Analysis of An Urban Food System Through the Lens of Multi-level Governance: A Case Study of Mzuzu, Malawi

by

Amanda Joynt

A thesis

presented to the University of Waterloo

in fulfilment of the

thesis requirement for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Geography

Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2022

Examining Committee Membership

The following served on the Examining Committee for this thesis. The decision of the Examining Committee is by majority vote.

External Examiner	Dr. Gareth Haysom Senior Research Officer African Centre for Cities, University of Cape Town
Supervisor	Dr. Bruce Frayne Dean, Faculty of Environment, University of Waterloo
Internal Member	Dr. Andrea Collins Associate Professor, School of Environment, Resources and Sustainability (SERS), University of Waterloo
Internal-external Member	Dr. Liam Riley Adjunct Research Faculty, Balsillie School of International Affairs, Wilfrid Laurier University Adjunct Graduate Supervisor, Geography and Environmental Management, University of Waterloo
Other Member(s)	Dr. Andrea Brown Associate Professor Department of Political Science University of Laurier

Author's Declaration

This thesis consists of material all of which I authored or co-authored: see Statement of Contributions included in the thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners. I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.

Statement of Contributions

Amanda Joynt is the sole author for Chapters 1-6 which were written under the supervision of Dr. Bruce Frayne. These chapters were not written for publication.

Abstract

Urban food systems exist in a paradox – there are large amounts of available food, as well as hungry people. Urban governments are often held responsible for food insecurity in their jurisdiction, however the governance of urban food systems is influenced by social, economic, and political forces at various levels of governance. This dissertation investigates the nature of these influences through a qualitative analysis of the perspectives of actors at multiple levels and types of governance. This work applies the Governance Analytical Framework to a case study of Mzuzu, Malawi's food system and asks why this paradox of availability and hunger exists. Multiple forces outside of the bounds of the city government are found to influence food system processes in Mzuzu. The city's food system outcomes are perceived to be influenced by an asymmetrical power balance between the national government and other types of governance, through the diverse pathways to access food, economic inequality, high urbanization rates, and the physical infrastructure of markets, transportation, and energy systems. This perspective-driven approach also elucidates the differing beliefs about the reasons behind Mzuzu's food system outcomes – notably cultural norms, the influence of liberal market and aid discourse, and government capacity and corruption, including the agency with which governing actors choose to create, implement, and enforce rules. The results of this empirical study of complex food system governance provides practitioners and policy makers with practical starting points to engage in the policy discussions and interactions required to govern Mzuzu's food system. Though this is a case study, the methodology can be applied to other urban sites, showing how governance can be a frame for comparative, qualitative assessment.

Acknowledgements

It clearly takes a village to build a dissertation. I am deeply grateful to the Province of Ontario and the University of Waterloo for supporting my first two years of study through the Ontario Graduate Scholarship and the University of Waterloo President's Graduate Scholarship. My work was further supported in the following years by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Joseph-Armand Bombardier Canada Graduate Scholarship. My field work was supported through the Michael Smith Foreign Studies Supplement and the Queen Elizabeth Scholarship. I pledge to not take my education for granted and feel blessed to have received these awards.

To my friends in Malawi, old and new, this work would not be as rich without your input and care. To Max and Rachel, you are my Malawian parents. Thank you for your extraordinary kindness. To my CITW friends: Simon, Joseph, Chimz, and Chris and the team at Wilderness Safaris, thank you for making it seem like it had not been 12 years! To Lovemore Zuze for your kindness, advocacy, and advice, to the Livingstonia team: Moses, Happy, Jacqueline, Paul, Gibson, Ella and the rest of the team at the University of Livingstonia Synod Governance Section for warmly welcoming me and supporting my work. To Charles and Elizabeth for enlightening conversation, Madalitso for safe taxi transport and kindness, and especially to my RA team Joshua, Mervis, and Faith, all who made this research so much easier and a lot more fun.

Dr. Bruce Frayne, thank you for your patience and for your calm, logical, and realistic approach to scholarship. To Dr. Liam Riley, Dr. Andrea Brown, and Dr. Andrea Collins, thank you for the solid network of constructive support. My grad school companions – Roxanne, Anil, Ning, Mary, James, Norman, Evan, Sondra, Steph, the food lab crew, the Queen Elizabeth Scholars team, and the Skype COVID crew - thank you for teaching me, for listening, and for going for walks and tea. To Dana and Shiva for your friendship, love, and wisdom and to Alan and Carrie for offers to review and for hilarity and inspiration. To my work colleagues for their patience and support, I am very grateful.

My long-time friends, Christine, Kristen, and Kelly kept me going with cards and phone calls filled with wit and wisdom. Allison Elgie, I am so blessed to have found a lifelong friend with whom to go through grad school. You are a phenomenal human and I can't wait to see how you change the world. Finally, to my family, who support my decisions despite my incessant need to pursue careers in fields that most people volunteer for. I am where I want to be. Thank you for your constant love and for trusting me to walk my own path.

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to those who stand in front of galloping Horsemen and say, "no further."

This thesis is also dedicated to the people who took time out of their lives to talk with me in the completion of this research, and who did so with kindness and thoughtful consideration, as well as to my friends and colleagues in Malawi.

Table of Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

1.0 Introduction

1.1 Overview

Cities have food, but they also have people who are food insecure (Ruel et al., 2017). This paradox exists in urban environments all over the world, with food insecurity rates ranging from 8% to over 60% (Statistics Canada, 2012; 2018; Fotso et al., 2012; Acquah et al., 2013; Sriram & Tarasuk, 2016; Ruel et al., 2017; FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP & WHO, 2021). As cities grow larger and more complex, creating urban food systems that provide for all citizens will be an increasing challenge in this century. In sub-Saharan Africa, city governments are facing increasing rates of urbanization and food insecurity with relatively few resources (Haysom, 2015; UNDESA, 2018; FAO, 2022; Pieterse & Parnell, 2014). For secondary cities– regional hubs that fall just under the size and importance of primary political or economic capitals – this challenge is further complicated by predictions of higher rates of urbanization and limited political and economic power (Goodfellow & Jackman, 2020; Baeumler et al., 2021; Neves, 2021). Mzuzu, the northern regional capital of Malawi and the nation's third largest city, provides the case study site for this research. This secondary city is currently undergoing transitions to its food system while navigating the influences of local, regional, national, and international governance.

For the purposes of this research, I focus on a secondary city because of the intensified pressure from urbanization, the fewer research projects outside of primary cities, and the added layers of domestic politics (Christiaensen & Kanbur, 2017; Smit, 2018). This does not mean that primary cities are not dealing with their own pressures. This research applies a more universal outlook to urban spaces; while the results are from a case study of Mzuzu, a secondary city, the methods used in this study could also be used to understand the context of other urban spaces – primary, secondary, or tertiary. This dissertation asserts that context matters, and that governance can be the consistent factor around which we understand urban food systems. Governance analysis can help us to understand how the contextual factors outside of a typical food value chain, such as the social, economic, historical, and political governance of a society can greatly impact food systems, thereby impacting food security outcomes.

Many factors influence the way a food system functions, creating difficulty in both understanding urban food systems and in knowing how to manage them. This dissertation sheds light on the governance of urban food systems, one of the most poorly understood determinants of food

security (Delaney et al., 2018). It addresses two parallel questions surrounding the influence of multiple levels of governance on Mzuzu's urban food system: What is the nature of this influence, and how could an understanding of these influences improve the analysis of urban food systems?

This introduction first defines the terms that I use throughout the dissertation. The context provides the factors and conditions in which I position my research and builds the argument for including the influence of sociopolitical context, such as multi-level governance interactions within the analysis of an urban food system. The description of the research problem follows. The methodology and methods are then briefly described, and the contributions of the research are outlined. The introduction is concluded with a paragraph synopsis of the dissertation's chapters.

1.2 Concepts and their Application to this Dissertation

1.2.1 A Note on Scales, Levels, and Types

In this dissertation I refer to 'levels' of governance, as well as 'types' of governance. Although Born and Purcell (2006) present scale as being fundamentally relational and socially produced, I refrain from using the terms 'scale' or 'scalar' because there is often an assumption that these scales are direct nested versions of each other, or that they have reporting or communication requirements between them. In contrast, the governance of urban space is more likely a web, with communication and reporting structures within and among different levels and types of governance (Collinge & Srbljanin, 2003). The use of 'scale' also feels deferential to structures of governance instead of a governance system where politics and agency may have more influence on what occurs within and between each governance level (Griffin, 2012).

When I refer to *levels*, it is to a political or social scale, such as international, national, regional, or urban. When I refer to a *type* of governance, it is to a sector, such as commercial, government, non-profit (NGO or civil society organization). These two descriptors will often be combined, such as the international commercial sector, or the Malawian national government.

1.2.2 A Note on Three Broad Areas of Scholarship

This dissertation studies the combination of three broad and contested areas of scholarship: food systems and food security, governance, and the urban environment. To provide clarity, the three concepts are briefly discussed below to clarify how they are approached in this dissertation.

Discussions of food systems often include discussions of food security levels. This thesis focuses on the governance of food systems and refers to urban food security as a desired outcome of urban food system governance. A food system is often thought of as the food supply chain, involving the production, distribution, and consumption of food to a specific population. It is also defined with a wider view by Pinstrup-Andersen and Watson (2011, p.3) as "the aggregate of food-related activities and the environments (political, socioeconomic, and natural) within which these activities occur." This thesis applies both definitions in different ways. While the food supply chain provides a useful path to identify initial research participants and to guide discussions, the wider definition is applied to the conceptual framework and analysis, as it includes the political, socioeconomic and natural systems (and their governance) within which the food supply chain operates.

The 1996 definition of food security from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) is most often applied in development sector, especially amongst global governance institutions. This definition states that food security is "when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life" (FAO, 1996). There are four components of food security – access, availability, utilization and stability – that are influenced by many other factors outside of the food system such as socioeconomic and environmental systems and physical infrastructure. This definition and the four components are referenced throughout the dissertation.

The definition of governance continues to evolve and remains a contested term in contemporary scholarship. Specific conceptualizations of governance are entrenched in varied fields such as corporate management or international development, resulting in different interpretations, applications, and a lack of conceptual clarity (Chhotray & Stoker, 2009; Hufty 2011b). The literature review in Chapter 2 expands on two debates occurring in parallel: the definition of governance as a subjective term, as in, what are the characteristics of 'good' governance, and the debate around the conceptual meaning of the word 'governance.' It is therefore important to clarify the meaning of the term in the parameters of this study. I have chosen to apply a definition I have garnered from the literature of the second, more analytical debate, which will enable me to see a governance context 'as it is.' It should serve as a reminder of the forces working within all systems and organizations and add to our capacity to analyze processes of governing (Colebatch, 2014) and include the tenets of governance: structure, process, and authority. From the literature, I have compiled a definition of governance that distills the concept to its foundational components and

holds when applied to its many forms. At its most basic, governance is a system of organization based on rules, both from formal structures such as laws, and informal structures such as norms. For the purposes of this dissertation, governance is viewed as the decisions about the setting of rules, the application of rules, and the enforcement of rules in any context – formal or informal (Kjaer, 2004; 2009).

The concept of urban is yet another concept with a wide range of definitions (Iossifova, et al., 2017). Often these definitions are 'fit for purpose' towards policy development and the management of a city, using geographical boundaries, population limits, or functions such as service provision to define themselves. The academic debate around an urban definition continues, with the dichotomy of urban/rural dissolving as economic, communication, and transportation systems broaden the spatial interactions between people. In simpler terms, the urban is generally defined as a 'concentration' or 'assemblage' of humanity within a certain defined space (Friedmann, 2014). Alternatively, Brenner and Schmid (2014) suggest the urban concept as a theory of processes surrounding people, structures, capital, and functions, resulting in complex, adaptive systems. These processes and concentrations beget shifts in the types of structures that serve the population both inside and outside the urban boundaries (i.e. taller structures like apartment buildings or large institutions like bank headquarters). This shift then necessitates secondary and tertiary sector functions for the population's demand for a diversity of services.

In this dissertation, I allowed urban to be defined through the perspectives of the respondents in the study. The respondents mostly referenced the spatial boundaries of the city as defined by law, referring to spatial management and responsibility for management. Although many did not define the city in terms of processes, respondents noted that the challenges the city was facing were due to processes and functions the city was expected to provide and was struggling to provide – such as housing, roads, utilities, and market space while under pressure from high urbanization rates.

Food system governance is the organization of food systems based on rules. It occurs at different levels from household to global, and the political, socioeconomic, and environmental systems it occurs within will interact with and affect each other. From an urban perspective, it is the structures and processes by which an urban social system – in Mzuzu's case, what occurs within the legal boundaries of the city – achieves the organization of its food system. Steel (2013, p. ix) phrases it straightforwardly as "understanding how a city eats." There are strong and plentiful connections

between the economic, social, cultural, and political governance that influence the way urban food systems function (Pinstrup-Andersen & Watson, 2011; Horton et al., 2017; Hawkes & Parsons, 2019). This complexity is why urban food governance is so important to understand, and as well so difficult to understand.

1.3 The Context

1.3.1 Urbanization

Urbanization in sub-Saharan Africa is occurring at higher rates than much of the world (OECD, 2020). In particular, secondary cities, such as Mzuzu, Malawi, are absorbing much of the continent's rural to urban migration (UN, 2019). Secondary cities are defined as regional centers of importance directly below the status of economic or political capitals. These cities are predicted to have the highest rates of urbanization in the coming decades in sub-Saharan Africa (Baeumler et al., 2021), more so than the continent's primary cities that have already become too expensive and crowded for the rural migrant (Duranton, 2008; Hommann & Lall, 2019). As a result, the governments of these secondary cities are under a disproportionate amount of pressure to manage the consequences of rapid urbanization (Battersby & Watson, 2018), often with less political and economic power than the primary cities.

In much of the developing world and as well in developed countries, the last decades have seen the phenomenon of a "second urban transition" (Kessides, 2006; Pieterse, 2011), where urban population growth is largely rural to urban and untied from economic growth, resulting in a rise in poverty levels. This type of urbanization is a challenge to the multiple levels of government that manage urban sectors (Rogerson, Kotze & Rogerson, 2014; Haysom, 2015) and more so for already under-resourced city governments (Smit, 2018). Population growth teamed with a lack of income, limited space, rising costs of living, and growing income inequality has a potentially synergistic effect on the food insecurity of an urban population. From a food system perspective, it increases informal settlements and the potential for food safety problems, as well as conflicts about informal vending (Tacoli, 2019; Njuguna & Kigaru, 2020). The result is cities that have food available, but a proportion of people who cannot access enough food. This phenomenon shows the importance of understanding and managing food insecurity as a result of the larger political economy, and not necessarily the availability of food.

1.3.2 The Challenges of Studying of Urban Food Systems

Humans are now a majority urban species (Angel et al., 2018; World Bank, 2021). Globalization has connected us to each other more than ever before, whether it be between the rural and the urban spaces or international and local food systems (Hinrichs, 2003; Fresco, 2009; Pradhan et al., 2020; Proctor & Berdegué, 2020). Consequently, food systems are complex, and it is difficult to study the urban food system as a whole due to the myriad connections to physical components, processes and places. Current empirical urban food research applies case studies to single sectors of the urban food system such as household food security, supermarkets, alternative food networks, urban agriculture, or informal markets (Morgan, 2013; Moragues-Faus & Morgan, 2015; Delaney et al., 2018). Hence, when it comes to policy (where it exists), many urban food policies are sectoral, compartmentalized into such areas as health and safety, urban agriculture, or zoning for supermarkets. Given the complexity of food systems, few cities are able to create a comprehensive food system development plan, especially when it is so tied to other food systems at different scales. Consequently, food policies exist at many levels and agencies of government and may compete with or contradict each other (Wiskerke & Viljoen, 2012; Maye, 2019).

The non-empirical and subjective work on food systems is often framed as detailed, intricate maps of an urban food system (Figure 1-1) (TEEB, 2018). These are very complex systems studies that often provide a picture of what should be happening, instead of an explanation of what is happening and why it is happening (Hawkes and Parsons, 2019). They also are potentially overwhelming to local governments. These systems maps are beneficial in that they show food value chains naturally reaching outside of urban governance boundaries into other governance levels. For example, farmers in rural areas under traditional land governance send food along nationally governed roads, which enter processing sites that may have international standards, or cities and markets with their own management structures. Because urban food systems naturally encompass multiple governance levels and types, this research takes the position that multiple governance levels influence the food security outcomes of a city.



Figure 1-1 Example of an Idealized, Complex Food System (TEEB, 2018)

Food system literature has provided valuable insight into urban food systems and food security at the sectoral level (Niles et al., 2018; Popkin & Reardon, 2018; Gizaw, 2019; Esposito et al., 2020; Davies et al., 2021), as well as quantitative work on household food security levels (Smith et al., 2006; Crush et al., 2019), notably the primary research from the African Food Security Urban Network (AFSUN) (Battersby, 2011; Rudolph et al., 2012; Tawodzera et al., 2012; Pendleton et al., 2012; Tevera et al., 2012; Acquah et al., 2013; Caesar et al., 2013; Mulenga, 2013; Mvula & Chiweza,

2013; Raimundo et al., 2014; Leduka et al., 2015; Chilanga et al., 2017; Riley et al., 2018). However, much of the empirical literature on food systems and food security is polarized; either providing specific details of an urban food sector using a case study or, on the other end of the spectrum, is too generic, non-empirical, and subjective for a city government to interpret (Delaney et al., 2018). Simone and Pieterse (2018) also acknowledge this dichotomy as an "axis" between surficial knowledge and highly phenomenological and social interactions of urban life, encouraging researchers to engage with this challenge by triangulating the two to "weave interconnections (p. xii)" within urban contexts. This research 'weaves an interconnection' by finding a consistent method from which to understand 'highly phenomenological' urban food systems.

The literature on food systems governance outside of the areas of rural-urban linkages and urban agriculture is relatively new, ramping up after the 2008 food crisis and focusing on international economics, governance, and the vulnerability of the urban poor to food price shocks (Clapp & Cohen, 2009; Clapp & Fuchs, 2009; Candel, 2014; Clapp, 2014; McKeon, 2014; McKeon, 2017). Initial studies on food system governance are case-based, noting the influences of a specific, higher governance level on urban food systems in a certain context (Brown, 2014; Riley & Legwegoh, 2014; Gore, 2018; Smit, 2018; Rousseau, Boyet & Harroud, 2020). These studies provide key evidence of the importance of viewing governance as a major influence on food systems by including the agency of governance actors, and larger structural and scalar influences such as history, modernism, discrimination, or environmental change (Termeer et al., 2010).

Despite these valuable contributions, Delaney et al. (2018) note that the field of food systems governance remains focused on productivity indicators and lacks the ability to critically analyze governance, with the majority of literature consisting of thematic overviews of the state of research instead of aggregations of evidence. The influence of multiple governance levels on urban food security levels is not well understood, acknowledged, or incorporated into food system governance (Candel & Pereira, 2017; Pérez-Escamilla et al., 2017). I argue that this lack of understanding is due to the low numbers of studies producing empirical evidence in the field of food systems governance, which itself is a result of few methods with which to analyze governance. This research proposes a method, using the Governance Analytical Framework, to create qualitative, empirical data on food system governance.

1.3.3 Governing Urban Food Systems

The global shift from a majority rural population to a majority urban population in 2006 gained attention from academics and international institutions, including the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the World Bank. As urbanization increases, the number of urban-focused documents from international agencies has increased significantly, intended to guide urban development along a sustainable and equitable path (Garschagen et al., 2018). These reports reflect the previously discussed polarity in food system research, referring to case studies and suggesting good governance values. Their strategies most often rely on economic development and the productivity of outlying rural areas to 'feed cities,' but there is little clarity on how to specifically achieve this vision (Haysom & Fuseini, 2019). As a result, these policies are often not being translated into effective urban food governance (Battersby et al., 2019).

The literature suggests that policies are not translating into effective urban food governance for two main reasons. First, a lack of methods to understand cities, and second, placing the onus of management on city government. The first proposed reason, the lack of methods to understand cities, is evidenced in the number of guides to urban food governance that are case-based and remain superficial regarding how to integrate or holistically manage urban food systems. In 2011, the FAO called for "a compilation of case studies to identify linkages between governance principles and better food security outcomes" (FAO, 2011, p. 8; Delaney et al., 2018 p.288). However, there are very few methods or frameworks that help to piece this case study research together (Smit, 2018), leaving a gap in our understanding of how to generalize the functions of urban food systems. There is little guidance, either academic or applied, about *how* to engage with food systems – where to start, and what to do – and less that incorporate actor agency and cross-scale dynamics (Smit, 2018).

The second reason for a lack of effective urban food policy implementation is the onus of food governance being placed on city governments. Institutions such as the FAO support the concept of local governance of food systems, creating the Milan Urban Food Policy Pact, an "international protocol to tackle food-related issues at the urban level" (MUFFP, 2021). The Milan Pact provides valuable guidance on how to integrate local governance with urban food systems. There is also a substantial component of urban food literature that suggests cities are the optimal hubs for both food system and socio-ecological innovation (Tegoni & Licomati, 2017; Sonnino et al., 2019). I

include these documents in the category of literature that provides general guidance. A close look at the recommended actions in these policy documents encourages cities to set up interactive, integrated systems; they are practical, general suggestions, but there is little acknowledgement of funding capacity, power differentials, and national contexts that may inhibit these actions. Power dynamics between cities and other governance levels may cause contextual impediments to enacting the 'translocal,' 'global,' 'collaborative' or 'transformative' relationships with other governance levels that literature suggests is essential to strong food systems (De Cunto et al., 2017).

This research questions these recommendations and suggests that cities alone cannot be responsible for effective food policy, especially when expected to take leadership over other, often more powerful, governance levels. Globalization has proliferated the linkages between urban and rural spaces, as well as blurring lines between multiple levels of governance, increasing the number and diversity of actors and making urban governance more intricate and "fragmented amongst large numbers of government stakeholders with limited capacities and conflicting interests." (Storper & Scott, 2016; Smit 2018, p.56). These dynamics can make food policy implementation initiated by city governments difficult to achieve.

Consideration and analysis of governance contexts, power, norms, and other actors is required prior to suggesting cities bear the majority responsibility of urban food system management. In addition, stakeholders and those involved in governance at levels more informal or smaller than the city level are often left out of policy development – often because of the difficulty engaging them within formal structures or for political reasons. Although focused on urban climate change governance, Bulkeley and Betsill (2014) suggest that these multi-level governance contexts are currently contested and configured between state and non-state actors. This dissertation includes this analysis and suggests that the contests also occur between state governance bodies (like city and national governments) and that these interactions are equally important in the governance of food systems.

1.4 The Research Problem

Many governance levels influence both the function of Mzuzu's food system as well as the city's capacity to govern the urban food system. My research posits that there are two overlooked factors that impact the ineffectiveness of urban food policy. The first is the lack of methods to wholistically understand the complexity of an urban food system (FAO, 2009; Fanzo et al., 2020). The second factor is the lack of inclusion of influences outside of the urban boundary and outside more formal

urban structures, such as the agency of various government or institutional actors (Hospes & Brons, 2016; Hawkes & Parsons, 2019), and the structures and norms of informal food sales.

While international policy and academic literature recognize that urban food systems require the participation of multiple levels of governance, the influences of these different governance levels on any specific urban food system are largely undefined in relation to the context of each city. In addition, there is little guidance on how to understand that context. This dissertation explicates the problem that urban food guidance is limited in method in two ways: it is often case-based, expecting busy and under-resourced city governments to adapt and pick out applicable lessons from case studies, or it is based on vague policy, expecting city governance to apply their own context to generalized governance ideals. However, to apply either of these, city governance must first understand their own city's context. By applying a case study of Mzuzu, this research provides clearer methods around *how* to understand an urban food system that includes the influences of outside governance.

The ability of actors to shift or use governance structures is often couched within political science or critical development literature and focused on discussions of corruption or modernism, such as Fox's (2014) analysis of intentional 'underdevelopment' in African cities that politically and economically benefit status-quo interest groups. The fields of urban planning also include discourse on agency regarding urban planning, pointing to a lack of formal governance and service provision in urban slums that has enabled informal governance to emerge through rent-seeking agents who will incur losses if the situation changes (Marx et al., 2013). These studies suggest that urban governance is fixed in interest groups who wield political power, regardless of their position within an urban geographical boundary. This conclusion suggests that governance is inherently political rather than institutional, particularly in conditions of perceived scarcity. It is then logical to assume that the governance of urban food systems is influenced by similar social, economic, and political forces, for virtuous or other purposes, and this dissertation centres these governance influences in its analysis of Mzuzu's food system.

Considering these research problems, this thesis asks the following:

What is the qualitative nature of the influences of multi-level governance on Mzuzu's urban food system?

From this main question, three subsidiary questions arise:

1. *What does the addition of actor perspectives add to the contextual understanding of Mzuzu's food system governance?*
2. *How can approaching governance analysis using actor's perspectives add to critical urban food studies?*
3. *Can the operationalization of a governance analytical framework provide a contextual understanding of Mzuzu's food system?*

1.5 Methodology and Methods

Governance is often viewed from many normative positions, but in this dissertation, I apply Hufty's "non-normative" (2011, p. 418) framework of governance, the Governance Analytical Framework (GAF), to understand the governance of Mzuzu's urban food system. This framework is intentionally analytical, meant to analyze governance that is producing outcomes out of sync with their intended governance. Governance, in this sense, is an observable phenomenon (Hufty, 2011b). As such, it provides the opportunity to investigate the agency and perspectives of those within the food system without imposing judgement or prescription (Hufty, 2011b). Based on this framework, I apply methods intended to reveal respondent perspectives on food system governance. My research aims to qualify governance systems through those acting within it, based on qualitative empirical evidence that describes the context. In this manner, the five basic properties of governance: actors, norms, processes, problems, and nodal points, are applied through an analytical framework instead of values being applied as a comparison against the existing context.

Gidden's theory of structuration is the theoretical foundation of my research. In Gidden's work, structure and agency are not given primacy over one another but are assumed to act iteratively to shift or fortify existing societal structures. Therefore, governance structures can be interpreted, molded, or reinforced by agents from within, essentially creating a 'duality of structure' (Giddens, 1984). Agency is defined as the ability to affect change, including changing the structures, and structure refers to the repeated patterns in society that determine what opportunities or decisions are available to whom (Barker, 2003). Structure and agency are in constant interaction, or "reciprocal causation" (Davies, 2011 p. 75) in any governance context, and this is what creates the outcomes we see in society and what makes these outcomes shift. This is what both reproduces and transforms our societal structures.

The methodological gaps highlighted in the literature review suggest that the case study focus in urban food research can be limiting due to its narrow focus on sectors or specific relationships.

These case studies are valuable in understanding specific urban contexts and interactions. However, I argue that it is difficult for urban policy makers to integrate many case studies and create constructive, wholistic policies. This thesis develops a method to see their own food system wholistically, and since analyzing such complexity is so difficult, I suggest the use of governance and actor perspectives to highlight and distill the important relationships and processes.

To operationalize this framework, this research applied a qualitative case study to the city of Mzuzu, Malawi, allowing for data collection from many perspectives and sources to enable a unique understanding of a contemporary phenomenon (Yin, 2014), such as a secondary city food system under 'second urban transition' circumstances. The results were analyzed using both deductive and inductive thematic coding, categorizing responses from 85 semi-structured in-depth interviews. The first coding pass applied the codes of the five categories of the Governance Analytical Framework. The second pass used inductive coding within those five categories, using the themes that emerged from the interviews. The analysis of this data constructs a qualitative view of Mzuzu's food system through the viewpoints of people within the system. From here, results were analyzed to show the commonalities and differences between respondents regarding the agency of actors, providing a starting point for policy discussions and conflict resolution.

1.6 Contributions

This dissertation illustrates the importance of understanding place and context as a starting point for governance research by providing a case study with three main contributions. These contributions are empirical, theoretical, and methodological.

The first research question asks what the addition of actor perspectives adds to the contextual understanding of Mzuzu's food system governance. Empirical contributions of this study provide contextual knowledge for the purpose of improving Mzuzu's food governance from an encompassing, multi-level governance perspective. In an applied context, laying out the various mental constructions of Mzuzu's urban food system provides improved understanding between the different food system actors, as well as identifying the dissonance and commonalities between levels and types of governance from which collaboration may begin.

