurable and painful times, in happiness and unhappiness. In other words, love and bless one another in good times and in bad, in sickness and in health; love and honour the person (not the experience, but the human being, in all their innate, God-imaging dignity), all the days of their life, even if they are an enemy, because their value always outweighs the pleasure or pain of an experience.<sup>230</sup>

It must be further stated that, for JP11, a utilitarian's desire to make "an indissoluble association between [a person's] own happiness and the good of the whole" does not result in a doer's true disinterestedness or benevolence.<sup>231</sup> In this case, the only reason that one would be motivated to work for the good of others is because it results in one's own happiness.<sup>232</sup> In light of JP11's logic, this is why a Mill-type iteration of the Commandment to Love would likely appear as "Pleasure and ensure the happiness of your neighbour in the same subjective way that you ensure pleasure or happiness for yourself", as opposed to "Pleasure and ensure the happiness of your neighbour to the same degree that you ensure pleasure or happiness for yourself". In this way, a person of a Mill-type ethical persuasion is still focused on their personal happiness, and not on the happiness of others.<sup>233</sup> Volunteering to help others merely becomes a means for the doer to achieve personal happiness.<sup>234</sup> This, from a Christian perspective, constitutes "doing the right thing for the wrong reasons" – here, the disposition of the heart, that which motivates the action, makes all the moral difference.<sup>235</sup>

In summary of Part 5, Mill argues that, to achieve an Edenic society on a macrocosmic scale, people must live by a variant the Biblical Commandment to Love, strengthened by utilitarianism, within their immediate communities. Given that pleasure and pain are the arbiters of that which constitutes the moral quality of a consequence, and that, in truth, all people seek utility despite the attestations of the philosophies to which they subscribe, the production of an

Edenic society requires that people be educated to equate their happiness with that of others, and that each thereby engage in calculated, benevolent self-giving made for the sake of others' happiness. Mill holds that human disposition toward this ethical orientation is achievable for two reasons. Firstly, the fact that humans live in a society naturally inclines them toward valuing society. To keep this society intact, Mill argues that because conscience is a *subjective feeling* produced by feeling, memory, ethics, self-adulation and -depreciation, as well as a desire to be liked, instead of being a supernatural, sixth sense of that which is morally right and wrong, it is therefore amenable to any moral code, including utilitarianism. Therefore, secondly, accepting and living by the utilitarian's objective core principle that all actions are accountable to Happiness theory, will result in universal happiness. Most importantly, Mill argues that it is entirely possible for God (if he exists) to reveal his divine plan through utilitarianism.

On the other hand, JPII argues that love, above all, is "a principle or an idea" which must be freely chosen and acted on by its participants.<sup>236</sup> This action "liberate[s] it from a [using,] utilitarian, i.e., consumer...attitude toward other persons", for it is known that it is possible to experience pleasure and happiness while engaging in immoral conduct.<sup>237</sup> He also argues that God is Love; according to Genesis, because humans are made in the image and likeness of Love, people therefore achieve their full potential precisely by loving – that is, by making a gift of themselves to others, allowing others to determine their own end, not merely using them for the sake of pleasure or pain's mitigation. Such self-gift brings human closer to an earthly experience of unity between themselves, God, and fellow man. Practically speaking, in marriage – the microcosmic expression of society – and in the act of conjugal intercourse, love requires that man and woman have the same *common end* – "procreation, progeny, the family" and spousal

relationship *maturation*.<sup>238</sup> To be truly benevolent, the role that each take on in this realization of love must suit the couple's relationship.

With this, JPII also holds that because the personalistic norm and the Christian iteration of Commandment (where love opposes use) can be viewed as synonymous, there is no way that hedonistic utilitarianism and personalistic ethics are compatible. This, demonstrated through 1 Corinthians Chapter 13's practical definition of love, reveals that according to Christian teaching, and just as JPII attests, love is not a feeling, rather, it requires choice, action, effort beyond impulse, effort toward self-giving, during both pleasant and painful times. Thus, the doer may or may not benefit from their own actions, and they may or may not achieve a pleasant experience from their interaction with another person, but this, however, is not the goal. The goal is to affirm and love the person with whom another is in relationship regardless of personal benefit. Therefore, JPII further asserts that equating one's personal happiness with society's good will not result in sustainable benevolence, for this means that one is motivated to work for the good of others because of the utility they gain in return. Thus, the position of the heart, that is, the motivation behind an action and consequence, makes all the moral difference.

Therefore, utilitarianism's *first principle* (according to *Utilitarianism*), is ensuring the experience of pleasure and preventing the experience of pain, whereas the (Second) Commandment to Love, according to *Love and Responsibility*, is honouring a person, who possesses innate dignity and worth. For Mill, the standard of utmost ethical perfection is the degree to which one has bestowed pleasure, happiness on, and helped to mitigate pain and unhappiness for other people. For JPII, the standard of ethical perfection with respect to the Second Commandment is the degree to which one has emptied themselves to serve others by dying to their personal concerns for happiness.

## 6: Constants and Inconstants, Addition and Subtraction

Another way to characterize the difference between JPII's objective-objective moral standard and Mill's objective-subjective moral standard is using mathematical notions of constant and inconstant variables, as well as addition and subtraction. For Mill, this characterization is wholly appropriate, given that both Mill and the utilitarian doctrine have a decidedly mathematical bent, with a focus on calculating utility.<sup>239</sup> As Harris also notes, “[t]he revised editions of the *Principles* suggest that over time Mill became less interested in economics as an abstract science, and more interested in its prescriptive use as a tool of civic morality and social policy” – the same economic orientation can be said of Mill's *Utilitarianism*. While JPII makes it abundantly clear that true abiding, self-sacrificial love cannot be reduced to mere calculation, and that the utilitarian's aim to calculate the *elusive* pleasurable and painful outcomes of an action is impractical, these characterizations are still somewhat helpful here in distinguishing between each philosophy.<sup>240</sup> Note that the following paragraphs include general observations exclusive of negative or positive connotations.

The constant variable (or value) in Mill's equation is pleasure (and avoidance of pain).<sup>241</sup> Each of these variables are experiences. By nature, however, the experience of pleasure is inconstant – varied, fluid, and ever-changing, for as Mill states, pleasure exists in a rich and varied hierarchy impacted by quality and quantity.<sup>242</sup> Calculations and intense reasoning are required because each experience of pleasure is, naturally, different. What is required of man to obtain the maximum amount of pleasure will vary each time. Moreover, how each person experiences pleasure, and what each person deems to be pleasurable, are also varied.

After establishing this unmistakable connection, however, Mill moves to destabilize traditional notions of the justice in response to claims that utility, being a

subjective, *uncertain standard*, has no business distinguishing moral from immoral conduct. He states: one might hope that because utility is an inconstant and unpredictable variable (subject to each person's subjective tastes and sensibilities), constancy and predictability – that is, *safety* – could be found “in the immutable, ineffaceable, and unmistakable dictates of Justice.”<sup>243</sup> This, Mill states, is untrue, for these principles of justice not only vary from nation to nation, and from individual to individual – in these, there also exist contradictions, emanating from personal bias or intersecting standards.<sup>244</sup> In this way, justice is as inconstant and subjective in its measurements as is utility – thus, justice and utility are indeed interconnected, with justice relying on utility for its full force.

Mill's views on justice and its relation to utility further prove the assertion that Mill's constant variable is, by nature, inconstant. As previously established with the inclusion of excerpts from *On Liberty*, using inconstant standards of justice and of utility to form the objective moral order counteracts and prevents social oppression and the tyranny of uniform public opinion, which has the potential to drown out individuality and freedom.<sup>245</sup> Mill seeks to keep human uniqueness and personal freedom intact to ensure humanity's safety.<sup>246</sup>

The constant variable or value in JPII's equation is the innate dignity and worth of the person; this dignity is not situationally dependent, nor is it dependent on one's willingness to affirm another, the quality of an experience, the degree to which one is able to please another's personal tastes, nor on a person's intelligence or particular usefulness – it is never-changing, ever-present, innate, and irrefutably objective through and through, and deserving of respect at all times.<sup>247</sup> In the context of marriage, family, and marital love, pleasure and utility must, above all, be *fully justified* by self-giving love, that is, *spousal love*.<sup>248</sup> In other words, the person must be prioritized above a desire for pleasure or for pain's mitigation, for fulfilling this desire does

not necessarily affirm or honour their innate dignity; as JPII states, “[f]or it is know that sometimes what is truly good, what morality and conscience command me, is accompanied precisely some pain and demands forgoing pleasure.”<sup>249</sup> In contrast to the logic supporting Mill’s subjectively rooted, inconstant standards for the moral order, JPII holds that self-sacrificial love of others, respect for their rational, their individuality, their freedom to choose their own end, etcetera., negate the effects of social tyranny.<sup>250</sup> In this way, JPII’s constant value is itself constant – pleasure, and inconstant value, must be subject to the highest good, that is, the ‘constant’ dignity of the person, in JPII’s objective equation for the moral order.

The concepts of addition and subtraction also play a role in each philosophy. Mill’s focus is on addition and fulfilment – addition of happiness to oneself and to one’s community, while also the subtraction of (freedom from) pain. He states: “men's sentiments, both of favour and of aversion, are greatly influenced by what they suppose to be the effects of things upon their happiness” – in this way, “[a]ccording to the Greatest Happiness Principle ... the ultimate end ... is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality”.<sup>251</sup>

JPII’s focus is the reverse – subtraction. To fully substantiate this claim, we must look to “Chapter II, The Person and Love – Part One: Metaphysical Analysis of Love”, subheading “Spousal Love” of *Love and Responsibility*, where JPII summarizes the heart of the Christian teaching in quoting Matthew Chapter 10, verse 39:

[T]he person can give himself to another person, both to a human person and to God, and through this giving a particular shape of love, which we define as spousal love, is formed. ... Christ expressed this in the sentence that seems to contain a deep paradox: “Whoever wants to save his soul will lose it, and whoever loses his soul for my sake will find it” (Mt 10:39).<sup>252</sup>

This same sentiment regarding spousal love, laying down one's life for another, or, in the vein of John 3:30, decreasing so that another may increase, is echoed in "Chapter III, The Person and Chastity – Part One: Rehabilitation of Chastity", subheading, "Subjectivism and egoism". Here, JP II states that pleasure is a good, but that when "the disposition of the will [is ordered] toward pleasure alone", it becomes a *moral evil*.<sup>253</sup> Ignatik further states that (conjugal) pleasure elevated and sought above the person results in an egoism, only to be corrected by self-giving to the point of dying to oneself.<sup>254</sup>

... [T]his egoism not only injures the person-object of love by reducing him to the role of a means to an end, but also impedes the attainment of the fullness of happiness for the subject of action. For man attains happiness through self-giving proper to the person, self-giving in love up to the point of losing oneself (see the evangelical "Unless a grain of wheat dies, it remains just a grain of wheat; but if it dies, it produces much fruit"). ... For this reason, it is morally reprehensible not only to subordinate other people to one's striving for pleasure, but also to seek a good for another person that does not take into account the dignity of the person.<sup>255</sup>

Simply put, the end of the conjugal act is the person; the person is separate from the 'mood-feeling' that accompanies the experience. This mood feeling – a fruit of affirming the person through conjugal love – is pleasure. This fruit, happiness, must be treated as *collateral*, *accidental* properties of the action, for the priority must be to affirm the person through pure self-giving – dying to one's own personal tastes, enjoyments, etcetera. to love another.<sup>256</sup> Thus, the focus of JP II's doctrine is subtraction, decreasing, so that others might increase.