The second research question asks how approaching governance analysis using actor's perspectives can add to critical urban food studies. Theoretically, this study builds the case for the influence of

structural inequality and agency as major influences on urban food systems. By extending my research outside of the urban boundary, influences of multi-level governance were included in urban food research, including those thought to be outside of a traditional 'food system.' Actors' responses provided guidance towards which external (to the urban) influences they felt were important to pursue, guiding the research. This study also finds that governance as a concept presents a broad framework for analysis, which satisfies Storper and Scott's (2016) and Wu et al. (2019) calls for common approaches to urban theory.

The third research question asks if the operationalization of a governance analytical framework provides a contextual understanding of Mzuzu's food system. Methodologically, this dissertation illustrates the application of interpretivism and critical inquiry to the research methodologies of urban food system literature. Although a case study, the operationalization of the governance analytical framework from Hufty (2011b) provides a universally applicable approach to understanding the drivers behind specific food system outcomes, as well as the commonalities and differences between Mzuzu's food system actors. The use of the GAF framework provides context-specific results from actors themselves, while retaining a common method from which to potentially derive comparative analyses. The inductive nature of the research provides a breadth of potential leads from which more deductive and specific research can follow. The results and analysis show how an analytical governance framework can move food system research towards a more universal and comparative approach.

1.7 Organization of Dissertation

Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the research context and rationale, as well as outlining the research problems and chapters. Chapter 2 shows the steps taken to create the conceptual framework that forms the basis of my research. Each step reviews the theoretical and empirical literature around food systems, food security, urban theory, and governance, highlighting the gaps in the literature, the theories and concepts I applied to these findings, and how these lead to the research questions. The chapter concludes by outlining the conceptual framework applied in this research. Chapter 3 details the methodology and methods applied to the field research in Mzuzu, Malawi, as well as the governance analytical framework. Through four different stories, Chapter 4 presents the thematic research results, focusing on the nature of the influences of multi-level governance on Mzuzu's urban food system. Chapter 5 provides further in-depth analysis of the data,

exploring the interactions and complexities of multi-level governance actors to create a picture of urban food governance using the perspectives of respondents. Chapter 6 sets forth the contributions of this dissertation to theoretical, methodological, empirical, and applied fields, including recommendations for future research.

2.0 Urban food governance literature: Building a framework to contextualize Mzuzu's food governance system

Chapter 2 fulfills three purposes. First, it reviews the three main bodies of literature that inform this dissertation – food systems and food security, governance, and urban studies – highlighting the evolution of the fields along with the contributions, debates, and continuing gaps in knowledge. Second, I show how my evaluation of each body of scholarship centers my research around specific theories and concepts, leading to a conceptual framework and making explicit my assumptions and ontological perspectives. Lastly, I review the research that integrates the three fields and explore these themes in the context of Malawi and the city of Mzuzu.

2.1 Food Security and Food Systems Literature

This section begins by discussing the seminal work of Amartya Sen, and how his work influences the concept of modern food security. It then segues into the evolution of food security and food systems literature, providing a background and justification for their inclusion in my research.

2.1.1 Food Security Theory

Until the 1980s, food security was synonymous with food availability, most notably of carbohydrate staples like wheat, maize, rice, or tubers. In 1981, Amartya Sen shifted the understanding of the cause of famine away from geographical and productive narratives and towards individual and institutional framings, showing how measurements of national food availability decline were ineffective in predicting famine. In the same writing, he introduced the concept of 'entitlements' (Sen, 1981), which in turn defines an individual's capabilities to function (such as work). Entitlements are derived from the 'endowments' that people have such as property, assets, labour power, and skills, and the ability of the person to trade those for goods and services (such as food) within their society. In further writings, Sen positioned these entitlements as the main route through which people attain the freedom to live their desired life and achieve development (Sen, 1999). If people are not provided endowments by a governing body (such as public goods or a functioning economy), they are less able to function, as well as access or trade wages for entitlements (such as food). Sen (1981) showed that famines can occur in the context of normal food production and are influenced by factors outside of typical food value chains, such as wages and social hierarchies. He made positive correlations between the likelihood of famine and the lack of democratic institutions in a state, linking factors such as a free press or democratic participation with an 'institutional

resistance' to famine (Vaughn, 1987). Essentially, Sen is describing a food system outcome (famine) and the importance of understanding the influences of the institutions and governance surrounding it.

Supported by the work of critical scholars (Vaughan, 1987; Maxwell, 1999; Clapp, 2009; Jarosz, 2011; Clapp, 2012; Crush & Caesar, 2014; Frayne & McCordic, 2015) and their attention to social, economic, and political dynamics of food systems, Sen's argument that hunger is caused by a lack of entitlements to food forms the first step in my conceptual framework (Figure 2-3). It is important to note that Sen defines entitlements as legal and market rights that are controlled by "legal means" in a society (Sen, 1981 p. 433). My research includes Deveraux's (2001) supplemental critique that entitlements are also influenced by non-market institutions such as gender, ethnicity, and class. Vaughan's (1987) exploration of the 1949 southern Malawian famine, provides a strong example of Devereaux's critique, taking two commonly accepted reasons for its cause – overpopulation and environmental degradation – and challenging these assumptions through the lens of changing governance and social institutions at the time. She analyzes the famine in the context of colonialism, the slave trade, migration, and the shift towards monocultures and a concentrated labour supply, showing that although high density populations and environmental degradation occurred, these were outcomes of deeper, systemic circumstances.

Sen's work and Vaughan's analysis show the importance of applying critical historical context in understanding current conditions and of digging deeper than colonial assumptions to understand food security outcomes. These works described above form the second step of my conceptual framework (Fig. 2-3); factors outside of a typical food value chain, such as the social, economic, historical, and political governance of a society can greatly impact food systems, thereby impacting entitlements and food security outcomes. These analyses of famines and food insecurity show the importance of including institutional decision-making and social context into food system analysis.

2.1.2 The Evolution of Food Security Literature

On a global scale, formal concepts around food security emerged after both World War I and World War II, focusing on producing enough food for a growing global population (Shaw, 2007; Tomlinson, 2013). The devastation of World War II led nations to acknowledge the new "global interconnectedness" and create institutions they believed would ensure a "satisfactory standard of living for all peoples on the earth" (United States State Department, 1948 p.82). The world's food

supply was dangerously depleted, and the Food and Agriculture Organization was created in 1945 as one of the first agencies of the United Nations. The alleviation of hunger was viewed as a cornerstone to preventing further conflict, and agricultural production was the main solution (Shaw, 2007). In the next decades, the concept of 'global development' grew alongside this production narrative with the stated intent of ensuring a global standard of living (McCalla, 2007).

Despite the definition of food security evolving over the last 45 years to include access, stability, and utilization (FAO, 1996), the focus of many development agencies, private sector actors, and national strategies remains fixed on availability and production. The formal concept of food security was first defined at the 1974 World Food Conference, and its definition centered around production. However, it did acknowledge the impact of supply fluctuations on staple prices and economic access to food, notably as a reaction to destabilizing food prices in the early years of the decade (Loux, 2020).

One of the largest influences on food security approaches was the Green Revolution, initiated in Mexico in the 1940s by introducing technological advances in mechanization and crop strains (Sonnenfeld, 1992). The strategy was to transform the resource base in subsistence-based food systems to commercially based, seemingly more efficient food systems. Such work continues through organizations such as CGIAR (formerly the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research), created in 1943 to solve food security from a productionist, scientific lens. The Alliance for a Green Revolution for Africa (AGRA), active today, embeds this same approach through the ideology of technology, commercial transformation and increasing production.

There is little debate around the need for agricultural transformation in sub-Saharan Africa to achieve food security, indeed there is strong evidence around the benefits of agriculture as a driver of structural development (McArthur & McCord, 2017; Fanzo et al., 2020). The debates centre around how to achieve this goal and the myopic nature of 'green revolution' initiatives (Asuru, 2017; Wei, 2020). Large, continental initiatives like the AGRA teamed donor agencies, philanthropists, and regional governance bodies with large food and agriculture companies like Monsanto and Cargill, as well as large NGOs. Armed with 30 billion dollars, the alliance aimed to mainstream food value chains and increase production of agricultural commodities on the African continent. Despite the efforts, AGRA's 2020 deadline to double incomes and productivity for 30 million African and Southeast Asian smallholder farmers has passed with less achieved than the stated goal (Wise,

2020a). The reviews of AGRA's work to attain food security point to an overreliance on structure (policies and regulations) rather than agency (communication, gender equality, education), and the preference towards policies that prioritized international companies, despite the discourse suggesting support for the continent's smallholder farmers (Moseley, 2016; Gengenback et al., 2018; Kilby, 2019).

Production-focused narratives remain central in many national level food strategies. In Malawi, food is encompassed within agricultural development in the country's multiple strategies, namely Malawi's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2012), the Malawi Growth and Development Strategies (2005, 2011, 2017), and the latest National Multi-Sectoral Nutrition Policy and Strategic Plan (2018). As of 2018, multilateral and bilateral aid agencies such as the World Food Program, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Development Program, the International Monetary Fund, the African Development Bank, the African Union, and bilateral agencies such as USAID, DFID (UK), and GIZ (Germany) continue to support agricultural policies and the commercialization of agriculture in Malawi and across the continent.

While the majority of global development agencies and bilateral development agencies promote food security policy and initiatives that focus on production (Blesh et al., 2019), debates between research and policy have become polarized. The movement from production to narratives on entitlements, nutrition, and access to food has occurred mostly in academia and the research arms of global institutions while the majority of aid still goes to productive programming (Holt-Gimenez et al., 2008). For instance, Moragues-Faus and Marsden (2017) provide many examples of political ecologists broadening food scholarship by creating diverse policy options that are often sidelined by capitalist ideas and agendas. Critical food studies literature has made valuable contributions by asking why production remains a major focus for food security solutions. These authors suggest that the stubborn focus on productivity as a food security solution serves existing neoliberal and political structures and is the most beneficial to those in power (Clapp, 2009; Jarosz, 2011; Moragues-Faus et al., 2017; McMichael, 2020).

From the perspective of international aid, development efforts have a strong historical momentum that favours rural development and the commercialization of agriculture. This strategy suggests the reliance on the idea that surplus food creates capital, thereby enabling a country to climb the Gross Domestic Product and Human Development Index ladders. Other authors advance this power

analysis by suggesting that policies that focus on access, stability, and utilization require an uncomfortable shift towards issues of systemic inequality and need for social and physical large-scale infrastructure. Maxwell (1996) and Jarosz (2011) show how food security solutions have moved towards the individual scale, obfuscating structural impediments to food in favour of the more convenient provisioning of food aid or seeds and fertilizer. This framing brings about solutions that emphasize 'personal responsibility' instead of acknowledging the structural, social and political roadblocks emerging from various governance scales (Battersby, 2013; Sonnino et al., 2016). Termeer et al. (2018) and Moragues-Faus et al. (2017) add to the analysis of food security solutions, suggesting that policies on access, utilization, and stability are difficult to implement from a structural level for reasons such as an inability to govern between sectors, power imbalances, low institutional capacities, one-dimensional problem framing, siloed departments, and conflicting values. The result is a continuation of short-term food security solutions to what are chronic, systemic problems (Legwegoh & Fraser, 2015).

From a governance perspective, large-scale, social changes such as gender equity or income equality are much more uncomfortable, expensive, and socially challenging to implement in a society; relying on simple 'economic development' or food provision to provide social development is politically easier and more beneficial to those currently holding power. For example, throughout the evolution of development aid, food aid has hidden under 'policy and strategy' without much thought to its political origins (Maxwell, 1998) and often without democratic debate on its necessity or effectiveness (Harrison, 2002). Zerbe (2004) found that American food aid in southern Africa was politically driven to introduce biotechnology and allow transnational companies to take hold, instead of the moral imperative through which it is advanced, resulting in further barriers for smallholder production, a favoured touchstone of agricultural aid discourse. This shows not only that food aid solutions are easier, but that they allow the bypassing of more structural, long-term solutions for solutions that benefit those already in power.

Critical research on international food governance has mainly focused on global governance institutions. McKeon (2014) describes the powerful actors who control the global food chain, and the local and national struggles against dispossession of resources. In their conceptualization of corporate power in food governance, Clapp and Fuchs (2009) identify "discursive contests" between governments, global institutions, and corporate interests over the framing of global food policies, and the assignment of problems into categories to then frame solutions for the benefit of

corporations. Although links have been made showing impacts of international and national-level decisions on specific urban populations (Davis et al., 2001; Jarosz, 2011; Brown, 2013; Crush & Caesar, 2014), the processes and reasoning behind the decisions, as well as impacts between other levels of governance, remain less understood. This gap in knowledge further supports Step 2 of the conceptual framework – that factors of governance outside of a typical food value chain can impact food system governance and therefore impact entitlements, which in turn impact urban food security outcomes.

Until recently, the focus on production left urban food security off the agenda of many international development strategies. The United Nations published the New Urban Agenda in 2016 after their Habitat III UN Conference, presenting the agenda as a path for resilient, smart, sustainable cities that interact directly with their surrounding rural areas (UN, 2017). However, scholars have questioned the reliance on technologies, paradigms of city-region strategies, or economic development as the 'catch-all' universal development tool, especially as the global food system becomes monopolized by fewer and fewer conglomerates (Haddad, 2015; Clapp, 2016; Kaika, 2017). In addition, there is little evidence that economic growth in developing cities has increased food security for the urban poor (Reardon et al., 2010; Crush & Frayne, 2011; Battersby & Crush, 2014). Instead, SDG and the New Urban Agenda strategies constitute a continuation of the historical role cities have played in the capitalist forms and neoliberal relationships between agri-food systems and urban centers – respectively supplying cheap food and cheap labour (Heynen, 2006; Dixon and Richards, 2016; Moragues-Faus & Marsden, 2017).

Research on urban food security has improved understandings of the importance of food policy that incorporates access, utilization and stability, supporting the premise that food security is reliant on more than just production and availability. Urban environments, due to their nature of minimal land space per capita, increase reliance on economic access to food and on the infrastructure – social and physical, informal and formal – that enables access to food (Ekpenyong, 2015; Frayne & McCordic, 2015; Ruel et al., 2017; Bricas, 2019). Urban food access is therefore reliant on many governance levels and sectors, such as utilities, education, and transportation, that do not equate themselves with food security (Crush and Caesar, 2014; Frayne and McCordic, 2015; Riley and Legwegoh, 2017; Sgro et al., 2019; Opiyo & Agong, 2020). There is agreement among civil society and scholars of the need for multi-level governance and cooperation to address these issues (Sonnino, 2019; Wiskerke, 2015).

Development policies in urban contexts have been slow to incorporate these research findings, as the policies remain focused on productivity as a solution to urban hunger. Urban gardens are a common reaction to food insecurity, echoing the theme of individual responsibility to solve systemic problems (Jarosz, 2011). Multiple literature reviews have found weak positive associations with urban agriculture and food security, but emphasize the importance of contextual understandings of bureaucratic, cultural, and infrastructure access prior to promoting urban agriculture as an urban food security solution (Crush & Frayne, 2011; Crush et al., 2011; Frayne et al., 2014; Poulsen et al., 2015; Warren et al., 2015). Rural development solutions are also assumed to work in urban areas, particularly in the measurements of urban poverty with rural instruments, causing confusion in understanding rates of hunger and access to utilities like water (Haysom & Tawodzera, 2018). More recent policies that focus on access, utilization, and stability are nutrition-based, centered at the household level, production-focused, and left to smaller-scale government departments or NGOs (Åhs, 2017).

Understandings of different levels and types of private industry within the development sector and food system of developing countries remain piecemeal, with even the definition of food security between sectors differing (McMichael, 2015; Moragues-Faus, Sonnino & Marsden, 2017). The private sector, in particular the international food sector, has been building a presence in developing countries over the last twenty years, especially through development partnerships with USAID (Feed the Future, Market Access programming), and through direct involvement with national policy development (Wise, 2017). These policies are production-based and encourage the development of commercial agriculture, often at odds with the rhetoric supportive of the small-holder farmer in Malawian national politics (Glover, 2007; Bezner-Kerr, 2013).

Although the development policies are geared towards rural farming and inputs, urban areas are also targeted for marketing by the private sector – often informal sellers are encouraged by large, processed food companies to sell small packages of processed foods in low-income areas, encouraging a 'ladder' towards more expensive and status-laden products in their product lines (Lawrence, 2011; Nestle, 2012). The growth of supermarket chains in urban areas has gained attention of researchers, creating a mix of positive and negative outcomes that are contextual to specific urban populations (van der Heijden & Vink, 2013; Anku & Ahorbo, 2017; Tschirley et al., 2020). The private sector remains the elephant in the room when discussing urban food security, with major impacts on urban food systems that can present challenges to urban governance bodies.

2.1.3 Food Systems Literature

A food system is the assemblage of environments, institutions, and practices within which food-related activities occur (Pinstrup-Andersen & Watson, 2011; Capone et al., 2014). Therefore, food system literature is large in depth and breadth, ranging from analyses of global economics to local nutrition and health programming, national agriculture policy, climate change, and processing and marketing strategies, to name a few (Henson & Reardon, 2005; Godfray et al., 2010; Dangour, Mace & Shankar, 2017; Parkinson et al., 2017; Niles et al., 2018). This section focuses on food system literature and its influence on the formation of my research.

Typically, food systems are visualized as a line, depicting how food moves from "farm to fork." Outside influences or inputs are shown in the form of infrastructure or commercial interests, such as fertilizer providers or energy and transportation systems that feed into the linear path (Figure 2-1). Authors within the field of global environmental change such as Ingram (2011) and Erickson (2008) created early frameworks to examine the complexity of environmental change on multi-scalar food systems. Although these frameworks could not, "assess the consequences of specific interventions" (Ingram, 2011, p. 427), they gave credence to the agency of actors at various scales and types, such as NGOs, transnational institutions, and corporations (Liverman, 2008). More recent food system literature expands the concept of food systems by including social, environmental, and cultural influences, resulting in a food system represented by a network instead of a linear structure, represented here from Hawkes, Parsons & Wells (2019) (Figure 2-2). Food systems now include a "diverse set of institutions, technologies and practices that govern the way food is marketed, processed, transported, accessed and consumed" (Capone, 2014, p. 13). These frameworks form a strong basis for my use of the 'network' model of food systems, forming the third step of the conceptual framework. This more inclusive model allows for inductive inquiry, allowing for the perspectives of respondents to expand outside of the typical food system to include non-typical impacts and local context. To clarify, I will refer to the linear food system as a 'food value chain,' as it references the direct steps and processes involved in the creation and provision of food.



Figure 2-1 Linear Representation of a Food Value Chain (BASF, 2019)



Figure 2-2 Network Representation of a Food System (Hawkes, Parsons & Wells, 2019)

Often, quantitative food security studies are used to justify agricultural or politically driven policies such as increasing agricultural production or input subsidies (Walls et al., 2018; Mockshell & Birner, 2020). These policy solutions are based on the outcomes of a food system (e.g., food insecurity levels), instead of a clear understanding of the processes through which food insecurity has arisen. This type of policy implementation has prompted warnings about the consequences of disjointed and universal urban food policy (Battersby & Watson, 2019). Battersby, Watson & Haysom (2019) and Frayne et al. (2010) argue that examinations of the urban food system can provide new perspectives on poverty, governance, and the scale of analysis. This dissertation argues that complementary examinations of food security levels *and* the food system are necessary to implement proper policy, and that one of the reasons for fewer food systems analyses is the lack of a comparative, useful methodology to contextually understand a city's food system.

Food systems literature further informs my research because of its objectiveness as compared to food security studies. Many food security studies are subjectively aimed towards ensuring food security for all, but food system analysis is intended to understand a system as it exists (CGIAR, 2020). Applying a food systems lens allows me to approach a food system more objectively, without problematizing it or positioning it in relation to a subjective ideal. This is consistent with calls in the literature to focus on food system processes, such as governance, and to dig deeper into the contextual causes of food insecurity (Boamah et al., 2020; Fanzo, 2020).

2.2 Structure and Agency as a Theoretical Basis for Governance Research

The inclusion of social and political contexts into urban food system studies invites the concepts of structure and agency. Agency is the capacity of individuals to participate in society and act upon their free choices, and structure is the recurring arrangements of institutions that influence agents' choices (Alkire, 2005; Barker, 2005). Agents are in a continual process of "fixing, unfixing, and re-fixing scalar structures" (Born & Purcell, 2006 p. 198) in an iterative and reflexive manner (Davies, 2011), and their ability to do so depends on their power within those structures. Factors such as gender, ethnicity, or class become an influence on food security when others use their agency to discriminate or prefer based on social factors, or when they reinforce or shift institutions that impact others' entitlements to food.

Agency plays a large role in the effectiveness of multi-scalar systems like food systems. Moragues-Faus and Battersby (2021) review the urban food scholarship's turn towards scale to study policy,

showing the different approaches such as administrative boundaries, political scales, or relational scales. In each of these examples, the scale is used as the lens, and power structures and political economics are the variables. Therefore, understanding the policy space of decision-makers, and how power and agency operates within that space, is as important as quantitative information (Grindle & Thomas, 1991; Griffin, 2007).

Depending on an individual's entitlements, they have varying agency to change or shift systems to their own benefit and/or to the benefit of their society. As entitlements are often determined by the 'rules' or structures of society, including norms and laws, and agency varies across the levels of power determined by those rules, governance is a natural examination point for understanding how social systems effect social outcomes. This perspective is supported by Bevir and Rhodes' (2016) suggestion that governance theory be 'de-centered' from structural analysis by focusing on the "social construction of governance through the ability of individuals to take meaningful action" (p. 5). They argue that governance arises from the social narratives within actors – their beliefs, norms, and perspectives create constructions of governance. Bevir and Rhodes continue to argue that governance is "the stories people use to construct, convey and explain traditions, dilemmas, beliefs, and practices" (Bevir & Rhodes, 2010 p. 94). These statements support my perspective of governance, however I disagree with the authors' argument that it is futile to search for "essential features of an abstract category that stands for a cluster of human practices" (p. 6). I argue here that it is important to find analytical characteristics of governance from which to analyze human systems. In this regard I look to Hufty (2011a, 2011b) and Bevir (2012) and the distillation of governance to its "essential features" as the decision-making processes of setting, implementing, and enforcing chosen rules through laws, norms, power, or language. It is in this definition I base my research and I look to social theory to further define the ontological and methodological premises of the governance aspect of my research.

There are many theories about agency and structure, but the most applicable in studying the outcomes of governance is the theory of structuration (Giddens, 1984), as it centers on the equal importance of both structure and agency, continually acting upon each other to shift or reinforce the status quo. Actors within a governance structure, from the smallest unit of a household to global levels of governance, will use the resources and the socially determined opportunities available to them to achieve their desired outcomes, at times working to reinforce the structure, and in others working to change it. For example, those with power to adjust structures can make choices about

food security strategies, such as which family members access food, or at a government-level, laissez-faire policies around informal vending or active food provisioning for the poor.

Due to the nature of my research, I apply the theory of structuration to inform the ontology of social interaction within the governance of an urban food system. Giddens and Stones (2005) explicitly state that "structuration was not formed as a theory with which one derives a specific research methodology, but one that forms the basis of logic within a theoretical framework." I therefore apply structuration theory as the fourth step in the conceptual framework that provides theoretical guidance on how societies constitute themselves through both agents and structures of society, that agents within societal structures, such as governance structures, either change or reinforce those structures over time (Figure 2-3). In this research, I apply the logic of structuration theory to propose that actors, within their governance contexts, apply their understandings and capabilities to maximize their own benefits (or the benefits to society) in any situation, and that this impacts their perceptions and actions within urban food systems. It is for this reason that I next delve into governance literature, and how it has evolved along with these concepts.

2.3 Governance Research

The definition of governance continues to evolve. Hufty (2011a) provides a historically comprehensive review of the etymology of the word 'governance.' He identifies its development from the idea of 'steering,' to the 'art of governing,' to a broadened term used to describe system reform and management. In the 1990s, globalization and the democratization of the developing world increased the diversity and number of governance actors, and thereby increased the debates and proliferation of governance concepts (Levy, 2014; Bevir & Rhodes, 2016). However, the many interpretations of governance can lead to slippage in the consistency of the "underpinning principles," and the literature lacks cohesion and strong theoretical roots (Ruhanen et al. 2010, p. 8).

The authors that engage in the debates of governance as a concept (Kjaer, 2011; Bevir, 2012; Van Assche et al., 2014; Fukuyama, 2016) in some way include three basic elements of governance: authority, structure, and process. All acknowledge the interplay of structure and agency, even if different terms are used. For example, Van Assche et al. (2014) use binaries of informal/formal, actors/institutions, and power/knowledge to describe their categories of governance. This is a deductive approach, with a danger of squeezing data into boxes which they may not fit. Therefore, I

chose to conduct inductive research using more analytical designations of governance, leaving the categorization of results as open as possible.

The contemporary root of academic governance literature is the debate over the definition and qualification of governance. The literature is then separated into two categories of 'descriptive' and 'prescriptive.' Although there are exceptions, these two categorizations allow us to understand the differences between the governance literature which aims to *explain* governance and that which aims to *improve* governance. There is a clear imbalance between these two branches of literature; much more of it is prescriptive and the disparity increases with the inclusion of policy documents from multi-lateral and bilateral governance institutions. Prescriptive literature focuses on what structural or political changes should occur to achieve a specific outcome. These types of normative prescriptions are commonly found in public policy and development literature – fields whose main purpose is to improve upon existing systems.

There are fewer descriptive case studies to aid the academic literature that theorizes the concept of governance. The literature on governance theory uses social theories and anecdotal observations to analyze changes in theoretical trends over time, and criticisms of this approach have highlighted gaps in empirical evidence, objectivity, and comparability (Ruhanen et al., 2010; Hufty, 2011a; Fukuyama, 2013; Bevir et al., 2017). It uses components of governance, such as policy, or forms of governance, such as polycentric governance, as an analytical lens with which to critically assess political or social processes. Regardless, established theories of governance are mainly structural, such as network governance, hierarchical Weberian governance, unicentric governance, or the newer evolutionary governance (Van Assche et. al, 2014; Bevir et al., 2017). Understandably then, governance theory often attributes function with structure to explain governance outcomes. However insightful they may be, there are limitations to these theories in that they are "limited in their capacity to explain significant observations to which they draw attention (Davies, 2011).

The concept of 'good governance' implies that agency plays a large part in poor governance – that adhering to 'good' behaviour and values within appropriate structures ensures the implementation of good governance within structures. For example, equity and inclusiveness, consensus, and transparency all depend on agents' willingness to include and provide information to the population they serve and to not use their powers within the system to obfuscate and deceive. The World Bank's good governance requirements are an example of the development community's habit of

promoting structural solutions to political and social problems (Ferguson, 1990; Li, 2007) (Table 2-1). Good governance values may seem structural but are subjective and heavily dependent on the agency of those implementing these values but also the agency of those who decide what 'good governance' means (Blunt, 1995; Graham, Plumptre & Amos, 2003; Healey, 2012). Good governance is a way for development agencies to engage in politically delicate issues in a 'technical' manner (Grindle, 2012). As a result, the good governance objectives and indicators are technocratic in nature, emphasizing administrative efficiency and economic liberalization (Li, 2007; Pereira & Ruysenaar, 2012).