It could be said that Mill's focus is also subtraction, for in Chapter 2 of *Utilitarianism*, Mill adopts the Commandment to Love as the heart of utilitarianism – "To do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbour as oneself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality."<sup>257</sup> In this way, to be a true utilitarian, and to achieve an Edenic, utilitarian world, humanity must be noble, and seek others' happiness.<sup>258</sup> Though the very nature of Christ's Commandment is self-gift, it must also be stated that, for Mill, the baseline consideration for the

unempathetic utilitarianism is self-protection. As outlined in *Utilitarianism*, Chapter 5 regarding justice, the most important facet of utility, Mill states that “[t]he moral rules which forbid mankind to hurt one another ... ([including] wrongful interference with each other’s freedom) are more vital to human well-being [and humanity’s sense of community] than any maxims”.<sup>259</sup> In this way, the focus of Mill’s ethical doctrine becomes less about preventing harm to another person and more about preventing harm to oneself, or, prioritizing the needs of oneself above those of others, which is quite opposite to the heart of Christian teaching.

By merely giving to each other prudential instruction or exhortation, they may gain, or think they gain, nothing: in inculcating on each other the duty of positive beneficence they have an unmistakable interest, but far less in degree: a person may possibly not need the benefits of others; but he always needs that they should not do him hurt.<sup>260</sup>

In this way, a person might not be beneficently motivated to act in others’ interest, but when they consider the personal impact of their unwillingness to protect others, they are motivated to reconsider their self-serving position. In this way, Mill affords that utilitarianism’s least noble though most basic motivation is as follows: “I take what I need. I will only obey the maxim not to harm you because then you will not harm me in return. The only reason I do not harm you is so that I may live peacefully.” (This begs an extraneous but nonetheless important question – if one has enough money and resources to live peacefully while still harming others, would said person choose to harm others)?

This *caveat* colours how readers perceive Mill’s statements from Chapter 2 regarding the Commandment. As previously noted, this quotation demonstrates that, for Mill, the negation of pain outweighs the assurance of pleasure, for “[a person] always needs that [others] should not do him hurt.”<sup>261</sup> Though Mill’s eventual hope is that people will be taught to equate their own happiness with that of the whole, the threat of violence



and self-protection is the most basic reason that motivates selfish individuals to act selflessly (whereas for JPII, the value that a person possesses independent of how danger, harm, and pain affect the actor).<sup>262</sup> At its most basic level, Mill's philosophy is indeed grounded in addition – that is, in Christian terms, addition to one's own life so that one might live. "Thus, at most one can want the other's pleasure 'next' to his own pleasure; but always only 'on condition' of one's own pleasure."<sup>263</sup> Self-security, therefore, becomes the indispensable *moral necessity* of greater value than common utility.<sup>264</sup>

In conclusion, in terms of constant and inconstant standards, Mill's objective moral order is based on inconstant standards of subjective notions of pleasure, pain, and justice, this to counteract the effects of uniform principles tyrannizing free thought and personal liberty. On the other hand, JPII's objective moral order is based on constant standards of the objectively dignified nature of the human person, this to counteract the negative effects of reducing the human person to a mere means to a useful and pleasurable end. In terms of addition and subtraction, *Utilitarianism's* most basic focus is addition – addition to happiness, and subtraction of unhappiness. The baseline consideration, however, is giving to receive, that is, adding to one's personal security. For JPII, the focus is subtraction, not simply giving for the sake of giving, rather, giving because it is a person's (Godly) nature to give without the ulterior motive to enhance personal security. Therefore, man must give (decrease) – not to receive (increase), even though he will find himself fulfilled – because it is his inborn purpose. Man fulfills his objective purpose by giving, dying to himself and to his own security to give life to others without expectation of return. In sum, Mill uses inconstant standards and mathematical notions of (primarily) addition to build his objective-subjective moral order, whereas JPII uses constant standards and mathematical notions of subtraction to build his objective-objective moral order.

## 7: Mill and JPII's Seeming Self-Contradictions

It would be easy to leave our comparison of these two texts at that – but further reading into the talks and the additional works of each philosopher provide a seemingly strange and incongruous similarity between each philosophy that is critical here to discuss, and it would do neither text full justice if this similarity were not addressed and analyzed.

To begin, Mill's *Autobiography* compounds the difficulty in distinguishing between Mill and JPII's core arguments. At the close of his mental crisis during young adulthood, Mill came to an important conclusion about human relationships, one which mirrors some of JPII's own arguments. Before Mill's epiphany, personal happiness was his primary object. Once he discovered that his current state and occupation in life were not resulting in his personal happiness, however, he fell into a deep depression.<sup>265</sup> His mental anguish was relieved once he realized that happiness must be achieved "by the way". Mill states:

I never, indeed, wavered in the conviction that happiness is the test of all rules of conduct, and the end of life. But I now thought that this end was only to be attained by not making it the direct end. Those only are happy (I thought) who have their minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness; on the happiness of others, on the improvement of mankind, even on some art or pursuit, followed not as a means, but as itself an ideal end. Aiming thus at something else, they find happiness by the way. The enjoyments of life (such was now my theory) are sufficient to make it a pleasant thing, when they are taken *en passant*, without being made a principle object. Once make them so, and they are immediately felt to be insufficient. They will not bear a scrutinizing examination. Ask yourself whether you are happy, and you cease to be so. The only chance is to treat, not happiness, but some end external to it, as the purpose of life.<sup>266</sup>

This principle is "re-affirmed thirty years later in his Utilitarianism, where he [claims not only] that 'conscious ability to do without happiness gives the best prospect of realising such happiness as is attainable'", but also that happiness, being innately temporary, cannot be experienced in perpetuity, and that resilient individuals cultivate *tranquility* that transcends all pain (such is how Mill compensates for the inconstancy and difficulty of attaining happiness).<sup>267</sup> The specific

wording of this passage from *Autobiography*, however, privileges readers with a simpler, fuller, more personal explanation of his original intent, thus enhancing *Utilitarianism*.

Thus, according to Mill, though happiness is life's direct end and therefore the first principle, personal happiness cannot be. Rather, it must be found *by the way*; moreover, one must aim to make others' happiness their ideal end. In doing so, personal happiness is achieved.

This excerpt from *Autobiography* alone is enough to truly muddy the once clearer delineation between utilitarianism and Christianity. Based on this passage, it could be argued that, to some degree, this method of finding happiness is similar to JP II's resolve to treat happiness as something accidental or collateral, per his earlier critique of utilitarianism.<sup>268</sup> In this way, contrary to expectation, it would appear that two moral doctrines on opposite ends of the moral spectrum – one a hedonistic and personalistic blend of utilitarianism, the other purely Christian – have more in common than was previously thought. If that were not enough to confuse readers, however, JP II further muddies the distinction in his 2002 Papal welcoming address to those attending the 17th World Youth Day in Toronto, Ontario, Canada. In seeming bold contrast to those core principles expressed in *Love and Responsibility*, JP II stating that

People are made for happiness. Rightly, then, you thirst for happiness. *Christ has the answer* to this desire of yours. But he asks you to trust him. *True joy is a victory*, something which cannot be obtained without *a long and difficult struggle*. Christ holds the secret of this victory. ... The joy promised by the Beatitudes is the very joy of Jesus himself: a joy sought and found in *obedience to the Father* and in *the gift of self to others*.<sup>269</sup>

Here we encounter a paradox. Based on everything that has already been stated of JP II's philosophy, the opening sentence of this quotation, that "[p]eople are made for happiness", appears to be a bald-face departure from *Love and Responsibility*. How can a Christian of JP II's persuasion say that people are "made for happiness", that they "[r]ightly... thirst for happiness", and yet, not subscribe to the utilitarian mentality? Furthermore, how can such a person

knowingly critique utilitarianism without qualifying as exceedingly hypocritical? Do not these two philosophers share the same view on life's ideal end, views only to be distinguished by use of different terminology? If so, what then is the fundamental difference between Christianity and utilitarianism? Are they not aligned in their purpose? Both doctrines advocate for care of others above care for oneself in one way or another – there is, therefore, clear overlap in these principles. Is Mill correct in asserting that, at the root of every moral doctrine, all people and all actions are both accountable and oriented toward Happiness theory?

To keenly delineate between each philosophy, we must first examine their core similarities. Both Mill and JPII believe that humans are 'created' for happiness, and that happiness must not be one's primary life objective. Mill asserts that happiness must be achieved *by the way*, whereas JPII asserts that it must be treated as something "accidental or collateral"; though it cannot be stated with certainty that these statements are synonyms, they appear close in their meaning. Each philosopher also acknowledges that service of someone or something other than oneself is what will (ultimately) cause or lead to happiness and or lasting fulfilment.<sup>270</sup>

Closer analysis of this expert from *Autobiography* provides clearer evidence of the differences existing between each philosophy. For Mill, the focus is on others' *happiness* as the ideal end in itself. Though it be not the goal of the action, a byproduct of focusing on the 'good' of others is that one will find themselves happy, or that they will come by happiness at some point as a direct result of their actions. For Mill, this type of action would constitute a purely benevolent, disinterested selflessness – thus, according to *Autobiography* (and, at *Utilitarianism's* core), a simplified iteration of Mill's altered version of this principle would be, "Do not treat others as a means to your own happy end by making others happy so that you

might also become happy – rather, ensure their happiness regardless of good feeling you will eventually feel by helping them.”

The issue for JPII is that, for Mill, others’ happiness is the ideal end, rather than people (those experiencing happiness) being ideal ends in and of themselves. Thus, Mill’s ideal end is an experience and feeling rather than the human person, as in JPII’s case. One must therefore reiterate *Utilitarianism*’s core principle – that all things are accountable to emotions and feelings experienced from within. In contrast, for JPII, in the case of human interaction, and per the (Second) Commandment to Love all are accountable to concrete, rational matter, the human person, who possesses the power of self-determination in and through their God-imaging dignity.

This brings us to a full examination of this excerpt from JPII’s World Youth Day address, which is still not fully reconciled to this core principle of *Love and Responsibility*. Perhaps the first two sentences of this quotation – that “[p]eople are made for happiness. Rightly, then, you thirst for happiness” – more than any other, explain why JPII begins his critique of utilitarianism by stating that “utilitarianism is a characteristic property of contemporary man’s mentality and his attitude toward life. . . . utilitarianism constitutes a perennial bedrock, as it were, on which the life of individuals and human collectives tends to flow”.<sup>271</sup> The *thirst*, the desire, the pang to achieve happiness, is perfectly natural, perfectly human. But, as the core of *Love and Responsibility* attests, the ideal end is the person, not the feeling. For Christians, the ultimate end, desire, and thirst of each is the person of Christ – “*Christ has the answer* to this desire of yours”.<sup>272</sup> One may rejoinder – does this mean that Christ is happiness? Yet this question comes too soon, for, JPII follows with “But he asks you to trust him.”<sup>273</sup>

Trust? Why? For what reason?

In accordance with the spirit of *Love and Responsibility*'s ethics, this *trust* is a trust that outlasts all feeling. It remains strong during both good times and in bad, in sickness and in health, all the days of one's life, regardless of pleasure, pain, happiness, unhappiness, utility gained, utility lost. Moreover, it seeks the person, not the feeling of a good time, or good times past. While it is true that, according to biblical teaching, the very same teachings from which JPPII's philosophy springs, Christ invites his followers to "unload all [their] burden [suffering] on to him, since he is concerned about [them]", it is critical to know that although this process of unloading is freeing, it can also be painful.<sup>274</sup> Thus, union with Christ will not always mean immediate gratification, immediate happiness, immediate rapture – as JPPII states, "[t]rue joy is a victory, something which cannot be obtained without a long and difficult struggle."<sup>275</sup>

For at the core of Christian teaching is Christ's invitation, a request for his followers to take up their own crosses, their pain, their suffering and walk with him along the road to death and resurrection: "Then Jesus said to his disciples, 'If anyone wants to be a follower of mine, let him renounce himself and take up his cross and follow me. Anyone who wants to save his life will lose it; but anyone who loses his life for my sake will find it.'"<sup>276</sup> In accordance with *Love and Responsibility*, this translates to "Those who forgo pleasure and pain's mitigation in the interest of upholding others' dignity will save their life", or, "Those who forgo pleasure and pain's mitigation by allowing those with whom they are in relationship to determine their own end, and by striving toward honourable ends with them, will save their eternal life."

This also is the core of Christian prayer, an echoing of the words of Christ in the Garden – "Not my will, but your will be done, Father", for as in the case of Jesus' crucifixion, the object was not to feel the least amount of pain, rather, to do the Father's will, which required him to endure much suffering for the sake of the people whom he loves. Moreover, according to his

own testament, Christ's sacrifice was done not merely to bring a temporary, non-transsubjective, -suprasubjective earthly happiness to those who follow the Word, but to bring all people "[t]rue [eternal] joy" regardless of their virtues, vices, and former sins: "Christ holds the secret of this victory. ... The joy promised by the Beatitudes is the very joy of Jesus himself: a joy sought and found in *obedience to the Father* and in *the gift of self to others*", even in the face of poverty, sadness, meekness, hunger, persecution for righteousness, choosing forgiveness over resentment, purity over impulse, peace over violence, self-sacrificial death to oneself.<sup>277</sup> This leads to eternal joy – through death, emptying oneself, self-gift, the pain of failing, falling, and rising to continue on the journey toward the person, just as Christ does for all of humanity in laying down his life, to new life in Christ's resurrection. Therefore, by excising pain and suffering in the way that Mill advocates, so too is the Cross excised, and thus the resurrection – that is, eternal joy – for one does not exist without the other.

In this way, for JP II, happiness is not equal to or synonymous with joy either. Rather, *true joy* is born of suffering for love, and "since Revelation tells us that 'God is love'", love is a person.<sup>278</sup> Therefore, according to Christian teaching, God is not happiness, and happiness is not equal to love, for love is not a feeling. Love is a choice to self-sacrifice, and self-sacrifice (Love), is Word made flesh in the human person of Jesus Christ. Therefore, self-sacrifice is itself a human person, Jesus. For if God is love, and love is the act of self-sacrifice, then Jesus is action, self-sacrifice, personified. Word – self-sacrifice – made flesh, life-giving action itself, the sacrificial lamb, bread of life, broken to take away the sins of the world, and to unite the world in eternally.<sup>279</sup> As Christians attest, he is eternal, he is not temporary, and unlike happiness, he is not experienced in isolation (for as JP II asserts, happiness is not suprasubjective or transsubjective). He is experienced in a communion of persons, in relationship.

In the same way that JPII states that “[t]wo-sided love [love that reciprocates and creates community] creates the most proximate basis for two ‘I’s’ to become one ‘we’”, it might also be stated that because Love and God are synonymous, it could be said that to *love* someone is to *God* them – thus “I love you” is synonymous with “I God you”.<sup>280</sup> In this very sentence, we see JPII’s principle keenly demonstrated, for with God, a relationship-oriented entity, the ‘I’ and the ‘you’ are united. Therefore, while happiness is a personal experience, Love (God), unites, upholds the dignity of the person, puts them before pleasure, even to the point of giving up his only son.<sup>281</sup> Moreover, as Christianity teaching, humans are an extension of God, all have their end in God – therefore, humanity is an extension of Love, “made in His image” and are therefore “very good”.<sup>282</sup> In this way, it is in humanity’s very nature to *God*, to *Love*, to self-sacrifice, to make a gift of ourselves, and in imaging him, we find our full and true purpose.<sup>283</sup>

Here we approach a key reason why JPII sees marriage and family as the core of society. As expressed in many of JPII’s other teachings, just as Christ’s love for humanity is so strong that he lays down his life so that all may find new life in him, so too is the love between a man and a woman in marriage. For in dying to their personal concerns, in committing to each other in love, for life, and under all circumstance, and in striving toward honourable ends and the strengthening of their relationship, the new life of a child in the one flesh communion of persons issues forth – “Spousal love ... consists in giving one’s own person. The essence of spousal love is giving oneself, giving one’s ‘I’.”<sup>284</sup> In this way, the end for which they strive is not only communion with each other as human persons, but also new life, another human person, children, who strengthens their marital bond. Christian scholar Christopher West echoes these same Wojtylian sentiments in his own *Eclipse of the Body*, where he states:

Scripture uses many images to help us understand God’s love. ...But, as John Paul II wrote, the gift of Christ’s body on the cross gives “definitive prominence to the



spousal meaning of God's love.' ... Indeed, we can summarize all of Sacred Scripture with five simple yet astounding words: *God wants to marry us*. "For as a young man marries a virgin, your Builder shall marry you; And as a bridegroom rejoices in his bride so shall your God rejoice in you (Isa 62:5 NABRE).<sup>285</sup>

In essence, Christ commits the ultimate act of spousal love by dying so that he might marry humanity. Therefore, just as humans are made in the image of God, so too is marriage an image of God's love for humanity. West further affirms this principle of JPPII's teachings on marriage, family, and society when he states that just as Christ dies on the cross to give eternal life and peace to all of human society, so too does the proper function of marriage and the family cultivate greater peace in the world:

[S]ince the family is the fundamental cell of society, if an "era of peace" is to be granted to the world, that peace can only come if there is peace in the marital relationship ... in the womb ... in the family. And this will only happen if we are reconciled to the truth of our own greatness as men and women who bear in our bodies the sacramental sign of the divine plan – a plan that inevitably leads us to the nuptial mystery of the Cross.<sup>286</sup>

In this way, West reaffirms JPPII's threefold, bible-based teaching; firstly, that God is Love; secondly, that Christ's *nuptial* sacrifice on the Cross is imaged in man and woman, the family, marriage, in procreation, progeny, the strengthening of the spousal relationship; finally, that the ultimate gift which God gives to humanity is new, eternal life – not merely with him in an earthly, subjective form of happiness – but through, with, and in the Holy Trinity of persons, just as man finds the truth of who he is in the self-sacrificial communion of persons in marriage – "man, being an image of God, cannot find himself unless through a sincere gift of self in the communion of persons."<sup>287</sup>

This does not mean that marriage is a means to Christ, or that one's spouse is a means to Christ – rather, each are ideal ends in themselves, and because humanity finds its end in Christ, man and woman are each other's helpmates toward "beatific union with God."<sup>288</sup> For JPPII's

alteration of Kant's moral imperative does not end with "Whenever the person is an object of action in your conduct, remember that you may not treat him merely as a means to an end, as a tool, but [you must] take into account that the person himself has or at least should have his end" – rather, it continues – "the relation to another man does not merely depend on the fact of him being an end in himself, but also on him being ordained to ends outside of himself that are perfective of him ... and ultimately to God as his final end."<sup>289</sup>

Therefore, in accordance with JPII's Christian philosophical foundation, while it is true that "[h]uman beings are made for happiness", happiness is not the first principle of Christianity, and it cannot be the reason for which one acts. Rather, loving others in the same self-sacrificial way that Christ loves his bride, the Church, to ensure an eternal communion of persons is, in truth, life's purpose. This is done without expectation of repayment, reciprocation, or instant gratification. Instead, the reward lies in eternal joy in God, who is Love – a transsubjective, suprasubjective entity who unifies all. In this way, Love – self-giving – powers happiness.

In summary, Mill holds that happiness must be found *by the way*. One's direct end is not personal happiness. Rather, it is to ensure others' happiness, and in doing so, so too is one's own happiness assured. Similarly, JPII holds that people are both *made* and *rightly thirst* for happiness. However, *true happiness* comes from self-sacrifice, forgoing concerns for one's own experience of pleasure or pain to strengthen relationships, create new life, to allow others to determine their own ends, and to affirm others' dignity. The ideal end is the human person, not others' happiness. This principle is reflected in the way of the Cross; Christians are called to walk with Christ, to share in his pain and suffering, and in doing so, to participate in the resurrection, which leads to eternal union with the person of God. Without, the cross there is no reunification with humanity's ultimate ideal end, that is, the Creator. In this way, for JPII, God

is Love, *spousal love*, an eternal act of self-gift imaged in marriage and family. Society's proper application of this Christian principle will result in greater social unification.

This brings us to the topic of faith.