Table 2-1 World Bank Dimensions of Good Governance

World Governance Aggregated Indicators	Examples of 'good governance' sub-indicators
Voice and Accountability	Freedom of assembly; freedom of the press; free and fair elections; religious freedom
Political Stability and Absence of Violence	Civil tension; wealth distribution; fractionalization of political spectrum; frequency of torture
Government Effectiveness	Degree of decentralization; fiscal stability; pro-business; credible policies; participatory
Regulatory Quality	Trade policy; competitive environment; price controls;
Rule of Law	Property rights; transparency; enforceability of contracts
Control of Corruption	anti-corruption institutions; nepotism

Source: *http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=worldwide-governance-indicators (2018-2020)*, Andrews (2008); Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi (2009)

A separate branch of governance literature examines agency outside of their structured positions. Griffin (2012) argues that in new spaces of governance, charismatic or coercive power, institutions, or material circumstances can defy the "spatial relations set by the imaginaries of governance theory" (p. 209). This has important implications for appreciating the limits to democratic and successful policy making (Griffin, 2007). Gillespie et al. (2013) take a positive slant on charismatic power, advocating for nutrition policy champions who, instead of relying on policy and rules, can move through a development governance system to re-frame issues to different stakeholders and build mutual trust. Despite this positive outlook, relying on charismatic or coercive power can be risky in certain contexts, especially those with weak institutions and accountability frameworks. In addition, food system governance would require a wider perspective from these nutrition experts prior to determining solutions; the many structures that influence food systems (energy, transportation, planning, etc.) are often not included in food system solutions, nor are included in the lexicon of one 'champion.' Therefore, the number of actors, the complexity of interactions between them, and the levels of governance involved in food systems increase the likelihood that the agency of many actors

is required to achieve urban food system solutions. In similar complex governance topics such as climate change, Betsill and Bulkeley (2006) contend that networks and regime theories of governance are limiting compared to the multilevel analyses that can capture the social, economic, and political processes where all governance levels – informal and formal – shape daily outcomes.

This system complexity, the importance of agency, and the identification of gaps in food system governance lead me to assert that further inquiry is warranted regarding the impacts of agency and structure on urban food systems from multiple levels of governance. It is therefore important to clearly set out my perception of governance as an observed phenomenon for its application to my research as lens to understand food system outcomes. This forms the fifth step in the conceptual framework (Figure 2-3), that governance is the setting, implementation, and enforcement of rules through norms, laws, power, and language (Feeny, 2003; Hufty 2011a; Hufty 2011b; Bevir 2012;).

A Note on Power Literature

There is a strong overlap between the literature on power and that of governance. Both fields ask questions about decision-making, agency, structure, and the balance of power. Both fields also hold conceptual debates over the definition of their subject. There is a subsection of governance literature that employs theories of power to analyze governance interactions, especially in contexts of unequal resource allocation and socioeconomic conditions (Brisbois & de Loë, 2016).

Lukes' 1974 work, Power: A Radical Approach, in addition to his continuing scholarship, proposes a three-dimensional view of power through instrumental, structural, and discursive means. In all three dimensions, the focus is on how certain parties exercise power over another (domination through political processes (Lukes, 2021)), and how the dominated can resist using the same pathways. Similar to structuration, there is a focus on the individualism of agency and the determinism of structure. These concepts emerge within this dissertation's analysis of governance, however the inductive and broad nature of this study aims to unearth the many different interactions of Mzuzu's food system, such as collaboration, cooperation, and negotiation. Future studies specific to power would be a valuable addition to understanding the nature of these interactions, however the deep analysis required to assess power is out of the scope of this study.

2.4 Urban Research

The study of the city, like food, has been around since humans began to live collectively, building institutions meant for storage, trade, and commerce. Theories about why cities formed center around the ability to manipulate raw materials, the advent of agriculture, divisions of labour, reduction of costs due to the proximity of other services, and possibilities of climate change, all of which increased human population density (Bairoch, 1991; Scott, 2017). Trade, transportation, and security measures are deemed subsequent results of city development; with arguments suggesting that cities emerged due to the need to keep safe the surpluses created by agriculture (Bairoch, 1991). Although the relationship has changed over time, cities and food are inextricably linked. It is therefore important to understand how cities have been viewed through time, and how this perception influences thinking today.

Advances in modern academic urban studies parallel surges in modernity, such as Durkheim's Divison of Labor in Society (1893) and Max Weber's Economy and Society (1924) and the industrial revolution, the advent of urban schools of thought post-World Wars I and II such as the Chicago School of Sociology (Gottdiener et al., 2015; Iossifova et al., 2017), and the advances of globalization (Short et al., 2000). Mainstream urban studies originally focused on the structural and functional evolution of cities, such as Christaller's Central Place Theory (Getis & Getis, 1966) or arguments that industrialization and globalization created cities that functioned as sites of control and influence over much of the globe's commerce and wealth (Sassen, 1991; Bricas, 2019). On the fringes of the field were more sociological studies of cities, especially as the repercussions of unequal urban policies became clear. Questions were asked of what it meant to build cities for people instead of the economy, and who benefitted from the assets and infrastructure of cities (Jacobs, 1961; Tostensen et al., 2001; Gehl, 2013). Subsequent analyses of race, the environment, gender, sexuality, and class gave rise to questions of unequal access to urban resources, with food becoming a major academic focus in the 2000s (Koc, 1999; Maxwell, 1999; Hubbarb & Onumah, 2001; Steel, 2013).

The literature on urban studies remains vast and full of debate. The new millennium saw emphasis on debates of inequality at the global scale, with not only a focus on urbanism in the Global South but on the inequalities and biases within the scholarly and policy discourses of urban studies. Debates continue around the jurisdictional and contextual epistemology of the urban, especially as cities of the Global South expand and scholars reject historical and colonial subaltern titles that

position southern cities in 'otherness.' Questions typical of this debate, are "is 'urban' a universal concept or should urban theory be contextually derived between the Global North and the Global South?" or, "in a globalizing world, how should urban theory progress?"

The debate around universal urbanism highlights this dichotomy between North and South, with authors such as Storper and Scott (2006; 2016), Watson (2009) Parnell and Robinson (2012), Robinson (2002; 2004; 2011), and Robinson & Roy (2016) debating the importance of language, methodology, and perspectives when examining what is 'urban.' What is agreed upon is that language that purports Western, developed cities as the norm and Global South cities as the compared 'other' (such as uneven, over-populated, or chaotic) is neither helpful nor appropriate (Roy, 2011; Battersby, 2017). Both sides of the urban epistemological debate agree that the urban is a complex construct and more empirical work is needed to understand rapidly shifting urban realities (Amin & Thrift, 2002; Amin & Thrift, 2017; Koch & Latham, 2017; Keith & de Souza Santos, 2021). In my view, these discussions bring the field closer to a global urban concept while dismantling historical Western dominance in the field.

Current discussions in the literature revolve around finding the most appropriate urban dimensions with which to approach comparative urban theory. Scott and Storper (2015, p. 1) advocate for the identification of the common dimensions of cities without "exaggerating the scope of urban theory or asserting that each city is an irreducible special case." These debates are important to this research because how 'urban' is defined influences the policies created to solve urban problems – many historical solutions have been based in Western hegemony or modernism for just this reason. This debate has created room to discuss urban commonalities outside of structural urban theory, refocusing on common urban processes and systems. If or when dimensions of the urban are agreed upon for comparative studies, it is important to acknowledge the continued policy transfer, researcher bias, development sector bias, capitalist power inequalities, and global structures that create diverse urban realities across the globe (Robinson & Roy, 2016).

From a post-colonial viewpoint, common urban dimensions should be understood from the perspective of the populations excluded from the colonial hierarchies of power, all called the subaltern (Roy, 2011). These perspectives may create a more uniform theoretical basis and lessen the dualism that posits northern cities as those that create theory and the others within a "rubric of developmentalism" (Robinson, 2002 p. 532). The result should be a dialogue that "abandons

dominance (whether from the North or South) and involves continuous criticism and self-criticism" (McFarlane, 2008, p. 354). This research therefore endeavours to avoid urban development discourse and "good governance" narratives, instead aiming to understand an analytical 'snapshot' of urban food system governance through the perspectives of those within it. Therefore, my choice to focus on process, specifically governance, bypasses the potential subjectivity of many urban dimensions. This dissertation conceptualizes the urban as an outcome of a set of processes determined by governance decisions and forms a picture of an urban food system through the interactions, actors, and structures that influence it.

The debate between the urban Global North and the urban Global South centers around criticisms of policy transfer and assumptions that universal urbanism will provide universal urban solutions (Battersby, 2017). Inherent problems with universal urbanism are found in the practices of global governance institutions. The Millennium Development Goals (2000) set value-based objectives for developing countries, with the sole urban component focused on water and sanitation infrastructure for urban slums. The Millennium Development Goals, for many reasons, did not achieve their objectives, but this one urban goal was singled out as one of the poorest-met due to its lack of ability to make allowances for different urban contexts (Satterthwaite, 2016).

The next iteration of the Millennium Development Goals, the Sustainable Development Goals, established in 2015, devoted one goal to sustainable cities and communities, with the focus remaining on infrastructure and economic development. However, an examination of the sub-goals of the SDGs shows an overreliance on one strategy – economic development to spur urban well-being – when evidence already exists on the fallacy of this argument, specifically around its ability to assure food security (Battersby, 2017; Caprotti et al., 2017). A major criticism of this universal solution to urban development is that the solution is couched within the problem that caused it – economic development through unsustainable consumption – and is therefore set up to fail regarding other SDGs such as environmental sustainability and equitable food systems (Gottdiener et al., 2015; Battersby, 2017; Adelman, 2018). Response to this criticism points to the extensive local level efforts at the city government level around the world and their acknowledgement of the impacts of income inequality on the quality of life in their cities (Corbett & Meloulli, 2017; Martín & de la Fuente, 2022). However, it is important to acknowledge these efforts are often made by cities with larger budgets, those in developed countries, or with supportive national governments (Robin & Acuto, 2018; Valencia et al., 2019).

In sub-Saharan Africa, where urbanization rates are between 3-5% per year (World Bank Data, 2021), much development aid programming focuses on rural scarcity and the development-oriented goals of increasing production (Fouilleux et al., 2017; Battersby & Watson, 2018); once food reaches urban areas equal access to it is assumed to coincide with economic development. This assumption does not coincide with findings about low-income urbanization, deepening income inequality, and the consequent lack of governance revenue to provide physical and social services to urban migrants (Benna & Benna, 2017; Sulemana et al., 2019). The urban SDG sub-goals assume good intentions, indeed, 'good governance,' from a global food system and economic system that are evidently unequal.

All urban sites are slightly different, making it difficult to form theory. Still, urban sites by their very nature require an analysis of factors outside of their physical boundaries, particularly regarding urban food security (Amin & Thrift, 2002; Born & Purcell, 2003; Brown, 2014; Riley & Legwegoh, 2014; Brenner & Schmid, 2014). The need for contextual analysis as well as a methodology applicable to all urban environments is a juxtaposition that has shown up often in comparative urban studies. The field of comparative urban studies is described as "the knowledge, understanding, and generalization of what is true of all cities and what is true of one city at a given point in time" (Mayhew 2009). Urban environments have commonalities, but each city has its own specific 'personality' based on its history, location, and present interactions with outside forces. It is these unique 'personalities' that create difficulties in comparative urban studies, leaving urban food studies within the realm of case studies. Nijman (2007 p. 1) suggests "each and every place is different or even unique in some ways—this is the idiosyncratic nature of place. What begs our attention is why separate places can be very similar in certain respects." In this manner, universal urbanism can be re-focused as useful lens to find urban commonality.

The concept of universalism can aid in finding common ground and its scholarly debates have forced me to interrogate what really is common between cities. Robinson and Roy (2016, p.5) characterize the universalism that "ties together urban outcomes across the globe" as "different circulations and flows" – this dissertation asserts that governance decisions can be viewed as circulations and flows, or processes, supplementing the existing flows of quantitative data on food insecurity. Recognizing the need for methodological shifts, recent publications have proposed moving away from 'city-based' case study research towards processes, agencies, and strategies that promote pluri-vocal urban food governance and equitable policy (Bevir et al., 2017; Moragues-Faus

et al., 2017; Fanzo, 2020; Sonnino & Coulson, 2021). There is a move away from the north/south comparativist debate towards finding other urban characteristics to compare, requiring extensive methodological innovation (Robinson & Roy, 2016). Robinson and Roy (2016, pg. 6) hope for many "interrogations of the conceptualization of urban that inspire multiple empirical and theoretical trajectories."

For my research, the main methodological interrogation is what commonalities amongst separate places can help to understand the idiosyncrasies of an urban space. This research posits that urban processes as led by a set of common governance inquiries can be the similar characteristic shared amongst urban sites. From there, urban theory should be based on real-life data about trends, practices and conflicts in the city (Parnell & Robinson, 2012). In essence, my research tries to advance Robinson's (2006) concept of 'ordinary cities' – that all cities can fit into an urban theory without being similar, and that researchers should strive to find the common ground from which to understand urbanism without having to group cities into hierarchical categories. The question is then how to study a food system to understand the unique properties of that system, but not be pigeon-holed into a sector or narrowed into a case study. How can we use a common urban denominator to understand the specific urban context? Although my research is a case study, a specific objective is to analyze the use of a 'universal' governance analytical framework to identify contextual urban food governance processes.

The urban food security agenda has many narratives, each with their own scale, assumptions, and goals. Sonnino et al. (2016) argue that 'productivism' has evolved from a national focus on self-sufficiency to a global scale of providing food for developing countries, inadvertently damaging the economies and entitlements of those countries and working its way into other narratives such as food sovereignty and the right to food. Their analysis of the convergence of food security narratives led them to conclude that 'place' should be the 'mediator' through which these food narratives meet. This dissertation responds to their call for a "place-based understanding of the diversity of food security conditions constituted by the flows of knowledge, materials, capitals and people that take place in and between food systems...embracing the complexities and contingencies in food-related flows" (p. 485). As such, I suggest that the lens of multi-level governance, a common process across urban systems, is a potential lens to study the intricacies of an urban food system. This requires viewing the urban as a multi-scalar social system (Moos & Dear, 1986), and builds on the concept of place as a social construction where governance outcomes emerge from various multi-scalar forces

(Cuellar-Padilla & Calle- Collado, 2011; Sonnino et al., 2016). I concur with Mould's (2016) assertion that urban theory is not required to stay in the confines of urban space, and urban processes are a more practical ontology through which we can excavate causes of urban inequalities. This perspective allows the expansion past urban boundaries while researching urban food outcomes. Urban systems are, by their concentrated nature, governed by multiple governance systems at multiple operating scales (Martin et al., 2003). This framing of the 'urban' is the sixth step in the conceptual framework (Figure 2-3).

2.5 Urban Food Systems and Urban Food Security Research

Research on urban food security or urban food systems has similar challenges to the field of urban research, surrounding how to 'see,' define, and analyze an urban food system (Haysom & Tawodzera, 2018). Currently, the state of the urban food security literature is dominated by theoretical approaches and minimal empirical evidence (Smit, 2016). Even with the growing quantitative data sets from groups like AFSUN, there are very few compilations for policy makers to draw upon. Crush and Frayne (2010, p. 7) warn that the body of evidence is so "fragmentary and inadequate that it can only lead to misguided or ill-considered interventions at the municipal and national level." Despite this reference being twelve years old at the time of writing, I argue this problem still remains, with the diversity of studies using different measures to assess different dimensions of food security. This makes it difficult to compare results from different studies even within the same spatial and temporal frames (Haysom & Tawodzera, 2018). For effective policy creation, wider attention to systemic issues that impact urban poverty and food security is required to be linked to place (Haysom, 2021). Haysom's (2021) analysis of Cape Town's food environment shows that applying planning and design approaches to analyses of data from household food security and poverty surveys can "provide an immediate and effective means through which to engage urban food system questions (p. 289)." I agree with this statement, and further suggest that it is the act of integrating these studies that has enabled the author to suggest place-based, sustainable solutions to urban food insecurity. This is what is missing in most urban sites, particularly those that receive minimal policy attention from national or international organizations.

Despite evidence of approximately 33% wastage of the Earth's food resources (FAO, 2018) and of hunger in urban areas with food availability (Edkins, 2000), the production narrative remains set in the development ideals for urban growth and prosperity. As discussed previously in this chapter,

critical food security literature has challenged the production narrative to emphasize the institutional and societal influences on urban food security, especially in the last two decades. However, it is only in the last decade that we see its influence in newer documents from the Bretton Woods Institutions and other international agencies (Garrett & Ruel, 1999; Crush & Frayne, 2011; Frayne & McCordic, 2015; Smit, 2016; Sonnino, 2016; Tefft et al., 2017; FAO, 2019). The World Health Organization, the Food and Agricultural Organization, and the World Bank have incorporated this work into their policies and guides, however the approach and detail within these documents expose the state of academic urban food security literature as still fragmented and, in some ways, stuck.

The stalled nature of urban food security literature is evidenced in the repeated recommendations from the literature over time. Smith (1998), in their literature review, provided three gaps in urban food system literature: the need to understand global/national/urban food linkages; the nature, levels, and drivers of food insecurity; and the form and functioning of urban food systems. In 2001, Tostensen et al. noted concern among African scholars about cities on the continent – they were becoming overcrowded, inequality was growing, infrastructure was failing, and the capacity of cities could not cope with the numbers of people looking for employment or shelter. Twenty years later, the gaps have only slightly shifted (Haysom & Tawodzera, 2018). Similar concerns in Crush (2016) show the consequences of not heeding Smith's(1998) and Haysom and Tawodzera's (2018) warnings that food system analysis and assessment are falling short in informing effective food security programming and policy interventions. Crush's (2016) four transformative processes of the urban global south – migration and population increase in urban areas; the monopolization of the food value chain by international companies; the nutritional double burden; and the increase of precarious work and unemployment creating tenuous entitlements – suggest that food policies in the urban global south are not integrating nor reflecting the repeated concerns and recommendations in the literature.

Additionally, the intersections between development and urban food security are at an impasse between the policy-driven governance institutions and researchers. Since the early 1990s, researchers have recommended multiple social and economic shifts in policy with regards to urban food security (Von Braun, 1993). The IFPRI Vision for 2020 (Garret & Ruel, 2000) provides ten well-researched briefs on the underlying causes and potential solutions for food security, many of which remain true today. Despite these recommendations, urban food insecurity remains a major problem. Structural, rights-based solutions that reduce vulnerability in poor, urban populations, such as advocating for

providing social infrastructure like water access (Frayne & McCordic, 2015), conflict with institutional or national policies in the Global South that focus on rural-based food production to solve urban hunger (Cohen & Garrret, 2010). These gaps between what governments say their food policies are and what is implemented (Qureshi et al., 2015) reinforce the findings that the motivations of policy makers are one of the major impediments to policy implementation and are also among the least understood influences on urban food system outcomes (Grindle & Thomas, 1991; Benson, 1999; Simatele & Binns, 2008; Gillespie et al., 2013; Pereira & Drimie, 2016).

2.6 Urban Food Governance

To Crush and Frayne (2011, p. 540), urban food security is about "access, regularity, food safety, and nutritional diversity and quality," as well as how the "food strategies of the urban poor are thwarted or enabled" by multi-scalar forces (p. 528). I interpret these statements as a call to understand the governance systems that influence urban food security. Urban food security, then, is determined by food governance processes at different levels and the structures through which it is delivered. Multiple authors have noted the need for an improved understanding of urban governance processes and their impacts on urban food systems (Atkinson, 1995; Maxwell, 1998; Crush & Frayne, 2011; Candel, 2014; Smit, 2016; Moragues-Faus & Battersby, 2021), but few have suggested methods of how to achieve improved understandings of food governance. Table 2-2 details identified research gaps in both multi-scalar governance and urban food research. Each of these authors have prioritized or noted governance arrangements or understandings as a gap in urban food system research, with the highlighted rows displaying the gaps this research seeks to address.

Table 2-2 Research Gaps in Multi-Scalar Food Governance and Urban Environments

References	Suggested Research
Crush & Frayne, 2010	The interactions between both the informal and formal urban food distribution systems
Hospes & Brons, 2016 p. 20	"Interactions between different actors (government agencies, civil society organizations and private actors) in the shaping of food policy and policy integration"
Smit, 2016 p.85	Methods of coordinating the diversity actors involved in governing urban food systems and understanding their relationships
Candel, 2014	Empirical data on governance arrangements at sub-national levels
Tacoli et al., 2013 p. 1	"The 'supply' of food security factors from farm to plate — production, processing, storage and distribution, and the 'demand' side of accessible markets and adequate incomes."
O'Neill et al., 2014	Arising tensions and dilemmas between social forms of governance (traditional, bureaucratic)
Warshawsky, 2016 p. 293	"theorization of the institutional roles, governance structures, and potential impacts of food civil society organizations"
Haysom & Tawodzera (2018)	Urban-specific food security measurements
Sonnino (2016 p. 190)	"scholarly and policy focus on 'connectivities' such as food exchange nodes between rural and urban spaces, and governance coordination in design and implementation of food security strategies."
Ruel et al. (2017)	"Understanding how to best tailor programs and policies to support the urban poor in tackling the distinct challenges of urban life."
Termeer et al. (2018 p. 92)	"large N studies to develop a database on food system governance arrangements and generate quantitative results."
Tonda & Kepe (2016)	National support and urban planning that recognizes informality and spatial justice
Lazaro et al. (2019)	Regulatory frameworks that include informal markets and mobile vendors
Sonnino and Coulson (2020 p.1)	"a new research and policy agenda that takes account of urban agencies, inequities of power and the politics of knowledge that permeate multilevel food governance."

Von Braun et al. (1993) and Atkinson (1995) were two of the first researchers to coalesce the issues around urban food security and to discuss factors outside of availability and political stability. Von Braun relates urban food security to factors of labour and nutrition. Atkinson moves beyond the household as a unit of analysis to inquire about contextual factors in food insecurity at both the individual and city levels, noting several factors that lead to malnutrition "operating at different levels of a food system where interventions can be made at different levels" (p.151). Both authors, however, stay focused on the household scale and on the responsibility of municipalities to plan for urban food security.

Alternatively, Maxwell's (1999) initial study on urban food environments in Ghana and Uganda showed the influence of cultural and sociopolitical contexts on urban food environments, adding further details by identifying the lack of formal social safety nets, the high proportion of income spent on food by the poor, its 'invisibility' to planners, its chronic nature instead of crisis, and the shifting of responsibility away from the state towards the individual and household as reasons for a lack of response to urban food insecurity. These findings have been echoed in later literature (Pereira & Ruysenaar, 2012; Battersby, 2013; Leroy et al., 2015; Connolly-Boutin & Smit, 2016; Sassi, 2018). Maxwell's (1999) suggested work on other factors has yet to see as much research focus as the household, most notably intergovernmental cooperation and contextual policy development (Warshawsky, 2016).

The need for urban-specific measurements and policies are noted by Haysom and Tawodzera (2018) who warn that "uncritical assumptions and poorly informed understandings about the state of food security has serious consequences for how policies are constructed." Therefore, food security solutions need to incorporate well-rounded, contextual understandings of food systems, including the idea that food security is influenced by other sectors at multiple levels. Haysom (2020) suggests urban governance is embedded in interest groups who wield political power regardless of the urban boundary. This forms the starting assumption of the research – that urban food system outcomes are influenced by the agency and structure of actors within multiple levels and types of governance. Consequently, the way to understand which sectors, and the quality and force behind each, is individualized to each city and requires methods to 'see' the decisions that influence urban food outcomes.

Candel (2014) provides a literature review of food security governance, remarking on the complexity of the issue, the different perspectives of governance, and how increasing the amount of empirical evidence of sub-national contexts could advance the food security governance field. The lack of empirical research is reiterated by Warshawsky (2016), stating that "empirical understandings of the nature of each governance scale is imperative to multi-scalar food system research, yet comparative, empirical governance research is lacking." This shows a potential need not only for empirical data, but also a methodological weakness of the field to incorporate the lived experiences of those living in urban environments (FAO, 2009; Fanzo et al., 2020). This is echoed by Sonnino and Coulson (2021), who found similar impediments to multi-scalar food governance as others (lack of empowerment of local scales, limited capacities, and scarce data), but raised concerns about the low priority given to understanding what knowledge and experiences are important to consider when examining complex food systems across scales.

Existing empirical and applied research on urban food systems can provide a foundation for multi-scalar governance research. Since 2008, the work of the African Food Security Urban Network (AFSUN) has collected data to inform policy on urban food insecurity. For example, Crush and Caesar (2014) and Riley and Legwegoh (2014) analyze the food systems of Msunduzi and Gaborone, respectively. The studies identified the two cities as having high economic performance and a main access point to food through international supermarket chains. Despite the modernized context and high urban incomes, food insecurity was high in both cities. My research methodology aims to understand the qualities of the food governance system that creates certain food security outcomes. Also, the methods aim to understand the crucial points of decision-making to create these outcomes. Studies such as these provide a starting point from which to analyze the conflicts, transactions, and actors' decisions that contribute to the manifestation of specific urban food systems. Finding commonalities in empirical data in urban food governance outcomes may help to build inductive theory that avoids normative influences from urban or development theory.

Social and political contexts are important factors in urban food security research, therefore urban food governance research requires a large amount of qualitative contextual data. Nisbett et al. (2014) sees political economy as the main factor in the implementation of nutrition initiatives and identifies competing ideologies and actors as a main barrier, specifically private versus public interests. Brown (2015, p. 5) concurs, stating that "policy choices…will need to navigate political and bureaucratic resistance in ways specific to individual governance capacities and environments." The contextual

data requirements will therefore not just require that of household food security, or governance structures, but of the interactions between governance levels and types. There is also a need to understand specific processes and how they differ between urban contexts. Ericksen's (2007) important work on food systems and global environmental change outlines the gaps in food systems conceptions, suggesting that "food system tradeoffs are often between different scales or levels of decision-making or management, so solutions to manage them must be context-specific" (p. 234). In a more recent paper, Atiglo et al. (2020) note the differences in food security levels of rural-urban migrants to three different Ghanaian cities, showing the importance of understanding urban context in relation to food outcomes. Treating cities as a monolithic entity can cause incomplete understandings of food security problems and an obfuscation of the diverse lives of the poor (Haysom & Tawodzera, 2018; Blekking et al., 2020).

The complexity of urban solutions increases when discord exists between the scales at which problems are produced (e.g. global decision about staple food price increases) and the scale at which problems are solved (e.g. urban feeding programs) (Termeer et al. 2010). In an urban setting, actors with many interests and agendas have "few processes for reaching consensus or resolving competing interests" (Smit, 2016 p. 82), resulting in reliance on personal initiative or a fallback to relying on power relations or technical solutions. Mismatches also occur when different types of governance interact, such as a development agency that requires rigid accountability and a traditional authority that operates within norms of patronage. Varied actors have different types and amounts of power across multiple scales, which requires an understanding of agency across the food system.

Urban governance research often relies on scalar understandings of governance, and my research emphasizes the importance of understanding urban governance as a product of multiple governance systems operating at different scales and with different intentions (Martin et al., 2003; Smit, 2018). This is supported by the work of Bevir et al. (2017), who suggest rethinking governance not as a structural formation, but as diverse policies across time, space and sectors that are interpreted by actors to create different webs of meaning. This forms the methodological premise of my conceptual framework (Figure 2-3), that governance, when viewed as a result of both structure and agency, is an interpretive lens that can illuminate the discord between intentions of policy and urban food system outcomes. This step forms the pathway to determining my methodology, briefly justified through literature below and further examined in Chapter 3.

Grindle (2004, 2007, 2012, 2016) explores the operationalization of governance research using good governance objectives. She asks what objectives should be prioritized, what is currently feasible, and what should be short and long-term goals. To do this requires an understanding of the current governance context. Accordingly, researchers like Fukuyama (2013) and Hufty (2011a, 2011b) focus on methods or pathways to analyze current governance contexts, pinpointing shortcomings and bridging the gap between governance mandates and the existing situation. Grindle (2004) suggests actions that provide a realistic good governance 'agenda' – understanding the historical and developmental context, addressing governance policy to reduce poverty, and applying priorities on a country basis, including assessing who exactly needs to do what. Grindle provides excellent critiques of good governance implementation, however like many pieces of prescriptive governance literature there is little recommended methodology on how to understand context and implement the prescriptions. Grindle's (2011) work highlights the next gap in urban food security research – how to operationalize governance research to understand multi-scalar processes. While still a knowledge gap, Grindle's and others' work on this topic ensured that multi-scalar processes are noted in the urban food security literature.

The *how* of governance research implies the need for a framework. Many governance frameworks exist as analytical tools for other phenomena, such as health systems or environmental management – but "what is needed are conceptual tools for incorporating and synthesizing diverse understandings of the...city" (Wu et al., 2019). Whereas Wu et al. (2019) proposed three lenses – area, hierarchy, and relations – I wish, in my research, to advance the specific requests for detailed understandings and applications of governance detailed in this review (Table 2-2).