## 8: Impact of Mill's Agnosticism and JPII's Christianity

Much of Part 7 discussed JPII's Christian take on self-sacrificial love and on the human person's eternal purpose. The most important topic left improperly addressed in this entire discussion of the (Second) Commandment to Love is each philosopher's view of Christ's First Commandment. As JPII states "it is worthwhile to recall the commandment to love in its full reading: 'You shall love the Lord, your God, with all your heart, with all your soul, with all your strength, and with all your mind, and your neighbor as yourself'."<sup>290</sup> We now approach what a Christian would characterize as the unequivocally fundamental difference between each doctrine.

Given the core ethics of *Love and Responsibility*, the fact that JPII was both Pope and canonized by the Catholic Church, his faith in Christ was clearly very strong. Mill's acceptance of Christian teaching was, however, much less clear. Firstly, Mill was an agnostic.<sup>291</sup> Secondly, as far as *Utilitarianism* goes, the question of God's existence is left open to readers discretion, likely to enhance the doctrine's universal appeal.<sup>292</sup> Using a Christian approach to dissect Mill's personal belief system as expressed in *Utilitarianism*, it is logical to assume that if Mill believed in God's existence, he would have envisioned him as happiness itself or a means to happiness, for happiness, being both perfect and most moral, and God its "morally perfect" creator, would mean the existence of a profound connection between them.<sup>293</sup> This, however, is not entirely so. Mill biographer Jose Harris states:

Like his father before him Mill found that the existence of evil made it logically impossible to envisage a divine being who was both ethically righteous and omnipotent; but unlike James Mill he was able to conceive of an 'ideal Perfect Being' of whose existence there was 'enough in the course of Nature (when once the idea of Omnipotence is discarded) to give to that belief a considerable degree of support'.<sup>294</sup>

Summarizing, Mill held that although pain's existence was proof that God was not all-good and *omnipotent*, this did not disprove his potential existence. And yet, Mill's exclusion of Christ's First Commandment from his appropriation and reinterpretation of the Second Commandment clearly illustrates Mill's admission that his iteration of the Commandment was "the nearest approach to [Christ's] ideal".<sup>295</sup> To any Christian, this exclusion is not merely inexcusable but wholly nonsensical, for in accordance with JPII's Christian beliefs, God and love are synonymous, rather than love and pleasure. If God is excised from the Commandment to Love, so is love. For God and love are one. Love of neighbour therefore cannot be achieved without God. Thus, to love one's neighbour as oneself is to "God one's neighbour as oneself." Thus, according to JPII's Christian perspective, God, love, and the Second part of the Commandment to Love are inseparable.

This paper's most crucial division therefore manifests itself in a simple question – which philosophy holds the greater truth on all things eternal? Mill's agnostic-Christian-utilitarian hybrid, or JPII's Christian doctrine, which relies for its full force on Christ's promises, and in belief in heaven?

As both philosophers attest, the utilitarian mentality is foundational to human attitudes toward life and human interaction. It would therefore make perfect sense for non-believers to finish this paper consciously subscribing to the utilitarian doctrine. Clearly, Mill does a throughout job of detailing humanity's most basic instincts, how they impact human action, how these actions' consequences affect society at large, and how actions can be molded to benefit society and oneself. But for those who are Christian, the blend of agnosticism, Christian personalism, Christ's Commandments, and utilitarian hedonism presents an insurmountable barrier to accepting Mill's insight on life's First Principle. For

Mill, these ethical doctrines are easily synergized. For JP II, such synergy results in a nonsensical, self-contradicting doctrine. To understand the logic of each viewpoint, one must examine each philosopher's personal theological views on God, his (potential) existence, the extent to which he 'influences' human life, and heaven.

We begin with Chapters 3 and 5 of *Utilitarianism* where Mill undermines notions of transcendental theory. As outlined in Part 5, Mill uses more the Second Commandment as well as internal and external sanctions to prove utilitarianism's necessity. On external sanctions, these can be appropriated from any moral doctrine, as long as they align with Happiness Theory. This includes belief in and love of God. This statement demonstrates Mill's potential belief that because God exists "outside the mind", people can exist independent of God and or think without God's influence.<sup>296</sup>

As for internal sanctions, Mill wholly refutes Christian notions of conscience, like those which Ignatik references from JP II's *Person and Act*. Conscience, Ignatik states, is a natural, morally endowed sensibility, inclining humans toward the objective moral order:

For conscience reveals essential *truth* about man as a person, and – according to the author – precisely the relation to truth belongs to the essence of freedom, and of conscience that binds freedom: "Freedom is due to the human person not as pure independence, but as self-dependence, which contains dependence on truth [...], and this is most vividly manifested in conscience [...]. The proper and complete function of conscience consists in making the act depend on truth."<sup>297</sup>

While Christians hold that *freedom of conscience* properly exercised requires the influence objective (Christian) truth for a morally righteous outcome, Mill argues that conscience is a subjective, *internal* product of human experience, feeling, praise, abasement, ethics, and a desire to be liked, and that it is not an objective, external God-given sixth sense that orients humanity toward goodness.<sup>298</sup> He further argues that abiding by this subjective feeling is

solely a choice, unprompted by supernatural grace; therefore, God can, if he so chooses, reveal his divine plan through utilitarianism, since he wants his creation's happiness.<sup>299</sup>

Mill further undermines transcendental theory by undermining the very notion of God. He states: some claim, that believers those who abide by 'God's' external sanction are more likely to behave well or in the interest of others.<sup>300</sup> But God is merely a concoction of the mind, a *subjective feeling*; indeed, the degree to which one believes is merely the measure of strength they possess to resist selfishness when feelings urge them to act otherwise.<sup>301</sup> Furthermore, whether God and his sanctions concerning *reward and punishment* objectively exist outside the mind, the sole reason that humans know and live by them is because these sanctions exist inside their minds.<sup>302</sup> Thus, the internal choice to adhere to these external sanctions depends on the degree to which one believes in social *Duty*, for God's existence is questionable.<sup>303</sup>

To further destabilize notions that 'God's' divine influence on conscience strengthens a Christian's resolve to live selflessly, Mill reminds readers that it is possible to refute one's conscience's advice.<sup>304</sup> For those refuting believers, objective morality exists only insofar as it is convenient to regard it.<sup>305</sup> The argument that one's conscience's immovable nature proves God exists *outside the mind* is, therefore, an inherently flawed argument.<sup>306</sup> Furthermore, those who, with much difficulty, remain obedient to their conscience merely do so because of *external sanctions*, not *transcendental theory*.<sup>307</sup> In sum, belief in God's grace and conscience's corruptibility no more predispose a person toward moral goodness than does belief in *Duty*; though utilitarianism may have its share of morally weak followers, so to do all other doctrines.<sup>308</sup> In truth, adherence to external sanctions is a free choice made internally. Furthermore, God, a mere figment of feeling, experience and imagination, and a misguided, dated explanation for one's internal sense of *Duty*, cannot be proven based on a person's

inconstant adherence to God's apparent will, as expressed by their 'conscience'. Therefore, 'God' and Duty have equal impact on human action. Believers therefore have no more access to a *subjective feeling* of social Duty than do non-believers; therefore, each are equally capable of committing morally righteous acts.

In undermining notions of God and conscience's objective existence, as well as their ability to positively impact a person's behaviour, Mill asserts utilitarianism's supremely selfless nature. He states: a utilitarian need not fear God nor punishment, nor selfish desires to be rewarded by God, to urge them to act in the interest of others, for the truest utilitarian does not use fear of God to discourage them from acting selfishly or expeditiously.<sup>309</sup> They simply act well out of a strong sense of Duty.<sup>310</sup> In this way, Mill upholds utilitarianism as the most honest, selfless, self-sufficient doctrine, needless of both God and an apparent inborn sense of moral rightness to function effectively.

Mill continues to undermine transcendental theory in Chapter 5 of *Utilitarianism*. While concluding that justice is the most crucial facet of social utility, Mill offers two additional conclusions about social justice that run contrary to Christian understanding of the Commandment to Love.<sup>311</sup> Firstly, to fulfill the dictates of justice, one must expect reciprocal repayment for one's deeds – evil for evil, good for good.<sup>312</sup> Secondly, there exist those things which one must do out of social Duty, and those things that one should do above the standard or minimum.<sup>313</sup> Punishment, reserved for those failing to fulfill their moral obligation, must always suit the crime; this requirement must be tempered, however, for it is no (moral) crime to refrain from generosity or beneficence.<sup>314</sup> Confusing virtue with justice in this way would result in a social tyranny which forces people to work tirelessly to repay unrepayable debts.<sup>315</sup>



In the spirit of reading the Second Commandment according to its full and original, Christian intent, one must note that Mill pairs Old Testament dictates of punishment with New Testament dictates of mercy and love. As Mill states, the law of “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth” (*lex talionis*) is born from Jewish, Mahomedan, (and therefore Christian law); this mentality toward justice, however, runs contrary to New Testament ethics.<sup>316</sup> For at the heart of John 3:16 is that Jesus comes into the world to fulfill the Old Testament law, to carry the weight of sin and punishment on his back, to forgive humanity and dying for the sake of all persons – past, present, and future.<sup>317</sup> In doing so, he takes away all need for retribution. Christians believe that his sacrifice grants mercy in its fullest and richest extent by repaying all human evil with his ultimate good. In accordance with JP II’s Gospel-based ethics, the love of Christ transcends all humanity’s virtue, all vice, and all the good things done in honour of him.<sup>318</sup> His sacrifice is was made so that all believers might participate in new life, true joy, through the way of the Cross.<sup>319</sup>

In sum, Mill views the Old Testament maxim “An eye for an eye”, and the New Testament maxims “Love your neighbour” and “Treat others...” as compatible. JP II, in accord with Christianity, holds Old Testament law fulfilled by Christ, and New Testament law in current effect. In the Christian view, it is therefore humanity’s duty to image Christ’s sacrifice, and to show mercy to one’s fellow man. Such are these core differences between each philosophy made manifest in their respective beliefs on God, heaven, Jesus, on Jesus’ sacrifices and on their impact on conscience, justice, mercy, and love.