So how does one analyze governance itself? Through determining a "non-normative" methodology, Hufty (2011b p. 418) has provided a distilled understanding of governance and how its analysis could be operationalized through understanding of five analytical factors of governance: norms, processes, actors, problems, and nodal points. Hufty (2011b, p. 405) provides a methodology for understanding complex governance situations by focusing on the problem as the dependent variable (such as food insecurity) and governance as an "observable, non-normative, descriptive phenomenon." This approach to governance assessment can help to evaluate governance contexts to understand the causes of underlying policy paralysis or unwanted outcomes. Viewing governance in this way may fill another gap of identifying crucial points of decision-making in a more objective manner, a gap highlighted throughout food governance literature, starting with Maxwell (1998). My

research explores the operationalization of a theoretical governance framework (Hufty 2011b) to provide empirical, qualitative data with which to build inductive theory on urban food governance.

As discussed in the introduction, this dissertation argues that complementary examinations of both food security levels and the food system are necessary to implement proper policy and that the reason for fewer food systems analyses is the lack of accessible methodology to understand what is happening in a city's food system. This work responds to calls in the literature to focus on food system processes as the commonality through which to understand the contextual causes of food insecurity and to develop effective urban food security solutions.



Figure 2-3 Conceptual Framework

2.7 Field Site

Secondary cities in Africa – like Mzuzu, Malawi – will absorb the majority of the continent's rural migration and population growth in the next three decades (Parnell & Oldfield, 2014; UN, 2014). The development and management of these secondary cities will be critically important to southern African urban livelihoods in the next thirty years (Zimmer et al., 2020). There are various definitions of secondary cities in the literature. Roberts (2014), while acknowledging that population size is significant, suggests that "function, specialty, logistics, trade importance, and competitiveness" are key determinants of a secondary city status. My further examination of these definitions suggest that secondary cities are defined according to their national or regional relativism. For example, Hannah at al. (2022), for the purposes of their analysis, define a broad range of tertiary and secondary urban areas with populations between 5000 and 500,000 people.

In the case of Mzuzu, I define it as a secondary city due to its size relative to the two largest cities (Lilongwe and Blantyre), its regional function as a commercial and trade hub, as well as its relatively similar size to another city of regional importance (Zomba). Mzuzu, like many secondary cities, is currently experiencing the consequences of urbanization past the limits of its infrastructure and bureaucracy and is therefore of growing concern for municipal governments (UN HABITAT, 2011; Haysom, 2015). To this end, the Food, Urbanization, Environment and Livelihoods (FUEL) project focuses research on the state of food security, food systems, and the challenges and opportunities of local governance in secondary urban centers in Africa. This program comprises three cities in sub-Saharan Africa, including Mzuzu, and connects with academia at the University of Livingstonia, just north of the city.

This section begins with a contextual review of Malawi's political history and national food history, then segues into more specific details on Mzuzu as the case study for this research. Key demographics and major policies and initiatives influential on national and urban food systems are included in this section.

2.7.1 Malawi Overview

Malawi is situated in southeast Africa, at the southern reach of the Great Rift Valley, highlighted by Lake Malawi which stretches the length of much of the country (Figure 2-4). It is a democratically ruled republic and is a member of the Southern African Development Community, the Common

Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the African Union, and the United Nations. The population sits just under 20 million, with the largest percentage being rural, and the urban portion of the population between 17-19% (NSO, 2019). The estimated national urbanization rate is 4.7% (UNHABITAT, 2020). Malawi is a young country, with a median age of 17 and 51% of the country under 18 years of age (NSO, 2019). Agriculture dominates the economy, with small-holder farming contributing a large part of economic activity and farming being strongly associated with national identity (Ferree & Horowitz, 2010; Conrad, 2014).

Figure 2-4 Map of Malawi

Malawi is ethnically diverse. While early anthropological studies found up to 25 different ethnicities (Tew, 2017), the country is separated into three bureaucratic regions with each generally associated with a specific ethnicity: Northern (Tumbuka), central (Chewa), and Southern (Yao and Lomwe). While Chichewa is the common language, 13 other regional dialects are spoken throughout the country (Kayambazinthu, 1998). Ethnic tensions in the face of modernity and resource distribution, elitism, and regionalism are attributed by the Malawian population as having a strong influence on political outcomes (Kaspin, 1995; Osei-Hwedie, 1998), especially in national government elections. The second democratic election in 1994 showed a clear regional trisection between presidential preferences, with the candidate from the more populous south, Bakili Muluzi, prevailing. Subsequent national and tripartite elections have followed similar patterns of regionalism (Zeze, 2015; Kayira et al., 2019).

The four settlements classified as urban centres in Malawi have very different histories, although all colonial in nature. The southern city of Blantyre, the largest in terms of population density, is the commercial capital and has the longest historical colonial and commercial history. Zomba, also a southern city, is the former colonial capital, home to Chancellor College, the largest college of the University of Malawi, and the former home to national parliament until 1994. As the central hub of the country, Lilongwe became the capital in 1974 under Hastings Kamuzu Banda, Malawi's first democratically-elected president, and grew as a bureaucratic political capital. The major infrastructure of Mzuzu was originally built around the British Commonwealth Development Corporation's tung oil estate in 1947, eventually incorporating as a city in 1985 and serving as the centre for northern regional government.

Private land, generally estates and large farms owned by international companies or Malawian elites, is 10-15% of total land; 15-20% is public lands, and the remainder, 65-75%, is customary land (FAO, 2007; Chirwa, 2008, USAID, 2010). There are 35 Local Government Areas (LGA) in Malawi, all which report to the national government. Rural areas are governed through traditional governance feeding into district and regional governance, while the four major urban centers link closely with their respective districts but are responsible for their own management as their own LGA, hierarchically reporting to national levels (Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, 2013). The Local Government Act of 1998 mandated that the four major cities create plans for the well-being of their respective populations. These plans followed structural planning

strategies, providing zoning for activities like environmental protection and industrial development (UN HABITAT, 2020).

Malawi is often positioned as one of the poorest countries in the world based on its agriculture-dominated GDP and the impact of AIDS on the country in the 1990s and 2000s, which erased many of the economic and social gains the country had made beforehand (UNDP, 2005; Boutayeb, 2009). Since gaining independence from British colonial powers in 1964, the country has remained relatively peaceful. Gender inequality, classism, and regionalism are influential factors in the political and economic spheres (Chikaipa, 2019; Kayira et al., 2019; Lusaka, 2019). Overall, poverty levels have decreased in the last 15 years, but have coincided with an increase in income inequality, with larger shares of household budgets being spent on food, especially in lower income brackets (IFPRI Malawi, 2018). Poverty rates in rural areas are higher than in urban areas, with extreme poverty rates estimated in urban areas to hover around 3% (NSO, 2020). An increase in urban informality and urbanization rates, increasing costs of living, including food costs, combined with a lack of urban poverty measurements calls these urban numbers into question (Mitlin & Satterthwaite, 2012; Lucci et al., 2018; Riley, 2020; Valencia, 2019). Multiple urban issues have been noted in the national policies as of future concern but are not yet strategically incorporated into government strategies (Govt. of Malawi, 2018).

Many historical factors influence Malawi's political context: almost a century of British colonial rule, thirty years of one-party state rule, the shift to democratic institutions in the 1990s, and continuing cultural and political influence through foreign aid. Colonization, in conjunction with the slave trade, allowed prime agricultural land to be captured (Vaughan, 1987), which has continued in the form of international and national tobacco and tea estates dominating primary farmland, mostly in the south of the country (Adams et al., 2019; Chinsinga et al., 2021).

Major political power is held within the Malawian elite; commercial holdings, media ownership, and construction enable the reproduction of arrangements between elites and followers that "maintain enough services for social conciliation" (Khan, 2010; Dressel & Dinnen, 2014; Cammack, 2017, p. 663). State resources such as estate lands, sugar markets or agricultural inputs change hands depending on who has political power, and alliances are formed based on relationships, religion, and politics within the small group of elites (Riley, 2014; Cammack, 2017). Relationships of patronage and clientelism between large business, politics, and rural leadership in Malawi have been

documented in the literature (Chinsinga, 2011; Kelsall, 2012; Hutton, 2013; Riley, 2014; Said & Singhini, 2014; Cammack, 2017; Dulani, 2019; Chekenya & Dzingirai, 2020) and have a large impact on the concentration of assets and resources into the hands of the "commercial bourgeouise" (Cammack, 2017, p. 662; Mdee et al., 2021). Historical neopatromonialism is typically viewed as partnerships between politicians and rural chiefs and focused on agricultural inputs (Phiri & Edris, 2013), however the urban sphere has been noted as sites of resource capture through the lack of devolution to city planning departments and the intentional creation of institutional gaps (Cammack, 2007; Manda, 2019).

The integration of development aid into state and social structures deserves attention (Grindle & Thomas, 1991), especially in the context of food security strategies. Since its independence, Malawi's government has received foreign aid; structural adjustment programs began in 1981 and the next 25 years were a turbulent time for donors and the Malawian government due to inconsistent policy implementation, a range of fiscal policy strategies, and vulnerability of the narrow economy to external shocks (Fagernas & Schurich, 2004; Conroy et al., 2006). The influences of foreign aid reach beyond supplementing government budgets to influencing policy, politics, and social trajectories in Malawi (Thindwa, 2014; Banik & Chasukwa, 2019; Storeng et al., 2019). Estimates from the early 2000s to 2018 put donor contributions between 60 to 90% of Malawi's annual government budget, depending on the department (Chinsinga, 2007; Khunga, 2018). This situation results in a multiplicity of aid agencies beholden to their own objectives, duplicated aid projects, a civil service burdened with managing multiple relationships, and money going into managing those multiple stakeholders instead of into projects themselves (ECI Africa, 2008; O'Neill et al., 2014).

Development aid in Malawi has been an off-again on-again affair, with donor countries at times turning a blind eye to clear patrimonialism, or pulling aid after revelations of corruption and embezzlement, only to return when promises of reform are made (Cammack, 2017). The introduction of newer donors such as China, India, and Brazil have complicated development relations in Malawi. Although much of the development funding structures have not changed – most aid still comes from established donors and all donors implement conditionalities that benefit the donor country's economy – the ideational preference is toward the newer donors who position themselves as 'development partners' instead of paternalistic funders (De Bruyn, 2016).

In the 1990s Malawi adopted democratic governance reforms; subsequent decentralization initiatives, encouraged by multilateral aid agencies, rolled out in 2000 (Conroy et al., 2006). It was assumed that decentralization would enable local politicians to more properly represent their constituents. Instead, institutional paralysis inhibited any implementation of local policy, leading to negative implications on democratic and poverty reduction agendas (Tambulasi, 2011). This is in large part attributed to Malawi's history of centralized national power retaining a heavy influence over subsidiary governance systems (Cammack, 2017). Sporadic devolution continues, with the national government influencing key decision-making factors, in particular the funding that reaches local governance levels (ECI Africa, 2008).

Tambulasi (2011) credits three factors with the local governance paralysis: historical path dependency that disregarded the importance of local councillors, pressures exerted by donor agencies to 'appear' to adhere to policies, and the political unwillingness at a national level to empower local representatives, evidenced by the lack of local elections from 2006 to 2014 (Tambulasi & Chasukwa, 2014), leaving even large cities like Mzuzu without representation except for traditional chiefs and local block leaders. In addition, the lack of accountability structures at the national level trickled down to the local level, allowing rent-seeking behaviour in local representatives, the subsequent loss of trust in local electorates, and poor infrastructure for growing urban populations (Tambualsi & Kayuni, 2013).

Governance research in Malawi focuses on the deviations between structural, written policy versus the actual outcomes of governance. Researchers have found similar themes of systemic manipulation in their work on Malawi's governance (Anders, 1991; Sahley et. al, 2005; Chinsinga, 2006; Cammack, 2007; Anders, 2010; Power, 2010; Cammack, 2011; Cammack & Kelsall, 2011), but few have focused on the food system outside of the politicization of maize and farm inputs (Mpesi & Muriaas, 2009; Tambulasi, 2009) or nutrition programming (Quinn, 1994; Verduzco-Galloet al., 2014; Donovan & Gelli, 2019). Food is so embedded in political systems however, that governance issues seemingly outside of food systems are likely to impact Mzuzu's urban food system governance.

2.7.2 Malawian Food Context

Hastings Kamuzu Banda, Malawi's president from 1964 to 1994, created a two-pronged approach to agriculture; solidifying Malawi's focus on self-sufficiency through farming as well as the continuance of tobacco and tea estates that dominate the south of the country. This strategy created a strong

economy at first, but eventually the reliance on rain-fed agriculture tipped the scales when the 1991-1992 drought coincided with the IMF and World Bank's decision to cut funding for fertilizer subsidies (Bezner-Kerr et al., 2018). Fertilizer subsidies were the backbone of Banda's agricultural policy, and their removal negatively impacted the majority of the country's cash and subsistence crops (Conroy et al., 2006; Peters, 2006). In 2005, after sequential years of hunger and famine, the Malawian government implemented a new farm input subsidy program (FISP) which continues today in varying forms with varied success (Tambulasi, 2009; Chinsinga, 2012; Mpesi & Muriaas, 2012).

Banda's hold on the agricultural trajectory of the country extended to control over the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC), created in 1971 and operated as an international promoter and buyer of agricultural commodities in Malawi. Once democracy took hold, the discourse shifted positively towards free markets and competition. ADMARC's role adapted to holding reserves and being a 'last resort' buyer, but corruption from government actors, structural adjustment interventions from the World Bank, and shifting priorities left it unable to effectively fulfill this role (Babu & Sanyal, 2018).

The major agricultural crop in Malawi is maize, with the grain being over 90% of the total grains grown, and over 50% of daily calories consumed (Smale & Heisey, 1997; McCann, 2005). Government control over the price of maize, weakened after changes to ADMARC in the 2000s, only applied to imported maize, which was brought in often due to ADMARC having insufficient stores. This set price impacted urban areas positively, with more supplies being brought to easily accessible areas instead of difficult to reach rural ones, whose depots eventually closed due to a lack of profitability (Devereux, 2002).

The introduction of newer donors such as Brazil, India, and China has reinforced food aid as a production-based, industrial endeavour. China has focused on large infrastructure projects such as power plants, stadiums, and the new Parliamentary and conference buildings through large loans. In terms of agriculture, China focuses on trade and credit lines to encourage economically viable crops such as cotton (De Bruyn, 2014). India is focused on rural to rural, south to south agricultural exchange and aid (Sabola, 2019), and Brazil has chosen to focus on extending its own experiences of nutrition strategies and commercial agricultural development. Both India and China have extended into partnership with established development agencies such as USAID, DFID, and UN agencies,

but contributions to development projects are still minimal compared to OCAD-OECD countries (De Bruyn, 2019; USAID, 2021).

Fewer but equally important studies in Malawi focus on the double burden emerging at the same time as the growth of the middle class, emphasizing the risks of poor diagnosis and management of non-communicable, food related diseases in both urban and rural areas (Price et al., 2018). The projections of a doubling of all urban populations by 2050 raise concerns about the policy bias towards rural populations and the lack of industrialization and job creation in urban centers (Manda, 2013). Simultaneously, second wave urbanization has increased levels of informal urbanization and food insecurity – the other side of the double burden. The Global Hunger Index for Malawi has declined by almost half over the last twenty years to 26.5, but the undernourishment rate has stayed steady at around 20% of the population (World Data Atlas, 2022).

In regards to urban food access, three major quantitative studies, each in the three largest cities of Blantyre, Lilongwe, and Mzuzu, have shown that households in urban Malawi access food in diverse ways – by growing food inside or outside of the city it if they have the means, access through informal traders or small markets, rural-urban food transfers, take out, and supermarkets (Mvula & Chiwesa, 2013; Chilanga et al., 2017; Riley et al., 2018). Although market chains first entered the food system under Banda with the People's Trading Centre (PTC), the international chains like ShopRite, entering the food system in the new millennium, are a smaller part of the food system than in other countries (Crush & Caesar, 2014; Riley & Legwegoh, 2014). Most of those who do not access supermarkets note their lack of providing credit, the distance to the shop, and the expense of the goods in the store (Riley et al., 2018).

The percentage of the population that is severely food insecure in each of the studied cities ranges across the studies, not only from geographical differences, but due to the nature of the research. Based on Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS), the low-income areas within the Lilongwe study had 72% severe food insecurity, compared to the whole of Mzuzu's areas (47%), and Blantyre's South Lunzu area at 21%. Despite the lack of comparability due to scale, these studies provide a vital starting point to understanding the state of food access, availability, and stability within Malawi's urban areas.

2.7.3 Food Discourse in Malawi

The discourse around food in the Malawian media often focuses on the need for increased production, aid projects that enable food productivity, and factors that lead to hunger, such as drought, floods, or pests, such as fall army worm. After the 2002 famine, a small, but powerful group of civil society NGOs demanded government accountability for food security, and these 'watchdogs' often editorialize in the mainstream media (Sahley et al., 2005). The media in Malawi can therefore be reactive to hunger as well as providing the 'campaigning and advocating' expected of a democratic free press during crises, often pointing out the need for policies or political action (Devereux, 2002; Chirwa & Chinsinga, 2013). Malawi has also encountered historical instances of government interference in the media, questions around the influence of media ownership (Gunde, 2017), as well as historical physical violence (Rubin, 2008; Devereux, 2009). Regardless, editorial policies implemented by media owners were shown to be a "critical safeguard" for political journalists in Malawi, in particular when writing about politics and food (Gunde, 2017).

Development sector food discourses in Malawi are as varied as the number of actors and focus on a wide array of food production approaches (MacAuslan, 2009; Banik & Chasukwa, 2019). Despite academic acknowledgement that urban hunger is associated with structural inequalities such as inadequate income, infrastructure, or food price shocks (Cohen & Garrett, 2010; McCordic & Frayne, 2015), much of the international development community and subsequently Malawian national policies continue to frame urban food security solutions within production-based rural agricultural development (Crush et al., 2012; Spoor et al., 2012; Battersby & Crush, 2014). Malawi's three Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, from 2002 to 2012 (Govt. of Malawi, 2002; 2007; 2012) mention food in reference to agricultural development and nutrition, leaving urban food issues out of development strategy and consequently, development funding.

The Malawian government's Food Security Action Plan, 2008-2013 was solely production and marketing focused with the objective of providing nutrition to both rural and urban populations. The newer Malawi Growth and Development Strategies, currently on the third iteration, include agriculture as a focus (MGDS III, 2017) and now includes urban housing, infrastructure, land governance, and energy as a priority for development. The Habitat III Report from the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development (Govt. of Malawi, 2015) incorporates food into the urban discussion through peri-urban production and urban agriculture. More recently, the 2018 – 2022

National Multi-Sectoral Nutrition Policy (NMNP) and Strategic Plan has been introduced through the global Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) initiative and the Ministry of Health. The two topics of urban development and food security in terms of non-production factors do not explicitly meet in these strategies and policies.

Since 2004, the complex donor landscape in Malawi led to the creation of "SWAps," Sector-Wide Approaches, meant to harmonize government and donor efforts in the country (Pearson, 2010). Food is encapsulated in both the Agriculture SWAp (ASWAp) and the Health SWAp. The ASWAp states six main goals around improving food security and nutrition, increasing agricultural incomes, and ensuring the sustainable use of natural resources. The most notable is "ensure sustainable food availability at the national level," however there are few mentions of the urban context (ASWAp, 2017). The second phase of ASWAp is underway, with urban areas mentioned as important markets to reach for farmers (World Bank, 2020). Policies on agricultural production take precedence in the ASWAp – understandable in an agricultural dominated economy – however there is a danger in assuming that urban populations will benefit from these strategies, considering that the famines over the last twenty years have been attributed to poor stock and fiscal management, failures of response, and weak institutions causing vulnerability in the population, instead of a lack of available food (Deveraux, 2002; Menon, 2007; Chirwa & Chinsinga, 2013).

Smaller NGOs and research projects in Malawi's development sector provide alternative productive solutions to the large-scale, monocultures promoted by many multi-lateral and bilateral donors. Their work has led to a more diverse products such as a Malawian sustainable food guide promoting indigenous foods and the incorporation of alternative farming practices such as permaculture and agroecology. These groups also play a role in advocacy for small-holder farmers, alternative food system approaches, and political accountability in the food system (Busse et al., 2020). Their programming and advocacy add a critical alternative to politically-driven food discourse in Malawi.

Political motivations are pinpointed as contributing to the confusion surrounding national food security strategies, especially in relation to maize prices, trade, and provision (Chinsinga, 2012; Chirwa & Chinsinga, 2013). A recent analysis by Banik & Chasukwa (2019, p. 189) found that food security policies are "influenced by the political incentives they provide for electoral campaigns and for securing a regular flow of financial resources...that are highly dependent on foreign aid." Media articles throughout election campaigns confirm provision of goods at rallies, and criticisms of large

campaigns such as the Farm Input Subsidy Program (FISP) suggest they are driven by the political incentives rather than technical benefits (Kadokera, 2017), a distinct change from the earlier fertilizer and seed 'starter pack' programs of the 1990s (Conroy et al., 2006).

Along with political and social aspects, discourse around spatial considerations is important when considering urban food systems, in particular vendor issues (Riley, 2012), and especially for the poor. Historically, under Banda's rule, street vending was not allowed. Once democratic elections took place, the new Malawian Constitution made a point of promising Malawians freedom to "work to pursue a livelihood anywhere in Malawi" (Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, 1994), interpreted by the public to mean commerce was freed from the confines of formal business spaces (Tonda & Kepe, 2016). This freedom came to conflict in Lilongwe in 2006 with Operation Dongsolo, a 'clean-up' of the streets to gain political favour with rising middle- and upper-class Malawians and impress upon them the government's march towards a modern society by removing informality (Roever & Skinner, 2016). Mzuzu's more recent conflicts over space and competition are echoing previous issues in Malawi's primary cities. Disagreements between city governance, market vendors and street vendors have arisen in recent years (Chavula, 2015; Chirwa, 2017; Singini, 2018; Sangala, 2019), emphasizing the importance of this issue as the city grows larger and demand for space and employment opportunities increase.

2.7.4 The City of Mzuzu

The region around Mzuzu was first inhabited by the Tumbuka, with first records of group migration into the area around 1435; the next four centuries was a time of in-migration to the area from both farther north and south of what is now Malawi (Chondoka & Bota, 2015). This movement resulted in trade with the Balowoka, domination by the invading Ngoni, and mixing with Chewa from the south who had migrated along trade routes north (Chondoka & Bota, 2015). The Livingstonia Mission, established in the 1890s, was the first western Christian missionary in the northern area and established relations with Tumbuka chiefs to create a colonial governance relationship (McCracken, 2008).

Compared to southern Malawi, the Northern region is more forested, of higher elevations, and is less populated. The Nyika Plateau north of the city feeds rivers that run to Lake Malawi, and the forests and mountains provide cooler temperatures and more precipitation than other parts of the

country. Geographically, Mzuzu is couched within hilly terrain and serves as the northern crossroads to the northern shore of Lake Malawi and Tanzania (Figure 2-4).

The Northern region is often seen as separate from the Central and Southern regions of the country, perceived as better educated and better off than the other two regions. (Malawi Country Report, 1994; FAO, 2010). The development focus of major aid agencies is in the central and southern regions of the country due to slightly better poverty indices in the Northern regions (Amadu, McNamara, & Miller, 2020). Resentment occurs between the Northern region and the rest of the country, with political statements made about ruling national parties being "anti-Northern" and occasional rumours of northern traditional chiefs discussing separation. The North often finds itself as the opposition or 'junior partner' in national politics (Osei-Hwede, 1998), and therefore not a recipient of as much national funding compared to the other two regions (Easterly & Levine, 2007; Manda, 2013). Although distant in geography and culture, the north, and therefore its main city of Mzuzu, is still influenced by national politics, illustrated by findings of "vertically-divided authority over food relief and water supply" that prefers loyalty to national political powers (Resnick, 2014, p. S3).

Mzuzu is Malawi's third largest city and the geographical and political center of the Northern region where 1.7 million people reside (UNHABITAT, 2011). In the decade between 2008-2018, Mzuzu's population had the highest growth rate of the entire country at a rate of 5.4% per year, and the current population sits just under 230,000 (NSO, 2019). The population of Mzuzu is expected to double in this decade, presenting a significant sustainable development challenge to the municipal government (Cohen, 2006; Manda, 2013; UN, 2014). The population has typically been Tumbuka, and Chitumbuka is the most spoken, but recent surveys have found a diverse urban population from various locales, and Chichewa, Chitonga, Chilambya and Kiswahili are also spoken (Riley et al., 2018). The University of Mzuzu houses a large student population, and agriculture, government, and tourism support the city's economy. Of the total workforce, those working in the 'informal sector' make up 40% of all employment, whereas formal employment accounts for 25% of employment in Mzuzu, and unemployment sits at 20% (Riley et al., 2018; NSO, 2018). These numbers are fluid due to households supported by both informal and formal employment, as well as those who receive remittances or pensions (NSO, 2018).

Municipally, the city is split in half by the boundary between of two governance regions – Nkhata Bay and Mzimba North (Figure 2-5). The original city's size was under 30 km^2 and through negotiations with both adjacent regions expanded to just under 150km^2 in 2010. Most of the extensions have been from the Mzimba district lands, and the governance structures are more connected to the newly created Mzimba North region than the region of Nkhata Bay. The city has 15 wards (Figure 2-6), and is governed by a mayor and councillors, with a CEO and staff running the administrative arm of the city.

Figure 2-5 District Map of Malawi (Gondwe & Shukla, 2020)



Figure 2-6 Mzuzu Ward Map (Mzuzu City Council, 2017)

2.7.5 Mzuzu's Food System

The ethnic lines drawn between the south and the north also influence its food consumption. Mzuzu's population is a cosmopolitan mix of the northern ethnicities of Malawi, with increasing numbers from southern ethnicities (NSO, 2018). This mix of people creates a diversity in food cultures. There is higher diversity of food staple consumption in the north, particularly maize, rice, cassava, plantain, and sweet potato, gaining the region and the city the unofficial reputation of being less impacted by hunger than the rest of the country. Recent studies place Mzuzu as the most food secure out of the four major cities that include Blantyre, Lilongwe, and Zomba (Mkusa & Hendriks, 2021). Although the most recent drought impacted the whole country in 2017, other major droughts – 2002, 2005, 2012, 2015 – often impacted the south and central areas more significantly (Adhikari & Nejadhashemi, 2016). The Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee (MVAC) assesses food availability and food insecurity across the nation each year. Annual reports from MVAC show the

majority of vulnerable districts in the south of the country (MVAC, 2014, MVAC, 2015, MVAC, 2016, MVAC, 2017, MVAC, 2019). The agricultural areas surrounding Mzuzu are considered less prone to crop failure due to higher precipitation and less intensive farming (Adhikari & Nejadhashemi, 2016; Mungai et al., 2020). Much of the city's food originates from areas just south of the city, Jenda and Mzimba, as well as from northern areas of Karonga and Nkhata Bay, including fish from Lake Malawi, approximately 45 minutes away by car (Figure 2-4).

Mzuzu is showing signs of second wave urbanization in the last 5 years with the growth of informal areas and a subsequent increase in informal workers in the food markets. Street vendors are a relatively new phenomenon, accelerating in number and type over the last decade, creating conflict between vendors who pay daily fees to sell goods in established markets (Banda, 2017). This has resulted in years of back-and-forth enforcement from city council, with street vendors being chased away from areas, only to return days or weeks later (Zgambo, 2020). Mzuzu's small city centre is the locus of this conflict, with the Mzuzu Main Market serving a large population within a small area. The majority of people access fresh vegetables at both formal markets and street vendors – this food type is the least expensive and the least likely to experience price fluctuations (Riley et al., 2018). The markets have issues such as lack of water and sanitation facilities, increasing risks of food-borne illness (Lazaro et al., 2019), and street sellers often sell from mats on the ground, sometimes dangerously close to the M1 Highway and informal minibus stops.