Those Christian notions of justice and freedom which Mill does not synergize with utilitarian teaching provide keener delineation between Mill’s iteration of the Commandment to Love and JP II’s. To begin, JP II argues that just because people seek pleasure or pain’s

mitigation does not automatically morally legitimate their pursuit. From this, JP II offers his improved version of Kant's "elementary principle of the moral order"; the original, "Act in such a way so that the person is never a mere means of your action, but always an end", is revised to

"Whenever the person is an object of action in your conduct, remember that you may not treat him merely as a means to an end, as a tool, but [you must] take into account that the person himself has or at least should have his end." This principle thus formulated stands at the basis of every properly comprehended freedom of man, especially freedom of conscience.<sup>320</sup>

This quotation reveals that both Mill and JP II envision human freedom differently. For JP II, though humanity is free to make both loving and unloving choices, unloving choices, specifically toward others, constitute a misuse of the true purpose of freedom, which contrary to the utilitarian's aim to acquire happiness, results in the doers "emptiness and unfulfillment."<sup>321</sup> Therefore, according to JP II, the freedom to choose our own end and ends as human beings does not make us free from accountability to God or to our fellow man. As established in Part 3 of this paper, in human relationships, freedom's true purpose is to protect others' innate dignity and to refrain from using others as mere instruments of utility. As Ignatik notes in *Love and Responsibility's* "Translator's Forward", "[b]eing created in and for love[, that is, self-sacrificial action that prioritizes and affirms others' dignity], man in his freedom is unintelligible without love."<sup>322</sup>

To be just, then, is to "give every man what is rightly due to him".<sup>323</sup> As JP II states: "It is rightly due to the person to be treated as an object of love, and not as an object of use ... [therefore] love is a requirement of justice, just as the use of a person as a means would be contrary to this justice".<sup>324</sup> Viewing a person as a mere tool is contrary to his very nature, fulfillment, and purpose; furthermore, it obstructs his dignity and ability to choose his own end.<sup>325</sup> In this way, JP II holds that justice envelops love, "[f]or certainly to love man or God, to

love a person, is something just” and honourable; conversely, because love is directed toward persons, and justice toward things that are owed to the person, JP II asserts that love supersedes justice, or at least becomes separate from it.<sup>326</sup> Therefore, love requires honourableness, and honourableness requires pleasure’s subordination; additionally, though loving a person is just, mere justice does not constitute love.<sup>327</sup> Contrary to Mill, JP II holds that justice, the highest form of utility, cannot therefore constitute the most important facet of the moral order.<sup>328</sup>

JP II continues this discussion, asserting that love and justice must be applied to sexual ethics, for it is just to treat a person as a person – not as an object for pleasurable use.<sup>329</sup> To reduce sexual love to mere “sensuality and affectivity” (a conscious and subconscious effort on the actor’s part), normalizes love’s distortion – thus, a pleasurable experience becomes pursuing pleasure, pursuing *pleasure alone*, and subordinating all things to pleasure.<sup>330</sup> The (hedonistic) utilitarian norm supports use of the person – therefore, it is at odds with the personalistic norm, justice, the Commandment to Love “God and neighbours”, and therefore with Christianity.<sup>331</sup>

The next critical addition to JP II’s ethics is that man, in his freedom, is accountable to God. This topic, fully addressed in “Chapter IV: Justice with Respect to the Creator” of *Love and Responsibility*, is briefly referenced in Chapter I, Part One where he states that his revised version of Kant’s moral imperative “stands at the basis of every properly comprehended freedom of man”.<sup>332</sup> Adding to JP II’s revised edition of Kant’s principle, Ignatik adds that man is not only an end in himself – he is “ordained to ends outside of himself that are perfective of him (and of his freedom), and ultimately to God as his final end”.<sup>333</sup> In this way, man, in his dignity, is “a creature called to the beatific union with God”, for as Christ states: “Whoever remains in me and I in him will bear much fruit, because without me you can do nothing.”<sup>334</sup>

Here, an important parallelism is established, for in the same way that the dignity of the person is constant, so too is God constant, never-changing, ever dependable, ever independent. Therefore, man, being made in God's image, wholly incapable of doing and being without him, is made for God, and is accountable to God; logically therefore, man must order his own end toward God – God, however, will not force him to do so.<sup>335</sup> As JP II states: “man [is] the only being that is willed by God for its own sake” and therefore has the freedom to reject his maker.<sup>336</sup> In this way, God does not create humanity as a means to his own happiness, rather, God creates humanity out of a love that extends to all people regardless of whether they requite him.<sup>337</sup> Because humans are free to requite God, they cannot become Love's means to an end, for love and use are opposed.<sup>338</sup> The human person must therefore choose to enter an eternal relationship with God of their own free will, for “God does not save man against his will.”<sup>339</sup>

Therefore, Mill teaches that freedom is for the sake of individual and societal attainment of subjective happiness and subjective mitigation of pain, that man does not possess an accountability to God, and that *lex talionis* properly ordered toward society's good, is the most important facet of social utility. In contrast, JP II teaches that freedom used justly demonstrates respect for the Creator and seeks to find its natural end in him; in addition, justice's importance does not supersede that of Love's, for all creation is accountable to Love, justice's source.

With this, we approach the final delineation between Mill and JP II's respective iterations of the Commandment to Love, as manifest in their views on eternal life and the temporary nature of happiness. As discussed in Part 3, Mill argues that happiness is both temporary and unsustainable, for a life in constant “rapture” is impossible.<sup>340</sup> A life void of most pain and filled with much happiness, however, is both possible, the happiest anyone could ever expect to be (were it not for “[t]he present wretched education and ... social arrangements”), and a life

“worthy of the name of happiness”.<sup>341</sup> In sum, one can never realistically expect to experience continual happiness – happiness (pleasure) is innately temporary.<sup>342</sup> Happiness, love, goodness, pleasure, utility, and so forth, does not range beyond earthly limits.

As an agnostic, the possibility of life beyond earth is, for Mill, either unlikely or fallacious. Human beings, being mortal, could never fully hope to experience eternal, continual happiness. In this way, according to Mill’s personal religious views, even the supposed noble sacrifice of ‘hero’ and martyr Jesus Christ for the sake of others’ “eternal happiness” would likely constitute a virtuous sacrifice better left undone – this because the sacrifice is unconnected to an attainable form of happiness, and such sacrifices are never “[themselves] a good”.<sup>343</sup>

Therefore, in accordance with Mill’s agnostic-utilitarian views, it is likely that a person will have lost nothing by orienting their earthly happiness toward their own satisfaction, or toward society’s satisfaction merely for the sake of their own safety and security, this because there exist no eternal consequences for what JPII terms “egoistic” behaviour.<sup>344</sup> To live any other way would be a wasted opportunity to achieve maximum pleasure and to minimize life’s pain. In Christian terms, therefore, orienting one’s earthly life toward one’s own happiness (toward saving one’s own life), would not result in losing one’s (eternal) life and happiness. It is therefore better to accept the human inclination toward pleasure and pain’s mitigation and to live in accordance with Happiness Theory than to place hope in the unfounded reality of heaven.

JPII also holds that earthly pleasure is temporary by nature. As a Christian, however, he would certainly have believed in heaven. In this way, the (Second) Commandment to Love is superseded by the First, which JPII adamantly acknowledges: one must believe in and love the Lord God with all their heart and soul, not because of the riches he offers, but because he is both good and deserving of love, simply because he is Love, and because humans are created in

Love's image.<sup>345</sup> With this said, and, in contrast to Mill's teaching, the truth of JP II's philosophy is that humanity is destined for eternal greatness. Humans can expect to gain eternal happiness beyond that which is experienced on earth. One must therefore focus on storing up treasures in heaven, as opposed to one earth.<sup>346</sup> That said, happiness itself must not be humanity's ultimate goal – rather, the goal must be to love God in and of himself, lest God become a mere means to the greatest pleasure and the mitigation of hell, the greatest pain. Instead, this truly permanent mitigation of all pain, and permanent experience of all that is truly good, truly moral, truly pleasurable, and truly joyful, becomes a byproduct of eternal union.

In summary, each philosopher holds opposing views on God's, heaven's, and hell's existence, and on the effects of Jesus' sacrifice on the Cross. These core differences are made manifest in their varied treatment of the First and Second Commandments, and in their views on God, Duty, conscience, human freedom, justice, and the innately temporary nature of happiness.

For Mill, external sanctions can be appropriated from any moral doctrine, including reverence for God. 'Conscience's' internal sanctions are mere products of one's internal sense of Duty, and, of mere subjective human experience, feeling, and so forth. Conscience's corruptibility and belief in God's grace no more predisposes one toward moral goodness than does belief in Duty, for adherence to external sanctions is a free choice made internally. In this way, Mill holds that believers have no more access to this *subjective feeling* of social Duty than do non-believers and that all are capable of behaving just as morally as God-fearing individuals.

Mill further argues that human freedom must be protected so that all people can attain their subjective happiness and subjective means of mitigating pain, without harming others. Mill also holds that justice is the most important facet of social utility, and that one facet of its proper application requires enforcement of the Old Testament principle, "an eye for an eye and a tooth

for a tooth”. Lastly, regarding happiness, Mill holds its nature innately temporary, thus revealing his implicit, agnostic stance that one can only expect to obtain earthly happiness.

For JP II, conscience is not subjective – rather, it is supernaturally endowed with morally righteous sensibility; compliance with it affects positive social change. Additionally, human freedom properly exercised requires that others’ dignity is prioritized above both personal and extra-personal concerns for happiness or pain’s mitigation. Man must recall that, in being an image of God the Creator, each also have their end in him, and are therefore accountable to him. Lastly, justice does not supersede Love’s importance, for all creation is accountable to the Love that honours the human person beyond virtue, vice, good deeds, and sinful deeds.

In this way, JP II’s implicit argument is that mercy precedes justice, for in preaching the Commandment to Love, Jesus aimed to unify all people in eternal life with him. Therefore, though JP II and Mill agree that earthly happiness is innately temporary, JP II also believes in the reality of eternal nuptial union with God through the way of the Cross. To achieve this everlasting communion, a human person must freely choose to requite God’s love. Thus, the heart of *Love and Responsibility* – that humanity must love each other as Christ loves, as the Commandment to Love fully intends in accounting for God’s existence. God and love are synonymous. To love one’s neighbour is to “God one’s neighbour”, therefore, God is inseparable from the Commandment to Love. The Second Commandment cannot exist or occur without the First. Such love leads to the heart’s fulfilment, that is, new life in Christ.

## 9: Conclusion

By closely examining and comparing Mill's *Utilitarianism* to JPII's *Love and Responsibility*, "Chapter I: The Person and the Drive: Part One: Analysis of the Verb 'to use'", we can conclude that, for Mill, all things are subject to happiness and to pain's mitigation – that is, to feeling a certain way. The best way of achieving personal happiness is to make others' happiness one's ideal end. For JPII, all things are subject to love, an act of self-giving made between two human persons to affirm the innate, God-given dignity of the other – thus, the end of all human interaction must be the human person. This end cannot truly be achieved without first honouring God, a directive which Jesus deems the First Commandment. While both philosophers see the value of pleasure, of utility, of happiness, and the unavoidable factor of use existing in (married) love, their philosophies are irrevocably demarcated by differing interpretations of the Commandment to Love. Each philosopher argues that their philosophy will lead to greater social harmony, which for JPII, and arguably for Mill also, means greater harmony within marriages and families.

Part 2 has offered five conclusions. Firstly, despite differences in era and in discipline, each philosopher defines utilitarianism in the same way; furthermore, each agree that human beings are inclined toward the utilitarian mentality. Secondly, JPII's critique of utilitarianism applies to hedonistic utilitarianism and to the incongruous nature of hedonistic and personalistic utilitarianism, which Mill champions. Thirdly, while Mill holds that all action and therefore all morality is oriented toward the Greatest Happiness Principle, JPII holds that in human relationships, all are called to subordinate a desire for pleasure and pain's mitigation to the protection of each person's inalienable dignity.<sup>347</sup> From this conclusion, one can assert that, fourthly, each philosopher conceives of the mind's limits differently – for Mill, people cannot



think beyond a basic desire for pleasure and pain's mitigation; for JP II, the mind is capable of prioritizing human dignity over these concerns.

Fifthly, both Mill and JP II hold that humans are geared toward social communion. While Mill explains what people should do with this inclination, JP II explains the source from which this inclination stems (God), and, in accounting for it, how humans should respond. Sixth and finally, Mill strongly rebukes the moral elasticity of Kant's *first principle*, as expressed in his *Metaphysics of Ethics*; conversely, JP II strongly values the moral rightness of Kant's *elementary principle*, as expressed in Kant's *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Each use their different interpretations of Kant's primary principle to justify their philosophies.

Parts 3 and 5 examined each philosopher's views on pleasure, utility, human dignity, and the Commandment to Love. On the one hand, Mill equates love with pleasure. Therefore, the Commandment to Love becomes the Commandment to Pleasure. To achieve an Edenic society, the greatest pleasure and least pain must be assured for the greatest number. In marriage, and in marital intimacy, the focus is to maximize personal pleasure by maximizing one's spouse's pleasure. Selfless acts are fundamentally motivated by fear of being harmed or caused pain (particularly for those who cannot bring themselves to become what Mill terms as benevolent utilitarians). Conversely, JP II holds that love and pleasure are separate entities. For JP II and the Church, the Commandment to Love is the Commandment to Self-Sacrifice. To achieve an Edenic society, one must focus on affirming the innate dignity and worth of each human person. This experience may involve a great amount of pleasure and or pain for the doer and the receiver of the (potential) action. In marriage, therefore, specifically in marital intimacy, the focus is to affirm one's spouse's dignity and worth by focusing on the person rather than pleasure or pain's

mitigation. Truly selfless acts are fundamentally motivated by a desire to serve and sacrifice for others, and to honour God by honouring others' innate, God-imaging dignity.

Part 4 notes the objective and subjective ways that each philosopher characterizes their moral order. On the one hand, Mill offers an objective moral order rooted in the subjective standard of personal happiness. What a person is inclined toward achieving, that is, pleasure and freedom from pain, determines who the human person is and what the moral standard is, which in turn determines what a human person should do. On the other hand, JPII offers an objective moral order rooted in greater objectivity, asserting that human beings are unique, unrepeatable, distinct, rational entities, possessing free will, and endowed with self-determination. Therefore, who a human person is defines what they should do and how they should interact with others. Mill considers the objective-subjective nature of his philosophy to be a strength, for subjective standards safeguard personal liberty. JPII considers the objective-objective nature of his philosophy to be a strength, for it safeguards the innate and equal dignity of all. While Mill believes that objective-objective (or 'constant') standards, *general propositions* and *axiomatic truths*, lead to false conclusions and society's disintegration, JPII believes that objective-subjective (or 'inconstant') standards based in personal tastes for pleasure and pain are corrupted by fallen human nature, and therefore lead to false conceptions of reality that, incidentally, cause harm to the human person.

Part 6 examined the basic mathematical and economic principles undergirding each philosopher's view of the Commandment and pleasure. The constant value in Mill's equation is 'experience' – that is, an experience of pleasure or of pain – granted, no two experiences are alike. Therefore, Mill's 'constant' is, by nature, inconstant. On the other hand, the constant value in JPII's 'equation' is the innate dignity of the human person, which is not situationally

dependent or subject to change, but ever-present. Therefore, JP II's constant value is, by nature, constant. Despite the usual positive connotations associated with constancy, and despite the usual negative connotations associated with inconstancy, each philosopher views their constant value as a strength, a positive life-force, in their philosophical 'equation'.

Furthermore, Mill champions addition, that is, adding to personal pleasures by giving of one's life to ensure others' happiness, which leads to personal fulfillment. On the other hand, JP II's focus is subtraction – giving of oneself, losing one's life, not because it is pleasurable, but because others should have their dignity affirmed regardless of the pleasure or pain involved, which, collaterally speaking, leads to personal fulfillment. Despite the usual positive connotations associated with addition and the usual negative connotations associated with subtraction, each philosopher considers their respective 'systems' to be the strength of their philosophical 'equation'.

Part 7 provided extra-textual insight on Mill and JP II's core principles to address seeming contradictions in their philosophies. As Mill's *Autobiography* attests, happiness must be found *by the way*, and that making others' happiness one's ideal end as opposed to one's own will, ironically, result in one's own happiness. The Mill-utilitarian's goal, therefore, is not personal happiness – rather, it is to ensure others' happiness, and in doing so, so too is one's own happiness assured. As JP II's 2002 Papal address at World Youth Day attests, people are both created for and righteously desire happiness – however, *true happiness* comes from suffering for others' sake. Forgoing concerns for personal pleasure and pain's mitigation so as to strengthen relationships, create new life, allow others to determine their own ends, and to affirm another's dignity, must be the goal in human relationships. Therefore, the ideal end of human interaction must be the human person as opposed to their happiness. This principle is reflected in Christ's

passion, death, and resurrection, which leads to eternal union with the person of God, humanity's ultimate end. In this way, for JP II, God is Love, spousal love, an eternal act of self-gift imaged in marriage and family. Emulating Christ's journey creates the possibility of greater peace and social unification.

Finally, Part 8 examined each philosopher's views on God, conscience, freedom, and justice. The argument – that the degree to which one values or believes in one philosophy over another is dependent upon one's belief in the existence of the Christian God. On the one hand, Mill seeks to achieve an Earthly paradise. His agnostic views make him skeptical of God's existence and of a heavenly reality. He believes it possible to appropriate religious values, to apply them effectively, without 'God' and 'grace', each of which, to Christians, are required for a truly deep and effective application of the Commandment. On the other hand, JP II seeks to achieve a heavenly paradise, because he is sure of God's existence, and of heaven's existence. This is why he would choose to forgo the utilitarian mentality of prioritizing pleasure so as to achieve eternal union with God. JP II's moral order is therefore founded in the Christ's First Commandment, which the (Second) Commandment to Love expresses when full contextualized. At the heart of his argument is that God and love are synonymous. To love one's neighbour is to "love God", therefore, God is inseparable from the Commandment to Love. The Second Commandment cannot exist or occur without the First.

In reading this paper, the author hopes that the reader has come to a greater understanding of utilitarianism and Christianity, two doctrines fundamental to Western thought. All that remains are two questions: to which definition of love do you currently subscribe – the Mill-utilitarian's definition, or the Wojtylian definition? In being informed of your current mindset, to which philosophy will you consciously subscribe in future?

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## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> Mill *Utilitarianism* 6, 3, 7, 11

<sup>2</sup> Mill 3; Harris *Mill, John Stuart*

<sup>3</sup> Ignatik *Love and Responsibility* xi; Wojtyła *Love and Responsibility* 18-19

<sup>4</sup> Given the heavier moral weighting attributed to papal documents, teachings, general audiences, etc., one may deem it inappropriate to reference Wojtyła's pre-papal work as a teaching of Pope John Paul II. This critique is invalidated, however, when one considers that the copy of *Love and Responsibility* to which this paper's author refers "includes revisions made [in 2001] by Blessed John Paul II himself of the original 1960 edition" (John Paul II *Love and Responsibility* Back Cover). As this fact suggests, these teachings are just as much championed by Wojtyła as they are by Pope John Paul II many years after the book's original publication; therefore, the author's choice to merge Wojtyła's and Pope John Paul II's identities and mindsets under *JPII* (an abbreviation of his papal designation). The author of this work asserts that one should therefore view *Love and Responsibility* as extremely important to the Catholic-Christian Church.

<sup>5</sup> Wojtyła 24; Mill 16; Ignatik 324; Mark 12:30-33; Matthew 22:37-29; Luke 10:27. The author has chosen to use JPII's term, the "Commandment to Love" to identify what Mill terms "the golden rule" and that which Jesus terms as the "Second Greatest Commandment" for the simple reason that it better communicates the difference inherent between Mill and JPII's philosophies, as well as this thesis' topic for discussion, namely, that Mill equates *love* with pleasure, and that JPII argues that *love* and pleasure are in no way synonymous.

<sup>6</sup> Mill 3

<sup>7</sup> Mill 16

<sup>8</sup> Wojtyła 24

<sup>9</sup> Wojtyła 19, 71

<sup>10</sup> John Paul II "Apostolic Pilgrimage"; Wojtyła 20

<sup>11</sup> Wojtyła 45, 82, 24, 232; Ignatik 324; Mark 12:30-33; Matthew 22:37-29; Luke 10:27

<sup>12</sup> Wojtyła 20

<sup>13</sup> The author uses the term 'Christian' in quotation marks for two reasons. First, to denote that the Church (in the case of JPII, the Catholic-Christian church), the moral authority on Christ's teachings, would not agree that Mill's views constitute a Christian viewpoint. In this way, the quotation marks remind the reader that Christianity would not view utilitarianism as a complementary philosophy. Second, as Mill biographer Jose Harris states, because Mill himself was somewhat averse to Christianity and its followers,

His writings on logic, economics, and politics were widely regarded by contemporaries not just as exercises in secular science but as veiled attacks on Christian orthodoxy, *and there were occasions on which Mill himself seemed to endorse this view. ... [P]art of his irritation with Christianity as a working philosophy stemmed from the fact that many of its adherents seemed to know far less about the subject than he knew himself.*

Harris

In this way, Mill sets himself apart from Christianity out of some level of distaste, not only for the religion, but for the ignorance of its followers. That being said, Mill is not wholly averse to

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Christian teaching, for Harris goes on to state that Mill’s dislike of Christianity is often exaggerated, and that Mill also possessed a deep appreciation for the likes of Comte, or Tractarians and their attempt to “reconstitute a sense of organic Christian *community*” (Harris). Harris also states that Mill possessed “a deep and detailed knowledge of the Bible”, and that he studied the teachings of Church fathers from throughout the eras (Harris). With this biographical information in mind, it is not hard to understand why Mill accepted and rejected some Christian teaching, and why he attempted to merge aspects of it with his utilitarian doctrine. This brief discussion concerning Mill’s personal attitude toward Christianity and his ‘Christian’-utilitarian doctrine is continued in endnote 26, found on page 9.