The growing population in Mzuzu has created informal settlements in some areas that increase risk of illness or disaster. In 2016, unprecedented flooding within the city displaced just under 20,000 people, mostly from the informal settlement areas. Over 1200 houses effectively collapsed, and the risk of water borne diseases increased along with food insecurity (Sangala, 2016). Affordability of land, the pace of unregulated developments, and land pressure from an increasing population were found to be factors in the increased vulnerability of informal areas to this disaster, impacting livelihoods, notably food security for lower income residents (Kita, 2017).

The effects of a growing population have also attracted supermarkets such as ShopRite, a South African grocery chain. ShopRite opened its doors to their large supermarket in 2013 in the Mzuzu Mall, a strip mall of approximately a dozen businesses. In addition to supermarkets, which only make up 30% of shopping activities (Riley et al., 2018), the majority of people access food from street vendors and markets. The more food insecure populations tend to access the smaller shops in

the surrounding neighbourhoods. These shops make up the largest share of food purchases in Mzuzu (Riley et al., 2018) and show the geographic nature of food purchasing in the city. The number of informal vendors in the city have increased, but the origin of these vendors speaks perhaps to the perceived opportunities in Mzuzu as compared to other areas – 75% of vendor respondents in a recent study migrated to the city, mostly from within Malawi (Zuze et al., 2022).

In 2010, the percentage of income spent on food for Malawi's urban poor was 60%; for higher income earners, it was 30% (NSO, 2010). The percentage of income spent on food in 2010 was 65% in Mzuzu. The income gap has widened since 2010, as the 2017 AFSUN report shows that 60% of survey respondents earned less than $70 USD per month and were spending 50% -100% of their income on food; 20% of the respondents earned less than $11 USD per month, and spent more than their income on food, up to 165%, indicating that their food access points are diverse, including accruing debt. The highest income earners in Mzuzu spend approximately 16% of their income on food. This 2017 estimate from AFSUN, though not directly comparable with Malawi National Statistics Office methodologies, suggests that the percentage of the population in Mzuzu that are classified as 'poor' has increased since the 2011 estimates of 15.9% (NSO, 2012). The most recent measurement of the cost of food items for a family of 6 in Mzuzu is 140,000 MK, equal to $185 USD, not including cooking fuel, school fees or other household essentials (CSC, 2020). Only the fifth quintile of respondents in the AFSUN (2017) report reached this level of income, which is the highest tier of income in the study.

Food security levels in the city correspond to the income findings in the AFSUN (2017) report; the food secure population sits at 28%, leaving 72% along the spectrum of mildly, moderately, and severely food insecure. Despite the high cost of living in the city, the diversity of food access strategies may be a factor in lower levels of severe food insecurity (28%) than one would expect when only the fifth income quintile was reaching levels of affordability. Similar to findings in Blantyre, urban or peri-urban agriculture, food sharing, and food transfers from rural areas may buoy residents to a higher level of food security than they would otherwise achieve through economic means. In addition to the strong rural connections between relatives and home areas, the desire to continue farming activities within the city is commonplace. Despite the preference to farm, the lack of land and inputs was cited as the main reasons for not engaging in urban agriculture (Riley et al., 2018), displaying a strong sense of food sovereignty and a lesser reliance on larger commercial food systems.

2.7.6 Thesis Statement

Food systems are the result of political, economic, and social systems that make up our societies. This is a logical understanding of how our food systems form but it is not necessarily how we have studied them in the past. Food system literature has often focused on outcomes, such as food deserts or food security levels. There is a gap in our understanding of how urban food systems function to create these outcomes. There is little guidance, either academic or applied, about *how* to engage with food systems – where to start, and what to do – and less that incorporate actor agency and cross-scale dynamics (Smit, 2018).

This thesis proposes that urban food system outcomes are influenced by the structures and subsequent agency of actors within multiple levels and types of governance. This thesis also proposes that governance is a both an analytical and methodological gap in food systems studies, and that viewing political, economic, and social systems as the deeper influences behind specific urban food outcomes can lead to improved understandings of urban food systems.

Three research questions support this thesis:

1. *What does the addition of stakeholder perspectives add to the understanding of Mzuzu's food system governance?*
2. *How can approaching governance analysis using actor's perspectives add to critical urban food studies?*
3. *Can the operationalization of a governance analytical framework provide a contextual understanding of Mzuzu's food system?*

2.8 Summary

This literature review and field site assessment highlights the gaps that I wish to address in this dissertation. This dissertation argues that complementary examinations of both food security levels *and* the food system are necessary to implement proper policy, and that the reason for fewer urban food systems analyses is the lack of a comparative, useful methodology to contextually understand a city's food system as a whole. As previously discussed, the literature on governance is often subjective, trending towards 'good governance' comparisons. This dissertation constructs a non-normative definition of governance from the contributions of three governance scholars (Kjaer, 2004; Hufty, 2011a; Hufty, 2011b; Bevir, 2012).

Overall, this research aims to qualitatively understand the influences of multiple governance levels on an urban food system, which are only addressed in smaller case studies of single links between one governance level and an urban outcome. This dissertation seeks to advance urban food systems research by creating an understanding of the current context through an analysis of food system actor perspectives.

This research is a novel approach to applying governance as an analytical lens through which to understand an urban food system. Methodologically, it qualitatively explores the governance of an urban food system through gathering the ideas and perspectives of urban residents and those involved from other levels of governance. This understanding is derived from the perspectives of people involved in Mzuzu's food system, including how the food system is structured, what the problems and solutions may be, and who or what holds the agency to shift or reinforce the system.

This research seeks to advance the argument that there are common dimensions from which we can understand the urban, and that governance is one of these dimensions. From there, however, cities must be defined contextually through the experiences of those who interact to create food system outcomes. This research seeks to build upon the majority of quantitative data on which urban food policy development relies, adding a more qualitative and contextual frame of reference to existing information.

3.0 Methodology

Chapter Three describes both the methodology and subsequent methods used to understand the governance of Mzuzu's urban food system. This chapter first states the research objectives. Secondly, I lead the reader through my decision-making in determining the type of research to employ. I explain why interpretivism and social constructionism are the most appropriate philosophical and epistemological approaches for this research. Lastly, I review the specific methods applied to each phase of the research and include a discussion of limitations and reflexivity.

3.1 Research Objectives

The purpose of this research is to understand the influences of multi-level governance on an urban food system by applying an analytical governance framework to a qualitative case study of Mzuzu, Malawi. The three main objectives below flow from the thesis statement and research questions, and determine the subsequent methodological approach and methods:

1. To define the interactions, functions, ideologies, and structures of Mzuzu's urban food system governance.
2. To qualify the nature of the influences from governance levels and types on the way that Mzuzu's food system is perceived and managed.
3. To explore the Governance Analytical Framework as i) a tool to analyze multi-level urban food governance and ii) a possible tool for comparative analysis of urban food governance across urban sites.

The methodological framework described below is meant to operationalize the conceptual framework described in Chapter 2 (Figure 2-3).

3.2 Research Design

Many considerations influenced the formation of my research as a qualitative case study that applies an interpretivist approach. My first consideration was placing my work within a theoretical framework. Although the aim of my research is to create a more impartial understanding of the workings of an urban food system, the origins of this research are normative; its main inquiries are based on the literature that finds gaps and assumptions in urban food insecurity framing and its proposed solutions. Initial literature reviews on urban food security, as described in Chapter 2, not only reveal gaps in quantitative data but also emphasize the differences between evidence-based policy recommendations and politically driven solutions to urban food insecurity. Typically, research that questions the structural status quo of sociopolitical outcomes is housed within critical political economy analyses (Lipschutz, 2010). However, critical political economy research often applies frameworks that analyze power structures and their evolution over time. I found these frameworks too assumptive and limiting to fully respond to the research objectives; analyzing only power structures may omit other factors that influence urban food systems.

Specifically, within food systems research, the value of the critical political economy lens is its findings of dissonance between well-documented impacts of an unequal food system and the continuation of politically driven food solutions (IPES, 2017; Scott, 2019). From this position I was able to discern the next step in determining my methodology – understanding the underlying reasons why this dissonance continues. To engage in research that asks why certain conditions exist in complex systems, the researcher needs to step away from critical theory towards more inductive, contextual approaches (Yin, 2013). I therefore chose to create a conceptual framework from existing social theories and more conceptual definitions of concepts like 'urban' and 'governance,' and to explore more analytical methods which could include power as a factor of agency and structure.

The search for appropriate methodology to achieve my research objectives led me to explore other fields that employed interpretivism, specifically those that saw empirical patterns as circumstantial evidence of underlying processes which are not explicitly manifest in the data itself (Mason, 1997). In this manner, I could position food insecurity rates and quantitative data as the circumstantial evidence of underlying processes.

Qualitative work can be built upon a solid foundation of quantitative data, making this research akin to a mixed-methods explanatory sequential design (Creswell, 2014). This is where rigorous

quantitative approaches such as the African Food Security Urban Network (AFSUN) Mzuzu household food security survey can support qualitative research. A qualitative case study approach is the best methodology for this type of research; it allows for data collection from many perspectives and sources to enable a unique understanding of a contemporary phenomenon (Yin, 2013).

Although my reading included many helpful books and papers on qualitative analysis, Jennifer Mason's book, *Qualitative Researching* (1997), provided the most useful guidance to determine the most appropriate methodology for my research. The first step is to define the "intellectual puzzle you wish to explain" (Mason, 1997, p. 23). The reader is then led through determining their ontology, their philosophical framework, and their epistemology, which then leads the reader to the most appropriate data collection methods to provide a social explanation to the intellectual puzzle. The intellectual puzzle in my research is that food insecurity exists in cities with abundant food. This paradox indicates that there are forces creating food system outcomes that do not sit within formal structures such as policy or legislation, and that they may stem from the interpretations and agency of actors.

I assumed that finding answers through a positivist approach would be almost impossible – hidden forces that create dissonant policy outcomes are hidden for a reason. Therefore, I employed a post-positivist ontology, not only ensuring I was aware of my own biases in how I interpreted and approached my research, but that I view the world through a lens where "understandings of objective truth are not achievable and can only be known interpretively" (Mason, 1997, p.140; Fox, 2008). The most common epistemology used within post-positivism is social constructionism, where actors jointly construct their social reality based on interactions between themselves and their environment (Holzner, 1972; Burr & Dick, 2017). In the case of this research, this forms an understanding of Mzuzu's urban food system as made up of strategies, plans, norms, and the interpretations of those by actors within their limits of social and political agency. This results in social interactions, situations, and relations within systems and processes that can then be analyzed. My research methodology therefore remains familial to critical political economy and is guided by the philosophy of interpretivism, the ontology of post-positivism, and based epistemologically within social constructionism. The next step in determining methodology was to choose which social constructionist medium to use, through which research lens, and which field methods would provide the most efficient way to employ them.

Due to the complexity of food systems and the high potential for many and diverse factors to influence food system outcomes, I required a lens that would allow as many factors as possible to arise without creating overwhelming amounts of data. Sonnino, Marsden, and Moragues-Faus' (2016) interpretation of Gibson-Graham's work (2002) provides a different way of seeing place-based approaches. They suggest that the analytical challenges of studying foodscapes shift towards seeing the "nature and potentialities of place and reflexive governance architectures" (p. 486) as an entry point to engaging with the multi-actor and multi-level structures of food systems. I interpreted the "nature and potentialities of place" as a call to find ways to understand the uniqueness of a city, but also ways to understand the potential leverage points within its urban food system. My response is to use governance as a lens for both requirements. This dissertation further responds to Sonnino et al. (2016) by advancing their arguments for a progressive sense of place that includes exogenous and endogenous forces; I not only include multiple levels of governance but open up the definition of governance to include their "different types of relationalities" (p.485), including underrepresented voices, to understand how they interact to form Mzuzu's urban food system.

There are pros and cons to using an analytical definition of governance as a research lens. The lens of governance was chosen because of its commonality between all human social systems, including urban systems. As a wider lens like governance is more appropriate for inductive research, it allows for generalized questioning that enables respondents to extend their answers outside of a typical food system. A downside is that the concept of governance is so complex and can include so many factors that the researcher could be overwhelmed and unfocused.

Often, to avoid data overload, case studies located within urban environments focus on a specific part of the food system, such as urban agriculture or informal markets (Battersby, 2013; Holdsworth & Landais, 2019). To search for the underlying influences on food system outcomes, I required an approach that minimized my role in determining what was important to study within Mzuzu's food system. If I focused on the role of supermarkets, or solely street vendors, I would miss potentially important influences of government discourse or international development policy. I required a way to 'see' the system as a whole and to avoid assumptions about underlying causes. Choosing to understand governance from the perspectives of those within the system is a good way to minimize the noise of extraneous factors. People's constructions of food security issues – how they define problems, solutions, processes, and other actors, for example – can focus the research on what

matters to people and provide an understanding of why urban food systems are creating their current outcomes.

I now needed to understand people's perspectives of urban food system governance in Mzuzu and therefore required a methodology that allowed for different explanations of the same phenomenon that could then be organized around relevant themes (Mason, 1997). As discussed above, social constructionism implies that meaning is constructed by a subject who interprets and applies meaning based on their own experiences and perceptions (Burr, 2015). Social constructionist methods, therefore, enable multiple realities to exist simultaneously through the perceptions and opinions of respondents (Mertens, 2007). The constructionist approach also minimizes the need for researcher interpretation, as the intent of gathering the perspectives of respondents is to understand the sum of their created realities and their relation to each other – not to interpret their meaning.

As this research asks "why" or "how," it requires a detailed contextual analysis, especially in situations of multiple variables that confuse the phenomenon and the context (Yin, 2013), as there is with food insecurity and urban food systems. Therefore, a case study of an urban food system is the most appropriate exploratory tool, especially when applying a new method of analysis such as the Governance Analytical Framework to food security. The Chapter 2 literature review acknowledges there is a need in urban food security studies to move from singular, descriptive case studies to more analytical and comparative governance methods. Still, using a case study in this case with the application of the GAF allows me to use common, more analytical variables that could eventually be compared between cities and their associated governance scales. Such variables, like problems and processes, could enable comparisons over time for the same context or in a geographically comparative study. My application of the Governance Analytical Framework responds to Ericksen's recommendation that "food systems be analyzed within a multiple level case study, even if one area is the focus, as it allows for the identification of critical drivers and determinant outcomes" (2008, p. 243). The application of a governance framework allows for a perspective-based construction of the food system within multiple governance levels, leading to a qualified understanding of their influences on Mzuzu's food system. The same research in another city may see different results, but the common framework could add value to the field of comparative urban food research.

3.3 Methods

3.3.1 Research Tools

The Governance Analytical Framework explores the reasons behind ineffective policies by analyzing the agency and perspectives of actors within a governance system. In determining a "non-normative" methodology, Hufty (2011b p. 418) has provided both a distilled understanding of governance and a mechanism to operationalize the concept. The GAF can evaluate governance contexts to understand the causes underlying policy paralysis, such as the persistence of productive solutions in urban food security policy. In my research, the GAF has been adapted to analyze a food system. From an analysis of the existing literature, this study is one of the more complex to which this framework has been applied.

Compared to other governance analysis tools, the Governance Analytical Framework (GAF) provides a more objective, analytical basis from which to study governance, instead of a comparative framework from which to grade an existing context with an idealized governance system. The GAF is intentional in determining the reasons behind a divergence from policy and the situation in reality (Hufty, 2011). In this research, I apply the GAF to the assumed intent of food system policy makers (to ensure food security) and the actual outcome (low food security levels). The problem, in this case urban food insecurity in Mzuzu, is defined as the dependent variable. The sociopolitical context, defined as independent variables, determines how governance is enacted; which rules or norms are created, which are implemented, and which are enforced. Governance sits in between the two, acting as both the intermediate variable and the analytical tool. Together, these three concepts form Hufty's "causal chain" (2011, p. 416) that I have adapted to my research (see Figure 3-1).

Figure 3-1 Hufty's Causal Chain (Adapted from Hufty, 2011b)

To determine the ways in which governance influences the dependent variable, Hufty (2011b) created five categories of analysis. This allows for the distillation of a complicated governance system into five encompassing categories and includes influences from the independent variables in the analysis. Table 3-1 lists these categories and provides general examples adapted from Hufty (2009) and Hufty (2011b).

Table 3-1 The Five Analytical Categories of the Governance Analytical Framework

GAF Categories of Analysis	Guiding Questions	Justification
3 Clearly define the **problem**	• A problem is a social construction formed by stakeholders. How does each stakeholder formulate the 'problem?'	• allows for deconstructing and reconstructing the problem • identifies where the dominant definition of the problem is coming from
4 Identify the **norms**	• What are the common norms within the system (meta, constitutive sectoral, regulative)? • From where did they emerge? • What is the effectiveness (power) of these norms? • Where are norms in competition?	• Observing power differentials and hierarchies of certain social, political or cultural norms
5 Identify the **actors**	• What resources does each actor have available? • What methods of influence does each actor employ? • In what spaces do they hold influence? • What types of influence do they have (reciprocal, patronage, directive, negotiation)?	• Identifies all relevant actors and the actors' perspectives of each other • Identifies discord and assumptions of roles and responsibilities
6 Identify the **nodal points**	• Where (and when and how) are the social interfaces (virtual or real) where decisions are made, and norms created, both formally and informally?	• Identifies nodes, including informal and social processes that may be left out of formal governance analysis
7 Identify the **processes**	• What are the historical processes that influence the processes now? • What are the sequences that result in decisions?	• Identifies processes, including informal and social processes that may be left out of formal governance analysis

(Adapted from Hufty, 2011b)

From the questions in Table 3-1, I formulated semi-structured interview questions around the five analytical categories around the specific research context (see Appendix 1 for the Interview Guide). The semi-structured interview method was preferred to others due to its conversational nature, which is more akin to the Malawian culture. In fact, I noticed a distinct difference between non-Malawian and Malawian respondents, in that Malawian respondents answered the question in a more colloquial manner, whereas others, the American respondents especially, answered my questions promptly and with shorter descriptions. For consistency I took care to ensure each main question in the questionnaire was posed to each respondent, but the open-ended nature of the questions allowed the respondent to associate their experiences with the workings of the food system. I then

allowed myself extra questions to follow the respondent and explore their relationship to the urban food system.

Technically, interviews are derived from a different unit of analysis (individual) than an organization at a certain governance level. However, this separation also forms a part of my argument – that organizations must be reductive and have agendas based on ideology or politics, but individuals are inherently more complex. Depending on the allowance of social structures, people may enact agency on the system for many different reasons other than that of an organizational directive. Therefore, understanding individuals' perspectives *within* their respective organizational systems is an essential part of understanding the differences between policy and unintended system outcomes.

3.3.2 Mzuzu as a Case Study

Secondary cities in the sub-Saharan African context deserve directed attention due to their rapidly changing contexts (Roberts, 2014; Battersby et al., 2019). In this section I assess Mzuzu as a case study in terms of its potential to advance the development of common urban theory (Wu et al., 2019). I also assess it in relation to Crush's (2016) four urbanization processes and Roberts' observations of secondary cities in sub-Saharan Africa (2014). These classifications provide further understanding of processes in the city of Mzuzu and the current state of its urban systems.

Following Wu et al.'s (2019) considerations for the development of common urban theory, the following list suggests Mzuzu as a prime case study for their three considerations:

1) what cities to study

2) from which geographical level(s), and

3) how the city relates to other entities

1) The argument has been made in Chapters 1 and 2 for the importance of understanding the transformation of secondary cities in southern African contexts. Mzuzu is a good case study because of its secondary status and the anticipated pressures it will face in the near future from its high urbanization rate. Mzuzu's limits to infrastructure and market capacity are just being tested in the last decade. The majority of the population in Malawi is rural, and therefore a case study on urban food systems at this time, when urbanization is a developing

phenomenon, is different than many other countries in Africa who are further along in the urbanization process; understanding Mzuzu's current food system could add nuance to urban theory development.

2) Although this case study includes multiple levels of governance, it is situated within the geographical level of the city and centers on the food system outcomes of Mzuzu.
3) Governance is the lens through which this research examines how the city relates to other entities. Mzuzu is a good case study because of its complexity and diversity in relation to other entities. Mzuzu is geographically, politically and culturally different from much of southern Malawi, creating complex relationships between political and cultural entities. It also has a high diversity of governance types and levels, from local to international, revealing an interconnected web of interactions that create contextual outcomes.

Crush (2016) identifies four transformative processes in the urban Global South. These processes compound and magnify, creating outcomes greater than each would on their own. Table 3-2 lists the four processes and their current state in Mzuzu. Table 3-3 assesses Mzuzu in relation to Robert's (2014) observations of secondary cities.

Table 3-2 Assessment of Mzuzu in Reference to Crush's Transformative Processes (2016)

Crush's Transformative Process	State of Process in Mzuzu
Migration and population increase in urban areas	• Annual urbanization rate of 5%, the highest in the country • Increasing population in informal areas
The monopolization of the food value chain by international companies	• Introduction of supermarkets from 2013 • International companies have access through development aid but focus on rural areas • High levels of subsistence and small-holder commercial farming, supplying fresh produce to the city
The nutritional double burden	• Rates of obesity relatively low for urban area but increasing • Stunting and wasting rates in children in Mzimba District at 30% (Kinyoki, 2020)
The increase of precarious work and increase in unemployment creating tenuous entitlements	• Informal employment rates higher than formal rates • Severe food insecurity rates at 28% (Riley et al., 2018) • Multiple access strategies for food

Table 3-3 Assessment of Mzuzu Regarding Roberts' Observations of Secondary Cities

Roberts' Observations of Secondary Cities in Sub-Saharan Africa (2014)	Assessment of Mzuzu
Colonial administrations have had a significant influence on the location, economic geography and governance of secondary cities.	Less influence than southern cities of Blantyre and Lilongwe, however administration emerged from colonial plantation. As the northern administrative centre, federal government structures result from colonial structures.
Policies to encourage decentralization to support the development of secondary cities in most African states have been unsuccessful.	Decentralization initiatives continue with varied success – urban management is devolved but underfunded.
There are strong anti-urbanization political sentiments prevalent in many sub-Saharan countries, resulting in a lack of support for developing functional networks of systems of cities in countries.	Due also to political differences between national political region and the northern region, lack of support financially as well as politically.
The ratio between the size of secondary cities and the largest city in the country, is much greater in sub-Saharan Africa than in other regions of the world. Generally, secondary cities are likely to have population primacy levels of less than 30 per cent of the country's largest city.	The two primary cities, Lilongwe and Blantyre, have populations under one million residents each, whereas Mzuzu is currently at 220,000.
Poverty and human-development index indicators for secondary cities are substantially higher than in other regions of the world.	Mzuzu's population often has lower measurements of poverty than the central and southern regions of Malawi.
Per capita GDP, household income and wealth are the lowest of all developing regions in the world.	The 2017 AFSUN report shows that 60% of survey respondents earned less than $70 USD per month; 20% of the respondents earned less than $11 USD per month
Secondary cities economies in sub-Saharan Africa tend to be more trade-based, with low levels of manufacturing and high levels of informal-sector employment.	Over 40% of employment in Mzuzu is based in the informal economy, and 23% of residents are employed in the formal sector (Riley et al., 2018).
Housing conditions in secondary cities tend to be better than in primary cities.	Reports of poor access to water and sanitation are similar to informal areas in Lilongwe and Blantyre.
Road, rail, telecommunication and, increasingly, air links between primate and secondary cities across the continent are the poorest of all regions in the world.	Mzuzu's airport has not received commercial flights for approximately a decade. There is one main, two-lane highway between Mzuzu and Lilongwe, which also continues north through to the Tanzanian border.

3.3.3 Field Engagement

My field work in Malawi began in late January 2018 and ended on May 31, 2018. As a Queen Elizabeth Scholar, my role included a placement at a local human rights organization, the Church and Society Programme at the CCAP Livingstonia Synod in Mzuzu. While working with colleagues at the Programme, I was initially able to make connections throughout the city with NGOs, city

governance, and vendors. As I previously lived in Malawi from 2004-2006, colleagues and friends introduced me to people throughout the international development community and government sectors in Lilongwe, the capital. The interviews were conducted over three months between March and May 2018. Using trusted connections to create a base of interviewees was the initial step to finding respondents and the most culturally appropriate manner to find key informants. Once connections had been established in both Lilongwe and Mzuzu, the snowball method was the most culturally appropriate method to find more interviewees, with requests made over email, phone, and WhatsApp, the messaging application most used in Malawi. Most of the in-person requests for interviews took place at the market or with street vendors. Still, some of these were through introductions arranged by colleagues or the research assistants.

The only criteria for participation of respondents in the study was that they fit within an established governance level and type for the study. My criteria for respondent selection prior to engaging in field work was loosely defined on purpose. As this was a constructionist-based study, I found it was best to view my original criteria as a draft, and iteratively define the governance levels and types through interactions with the respondents (Table 3-4). As a result, some categories shifted while I was in the field. For example, the original category of 'vendors' was separated into two: 'market vendors,' those that pay a fee within a designated food market, and 'street vendors,' who are either mobile or selling stationary from the street side, referenced at times as 'informal vendors.' The argument can be made that street vendors are also businesses however I chose to delineate along the line of being formally regulated by governance structures, which market vendors are. It also emerged that many of the issues arising within the urban food system are due to the differences between these two groups, making it an important division. This method is consistent with Creswell's (2014) description of emergent design, encouraging the researcher not only to learn from participants but to adapt the methodological structure around the research environment.

Some market vendors also acted as formal market governance and responded to interview questions in that capacity. Therefore, I created another category, that of the 'market vendor governance.' Overall, seven governance types and three governance levels were applicable to the study – international, national, and city levels. The regional level, important within the formal government type of governance, was not included due to inability to find respondents and due to overlap between governance responsibilities in the city government. I also delineated between formal, large aid agencies and national and local non-government organizations (NGOs) and civil society

organizations (CSOs), due to the major differences in governance and purpose. Not every combination of level and type had respondents; in total there are ten groupings, detailed in Table 3-4.

Table 3-4 Final Respondent Categories

	Governance Level		
	City	International	National
Governance Type			
Academia			X
Aid		X	
Business	X		X
CSO/NGO	X		X
Government	X		X
VA Governance	X		
Informal Workers	X		

Three research assistants (RAs) were hired from February 2018 to the end of May 2018. Two were hired through connections with colleagues at the University of Livingstonia, and one was hired through connections with a small NGO. The research assistants were provided with a one-day training in the appropriate methods for interviews, as well as research ethics, transcription, and translation (Appendix 2). The engagement strategy included initial meetings with the Research Assistants to discuss and map out the food markets, both formal and informal, in the city. In addition to markets, food supermarkets, markets, and areas with small shops were identified on a small map as possible locations to find respondents. Part of the training of myself as well as the research assistants was a 'practice' interview with an employee of the Church and Society Programme. The respondent was included in the research, but as they knew this was our 'practice' interview, they were open to stops and starts to work out logistics.

Prior to an interview, ethics documents were translated by the RAs and provided either in paper or verbally based on the participant's preference. When required, the RAs provided translation for interviews in either Chichewa or Chitumbuka. The recordings or notes were then transcribed to a

word document in the language which the interview was conducted and then translated into English. When the interview was in English, I completed this work on my own.

Overall, 85 semi-structured interviews were completed. In total, 93 invitations were extended for interviews, with those not being interviewed receiving the invitation but not able to meet due to timing or being out of the country. Most interviews were set up either through email or direct phone call. Each interviewee was given an identifying number and then categorized by gender, governance level, and governance type. The number of interviews is high for a qualitative study. This is due to the number of levels and types of governance throughout the food system. When possible, I completed multiple interviews with people in the same level and type of governance to ensure a certain level of saturation, triangulation through member checks, and to avoid misguidance by key informants (Creswell & Miller, 2000). I did not actively seek to equalize the respondents by gender as I wanted a representative sample of each governance type and level to understand the general gender ratios of each.

The majority of interviews were conducted in Mzuzu during regular business hours. For one week out of each of the three months, I visited Lilongwe and conducted interviews with international development agencies and national government offices. If possible, the respondent's office was used, but when one was not available, I met the respondent at the most convenient place, often outside at a café or on the street side. The duration of interviews was between 30 minutes to 1 hour and followed the standard interview guide in Appendix 1 while allowing for the respondent to present information, opinions, and alternative discussion topics.