<sup>14</sup> Wojtyła 24

<sup>15</sup> West *Made for More*. Eden, as defined by the Oxford English Dictionary: “1. The abode of Adam and Eve at their creation, Paradise; also more fully, the garden of Eden. ... 2. transferred and figurative. A delightful abode or resting-place, a paradise; a state of supreme happiness” (Eden). This term serves as a mere allegorical representation of each philosopher’s desire to achieve social harmony. Although *Eden* is not used in either primary text, it has been selected because this essay examines each philosopher’s view of a *Christian* commandment whose underlying purpose is to foster greater peace on earth and good will toward one’s fellow man.

<sup>16</sup> As the following excerpt states, *Love and Responsibility* critiques utilitarianism in general, as opposed to merely Mill’s specific iteration of the doctrine:

The critique below refers to utilitarianism both in its hedonistic version as well as in any other one, insofar as it allows treating the human person instrumentally and reductively (we mean the reduction of the person as value to the value of a function that is served by the person, i.e., to this or that – not necessarily hedonistic – usefulness of the person). this critique, however, does not concern the aforementioned *personalistic* version of utilitarianism.

Wojtyła 19

<sup>17</sup> John Paul II “Apostolic Pilgrimage”

<sup>18</sup> Wojtyła 15

<sup>19</sup> Mill 3; Wojtyła 11

<sup>20</sup> Harris

<sup>21</sup> Harris

<sup>22</sup> John Paul II. “Apostolic Visit”

<sup>23</sup> Matthew 16:24-25; Ignatik 302

<sup>24</sup> John 14:27

<sup>25</sup> Matthew 6:19-21

<sup>26</sup> A continuation of endnote 13, found on page 3. Mill’s proclivity toward synthesizing contradictory viewpoints is not limited to *Utilitarianism*. In her assessment of Mill’s views on “Science and logic”, Mill biographer Jose Harris notes that “Mill initially pursued his [scientific] enquiries in a deliberately open-minded, ‘non-sectarian’ spirit, hoping to reach a position in which the partial truths contained in rival schools might be resolved or synthesized” (Harris). We see this viewpoint not only expressed in Mill’s *Utilitarianism*, but also in Mill’s *On Liberty*, where he states that worldviews with which one disagrees must be heard, for it is likely that they “[contain] a portion of truth” that would be lost if they were to be silenced –



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[T]hough the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and very commonly does, contain a portion of truth; and since the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied.

Mill On Liberty 50

It is worth noting that this Mill-mindset inspired the author to examine these works from the four following perspectives: firstly, JPII's *Love and Responsibility* from a Christian perspective; secondly, Mill's *Utilitarianism* from a Christian perspective; thirdly, Mill's *Utilitarianism* from a utilitarian's perspective; fourthly JPII's *Love and Responsibility* from a utilitarian perspective. The author aims to examine each philosophy with fairness and objectivity so that greater understanding between each doctrine might be achieved.

<sup>27</sup> Harris

<sup>28</sup> Mill 3

<sup>29</sup> Wojtyła 19

<sup>30</sup> Ignatik 19

<sup>31</sup> Ignatik 19

<sup>32</sup> Edwards 206-209. Act utilitarians “assess the rightness or wrongness of each individual action directly by its consequences” (Edwards 206). A hedonistic-ideal utilitarian hybrid (as in the case of Mill), holds “that although pleasantness [is] a necessary condition for goodness, the intrinsic goodness of a state of mind could depend on things other than its pleasantness, or, as [Mill] put it, there are higher and lower pleasures” (207). A normative utilitarian champions “a system of normative ethics, that is, as a proposal about how we *ought* to think about conduct” (207, 208).

<sup>33</sup> Ignatik 147

<sup>34</sup> Ignatik 146, 147

<sup>35</sup> Mill 1, 11

<sup>36</sup> John Paul II “Apostolic Pilgrimage”; Wojtyła 20

<sup>37</sup> Wojtyła 15

<sup>38</sup> Wojtyła 15

<sup>39</sup> Wojtyła 7

<sup>40</sup> Wojtyła 6

<sup>41</sup> Wojtyła 7; Ignatik 300

<sup>42</sup> Wojtyła 7; Ignatik 300

<sup>43</sup> Ignatik 147

<sup>44</sup> Mill 30

<sup>45</sup> Ignatik 300

<sup>46</sup> Mill 3

<sup>47</sup> Mill 3

<sup>48</sup> Mill 3

<sup>49</sup> Mill 4, 5

<sup>50</sup> Mill 3, 51

<sup>51</sup> Mill 3

<sup>52</sup> Wojtyła 11; Mill 3

<sup>53</sup> Ignatik 301-302; Wojtyła 10, 11, 19

<sup>54</sup> Wojtyła 9, 10

<sup>55</sup> Wojtyła 10

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- <sup>56</sup> Wojtyła 10
- <sup>57</sup> Wojtyła 10
- <sup>58</sup> Wojtyła 10, 12
- <sup>59</sup> Wojtyła 11
- <sup>60</sup> Wojtyła 21. JPII identifies Kant’s moral imperative as “people are ends in themselves, and never to be used as a means to an end” (Wojtyła 21).
- <sup>61</sup> Wojtyła 15
- <sup>62</sup> Mill 5, 6
- <sup>63</sup> Mill 7
- <sup>64</sup> Mill 7
- <sup>65</sup> Mill 11
- <sup>66</sup> Mill 7
- <sup>67</sup> Edwards 206
- <sup>68</sup> Edwards 206
- <sup>69</sup> Mill 7
- <sup>70</sup> Mill 7
- <sup>71</sup> Mill 7
- <sup>72</sup> Mill 7
- <sup>73</sup> Mill 8
- <sup>74</sup> Mill 9
- <sup>75</sup> Mill 8
- <sup>76</sup> Mill 9
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- <sup>79</sup> Mill 9
- <sup>80</sup> Mill 9
- <sup>81</sup> Mill 9
- <sup>82</sup> Mill 9
- <sup>83</sup> Mill 9
- <sup>84</sup> Wojtyła 6. The structure undergirding JPII’s anthropology of the human person’s objective nature exists in five interconnecting components. Each build on the former, and in the following order. Firstly, and most importantly, every subject is at the same time an *objective* being, that is an objective something or somebody” – “a concrete ‘I’, each time unique and unrepeatable” (Wojtyła 3). Secondly, “the person as [an objective] subject differs from even the most perfect animals by his *interiority* and a specific life, which is concentrated in it, i.e., an interior life” (4). Thirdly, man first perceives God, the tangible world, and the intangible world through his senses, and then reflects interiorly through cognition; desire motivates him to seek the good (5-6). Fourthly, man perceives the physical reality, reacts out of habit, and acts “attempts to make his mark, to state his ‘I’” through the use of free will – thus, physicality, interiority, and self-assertion (6). Fifthly, regarding free will, “No one else can will [or want] in my stead... I am and should be self-reliant in my actions. All human interactions are based on this presupposition, and the truth about education (*wychowanie*) and about culture is reduced to it” (6; Ignatik 299). With this, Ignatik, JPII’s editor, adds that although man is an end in and of himself, free to will as he pleases, endowed with the power to reject or requite God’s love for him, he is also dependent “on God and his truth” for his existence and his ability to act (Ignatik 300). In his dependence, man is informed that his “*vocation to a life of happiness with God* is

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fundamental for his human dignity” (300). In this way, access to one’s fully alive, fully dignified, fully human potential and divine inheritance as God intended, is only possible through requiring God’s all-fulfilling love. Thus, “man, [though free to determine his own conduct,] being an image of God, cannot find himself unless through a sincere gift of self in the communion of persons” (300). It is therefore crucial to remind readers that, in accordance with Ignatik’s addition, the Commandment to Love, that is, the Second Commandment to love others as one loves oneself and to honour their dignity above all else, cannot be fulfilled without honouring the First Commandment – that is, acknowledging, honouring, and living in communion with God.

<sup>85</sup> Wojtyła 7; Ignatik 300

<sup>86</sup> Wojtyła 7; Ignatik 300

<sup>87</sup> Wojtyła 7; Ignatik 300

<sup>88</sup> Wojtyła 20

<sup>89</sup> Wojtyła 10

<sup>90</sup> Ignatik 146, 147

<sup>91</sup> 1 Samuel 16:7

<sup>92</sup> Wojtyła 20

<sup>93</sup> Wojtyła 20, 21

<sup>94</sup> Wojtyła 20, 21

<sup>95</sup> Wojtyła 21

<sup>96</sup> Wojtyła 21. As stated in Part 2: Comparative Overview of this paper, JP II formulates the following revised edition of Kant’s moral imperative: “Whenever the person is an object of action in your conduct, remember that you may not treat him merely as a means to an end, as a tool, but [you must] take into account that the person himself has or at least should have his end.”<sup>96</sup>

<sup>97</sup> Wojtyła 21

<sup>98</sup> Wojtyła 21

<sup>99</sup> Wojtyła 21. The term “positive emotional-affective” moments first appears under Chapter I, Part One’s subheading “The second meaning of the verb ‘to use’”, a section devoted to further distinguishing between use and love, and the importance of love (Wojtyła 15, 17). JP II states: action is accompanied by a person’s mood and feeling (or what JP II calls *emotional-affective moments*) (15). These ‘mood-feelings’, experienced in man’s *consciousness*, precede, accompany, and follow action (15). Despite being experienced in unison, mood-feelings are separate from action (15). Without mood-feelings, actions would be mechanical – but they are not. Actions are brightly *coloured* by mood-feeling (16). Mood-feelings affect how humans understand “the objective structure of human acts” (16). Generally, mood-feelings are either pleasurable (positive), or painful (negative). While pleasurable mood-feelings are experienced as “sensual satisfaction... affective contentment, or as a deep and thorough joy”, painful mood-feelings are experienced as “sensual pain... affective discontent, or as deep sorrow” (16). These mood-feelings – rich, diverse, and intense – affect how humans experience male-female relationships and the sexual relations thereof (16).

<sup>100</sup> Wojtyła 21

<sup>101</sup> 1 Corinthians 6:18

<sup>102</sup> 1 Corinthians 6:18

<sup>103</sup> Wojtyła 11

<sup>104</sup> Mill 7

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- <sup>105</sup> Mill 3  
<sup>106</sup> Ignatik 300  
<sup>107</sup> Wojtyła 21-22  
<sup>108</sup> Wojtyła 22  
<sup>109</sup> Wojtyła 22  
<sup>110</sup> Wojtyła 22  
<sup>111</sup> Wojtyła 22  
<sup>112</sup> Wojtyła 22  
<sup>113</sup> Wojtyła 23  
<sup>114</sup> Wojtyła 23  
<sup>115</sup> Wojtyła 23  
<sup>116</sup> Wojtyła 23  
<sup>117</sup> Wojtyła 22-23  
<sup>118</sup> Mill 7; Wojtyła 20  
<sup>119</sup> Mill 7; Wojtyła 20  
<sup>120</sup> Mill 8; Wojtyła 20  
<sup>121</sup> Mill 8  
<sup>122</sup> Wojtyła 117  
<sup>123</sup> To create a full, rich understanding of JP II's definition of pleasure and the mentality with which one must approach it, influence from sections beyond Chapter I, Part One of *Love and Responsibility* have been included in this analysis.  
<sup>124</sup> Wojtyła 7  
<sup>125</sup> Wojtyła 7  
<sup>126</sup> Wojtyła 8  
<sup>127</sup> Wojtyła 9  
<sup>128</sup> Wojtyła 10-11  
<sup>129</sup> Wojtyła 10-11  
<sup>130</sup> Wojtyła 16  
<sup>131</sup> Wojtyła 16  
<sup>132</sup> Wojtyła 16-17  
<sup>133</sup> Wojtyła 18, 17  
<sup>134</sup> Wojtyła 22  
<sup>135</sup> Wojtyła 140  
<sup>136</sup> Wojtyła 140  
<sup>137</sup> Wojtyła 140, 20; Ignatik 140  
<sup>138</sup> Wojtyła 82  
<sup>139</sup> Wojtyła 82; Ignatik 140  
<sup>140</sup> Ignatik 14, 140; Wojtyła 140, 147  
<sup>141</sup> Wojtyła 140  
<sup>142</sup> Wojtyła 143-144; 144, 145; 180  
<sup>143</sup> Wojtyła 88  
<sup>144</sup> Wojtyła 143-144  
<sup>145</sup> Wojtyła 142  
<sup>146</sup> Wojtyła 143-144  
<sup>147</sup> Wojtyła 143-145  
<sup>148</sup> Romans 3:23

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- <sup>149</sup> Wojtyła 145  
<sup>150</sup> Wojtyła 144; 142  
<sup>151</sup> Wojtyła 145; 180  
<sup>152</sup> Romans 7:21-23  
<sup>153</sup> Wojtyła 181  
<sup>154</sup> Wojtyła 181  
<sup>155</sup> Wojtyła 61-62  
<sup>156</sup> Ignatik 300  
<sup>157</sup> Wojtyła 18  
<sup>158</sup> Wojtyła 18  
<sup>159</sup> Wojtyła 15; 145; Ignatik 14-15. In practical terms, Ignatik adds that true love requires actors to want, or *will*, to do the following: first, to affirm the other's dignity; second, to show the other that they are loved and created as fully dignified creatures by God, and that the fulfilment of their end occurs in eternal union with God; finally, to ensure their action suit the role they wish to assume, and that this role suits the relationship (Wojtyła 15; Ignatik 14-15; Ignatik 302). Actions seeking to affirm another's dignity that do *not* suit the relationship result in (potentially unintended) *anti-love*, or use, which causes love's deterioration (Ignatik 14-15).  
<sup>160</sup> Wojtyła 14 -15; Psalm 19:12  
<sup>161</sup> Wojtyła 46  
<sup>162</sup> Wojtyła 45  
<sup>163</sup> Wojtyła 43, 44  
<sup>164</sup> Wojtyła 43, 44, 45  
<sup>165</sup> Genesis 1:28  
<sup>166</sup> Mill 1  
<sup>167</sup> Mill 11  
<sup>168</sup> Wojtyła 15-16  
<sup>169</sup> Wojtyła 6, 10  
<sup>170</sup> Wojtyła xxii  
<sup>171</sup> Wojtyła 21  
<sup>172</sup> Mill 11  
<sup>173</sup> Mill *On Liberty* 12  
<sup>174</sup> Mill 44  
<sup>175</sup> Mill Utilitarianism 58  
<sup>176</sup> Mill 62  
<sup>177</sup> Harris  
<sup>178</sup> Harris  
<sup>179</sup> John 14:6; Revelation 22:13; Galatians 5:1  
<sup>180</sup> Wojtyła 24  
<sup>181</sup> Mill 11  
<sup>182</sup> Mill 11, 14  
<sup>183</sup> Mill 11, 14  
<sup>184</sup> Mill 15  
<sup>185</sup> Mill 15, 16  
<sup>186</sup> Mill 16  
<sup>187</sup> Mill 16  
<sup>188</sup> Harris

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189 Mill 16  
190 Mill 7  
191 Harris  
192 Mill 27  
193 Mill 27  
194 Mill 27  
195 Mill 27  
196 Mill 27  
197 Mill 27  
198 Mill 28  
199 Mill 28  
200 Mill 28  
201 Mill 28  
202 Harris  
203 Mill 11  
204 Mill 11  
205 Mill 16  
206 Mill 30  
207 Mill 30  
208 Mill 30  
209 Mill 17  
210 Mill 17  
211 Mill 21  
212 Mill 23  
213 Wojtyła 12, 22  
214 Wojtyła 12-13  
215 Wojtyła 13  
216 Wojtyła 13, 22  
217 Wojtyła 22-23, 18  
218 Wojtyła 13-14  
219 Wojtyła 24  
220 Wojtyła 25  
221 Ignatik 19  
222 Wojtyła 25  
223 Wojtyła 25  
224 Wojtyła 25-26  
225 Wojtyła 26  
226 Mill 21  
227 1 Corinthians 13:4-8  
228 1 Corinthians 13:4-8  
229 Wojtyła 117  
230 Matthew 5:44  
231 Mill 16  
232 Wojtyła 22  
233 Wojtyła 22  
234 Wojtyła 22

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- <sup>235</sup> Ignatik 146, 147  
<sup>236</sup> Wojtyła 13  
<sup>237</sup> Wojtyła 13  
<sup>238</sup> Wojtyła 13-14  
<sup>239</sup> Mill 23  
<sup>240</sup> Wojtyła 20-21; xxii-xxiii  
<sup>241</sup> Harris  
<sup>242</sup> Wojtyła 21; Mill 7  
<sup>243</sup> Mill 53  
<sup>244</sup> Mill 53  
<sup>245</sup> Harris  
<sup>246</sup> Harris  
<sup>247</sup> Wojtyła 52  
<sup>248</sup> Wojtyła 45, 82  
<sup>249</sup> Wojtyła 21  
<sup>250</sup> Wojtyła 6, 20, 21; John Paul II “Apostolic Pilgrimage”  
<sup>251</sup> Mill 3, 11  
<sup>252</sup> Wojtyła 79  
<sup>253</sup> Wojtyła 140  
<sup>254</sup> Wojtyła 140  
<sup>255</sup> Ignatik 140  
<sup>256</sup> Ignatik 140; Wojtyła 17, 20  
<sup>257</sup> Mill 16  
<sup>258</sup> Mill 11  
<sup>259</sup> Mill 62, 58  
<sup>260</sup> Mill 58  
<sup>261</sup> Mill 58  
<sup>262</sup> Mill 58  
<sup>263</sup> Wojtyła 139  
<sup>264</sup> Mill 52  
<sup>265</sup> Mill, *Autobiography*, 134; Harris  
<sup>266</sup> Mill, *Autobiography*, 142  
<sup>267</sup> Harris; Mill *Utilitarianism* 13, 16  
<sup>268</sup> Wojtyła 20  
<sup>269</sup> John Paul II. “Apostolic Visit”  
<sup>270</sup> Ignatik 300  
<sup>271</sup> Ignatik *xi*; Wojtyła 18-19  
<sup>272</sup> John Paul II “Apostolic Visit”  
<sup>273</sup> John Paul II “Apostolic Visit”  
<sup>274</sup> 1 Peter 5:7  
<sup>275</sup> John Paul II “Apostolic Visit”  
<sup>276</sup> Wojtyła 79; Matthew 16:24-25  
<sup>277</sup> John Paul II “Apostolic Visit”; Matthew 5:1-12  
<sup>278</sup> Wojtyła 234  
<sup>279</sup> Matthew 26:26; John 1:29  
<sup>280</sup> Wojtyła 68

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- 281 John 3:16  
282 Genesis 1:27  
283 Ignatik 300  
284 Wojtyła 78  
285 West Eclipse of the Body 68  
286 West Eclipse of the Body 68  
287 Ignatik 300  
288 Ignatik 300  
289 Wojtyła 11; Ignatik 302  
290 Wojtyła 232  
291 Harris  
292 Harris  
293 Harris  
294 Harris  
295 Mill 16  
296 Mill 28  
297 Ignatik 11  
298 Wojtyła 11; Mill 27-28  
299 Mill 21  
300 Mill 28  
301 Mill 28  
302 Mill 28  
303 Mill 28  
304 Mill 28  
305 Mill 28  
306 Mill 28  
307 Mill 28  
308 Mill 28  
309 Mill 28  
310 Mill 28  
311 Mill 62  
312 Mill 44  
313 Mill 47  
314 Mill 48  
315 Mill 48  
316 Mill 55  
317 John 3:16 - “For this is how God loved the world: he gave his only Son [Jesus, who issues the Commandment], so that everyone who believes in him may not perish but may have eternal life.”  
318 Wojtyła xxiii  
319 Mill 55  
320 Wojtyła 11  
321 Wojtyła 117  
322 Ignatik xi  
323 Wojtyła 27  
324 Wojtyła 26  
325 Wojtyła 26, 27



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- <sup>326</sup> Wojtyła 26  
<sup>327</sup> Wojtyła 26-27  
<sup>328</sup> Mill 62  
<sup>329</sup> Wojtyła 27  
<sup>330</sup> Wojtyła 27, 28  
<sup>331</sup> Wojtyła 28  
<sup>332</sup> Wojtyła 11  
<sup>333</sup> Ignatik 302  
<sup>334</sup> Ignatik 302; John 15:5  
<sup>335</sup> Ignatik 302  
<sup>336</sup> Ignatik 302  
<sup>337</sup> Wojtyła 11  
<sup>338</sup> Wojtyła 11, 26  
<sup>339</sup> Wojtyła 11  
<sup>340</sup> Mill 12  
<sup>341</sup> Mill 12  
<sup>342</sup> Mill 12  
<sup>343</sup> Mill 16  
<sup>344</sup> Wojtyła 22  
<sup>345</sup> Wojtyła 24  
<sup>346</sup> Matthew 6:19-21  
<sup>347</sup> Wojtyła 15