3.3.4 Ethical Considerations

Once the methodology was constructed, a proposal for field work detailing specific methods was provided to University of Waterloo Office of Research Ethics and the Research Ethics Committee of the University of Livingstonia. As a recipient of a Doctoral Graduate Scholarship from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, my actions were guided by the Tri-Council Policy on Ethical Research. I received ethics certificates from the University of Waterloo on December 18, 2017 and from the University of Livingstonia on Feb 24, 2018.

Other actions taken to maintain ethical standards included consent forms in English, Chichewa, and Chitumbuka. The consent forms included an overview of the research project, an invitation to

participate, a description of my responsibilities as a researcher, my contact information as well as that of one Research Assistant, and clarity regarding informed consent (Appendix 3). During the introduction to the interview, it was reiterated that informed consent included not answering questions if the respondent felt unable or uncomfortable in providing an answer. The preamble also ensured the respondent felt comfortable ending the interview at any point. Interviews were recorded unless consent was not given by the interviewee, and the recorder was turned off for any comments the respondent wished to be confidential and off the record.

Follow up was completed through email, phone, or direct contact, depending on the respondents' preference. Respondents were offered the option of receiving a transcript of their interview and to add or subtract any part of the interview. One respondent requested a transcript, which was provided within two weeks, and a follow up call confirmed that no changes were requested to be made to that interview. Audio recordings and written documentation pertaining to interviews were de-identified, digitized and are kept on a password-protected hard drive. When transcripts of the interviews were uploaded for transcription and analysis, the login password on each platform was changed frequently to ensure the data was protected. When using quotes in the dissertation, I confirmed that I had written or verbal permission from that respondent. Even with permission, all identifying information was removed from the respondent, and only their governance level or type was attributed to the quote when necessary for context.

3.4 Data Synthesis and Analysis

3.4.1 Data Synthesis

The majority of interviews were completed in English. These interviews were transcribed on my own, using Transcribe Wreally, an online and secure transcribing service that electronically transcribes audio data and creates a word document. Due to accents and recording noise, the documents still required me to listen to the full recording and edit and re-transcribe the audio file. Having a transcribed file to work from made the process faster than if I transcribed by myself only from an audio file. The translated and transcribed files completed by the research assistants were reviewed for accuracy and re-transcribed where necessary.

Once proof-read and transcribed, the interviews were inputted into Dedoose, an online qualitative data analysis platform. Dedoose was chosen because of the ease of use as well as the lower cost of

the platform compared to other programs such as Nvivo. Interviews were initially coded along the five categories of the Governance Analytical Framework – problems, actors, nodes, processes, norms – and each interview was provided with the identifiers of gender, governance level, and governance type. For the second step, a thematic coding pass, a separate data set was created for each of the five factors, allowing for easier analysis. A checklist was used to ensure that all five of the GAF criteria for the 9 groups was captured.

Respondents were categorized into groups describing their level and type. Governance types were categorized as academia, aid, business, local NGO, government, vendor governance, and informal workers. All the categories were identified as groups that worked within or directly adjacent to the food system. Table 3-5 shows the ten categories and levels of the respondents, with the corresponding numbers of respondents.

Table 3-5 Governance Type and Level of Respondents

	Governance Level			
	City	International	National	**TOTALS**
Governance Type				
Academia			7	7
International Aid		10		10
Business	11		2	13
Civil Society Org	4		10	14
Government	8		19	27
VA Governance	5			5
Informal Workers	9			9
TOTALS	35	10	34	**85**

Prior to field work, the levels identified for the study were international, national, regional, and city. The only respondents that identified as regional were those working within Malawian non-governmental organizations, but they also felt they worked at a local urban level. Though many government respondents were working at the regional level, some were within the national government or were working in the city government within a regional team. To be consistent, the

respondents were categorized at the level in which they identified, and no respondents used 'regional' as a first identifier.

The goal of the data synthesis step was to prepare the data for more in-depth analysis, creating a descriptive "explanation of a set of processes" (Mason, 1997, p. 154). I grouped themes around respondents' comments about the topic which created the text within the Governance Analytical Framework categories. For example, the theme of energy includes perceptions of other *actors* regarding their responsibilities, definitions of the *problem* regarding assumptions of corruption, and *nodes* of interaction between three different levels of governance.

3.4.2 Data Analysis

In previous applications, the GAF has been used in smaller, very specific contexts of disparate policy intent and policy outcomes ((Hufty, 2011; Diaz-Castro et al., 2017; Munoz Dela-Cruz, 2017). Fewer numbers of respondents allowed for a very detailed analysis of the problem in these cases. In this research, the GAF has been applied to a larger system, and the five categories of the GAF have been useful in the organization of the larger dataset.

The analysis of the data occurred in two phases. The first phase categorized the interview text into one of the five GAF categories. The five analytical categories of the GAF, as described in Table 3-1 (Chapter 3) are problems, norms, actors, nodal points, and processes. Each interview was coded into these five GAF categories using a qualitative analysis software, Dedoose. Iterative coding was applied for the thematic analysis, exploring themes that emerge from the data to understand specific phenomena (Blackwell, 2012). Major codes were identified by the number of times it arose within the 85 interviews. As each interview in one of the categories was coded, general codes were written down, and I noted the number of times each code was identified. For example, the Problems category had many codes. Some of the themes that emerged was road quality, transport costs, transportation quality, and road access. After seeing these codes multiple times, I created a Transportation root code and included the smaller topics as sub-codes. To ensure that one interviewee did not dominate a category or overinflate the number of times a theme arose, I ensured that each highlighted quote contained each respondent's assigned number.

The coding of the GAF categories required separation of some categories into sub-themes (Table 3-6). For example, the 'problem' category was separated into 'causes,' 'responsibility to solve,' and

'solutions,' and nodes were separated into 'virtual space' and 'physical space.' The second phase coded these results based on emerging themes from each governance grouping; each of the ten governance groups were analyzed for emerging themes for each of the five GAF categories.

Once the common themes were identified from the analysis, the groupings of respondents were compared for agreement or disagreement regarding the food system outcomes, the causes, potential solutions, and who held responsibility for each of these. Commonalities between groups were then identified by a co-occurrence analysis of the five GAF categories and thematic data sets. The most effective way to further compare the perspectives of each governance group regarding common themes was to first identify the theme – such as transportation systems – then examine each group's responses regarding problems, responsibility, and solutions under that theme. Differences between groups were also identified by a lack of co-occurrence in themes under the five GAF categories and thematic data sets. Figures and tables representing this analysis are reported in Chapter 5.

Table 3-6 Governance Analytical Framework Codes

GAF Category	Sub Codes
Problems	Responsibility to Solve
	Causes
	Solutions
Nodal Points	Physical Space
	Virtual Space
Norms	Regulatory
	Meta
	Constitutive
	Sectoral (Development Aid)
Actors	Perceptions
	Directive Transactions
	Negotiation Transactions
	Reciprocal Transactions
Processes	Multi-level governance interactions
	Food System Processes

3.5 Limitations and Reflexivity

This study is the first time that the Governance Analytical Framework has been applied to a food system – previous studies have analyzed mental health, women's health, and forestry contexts (Hufty, 2011; Diaz-Castro et al., 2017; Munoz Dela-Cruz, 2017). This study does not quantify the impacts of governance on an urban food system; however it is an important initiative to understand food systems in a way that directly considers the local context and applies the perspectives of those involved in the food system.

This study does not aim to provide clear directives on how to proceed – that is the realm of those within the food system. The study provides clarity on the perceptions of the food system, as well as with whom these perceptions may concur, where they are at odds, and therefore what topics may be considered for initial actions on urban food system management. It is important to acknowledge that a different researcher at a different time may have encountered other opinions and perspectives, resulting in different findings. Despite my efforts to include as many voices as possible and to reach saturation within the levels and types of governance, I do not assume this research to be definitive or comprehensive in nature.

Almost all respondents did not believe they were qualified to discuss urban food systems. This could be seen as a limitation of the study. However, I find this provides context to the current nature of urban food governance. The inductive nature of the interview questions provided opportunities to engage with the respondents about their understandings of where they fit into the food system. Despite the relatively high number of interviews for a qualitative study, the respondents are categorized into different governance levels and types, therefore lowering their total number, making the sample sizes for some too small, and for others too varied for statistical analysis within the group. The numbers of respondents in each group varies. Some groups, such as middlemen who did not also farm, were difficult to access due to their transitory nature and the small amount of time they spent in the city. Most middlemen I interviewed were farmers who brought their own crops to sell as well as supplying others, therefore having time to provide an interview while selling at a market stall.

Considering validity, there was sometimes hesitancy from lower-level workers to speak to me without expressed permission from their supervisors, and I was sometimes sent straight to a top manager or CEO for an interview. This could have increased the likelihood of me hearing the

formal policies and procedures within organizations. Regardless, interviews were conducted in each grouping until respondents reached qualitative 'saturation,' in this case were providing similar answers to interview questions.

Certain populations were more challenging to access than others. Access to the Malawian Indian ethnic community was a challenge. The common name of the community is misleading, as the community has resided in Malawi since the 19th century, mostly as traders, and is made up of ethnicities from south Asia, including India, Nepal, and Pakistan (Ray, 2010; McCracken, 2012). The community is viewed as relatively insular, rarely mixing with the native Malawian population. There is a large proportion of smaller supermarkets and restaurants owned by the Indian-Malawian population throughout the country and the influence on urban food systems is apparent, yet only one interview was recorded. The sample was biased towards native Malawians as well as international development agencies and their associated nationalities. The new phenomenon of Chinese national-owned businesses came up in discussion with the research assistants, however there were no businesses found that were both Chinese-national owned and within the food system.

Access to large international agencies was challenging due to many physical security measures and the lack of receiving replies from employees, yet with persistence I was able to achieve a high number of interviews. Access to regional governments was challenging because of a lack of response and integration of job duties with city employees, as well as difficulty identifying appropriate respondents. Although some urban and national actors provided information on regional operations, contact with the Mzimba Regional office was unsuccessful. In some cases, such as international businesses, saturation was difficult to achieve due to availability of respondents. Through observation as well as reading local media, child street vendors comprised a part of the informal food system. For this research, the requirement for inclusion as a respondent included being over the age of consent, therefore the perspectives of these actors were missed in this study. Any input they have into this work was taken from quotes in local media articles.

Despite providing a proposal to the University of Livingstonia Research Ethics Committee two months prior to my departure for Malawi, delays in receiving feedback from the committee responsible for approving the Malawian research licence resulted in a one-month delay in implementation of research after my arrival. This time allowed me to become familiar once again

with Mzuzu and the surrounding area and to visit friends and re-establish personal connections. I was therefore ready to engage with the community once my research was permitted.

Researchers who do not reside in Mzuzu will encounter increasing costs for rent. I was lucky to have family friends to stay with for one month prior to finding housing for the remaining three months. This limitation is likely to be an increasing issue in urban research throughout the globe as urban costs of living rise and housing availability decreases (Lucci et al., 2018). The cost for an urban researcher to conduct in-depth assessments will increase in the coming years.

Considering reflexivity, I engaged in what Mason (1997, p. 4) calls "active reflexivity," where the researcher continually and iteratively reviews their actions within their research and gives it similar value and attention to the data being collected. My history in Malawi also proved helpful to my research. I was familiar with the geography, history, language, and culture, as well as where I fit within it as a foreigner. My first observations centered around myself remembering common reactions to me as a white, 'Western' female. They included observations of assumptions of my character as trustworthy, or as someone who is meant to quietly endure street harassment focused on my race or gender. Once I settled into a routine, my observations expanded outside of my own experiences to being more contextual and situational.

One of my first realizations was that my past experiences in Malawi as a development worker could potentially impact my current objectivity. Qualitative researchers should reflect on their personal background, culture and experiences can shape how themes and meaning are advanced in their research (Creswell, 2014). Interactions between myself and respondents are influenced by power dynamics that flow both ways, influenced by factors such as gender, class, and race (Merriam et al., 2001). Prior to and during my field work, I reflected on my previous experiences in Malawi and how they may influence the formation and results of my research. Any gaps in my understanding of situations could easily be filled in with historical information and assumptions. To ensure I avoided this behaviour, I asked questions of my colleagues about certain aspects of political or social context, as well as noting in my field notes my observations about how the country had changed over the last 12 years. I also ensured that the processes of my research were solidly grounded in theory and literature. One of the main reasons I chose the epistemology of social constructionism was to avoid, as much as possible, the necessity of my own interpretations influencing the data.

Due to my appearance as a white female, responses from some interviewees may have been biased towards emphasizing the needs of certain stakeholders in hopes for monetary assistance. The research assistants were key in minimizing the expectations of respondents, especially as renumeration for research participation is not allowed in Malawi, but this was still evident in three interviews and may have biased some responses. My appearance as an outsider also had a positive side, in that many respondents assumed I did not understand the basic systems of operation in Mzuzu's food system (which was in part true) and felt the need to explain things very simply and clearly.

Due to safety concerns for both myself and the research assistants, interviews were completed only in the daytime, and therefore opportunities to interview vendors in the evening market were missed. Further, the evening market, operating from 5:00pm to approximately 8:00 or 9:00pm, was very busy and my presence may have proved to be an inconvenience for vendors. On occasion, I had the opportunity to observe the crowded street market that emerged after the shutdown of formal market hours. In addition, I was cognizant of the need to not interrupt daytime vendor sales with my presence and ensured that respondents knew that they were free to conduct business during the interview, as well as stop the interview if they wished. Many respondents were comfortable with this arrangement, with one even leaving to complete a small task and leaving myself and the research assistant to operate their market booth for 15 minutes.

Regarding trustworthiness, my appearance as a well-dressed white female likely provided me with more access to office buildings than would be given to others. Many of the cold call interviews in Lilongwe were procured by walking down the stairs from an arranged interview to each floor of a Lilongwe office building where many donor and international agencies resided. As I did not look 'out of place,' many security guards on each of the floors allowed me to enter the offices and request an interview. Discussions with fellow researchers, one a Malawian male and the other with the appearance of an 'Indian-Malawian' male, noted that this task would have been much more difficult for them.

In my writing, I intentionally avoided the use of 'colonial' and western comparative language, such as 'hyper-urbanized,' or 'crowded.' This took the form of purposeful review of my dissertation chapters, as well as asking colleagues to review my writing with the sole purpose of revealing blind spots.

Reflexivity was required regarding the specific issue of corruption. Due to my positionality as a white, western female, I felt that my bringing up the subject may create defensiveness resulting in presenting Malawi or its governance systems in "glowing terms" by respondents (Jones 2015, p.58). I attribute this to the historical and current habit of scholars to position African governance as 'corrupt' against assumptions of more functional western governments (Wedel, 2012). Corruption occurs everywhere in the world in different forms, but often 'African' corruption is used by western powers to establish a global pecking order and encourage a march towards liberal democracy and neoliberalism (Adetula, 2011). I intentionally did not ask about corruption but allowed it to arise if the respondent spoke about the topic on their own. In addition to the field work, I felt it was important in my literature review and analysis to use predominantly Malawian authors who published on issues of corruption, to avoid the multiple lenses and assumptions required of a western scholar to fully understand the context of corruption in the country.

3.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter described my methodological approach to understanding the governance of Mzuzu's food system. The research applies qualitative methodology using social constructionism and is guided by the Governance Analytical Framework (Hufty, 2011). The Governance Analytical Framework provides a methodology that equalizes voices across the governance spectrum. In this manner, it avoids the trap of reductionism of poverty experiences, many of which are untested generalizations and harmful misconceptions that create impediments to realistic poverty solutions (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011). The research methods employed were semi-structured, in-depth interviews with actors at all governance levels of the urban food system. The analysis involved two phases of coding: one that qualified all the interviews within each of the five GAF categories, and a second that iteratively created thematic categories with which to analyze and qualify Mzuzu's urban food system.

As the following chapters show, the Governance Analytical Framework illuminates the perceptions, ideas, and interactions of all levels of governance in that affect Mzuzu's food system, resulting in a complex matrix of social realities. The results and analysis are explained in Chapters 4 and 5. The concluding chapter, Chapter 6, discusses recommendations and contributions, as well as the application of the Governance Analytical Framework.

4.0 Outcomes of Mzuzu's Urban Food System

Chapter 4 presents the research data in four stories about Mzuzu's urban food system. Many stories emerged from the rich details that respondents provided in the interviews. These stories were chosen because they contain the most common themes to emerge between and within each governance level. Each story starts by presenting a food system outcome often cited by the respondents. The perceived governance influences and forces behind each story are described by respondents; their perspectives opinions form Hufty's causal chain (2011b), describing their understandings of the context, governance processes, and outcomes for Mzuzu's food system. Essentially, each story works backwards along Hufty's causal chain (Figure 4-1). At times the causal chains require two levels – the first level will discuss the perceived deeper context of the governance decision, and the second will show how some outcomes of these deeper contexts become the perceived contexts for further food outcomes.

The second section of each story discusses the themes in greater detail, embedding them in the current literature and referring to the research objective – to qualify the influences of multi-level governance on Mzuzu's urban food system by defining governance interactions, functions, structures, and ideologies. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the four stories' themes woven together in relation to the four pillars of food security and urban food governance literature.



Figure 4-1 Hufty's Causal Chain (Adapted from Hufty 2011b)

4.1 Story #1 – Street Vending Outcomes in Mzuzu

This story is the longest and most detailed of the four stories presented in this chapter. Vending, defined formally within markets or informally outside of market areas was discussed in almost all interviews, suggesting its importance within Mzuzu's food system. At the surface, the long-standing

conflict between the city government, market vendors and street vendors seems like a disagreement over the use of urban space – there are too many vendors and not enough space, and the city requires new market infrastructure. Indicators of conflict include media coverage, protests, violence, such as the burning of city offices, and the refusal of market vendors to pay daily city fees in protest of the city 'allowing' street vending. Market vendors emphasize the need for enforcement of street vendors, street vendors advocate for space that enables them to make a living, and the city government is overwhelmed by the needs of each, the magnitude of the problem, and the pressures to govern multiple facets of a modernizing food system. The interview results provide an opportunity for a deeper analysis of how this situation arose and why people feel it continues, including the governance actions (or inactions) at different levels that seem to influence this apparent stalemate. This story reviews the perspectives of the four main groups involved – market vendors, street vendors, vendor association leaders, and the city government. Section 4.2 then discusses the deeper influences on the governance of Mzuzu's food system regarding this outcome.

4.1.1 Market Vendors

Market vendors are defined as people who sell goods in a stationary stall within a space defined by the city government as a market. Market stalls are typically made of timber and iron roofing about 1-2 meters wide. Since 2015, market vendors and the city government have disagreed on the amount of daily market fees and the transparency of their use in government operations (Mkandawire, 2015). These issues were continually raised in interviews with market vendors; they noted that city government decisions to raise fees while withholding information regarding the use of market fees has resulted in decisions by market vendor groups to impose fee boycotts, impacting one of the largest sources of tax revenue for the city. This group questioned why the funds from market vendors were not used to improve market infrastructure, such as providing electricity, cold storage facilities, or improving access such as roads and walkways.

"The whole of Chimpozo [market]. They are not paying the market fee. It is the city council that is in the wrong thus they are stranded now with the situation. They cannot go with it anywhere because their explanations are not tangible. They collect the money from the people for one thing and they use that money for other things well known to themselves. So when the people have boycotted, are they wrong? No, they are not wrong." Respondent #056

"So mostly what is challenging is how the place looks as you have seen. It was painted sometime back maybe 8 years down the line. They don't renovate this thing. Last time the market got burnt but there is nothing that the city is doing." 068

Market vendors are represented by elected market vendor associations and their representatives are designated to interact with city government officials regarding market issues. Perceptions from market vendors regarding their representatives were generally negative. Decisions by the vendor association representatives at times caused conflict with the market vendor population, especially if they were seen to side with city government, resulting in market vendors feeling underrepresented. The lack of communication between market leadership and market vendors created mistrust and assumptions that vendor association representatives were taking bribes from city officials on top of any allowance they receive in their position. Regular invites to council meetings or with the market masters (a city employee) are the only institutionalized types of communication between vendor representatives and city officials, but official communications between vendor representatives and the vendors were less clear and dependent on the representative. Market vendors also perceived city officials as beholden to the national government, as the CEO of each of the major cities is appointed by the current national government. Market vendor decisions were often made by product group, such as tomato vendors or fish vendors, on whether they wanted to support the vendor governance representatives' decisions in negotiation with the city, such as the decision to participate in a protest walk or support a political rally.

Regarding street vendors, market vendors voiced frustration that the street vendors are taking away business from the market by being more accessible (as they sit along the roadside outside of the market where people walk), and by selling goods for cheaper prices as they do not pay a daily market fee. Market vendors have taken steps to resolve these issues with city council, such as raising the issue with vendor association representatives, boycotting fees, requesting enforcement, raising issues to MPs or city councillors, and delivering petitions to the city government via a protest walk.



Inconsistency around who pays fees and the amount of those fees has positively impacted other street sellers, such as high asset farmers who bring their goods directly to town with large trucks, visiting office buildings and selling from parking lots. Although one of these farmers noted a willingness to pay a fee, they also stated that they only once paid a fee of 10,000MK ($13 US, relatively low according to the respondent) to city officials and then were not asked again. Other wholesalers drop their goods at the main market but do not pay a fee. Some informal vendors, mostly female, completely avoid the streets and markets and sell out of their homes as it is safer and more convenient; they use their own community connections to service larger institutions such as schools, lodges, and churches through online messaging services such as WhatsApp.



Market vendors felt that not only do street vendors directly impact their sales through their presence in front of the market, but the number of vendors has also increased other costs and minimized profits. All market vendors noted that increasing numbers of informal vendors in the city has increased competition for wholesale goods. As a result, they see wholesalers and farmers not needing to service satellite markets if they can sell the total of their goods at the main market. It was stated that the middlemen decided where the drop off points are; for example, Matabwa Market, close to the main market, is for rice, beans, and tomatoes, and the Central Market (a part of the Main Market area) is for fish and fruit.

Vendors who worked in satellite markets outside of the central main market cited the expense of travelling to the center of town for goods, requiring an extra cost of transportation on top of the daily market fee. Satellite market vendors also noted that the trucks are reluctant to enter the satellite market areas due to the poor quality of the entry roads and the lack of space for larger trucks to enter and drop off goods, again forcing them to spend money on transport to gather goods in the center of the city, and to therefore charge more for their goods in the satellite markets. Road quality also arose as a topic for increased costs as some vendors travel to rural areas to gather goods; the quality of the roads impacted the time they spent travelling and not selling, resulting in a larger opportunity cost.

Speaking as a consumer, one respondent noted the high desirability of the central Mzuzu markets to other markets in the city as well as the desirability of the main market to vendors:

"On a good day, and a good market you are assured of many products unlike other places where you will run short of supplies because of accessibility and so forth. So in Mzuzu [Main Market] you have people from the peri-urban as well as the urban areas [buying and selling]." 033

Middlemen, often farmers and wholesalers/traders, were described as sometimes impacting profit margins by charging high prices for wholesale goods, especially due to the high demand from vendors. Some middlemen were also described as a regular and trusted part of networks for access to products. Both market and street vendors remarked that since the competition is so high for buying wholesale goods, their profit margins have decreased, sometimes just barely breaking even for the day or losing money.

"Sometimes we make losses because like today since we have come here its only few vegetables that have been sold, but sometimes we get orders at higher prices which makes us to lose here. Sometimes profit its only MK1000.00 [$1.30US] that we found." 076

The city government was also mentioned in the fact that market vendors pay for their own security due to the city only hiring security to look after its own infrastructure, for example, metal roofing sheets in the market. Market vendors noted that on top of their daily fee, they pay for extra security from their own pockets to avoid theft of their own goods after not being able to solve the situation with the city. The security fee is managed by vendor representatives.

Interactions between market and street vendors were more open and symbiotic than was posited in the media, with regular purchasing from each other, as well as venue switching by market vendors to

selling on the street when sales were low. Both market and street vendors acknowledged the issue as one *"where everyone is trying to feed their family"* (062, 072) and focused much of their frustration regarding the management of the conflict on the city government.

"*...we are not hating our friends who are selling their products, no. They are also people and vendors just like us but the place they are selling their products on is not the right place.*"074

In addition to the stated difficulties with street vendors, market vendors also pointed to small to mid- size shops that can buy in larger quantities for cheaper prices, resulting in direct competition near their market stalls. At times these shops also provided wholesale goods for street vendors. None of the respondents saw the addition of a large South African supermarket chain, ShopRite, as a competitive force, rather indicating that it was a complementary shop to the market, especially as the main market is in close proximity and people shopping there will access the main market as well. Table 4-1 below describes the many links made by market vendor respondents between governance and the food system outcomes that directly impact their costs and profits.

Table 4-1 Causal Chains According to Market Vendor Respondents Regarding Costs

Perceived Social, Economic, Political Context	*Governance Processes/Decisions*	*Food System Outcome*
Free movement, low rural employment leads to high urbanization and high informal urban employment rates	Low focus from aid and national government on urban issues – rural bias	Market infrastructure old and failing, new infrastructure inadequate, high vendor competition and low profits
High urbanization and high informal vending competition, free market norms	Middlemen operate freely from national, regional, or city regulation	Wholesale items dropped at main market, satellite markets avoided by middlemen, low profits for vendors
Free movement, high urbanization, high informal employment	Daily migration of rural vendors selling within Mzuzu	High vendor competition and low profits
Corruption within national and city governments	Government money held at national level Local government employees not paid for work	Decreased transactions in Mzuzu leads to low profits and low economic activity
Free market norms, liberal economic ideology	Middlemen operate freely	Strong electronic communication networks between vendors and middlemen, low-income farmers potentially exploited, vendors charged high prices for wholesale goods
Mistrust of govt. officials and vendor association	Vendors decide to pay for security to protect their goods	Increased costs to sell goods at formal market stall, negatively impacting profits

4.1.2 Street Vendors

Street vendors sell goods outside of the formal tax system and formal market infrastructure. Street vendors will either be stationary, such as sitting on the ground outside of a market or shop throughout the city, or mobile, moving around the streets carrying their goods. The issue of conflict between Mzuzu's market vendors and street vendors, or as they have been labelled, "illegal vendors," first arose in the local media in 2017. Since then, the media stories about illegal vending in Mzuzu have increased, along with the numbers of street vendors. As a solution to the growing needs of vendors, city council and donors built Ndata market (Figure 4-2). This process took 7 years to complete by 2016-7 but remained almost empty due to complaints that it was too far away from the road, and that moving from the street to sell there would mean much lower profits. Indeed, the few market vendors that sold goods from Ndata market complained of paying fees to city council for their stall whilst the street vendors were allowed to sell freely and were not charged a fee. Street vendors were aware of their impact on market vendors but stated they could not afford to move to a market stall due to the potential losses.

"Vendors inside there we don't interact, the reason is that they think that us we sell more comparing with them – but it's true that we sell more here." 069

Figure 4-2 Central Mzuzu's major food purchase points. Yellow polygons represent popular areas for street sales

City government decisions around illegal vending enforcement are most often the result of pressure from market vendor associations. Enforcement actions were a partnership between city government and the local police; it was contingent on city funding as any enforcement measures require payments (allowances) to the local police station. Enforcement takes the form of police or city

officials confiscating or destroying goods, fines, and physical removal from street sides and areas directly outside of the main market, often called 'chasing.' This enforcement was effective for only hours, as vendors returned once police and city officials had left. One respondent in the academic group noted:

"So I had a chat with one of these officers they say 'you know what, we are just getting money for nothing here.' These guys, they are being paid to chase their own wives. So they say that they are spending over half a million [kwacha] just for a week on allowances. You can't sustain this, the solution is provide places where these [people] can sell and feel safe even beyond 5 o'clock." 006



According to street vendor respondents, national politics had a large influence on the current food system outcomes. 2018 was an election year, and national government candidates entered the growing debate over street vending in the media, invited either market or street vendors to attend rallies, and provided funds to female vendors to dance at rallies. Street vendors knew that during this time there would be no enforcement of street vending and therefore sold their goods without fear of reprisal, since current officials across all three levels of government (city, regional, and national) were hoping to be re-elected. All vendors, both market and street vendors, shifted their behaviour and became political tools during this time, with politicians using the media to place blame on other political parties for the current state of vending in Mzuzu (Kasaila et al., 2018). This shows that governance priorities can change within the same group depending on the context – when a national representative's needs change (to stay in power), then then behaviour of others (street vendors) can shift to accommodate their own needs that would otherwise be disallowed. Essentially, the structure of tripartite elections shifts power and agency to national politicians and street vendors when it would otherwise be in the hands of city council and market vendors.

"So you can see that sometimes if they city assembly tries to stop them [street vendors] then politicians come in [and say] "no, leave them, no…", so there's a lot of things that go into play when those conflict." 050

"We know because they invite us to dance for them [the current ruling party], so its where they tell us that they are letting us to sell in the streets because elections are near." 070

4.1.3 Market Vendor Associations

Vendor associations were depicted by respondents as having a strong structure and hierarchy. Food section representatives were relied upon to resolve their internal issues, such as setting prices and space allocation, and the vendor association leaders were there to solve any further issues or to interact with the city government, represented by an employee called the 'market master.' Often leaders cited the structures of how people would take an issue forward to demonstrate the effectiveness of the governance structure. Leaders also noted that they have brought issues forward, such as the need for waste bins and management to the city council but received little action or response.

"Structures in leadership are there to solve issues and there are steps people know to take. The structures exist." 054

"What happens is this, they can solve there as section, and if they have failed they can bring the issue to me and look the way forward of the story. This is why we elected representatives for each section so that we should help each other." 053

Vendor association elections were described as democratic, and other respondents noted that city council was responsible for ensuring elections were held on a regular basis, but at times the interval was skipped, resulting in continual leadership and no elections. Overall, the respondents acknowledged that the structures were in place for reporting and communication, but that these processes did not occur often, or when they did, they felt that the city did not respond in a timely manner or provide the needed resources. One representative noted how they communicated to the city council that they should have a clean market:

"We have a market master who represent the city council here in the market, then we have the vendors committee which represents vendors here. If the sweepers have not swept this market for two days we boycott paying the market fee so that they should clean the market." 071

One pilot project, Chibavi market (Fig. 4-3), is meant to explore market self-governance, with the market vendors themselves managing the daily fees and market infrastructure. Even in this situation, the vendor governance representatives expected partnership and communication with the city for larger infrastructure issues such as waste removal, but this expectation was unclear to city officials who expected these issues to be managed by the market. The city expected payments to come from the self-managed market fees; at the time of the interviews a local city councillor was engaged in communicating with the two groups.

The governing group of the Chibavi market vendors also found themselves beholden to cultural or political commitments, such as finding it difficult to get larger businesses in their market to pay their fees or feeling it was important to respond to a request from the neighbourhood police station to buy paint for their new building. Community support was a priority for the vendor governance in all markets, such as assisting with funeral costs for vendors' families, or allowing customers to buy on credit, with the main difference being that other markets relied on each vendor to supply extra funds for these types of initiatives, while Chibavi used the market fees for these expenses, leaving them less able to maintain or build infrastructure like washrooms. Despite these issues, the Chibavi market vendor association most appreciated the ability to understand and provide transparency on how the market fees were spent.

Perspectives on the leadership of market vendor associations was mixed among respondents from market vendors, street vendors, and city government. Market vendors often felt that their issues were not fully communicated from leaders to city council, and that city council responses were either not effective or communicated back down the chain. Questions of party loyalty, corruption and bribery arose in conversations, and market vendor leadership was seen as generally ineffective or uncommunicative with their own members, especially when it came to solving the issue of street vendors.

Figure 4-3 Market Locations in Mzuzu. Nationally managed highways are highlighted in purple.

4.1.4 City Government

For market vendors, communication with city government was the most identified hurdle to creating solutions. These issues stemmed from communication routes not being fulfilled between market representatives and city representatives, the complex nature of urban land and asset management, and the length of time for assets like markets to be planned and constructed.

The administration and communication routes between all parties were not only complex, but there were discordant expectations of responsibility and ownership between city government, market vendors, and vendor governance. The unclear communication routes were described by one city government respondent below:

"Sometimes we communicate through committees, and these committees sometimes they do not actually take this message to their people there. So in that way it seems that the information stays with the council and the committees but not the actual person who is being represented. On our part, sometimes we communicate with our officers on the ground in the market, but them also they cannot also take this information we give to the market master [for each market]. But he does not take that information to them or back to the office [Market Supervisor] if there is a problem in the market. So such kind of things that are miscommunication break down between these structures. We have not improved them. So these are challenges." 058

City government representatives understood the need for improved markets throughout the city as well as the need for WASH infrastructure but felt overwhelmed by the needs of service delivery for all of the markets in the city, as well as their responsibilities to enforce existing regulations around food safety. The consultation and construction for Ndata market, for example, was seven-year process where circumstances drastically changed in the last three years from heightened rates of urbanization and street vending. The needs of both market vendors and newer street vendors shifted, in addition to new people entering the markets. One respondent noted that many vendors live elsewhere but come to sell in Mzuzu due to the potential to make more money, therefore increasing the pressure on the city to plan for people who do not live in Mzuzu.

"the challenge is that since we do receive people from other districts, our Central Market is congested because everybody would want to sell at the Central Market. They can't go to the peripherals because they don't know those places and they are not assured of getting money." 035

The city government respondents were clear in their desire to use planning tools, communication, and policy to drive the more formal, modernized development of the city's markets, such as providing markets with safe spaces, sanitation, and water access, but felt like the rate of informal development often overtook the rate at which they could work, including time for consulting communities. Frustration was voiced at the amount of time and money put into the Ndata market

only for it to remain mostly unused; the respondents focused on the changing demands of vendors over the time of the construction.

In direct terms of enforcement of street vending, the city government often did not have the funding to enforce the rules around street vending each day. When frustrations arose within the market vendor populations, often city fee collectors would not venture to the markets to collect daily fees, fearing anger from market vendors. When there were funds to pay for police enforcement, city officials and policemen would arrive in a van to then chase and fine street vendors, at times taking their goods and holding them until they can pay a fine at the police station or city offices. Many respondents noted the futility of this exercise, and positioned the street vendors as 'gap fillers,' noting that they are providing a service to people when they are coming home from work and providing them with easy access to food instead of having to enter what can be a muddy, unclean market.

Much of the city governance decisions were seen by both city government respondents and others as reactive – in that the city had the capacity to react to issues such as cholera or flooding with ordinances, aid, or enforcement, but that urbanization and other issues were moving too fast to plan for and manage proactively. Many city government respondents desired a larger capacity to enforce existing food safety laws, especially prior to food reaching the city, for example ensuring proper pesticide use. A large concern was the safety issues that arose due to this unplanned informality, such as water or food-borne illness, the use of dangerous chemicals like formaldehyde to keep food appearing fresh, or street vendors selling too close to the roadside or highways. City government respondents noted the small budget allocated to manage these issues, that 11 out of the 15 areas in Mzuzu were "on the line" of food insecurity and pointed out the lack of aid programmes targeting urban development.



4.2 Story #1 Discussion

This story raises many issues discussed in the literature on urban food systems such as vendor conflicts, the modernization of food provision, and historical and current urban planning. These are commonly cited in urban food governance literature and discussed in 4.2.1. The subsequent section, 4.2.2, presents how the less-considered factors outside of the typical food system – historical discourse, behavioural norms, and politics – influence the governance of Mzuzu's food system.

4.2.1 Vending and Urban Food System Governance

This story displays issues around vending, urbanization, and planning – issues that are well described in sub-Saharan African food systems literature and are further discussed in this section.

4.2.1.1 Urbanization and Employment Outcomes in Mzuzu

Mzuzu shares many characteristics with cities that are undergoing urban transformation in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite the contention that urban growth is a necessary transformation to middle-income status, many countries in sub-Saharan Africa are experiencing a positive correlation between income inequality and urbanization (Sulemana et al, 2019). Increasing prices for goods, including living expenses like utilities, and decreasing informal wages means lowered purchasing power for the urban poor (Bricas, 2019). High rates of urbanization are seen as exacerbating the problems of vending competition, rising wholesale prices, and insufficient sales in informal urban food economies in South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (Blekking et al., 2017; Battersby & Muwuwo, 2018; Tawodzera, 2019; Giroux et al., 2020).

While the respondents from international agencies and national government acknowledged urbanization as a growing issue in Malawi, their focus remained on rural areas. Much of the concern about impacts from high urbanization rates in Mzuzu emerged from respondents from all levels of city governance. In this story, city level respondents linked urbanization with the growing amount of informal vending and the resulting low profits from the increasing competition. It was some vendors who noted their own food insecurity, with an emphasis on not being able to afford food from the low profits made from their trade, consistent with findings from Maputo that found over 30% of food insecure households participated in the informal economy, with the majority of these being female headed households (Raimundo et al., 2016). This finding is also consistent with the AFSUN study on Mzuzu's food insecurity rates that found the most vulnerable households to be those who

worked outside of the formal sector, in particular women, who also make up the majority of street and market food vendors (Riley et al., 2018). They also noted the extra costs of living in the city – rent, cooking fuel, school fees, and water were the most noted costs after food, consistent with other findings that saw "the high costs associated with urban shelter, transport, health and education undermine the ability of the chronically poor to access sufficient food" (Crush & Frayne, 2011 p. 536; Riley et al., 2018).

Street vendors who sold outside of the main market, or those who also acted as their own middlemen made comments that indicated they fared better than vendors who sold only within the main markets and satellite markets. The studies that examine the food security of food vendors themselves note the correlation of selling food in the informal economy and food insecurity (Piaseu & Mitchell, 2004; Fonchingong, 2005; Raimundo et al., 2016), yet few have delved deeper into discerning between the many types of food vendors. The nuance found in this study shows the need for a more detailed examination of the diversity of food vendors – their characteristics, and the different strategies they implement to increase profits in a highly competitive context.

4.2.1.2 The Influence of Governance Decisions on Vending in Mzuzu

The main reasons provided as to the low levels of market infrastructure was the lack of communication and transparency between actors, notably market vendors, the vendor association representatives, and the city government. The disputes around security provision, market fee increases, and fee use transparency all suggested that communication with city government and planners requires improvement – not just in the frequency, but in the method and type of communication. Market vendors connected the need for transparency and improved communication to a number of issues already documented in Malawian urban markets, such as intense competition among vendors, poor or lacking hygiene facilities and a lack of storage infrastructure (Gelli et al., 2019; Lazaro et al., 2019). These types of clashes between city government and more informal vendors are common (Kayuni & Tambulasi, 2009; Riley, 2014; Jongh, 2015); less commonly researched are governance decisions and interactions between formal open air market vendors, their representatives, and city governments (White & Kampanje-Phiri, 2019).

Regarding physical infrastructure planning, a positive example of communication was provided by vendors around the provision of electricity in some markets. Prior to hooking up a market stall, ESCOM, the national energy provider, now checks with the city government to ensure the market

stall is permitted properly. This was cited as an example of effective communication within existing governance structures – in this case the Mzuzu Town and Country Planning Committee, made up of utility providers, community representatives, and government managers. This example was provided as a positive outcome, but the respondent also noted that this was still a reactionary measure, like many of the governance decisions made by an overwhelmed city governance structure.

The most common mention of observed city services were two types of city employees – those paid to sweep the market as well as the daily fee collectors. Inspectors, such as health inspectors were rare, but market vendors stated that they would often come, note an issue, and then the issue would remain unless it was one that could be enforced upon a vendor, such as a directive to clean an area or not sell cooked food. Respondents did not recall any inspections that resulted in the inspector enforcing an action upon the city. One interpretation of this type of outcome is that enforcement (inspections, fee collection, and enforcement of the use of public space) upon individuals with smaller amounts of entitlements is easier than government coordination or programme implementation; enforcement takes one person and does not require as much funding, nor does it require enforcing an action upon a more powerful entity such as a large, politically connected business.

The same reasoning could apply to tax or fee collection – multiple city government and business respondents remarked on the ease of collecting fees from market vendors who need to man their own booths and show up on most days. It was more difficult, according to city government respondents, to collect from larger businesses and homeowners in the city – there are advertising campaigns across the city to urge people to pay their 'city rents.' This is consistent with findings from across sub-Saharan Africa in urban environments; the low levels of real estate registration and low capacity of city governments to enforce tax payments have impeded their ability to collect and subsequently use funds to manage the city (Fjeldstad et al., 2017). In Mzuzu, this may lead to a reliance on the more convenient and available vendors, especially when the national government may withhold or reduce transfers to opposition-held city councils (Jibao & Pritchard, 2015).

Another interpretation of these outcomes is that the lack of clarity regarding responsibility for different market operations causes confusion, frustration, and ultimately capitulation on the part of vendor associations and market vendors. Questions arose from vendors, such as despite the costs of hiring the Mzuzu police, why the city government chose to forcibly remove street vendors around

markets instead of provide transparency around spending and physical infrastructure to the vendors of the main market. The statement below is a good example of the low levels of agency one market vendor feels, as well as what group should be responsible for the market infrastructure in the city.

"The city council also, it is not sanitary here at the market. They are not emptying the bins that anytime we be hit by diseases. The government should be pushing them to be cleaning the market. There is so much carelessness." 072a

4.2.1.3 The Influence of Governance and Complex Bureaucracy on Mzuzu's Food System

A consistent topic from government respondents was the complex jurisdiction of both physical land and governance matters in Mzuzu – the "many landlords" of city, regional, and national government levels that could cause confusion and delay in resolving planning issues. In reference to vendors, road access to the markets and transportation costs were primary concerns in their daily lives. The combination of the two issues highlights a possible reason that the main market is so accessible and popular – it sits at the junction of two major nationally managed highways, the M1 and M5 (Figure 4-3). The paved highway roads, their embankments, and large side clearances provide open areas for street vendors and passable, mud-free routes for customers and pedestrians. Other satellite markets rely on city-managed roads; respondents remarked that satellite markets are declining in ability to provide diversity and low-cost fresh food, and vendors in those markets consistently noted that wholesale trucks and consumers do not enter the area because of the quality of the roads as well as the sanitary conditions of the markets.

"It is difficult because it is raining time, I don't buy; the mud on the floor [in Chiputula market] is the problem. I cannot afford to use a taxi [to come to town, but] in town it [food] is cheaper. In Chipitula there is a small market, food is expensive..." 061 – consumer

"Most of the roads are in bad shape. The first one is entry road through the post office into Luwinga Market. The road is in very bad shape... when the rains come, we the vendors finds problems walking or even those who are driving also find problems when driving...the MP and the Councillor, they have never been here. They should come to see here at the market and find ways on how they can help us. This market...the road it should be in good state." 072b – vendor

The food security literature in SSA remarks on the importance of rural access to roads for access to markets (Omiti et al., 2009; Berg et al., 2018). The findings of this study add to the importance of

transportation corridors by highlighting the importance of the urban road quality to and within urban market areas, both formal and informal, for wholesale access and consumer patronage. Additionally, encouraging higher levels of patronage in satellite markets requires not only lower or equivalent prices to the centre of town, but sanitary conditions such as floor areas that are not impacted by rain and waste; otherwise, customer preference is to remain on the path of main roads or purchase from more convenient street vendors.

The popularity of the main market seems to have created its own positive feedback loop, where the ease of access for customers through nationally-managed roads, high demand for goods from middlemen, the ease of access, and established drop off points have promoted the frequent use of the main market as opposed to the smaller markets around the city. Based on work in Lilongwe, one academic respondent suggested that there could be potential impacts on Mzuzu's food security, especially for low- and middle-income residents when one central market dominates the more informal food system in a growing city. One respondent remarked that although some of the outlying markets in Lilongwe are technically illegal, they are feeding people as well as providing credit, which is helpful for people with precarious livelihoods.

"Markets in lower income areas in Lilongwe are essential for buying in small quantities at which people can afford. In the peri urban [areas], middle classes rely almost exclusively on neighbourhood informal markets. If the market is vulnerable to government policy, then those people are vulnerable. Spatially, markets are essential" Anon.

Interestingly in Mzuzu, the night market, situated outside of the main market where street sellers are 'illegal' during the day, was a popular event where street vendors came after the formal open-air market closed. No respondents felt this was a major conflict between the two types of vendors, despite the mentions that many people coming from work will purchase their goods here instead of accessing the market in the daytime. It seemed that space for vending was a deeper concern than the timing, as it was outside of more 'formal' business hours.

The construction of "illegal markets" has caused conflict in Malawi in both Lilongwe and Blantyre (Riley, 2014; White & Kampanje-Phiri, 2019), and in the past have resulted in destruction of markets or, on the more productive side, required a facilitating party like a CSO or academic to advocate for solutions and lobby government departments to provide solutions under their specific mandates (White & Kampanje-Phiri, 2019). The development of planned markets and housing is a priority for

the city but tends to fall behind the 'natural planning' of vendors in outlying areas of the city. The issue of multiple landlords was seen as both a barrier and in the case of the quote below, an advantage to informal market development or agriculture in the city:

"*But we don't have any jurisdiction, because it's District Assembly, so you see that it's not clear cut. Maybe it is the lack of demarcation of who is doing what is also what creates chaos. And people try to take advantage of that chaos and go and grab land which they don't know who it belongs to... is it the city's, is it Lands [national government]...*" 050

This issue was brought up in tandem with discussions of the slow implementation of Malawi's new Physical Planning Act (2016), which is meant to modernize and provide planning for both urban and rural areas, guided by the local governments. It was yet to be "in force" as of 2018 according to many government respondents. This was attributed to the lack of capacity and true devolution provided to the city, with concern that the added planning responsibility required more capacity, both human and financial, than currently existed, requiring time to build staff capacity in the cities and regions.

"...the function that was dedicated to city council was just the management part, the planning piece was with national government. And what the new Act is saying – both planning and development control becomes the responsibility of the local council...and the thinking was that with time they would build capacity then they would be able to take over all the functions and be able to do things on their own, but they have had challenges to build that capacity. That's why you see a lot of challenges in planning. We have challenges to contain development. The rate at which people are developing and the rate at which we are providing for the infrastructure you know, I think government and several other landlords are failing to meet the demand." 032 (National Government)

"I would like to see an improvement in the funding for urban development programs... and also the councils being able to have enough funds and also the capacity of the national department being built both in terms of human resources and funding." 005 (City Government)

4.2.2 The Influence of Democratic Ideologies and Political Norms on Urban Food Governance

4.2.2.1 The Norm of National Government Power

At the root of some discussions on Mzuzu's food system were comments from respondents about 'how things used to be' under the rule of Kamuzu Banda; there was both nostalgia and a desire for

order and following of rules that was associated with this time. Respondents were quick to note that the preferred political state was democracy, but that it came with a price – that of disorder, of people making up their own rules, and of a lack of discipline.

"There was a time when Malawi was not a democracy. It was very easy to enforce the law. We all embrace democracy and you felt like indeed it's good. But the way we are using it, it's still wrong to be honest because you cannot have a country with no laws, you need laws. Malawi has so many good laws... but the way the residents have now started disregarding them. I'm not very impressed. The way things are now." 077

The comparison between the past and present was often drawn when respondents spoke about the quality of services and infrastructure provided as well as the norms and rules people followed regarding street vending. Street vending was prevalent in Malawi prior to Banda, when it was then discouraged, but the discourse of Bakili Muluzi, democratically elected in 1994, enabled and promoted street vending. This was a stark contrast to Banda's characterization of vendors as lazy or polluting a city that should otherwise demonstrate elegance and cleanliness (Jimu, 2005). In opposition, Muluzi positioned himself as "patron" or "chairman" of the vendors (Kayuni & Tambulasi, 2009). While Muluzi's second term was characterized by attempts to formalize and contain vending (Tonda & Kepe, 2016), what respondents remembered was the conflation of democratic norms with vending as compared to the controlled shops and markets of the Banda era.

Similar issues from Malawi's past were identified by Kayuni and Tambulasi (2009) and Riley (2014) under the successive leadership of Bingu wa Mutharika. In 2006, Operation Dongosolo meant to move street vendors to designated markets in three of Malawi's cities (Lilongwe, Blantyre, and Zomba), resulting in protests and violence. Like the more recent complaints of market infrastructure in Mzuzu, the spaces provided in 2006 were too small, provided inappropriate infrastructure, and led to decreased profits for vendors.

Geographically, the enforcement of vending space in Mzuzu reflects many of the conflicts between national governments and vendors in the wider SADC region. Informal vending in public spaces is often seen as competition against legitimate, more 'tidy' commercial businesses in cities, resulting in numerous approaches to deny informal vendors access to public space (Lindell et al., 2013; Arias, 2019). In Chichewa*, dongosolo* means order and discipline. The connection to cleanliness and order and the appearance of the city has been documented in the literature as a colonial legacy, and Tonda

and Kepe (2016) connect the post-colonial pressures to mimic world-class cities and prove their evolution from 'other-ness' by correcting their urban form with "cleanness, beauty and order" (Kayuni &Tambulasi, 2009, pp. 89,90).

Comments from all types and levels of respondents in this research echoed these sentiments in their desire for order; in the vendors it was a desire for healthy, safe markets; in government officials the need for visual order was combined with the desire for tax revenue, food safety, and a more modernized food system; for international aid respondents order meant a free market, transparency, and food safety that begins at the farm. The only governance level that truly felt the pressure to solve the vending issue between market and street vendors was the city level. The results and decisions around solving the problem, however, are similar to Operation Dongosolo in that those vendors who did not move endured direct enforcement such as chasing, fines, and a loss of assets.

The retention of national power was also a common theme in this story. First, the differences between Operation Dongsolo in 2006 and Mzuzu's current vendor situation is the presence of local city representatives who report to an elected mayor (a function of the national government enabling local elections in 2014 after years of centralizing power), the urbanization rates, and higher numbers of local vendors. The use of the media and the power of the national government are common threads between the two; in 2006 there was no city representation, and although there are currently elected city officials, it was the campaigning national candidates that retained the power of the media, capitalized on the conflict, and influenced the city's enforcement behaviour, as well as street vendor behaviour.

Figure 4-4 below adds further nuance of the causes and effects described by market and street vendors regarding the food systems outcomes regarding market governance in Mzuzu.





Figure 4-4 Causal Chains Regarding Market Governance in Mzuzu

Centralized national power was also noted by respondents in the political placements of regional or city employees, the amount of budget determined to go to cities that were deemed loyal to the national party in power, and the use of city assets, such as trucks, for campaigning. Vendors remarked on these issues because they connected them to the lack of trust and transparency in how their market fees were being used. Respondents familiar with the devolution policy of Malawi remarked that there were many strings that were still attached to national politics, and that it impacted Mzuzu's functions as a city. As Mzuzu (and the rest of the north) tends to elect opposition parties to the southern-led majority government leaders, access to resources may be affected, as found in Cammack's (2011) assessment of market management, noting the importance of leadership associations to national politics to secure funding for market infrastructure. This "vertically-divided

authority" (Resnick, 2014, p.S3) may inhibit the authority of the city government to provide equal services to those who may be under 'opposition control' (Fox, 2014), such as was documented by O'Neill et al. (2014) with water supplies and food relief being controlled by political parties and local elites in Mzuzu.

4.2.2.2 The Influence of Liberal Economic Ideology in Food System Governance

In the literature, the use of neoliberal (or liberal as described by respondents) economic policies in development contexts is attributed to structural adjustment policies developed in the early 1990s by international financial institutions. Although respondents once again invoked nostalgia for the ease of process brought through unilateral political control, they connected current food system outcomes to key governance concepts from international agencies. This reflects Cammack's (2017) finding that donor receiving countries tend to adopt the donor communities' preferred development strategies. These strategies often reflected economic liberalism and a market-oriented mentality that often accompanied the third wave of African democracy (Makinda, 1996; McGuigan, 2005) but also the discourse of neoliberal, individualized economic growth strategies promoted by large international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Anders, 2008; Cammack & Kelsall, 2011). These strategies, often based on national economic measurements like Gross Domestic Product, have included structural adjustments and pro-poor growth strategies such as agricultural commercialization.

Mention of international aid rarely arose in conversations about urban markets and vendors. Some vendors inquired for the possibility of aid agencies developing market infrastructure, but then noted that the one effort (main market washrooms provided by a partnership through the aid agency Plan and the city government) was unsuccessful as the washrooms were unclean and across the highway from the market. Aid was seen by other respondent types to be more focused on nutrition and health in the city instead of the food value chain, and mostly focused on rural areas but headquartered within the city. Issues raised by academics and international aid focused on food safety at a larger scale and throughout the value chain, such as pesticide use, market hygiene, and vendor education. Lazaro et al. (2019) identified three key opportunities in Mzuzu markets, such as a regulatory framework that includes informal markets and mobile vendors, WASH facilities at every market, and foodborne disease education for vendors. Specifically, large aid agencies focused on reforms to macroeconomic policy to create *"business enabling environments"* (081), commercial

agricultural systems, cash crop management, and public financial management to stop corruption and inefficient use of resources.

The concept of international aid influencing the discourse and policies of urban food systems was not raised in any interview but warrants attention and analysis. The modernization of food systems was a stated goal of many international aid respondents, but few mentioned the larger ideological choice being made to envelop many of these more informal vending routes into a capitalist, formalized, free market system of rules and policies. This is not inherently a good or bad choice, but one that should be made with awareness of the potential impacts to the positive sides of informal market operations such as providing credit and low-cost goods, compared to more formal parts of the system like supermarkets.

Throughout the interviews and especially within the higher levels of government, there was a conflation of liberal economic policy with democratic norms of freedom, with arguments that full government control of economic and food systems, while historically effective, was undesirable amongst Malawi's population. There was hesitancy at all levels to test the "right to freely engage in economic activity, to work and to pursue a livelihood anywhere in Malawi" as cited in the Malawian Constitution (Democratic Republic of Malawi, 1995). Hickel (2014) describes this discourse of neoliberalism as a central ontology of Western culture in that individuals are 'liberated' when they can operate within free markets. Hickel (2014) then correlates aid agency rhetoric with neoliberalism, as "the empowerment and capability approaches have claiming space in the field of development" (p.1360). Hutton (2013) found similar themes in Malawian political discourse that sought to legitimize political authority through "an on-going process shaped by historical narratives and lessons, the rhetoric of leaders, Western democratization discourses, and visions for the future" (p. 7). The discourse of this type of freedom was evident in many interviews, including this quote from a respondent who was both a vendor and a farmer.

"So now on the prices it's on one's liberty... You can sell the way you want to." 056

One result that emerged that has not been as deeply covered by existing literature is that of the same discourse influencing that of the behaviour of middlemen – those who purchase food from farmers and bring goods into the city to sell wholesale – as well as those who may have power to govern them. These topics were connected often by national and city government respondents to

middlemen and the individual freedom to negotiate prices for goods at the farmgate as well as at wholesale to vendors. Price setting of agricultural goods was noted as a practice done in the past by the national government, and that democracy was linked clearly to more liberal, or deregulated, market governance.

These historical and political influences on the attitudes of government around the freedom of enterprise potentially influence the behaviour of middlemen to act as free agents in a free market. The government's choices to not interact with, or to allow middlemen to operate freely influences the price paid to farmers and the prices demanded from vendors, which according to many respondents can be unfair and exploitative, setting up prices for consumers and determining profit of informal and market vendors.

"but if in most cases the buyer [middleman] when he goes there you find that he says 'ah no, this is poor quality, I will not buy.' Now because you've spent the whole year farming and want this so you can afford this, 'Okay, fine, just buy and then I stop everything.' So we disadvantage our own farmers." 006

Many studies have attributed dysfunctional food systems to free market functions such as profit maximization and a lack of concerted governance; food being a nebulous topic that fits into many mandates, therefore making the food system a victim of a lack of governance coordination and communication (Steel, 2013; Ledger, 2016; Clapp, 2020). In the case of Mzuzu, although the typical modernization and monopolization of food value chain ownership has not occurred to the same degree in Malawi, vendor, government and CSO respondents have the opinion that some attributes have taken hold, such as most of the profit to be attained in the food value chain going to middlemen or traders.

In opposition, larger city business respondents were more favourable towards middlemen and vendors, suggesting they provide a valuable service to the city, filling gaps that would otherwise not be filled by government. Kutengule et al. (2006) confirmed this sentiment, and also found that as ADMARC lessened in its reach across the country, small vendors to an extent, "bridged the gap...to provide reliable and efficient marketing services" (p. 436).

"So people bring food and I put my hands up for the vendors because they're very creative and they do everything to bring food. Now I don't know whether the prices that they offer do give them an acceptable return. I don't know about that, but they are very good. I think they sustain Mzuzu." 016

Results from Kankwamba and Kornher (2020) suggest that the governance decisions to overlook middlemen as a formal part of the food system may be a decision to avoid conflict over the profitability of trading versus the benefit of the city or region accruing tax revenue. Their study on maize traders in Malawi reports that "when registered, traders make four times less profits. Unless the business environment is reformed in favour of small businesses it does not pay to register" (p. 850). For farmers who act as their own intermediary, Gabre-Madhin et al. (2001) found several constraints to their operations that repeat 20 years later in this study's interviews, such as high transport costs, limited external finance, a lack of quality certification, limited price information, and limited contract enforcement.

The 'hands-off' approach to governing the intermediary parts of the food system may play an important role in the resilience of Mzuzu to urban shocks, both environmental and social. Table 4-2 lists the diverse food supply pathways as provided by respondents. The existing diversity of food access routes in the city was noted by many respondents as a strength of the food system and has recently been confirmed quantitatively through Gomez et al. (2021), who found that "boosting a city's food supply chain diversity increases the resistance of a city to food shocks of mild to moderate severity by up to 15 per cent" (p. 250).

"They're growing their own. It's unlike a town like Lusaka, Lusaka has a very high population and they are all urban and the price of maize there is high. You will get strikes, you know, people's going on strike in Lusaka because maize has become scarce. You will not get that in Mzuzu." 016



In this instance it may seem that power is more diffused through Mzuzu's food system through different actors using their agency to improve their entitlements (Foucault, 1994; Sen, 1981; 1999). However it is important to remember that the choice is made by government authorities to not sanction intermediary pathways of food access or to drive food access towards a pathway that is more 'modern.' The multiple pathways of food access are governed through indirect techniques of

regulation such as the internalization of discipline and cultural or historical norms (Allen, 2004), but are still under the shadow of government decisions. In Mzuzu's case, they are also a result of a city government with low funding and capacity to govern and fully regulate the food system.

Table 4-2 Intermediary Pathways for Food Sales and Food Access in Mzuzu as discussed by Respondents

Group(s)	Pathway
High-Income Farmer	Direct Sales to markets and vendors
High-Income Farmer	Direct sales to institutions and businesses
Middle to High-Income Mzuzu Resident	Produce food for personal and family consumption on owned or rented peri-urban land
Middle to High-Income Mzuzu Resident	Purchase staples such as maize direct from farmers and store at home, provide to family members
Low-Income Mzuzu Resident	Walk from urban to peri-urban or rural farm for *ganyu* or work for food
Low-Income Mzuzu Resident	Faith-based CSO food provision in urban area
Low-Income Mzuzu Resident	Receive from family in urban or rural areas
Middlemen, Vendors	Purchase from urban wholesalers and sell to urban customers
Middlemen	Purchase from farmers and sell to urban vendors
Market Vendors, Street Sellers	Purchase bulk from farmers and sell in markets or street sides
Market Vendors, Street Sellers	Purchase from middlemen and sell in markets or street sides

4.3 Story #2 – Supply Challenges: Politics, Viruses, and Bottlenecks

These three smaller stories discuss outcomes directly associated with the supply of specific types of food in Mzuzu: maize, bananas, and protein sources.

4.3.1 Outcome: Maize Price Fluctuations

As previously discussed, maize is an important carbohydrate in Malawian diets and much of the subsistence and commercial farming in Malawi produces maize, which is then cooked into a porridge, *nsima*. A common outcome in Mzuzu's urban markets was the sharp rise in maize prices during 'hungry season,' approximately from January to April (Gelli et al., 2017), when maize reserves run low and the new maize crop has not yet matured. Although international maize prices can follow a similar trajectory, Malawi's maize prices can rise 2-3 times higher than the international reference markets (Gilbert, et al., 2017). Most respondents connected the variable nature of maize production and supply with price fluctuations in Mzuzu's markets but differed in the connections between these correlated factors. For many respondents outside of the national government, national politics and governance decisions were the most dominant determinants for high maize prices in the urban markets. Three major themes emerged from these discussions: an overwhelmed national public service with rural priorities, corrupt partnerships with middlemen, and the use of maize as a political crop.

Often coupled with discussions of national government was the rural focus of the Farm Input Subsidy Program (FISP), a national program meant to assist the poorest farmers to grow crops, particularly maize. FISP was seen as ineffective, prone to nepotism from village leaders, often delayed, and overwhelming to the capacity of the Department of Agriculture, as all other programme delivery stops when it is time for FISP delivery.

"During [FISP], the whole system, the extension services are on hold; it's that they cannot do any other activity except to make sure that this input distribution is done. So it's at the expense of other activities that government public officers should do. So you go to the Ministry, all the officers have gone out on farm inputs program. At the ADD level, EPA level, it's going to be the same...but agriculture is not only inputs distribution. There are so many other things, but at that time everything is suspended, you can't get extension services." 046

FISP was blamed not only for being distracting, but for taking up resources that could be spent providing urban and peri-urban areas with agricultural extension services. CSO respondents

proposed that national agricultural officers, who were already understaffed, did not want to live in rural areas, therefore limiting their reach, and were not allowed to serve urban areas, and therefore they missed many of the highly productive urban weekend farmers and others that farmed closer to the city and sold their goods there. These same 'weekend' farmers noted that setting prices is unfair to farmers who did not receive benefits from FISP – they therefore grow maize only to feed themselves and give to family members. This observation impacted the behaviour of more productive farmers as they bypass the markets, growing only for family and not to sell because it is "*too political*" (049). The close location of these farmers to Mzuzu as well as their productivity would be a boon for any regional food planning initiative, but when it comes to maize, few are interacting with local markets.

"And we managed to sell most of it to those people who needed it, especially during the times of famine, but after some time I found that maize was a political crop and that you cannot make good business on that." 049

The topic of political interference continued with discussions of partnerships between political figures and middlemen. Respondents felt that high-level bureaucrats within the Ministry of Agriculture inappropriately control and manage maize supply and prices to benefit themselves, resulting in food shortages. Under the request of anonymity, multiple stories were told from different respondents of government officials taking advantage of maize price volatility. There were mentions of the recent scandal involving the dismissal of the Minister of Agriculture in 2017 for the overpayment for maize from Zambia, resulting in theft from government funds. Respondents noted that the CSO networks were instrumental in both raising the issue and demanding action from the government but insisted that these corrupt practices continue in various forms. Examples were provided of politicians purchasing maize through middlemen and sending it to Zambia. One anonymous respondent gave the example of one MP taking advantage of exaggerated losses of maize in the Malawi Vulnerability Assessment (MVAC), exporting maize through middlemen, then encouraging the national government to "buy" it at higher prices through their vendor partners. Respondents then tied this behaviour to highly fluctuating maize prices in the city as well as less available supplies of maize, remarking that vendors have now learned the behaviour of accumulating large amounts of maize, holding it back until the demand is very high, and then charging high prices.

"So the real people who need that they don't have access because entrepreneurs also, they take advantage, they go there, queue up, they connect with the ADMARC team, the staff. You know maybe ADMARC will receive 200 bags,

they will end up sharing a hundred and fifty bags [with vendors] and then the community people might end up getting only 50 bags, which is why you have queues that don't end...because others are buying that and selling at a higher price." 038

Further to the statements about maize being a political crop, respondents within all levels and types of governance noted that the national government politicizes maize to retain or gain power – *"politicians will use it to 'woo' people to vote for them and they know it works because some people think only maize is food" (048).* Respondents noted that campaigning politicians use maize to 'buy' votes during electoral campaigns focusing on rural areas, with comparatively little attention paid to urban areas. A range of respondents stated that rural traditional leaders will receive benefits like maize and fertilizer in exchange for loyalty to a party and mentioned that urban market leadership is prone to the same loyalty requirements.

"Programs go to where politician's votes are, therefore remain rural and regionalized, not urban. Yeah, and also maize has become a political crop in this country, because sometimes for you to win votes it's about whether there is adequate maize in the reserves or not." 023

Other CSO respondents framed the popularity of maize in Malawi as an 'addiction,' suggesting that although *"maize is a small part of the Malawian food wheel but it is a big part of the development sector"* 082, and that large aid investments in maize are preferred in national government because it is *"easier for top politicians to skim money*" (Anon). Respondents then cited the low desire and capacity within the government for maize policy reform, transparency, and monitoring, making the connection between maize dependence and the national government's willingness to reinforce the discourse because of the political power it provides.

Two CSO respondents that focused on less commercial forms of farming noted that the national government will publicly say yes to many things, including indigenous crop development, alternative farming techniques, urban agriculture, permaculture, and alternative investment, but not follow through with substantial funding. The reasons suggested for this resource flow was that politicians can more easily skim money out of foreign seed companies and through the manipulation of maize stocks, as opposed to small NGOs focused on building healthy food systems.

"...because these days there is a lot of corruption, so sometimes they [national government] would not look interested in what others are doing [alternative agriculture] because they want to settle contracts with these foreign seed companies,

obviously they get something out of that... so the government is not very willing to be seen supporting something that would compete with seed companies." 021

Outside of national governance and politics, respondents suggested wholesale maize prices were impacted by rural productivity, which was in turn impacted by short-term and annual weather patterns. Many street and market vendors made predictions about the price of maize based on the levels of precipitation over the planting season.

"Last year food was available here [in Mzuzu] because we had enough rains, but this year hunger will be there because the rains were in a short period and affected the growth, especially maize since we depend as a reliable food". 070

Floods and drought in surrounding areas such as Karonga were seen to raise maize or rice prices, and respondents made the connection between rural infrastructure, environmental management, and Mzuzu's food availability. Although climate change was not alluded to specifically, respondents noted that erratic weather, the increase in fall army worm outbreaks, floods, and droughts were worsening.

In summary, respondents felt (either positively or negatively) that much of the food system was intended to create demand for and to continually supply maize for consumption. Some saw this as a response to the demand of Malawians for a desired carbohydrate. Others saw the proliferation of maize and the accompanying discourse as a way of creating and continuing dependence on the national government, of using it as a political tool to influence the population, controlling a major food crop, and gaining power and profit. Respondents felt all these factors had a major influence on fluctuating maize prices in the city, and therefore impacted food security levels in Mzuzu.

4.3.2 Outcome: Tanzanian Bananas

The large trucks that enter the small drop off area at the Mzuzu Main Market are full of bananas from Tanzania. Vendors line up at the trucks to buy bananas at wholesale and sell them throughout the city. When respondents voiced frustration over the presence of Tanzanian bananas within the Mzuzu markets, it was not because of the origin of the produce but due to the lost opportunities of Malawian farmers who could have been producing for the markets. Banana Bunchy Top Disease (BBTD), present in the country for two decades but accelerating as of 2018 in the northern districts, stunts banana plants, reduces fruiting and is spread easily through aphids and the use of infected

propagative suckers (Kenyon et al., 2007). The impacts of the virus were seen as the cause of the low levels of Malawian banana production, especially in the north and close to Nkhata Bay, where much of the city's banana source had originated.

Respondents who produced bananas to sell in Mzuzu connected the low levels of information, regulations, and actions from the national government to the inability of large and small-scale farmers to deal with the virus, the subsequent loss of much of the crop, and the filling of the gap by middlemen and vendors who brought Tanzanian bananas to the city. Farmers who had higher asset levels, such as 'weekend' or retired farmers who lived in the city, were looking to websites from Kenyan, Philippine, or Tanzanian universities or government departments for information on how to manage the virus. However, they noted that information was insufficient, especially when the Malawian national government (here the Department of Agriculture) was insisting upon farmers burning their crops without further information, extension services, financial assistance, or clean banana plants to replace what was lost.

"But they have to explain how you remove or destroy the bananas...and also the people will not destroy their bananas if they do not see a supply coming to replace it...I think I'm not seeing that. Um, so that is the problem with bananas and this is an area where extension services needed to be reinforced. At the moment we don't have adequate extension services again, perhaps the government can't afford them. But yeah, I think the government can't afford them." 016

"*The government is trying to bring some resistant varieties, but those are not available to farmers easily to access to plant so it's a big problem. They're doing some propagation but it's not in sufficient numbers to the demand that is there."* 049

Middlemen were also the focus of the spread according to some respondents, who blamed the middlemen for entering farms to purchase bananas with their trucks already half-full of infected bananas. There were questions about if middlemen who walked onto farm properties without alerting the farmers were also spreading the virus. Respondents believed middlemen felt entitled to engage directly with farmers and determine prices, and that this contributed to the feeling that middlemen could freely inspect farms from which they may buy produce. They noted the lack of any regulation or norms around middleman behaviour, suggesting they are the more 'invisible' part of the food value chain who then escape management by any formal governance system.

I found it was common in the Philippines and I found they were able to manage it. And we studied, got videos from the Philippines and try to practice what they are doing. It didn't work. Well, it worked briefly, but then the vendor farmer interaction is such that you cannot really manage the disease. They're going to different farms and they come into your farm and they come and tell you where your own bananas are." 016

In summary, this story highlights the low priority of certain crops compared to others (e.g. maize or tobacco) to the national government and the low levels of awareness of many respondents regarding the issue. Respondents who were farmers were the only people to mention BBTD, and vendors mentioned that the bananas being sold were from Tanzania but did not state why they thought that was so.

4.3.3 Outcome: Protein Bottlenecks

Most respondents remarked on the ease of accessing *relish* – greens or vegetables for meals at the markets and street vendors. For multiple reasons, the more difficult food group to access was protein; all these reasons point to specific supply bottlenecks before the protein source enters Mzuzu's food system.

For meat, the bottleneck is the low capacity of Mzuzu's one abattoir in comparison to the growing demand in Mzuzu. Respondents noted that there is a higher demand than what the one abattoir and the one associated government veterinarian can provide. Respondents suggested the lack of national government capacity and funding towards the necessary staff and structures to increase abattoirs and abattoir output was a major impediment. The other issue is that of trust – respondents noted the newer concept of buying meat at ShopRite, and often how the meat will be older and rotten, and some did not trust the processes at the abattoir or market butchers, preferring to buy at ShopRite or PTC. The processors noted that the physical infrastructure and reliability of processing was not supporting Mzuzu's demand for protein:

"Another challenge from this is processing and trading help for farmers. There is no manufacturing in Mzuzu. If the government is in support of machinery, there would be support for entering the market – those things are not here." 085

The market butcher also is a venue to another type of bottleneck in the form of demand from *susa* sellers – mostly young male informal vendors who walk around Mzuzu with a small charcoal burner and grilled meat sticks. They demand fatty meats for their product, with one butcher identified as

the preferred supplier. While often susa sellers are supportive of one another, a lack of supply can mean physical fights or grudges. Market butchers themselves travel to market auctions to decide on livestock and transport it back to the city – in this sense, the butcher association governs the informal import of red meat into the city – within each market they are reliant on each other's communication and agreement on products and prices. While there is solid cooperation in these relationships, the bottlenecks occur within market infrastructure such as the lack of sanitary facilities to increase the amount of meat available, as well as the low capacity to provide veterinary inspections at the abattoir.

Respondents in commercial and informal businesses noted the frequency of city and national government inspections, but little assistance in the form of improving infrastructure or processes that would create efficient market functions. One business, a national family-run restaurant, had streamlined their supply chain for all national restaurants to ensure a consistent supply of chicken and every ingredient in their recipes – all of which came from either South Africa or Lilongwe.

When discussing fish, respondents brought up the strong influence of weather on Lake Malawi on both the availability and price of fish in the city. The resulting fluctuations in supply could also cause consumer mistrust in the quality of some fish, creating a decrease in demand. Market vendors emphasized the importance of freshness to Mzuzu consumers, such as people preferring to buy live chickens or to know the days on which certain shops would procure fresh meat.

For dairy, commercial farmer respondents noted the high demand and low supply of dairy products in Mzuzu. A previous dairy processor in Mzuzu shut down in the late 2000s, leaving the wholesale supply of dairy products to be procured from Lilongwe. Any dairy farmers in the north were managing their sales through motorbike pickup to smaller processing at a farm outside of town, who then sold the milk to local urban institutions or contacts. Due to the small nature of the processor, payment for the raw milk could take over a month. These higher income farmers also noted the requirement for veterinarians to inspect meat and other animal products, but suggested they are looking into hiring their own veterinary consultants because of the low capacity of the national government to provide veterinarians and inspection services. Higher income farmers who could access the internet often used information from universities in Kenya to manage their farms and mentioned the need for Malawi's agricultural colleges to promote agricultural food value chain development, such as how farmers access processing capacity.

"In the past we used to have a dairy industry whereby people would come and sell their milk and we would actually have some dairy products. With a defunct dairy factory here, this is a challenge. The production is reduced and there is over-reliance for imported as well as they are produced from other areas." 001

"*we don't have milk in Mzuzu, we don't have cheese. We don't have even this surplus meat and what have you, so at least when Bunda [College] comes with their technology and what have you, some of the farmers will need some funding so that at least they come up with sustainable funding which is going to help us to build the city as it grows*" 029

4.4 Story #2 Discussion

These stories have highlighted the gap between high asset and low asset farmers in access to resources such as information, storage, access to assets, and processing capacity. This story has shown respondent's perspectives of the need for protein processing capacity in the Mzuzu region and the expectation of both city and national government to support more commercial levels of protein provision in the food value chain. Three major themes emerged from this story, corruption and the political manipulation of food, government capacity and decentralization, and inequality between suppliers of food to the urban food system.

4.4.1 Corruption and the Political Manipulation of Food

Among discussions from national government employees, CSOs, international aid, and academics, it was felt that the national Ministry of Agriculture, particularly the Crops Section, as well as elected officials prioritize certain crops over others for both well-intentioned and fraudulent reasons. These sentiments are not new; many authors have used different methodologies to correlate national government clientelism, neopatrimonialism, maize price manipulation, and local food insecurity (Jayne et al., 2010; Daka, 2013; Holden & Lunduka, 2013; Phiri & Edris, 2013; Phiri, 2016; Riley & Chilanga, 2018; Dulani, 2019; Fuje & Pullabhotla, 2020; Tengatenga & Soyiyo, 2020). Respondents felt both national governance actions and inactions have a large influence on maize prices in urban markets.

This dissertation correlates respondents' perspectives with previous findings of the dominance of maize in the food system and adds nuance to the discussion, suggesting that urban markets that service the majority of Mzuzu's lower income population are more susceptible to price manipulation by politicians, middlemen and vendors. Sassi (2015) found that national governance actions around maize trade (such as when export bans are implemented or not, the lack of enforcement around bulk

buying, and minimum prices announced by ADMARC) incentivize wholesalers to hold back and then release stocks, both reinforcing and causing volatility in maize prices, especially in urban markets. Export bans have also been found to benefit the urban non-poor over the rural poor by misdirecting agricultural investments and encouraging hoarding (Edelman & Baulch, 2016).

I assert that the urban wealthy are not as affected by maize price fluctuations by growing their own maize, farming on rented customary land (Jayne et al., 2010), being able to afford the price increases, or by accessing rural areas to buy directly from farmers. This conclusion emerges from the higher-income respondents that mentioned how often they rent land to farm on their own, and how they do not access local markets for maize or other staples. This is supported by work from Tione and Holden (2020) and Abay et al. (2021) showing increasing land prices around urban centers in southern Africa, often owned and farmed by high income urban residents. In addition, the study by Riley et al. (2018) found that 61% of the wealthy population in Mzuzu practice farming outside of the city, suggesting that farming is a function of wealth and assets.

My findings add to the work of Ochieng et al. (2019) that states that Malawi's maize market is pyramidal – oligopolistic at the top and highly competitive at the bottom. I agree that the very bottom of the pyramid is highly competitive between vendors, and potentially exploitative to the small-scale farmer – what requires further attention in governance are the interactions between vendors, the large-scale traders, middlemen, and the "top" of the maize market, highlighted by respondents from this study.

"Sometimes the government controls price but indirectly, you know vendors who happen to be the agents of big politicians still buy from the farmers at low price and then comes at a certain point, the same government will say now we can export, giving those big wigs opportunity to sell [to a] better market outside." 026

A possible indicator of these connections and increasing competition in the 'bottom' of the maize market is a recent report on unregulated trading in urban centers, and that more traders are "treating agriculture like a business" (CfSC, 2020; Mkweu, 2020), resulting in price volatility outside of the typical hungry season. In September 2020, maize prices increased by 22% in Malawi's three largest cities (including Mzuzu), the highest rates in the country (CfSC, 2020). Calls for tighter national government controls on trading continue, as does the selling of crops to private vendors for lower

than government-set prices, particularly in the northern and central regions where there is less government purchases and more private vendor purchases (Chimjeka, 2021).

The national government, aware of the problem of 'hungry season,' specifically formed the Green Belt Initiative to create more commercial, large-scale forms of agriculture through irrigation along Lake Malawi. The concept is to increase the supply of maize in hungry season to therefore mitigate the price increases over the annual cycle. The introduction of maize in "off-seasons" is intended to lower prices and decrease their volatility, however the recent rises in maize prices suggest that increasing availability of maize may not provide the solution to hoarding.



The case of Tanzanian bananas presents the link made by respondents between the national government's distracted and dominating focus on maize and the low prioritization of other crops or structures of the food system. In the case of Tanzanian bananas, Mikwamba, Dessein, and Kambewa (2020) suggest that the lack of regulatory focus on BBTD is due to the status of bananas as an orphan crop – neglected by policy makers, NGOs, and government for the sake of more prolific or short-term gain crops. They found that blocks to communication, clientelism in FISP distribution, and a lack of trust between government extension officers and farmers created a major impediment to banana farming in southern Malawi.



A large partnership established in late 2019 between the Malawian government, the European Union (EU), and the FAO is meant to revitalize the banana industry across the country over five years. This partnership demonstrates the possible shifting of structures and processes amongst international aid and the new national government. Interactions between international aid and the Malawian national government can move between cooperative to highly contentious, dancing around cultural values and priorities (Resnick, 2012; Wroe, 2012; Strasser, 2016; Banik & Chasukwa, 2019). Respondents, especially from CSOs, felt international aid was playing a double-edged role, in that development agencies, to ensure that aid programs reach the Malawian citizen must play the game with the national government of the day to ensure that they can stay and help, which means at times turning a blind eye to corruption within the national government, such as clientelism or nepotism. They felt that aid agencies are 'stuck' in a relationship with the national government and it therefore taints aid agencies as corrupt as well.

Respondents outside of the national government felt that large, commercial-based agricultural aid reinforces the system that enables corruption in the national government, repeating the faults with historical agricultural input programs. CSO respondents listed multiple consequences of this relationship, including rural bias, as these areas counted for more votes, and that development

money funneled through the national government is targeted towards areas consistent with the ethnicity or families of the ruling parties.

The governance of international aid in Malawi also presents ideological and political challenges when it comes to urban food security. One international aid consultant noted with frustration their own lack of power to influence the norms, assumptions, and discourse about development within home country governments, such as the belief that food security is solved through increasing rural agricultural production but not through support of the government bureaucracy or infrastructure of the urban food value chain. This assumption was posited as one of the reasons it was so easy for the Malawian national government to keep development aid focused on agricultural production.

"It's much easier to say I'm working with these poor peasants [rather than urban market development] and it sells better [to governments in the home country]" 039

The national government was identified as the organization most able to influence food prices, especially maize prices. Respondents noted that the authoritarian control in the days of Kamuzu Banda were better in terms of food prices and accessibility, and that national government actions now are more prone to corruption and negative impacts on prices and food trade. Discussions of times under Banda also raised historical concepts such as colonization, in that some respondents commented on maize being a non-native crop, and how the influence of cultural hierarchies, colonization and then authoritarianism influenced Malawians' culture to not challenge authority and to not deviate from norms – hence respondent's suggestions for why corruption, especially around maize, is endured by Malawians.

"The fear, yes, but I think gradually that is fading away now because we are coming from a very serious dictatorship. Until 1994 we were in a dictatorial regime and people are still you know, I mean transitioning from that phase, and we live in a culture where sometimes you are not allowed to question decisions made by elders or people – sometimes they do suffer in silence." 023

4.4.2 Government Capacity and Decentralization

The theme of capacity in formal governments was often raised by all levels of respondents and included city, regional, and national levels. To respondents, capacity included discussions of numbers of people, funding, and skills. Capacity is tied closely with corruption because people felt that they both contributed to low levels of government services, but also because they felt

corruption could cause low capacity in governments. They also felt that due to the secrecy around corrupt practices, they could never be certain which was which.

The concept of decentralization emerged from policies to reduce centralized power in African governments in the 70s and 80s, consistent with international aid strategies to 'democratize' and spread power away from single, national leaders (Dickovick, 2014). Despite the value of decentralization being agreed to in principle and policies and strategies written, often in reality the practice is hedged or undercut to ensure true power remains at the national level (Boone, 2003; Stren, 2019).

Respondents echoed these sentiments from the literature by commenting on the "incomplete" or intentionally partial decentralization. This 'partial policy' was positioned by national government, city government, aid, and CSO groups as a negative influence on the ability of the national government and city governments to implement their programming. Many departments at all levels noted the difference in funding between sections in national government departments, such as the large amounts of funding flowing through the Crops section of the Department of Agriculture to the detriment of other sections who were underfunded and understaffed. Respondents linked this chronic lack of capacity to the 'low flow' or 'slow flow' of funding from central government accounts, remarking on the time it takes to receive funds as well as the amounts needed and budgeted versus the amounts received.

International aid respondents tied the poor implementation of the 1998 Decentralization Policy, meant to devolve administration and political authority to the district level, to low capacity and a lack of funds at lower levels of governance. Other respondents alluded to the strength of norms associated with centralized, national government control and named it as a barrier to decentralization and funding flowing to district levels. For example, the norm of national government central control was also used to explain how simple changes to import and export permits from one office in Lilongwe to regional offices enabled improved trade and unblocked a large impediment to food system transformation. One respondent mentioned that it is easier for aid agency representatives to suggest changes in bureaucracy as there is little internal willingness to break cultural norms and 'challenge authority' by suggesting solutions and taking initiative.

"To get something to change you have to go to the top – people within the country's governments will not take things up to management or feel [they] will endure consequences if they take initiative." 038

Respondents from international aid acknowledged both the complex nature of development governance and their own role in its creation. One respondent commented on the burden aid agencies create on national government capacity, and the need for development agencies to acknowledge their role in low government performance. They noted that government employees are incentivized by high sitting fees (often higher than monthly salaries) to attend workshops that provide reportable outcomes for development agencies instead of the government, disabling the work that local public servants do for development, including urban infrastructure and food supply management.

The lack of implementation of national policy was a further frustration for international aid respondents, with praise for the level and quality of the written policies and strategies such as the national export strategy funded by the United Nations Development Programme. Respondents pointed to issues of capacity to implement policies – both in human resources and the flow of resources to lower levels of government. The visions for rural-urban co-development exist in high

level policy but the government's capacity to institute these changes is "*not there yet*" (034, 031, 047). One respondent noted that the norm of aid agencies to be project-driven instead of strategy-driven exacerbates problems in implementation. For example, the World Bank Agriculture Commercialization Project was initiated in 2017, with one respondent stating in 2018 *"we're really in the 'figuring out what we're going to do' stage...technically we are in implementation...."* 003. The project's implementation was officially launched in January 2020 (FBA, 2020).

The capacity of ADMARC to purchase and store crops was questioned by many, again in the context of confusion between capacity and corruption. ADMARC's reach into northern rural areas is limited, and respondents remarked on the poor timing of buying, often because of the lack of funding. In the past, as the sole purchaser of maize, the para-statal agency had enough power and funding to reach farmers. Since the 1990s, the agency relies on lower levels of government funding and capacity (Kumwenda & Madola, 2005), limiting is ability to *"compete in a liberal market society"* 027. Again, the topic of middlemen taking advantage of the low national government capacity arose in these discussions. To add to this, a respondent mentioned that many of the ADMARC market locations (where farmers would bring their goods to sell) had dramatically decreased since the 1990s, especially in the rural areas, essentially 're-centralizing' operations (Kutengule et al., 2006). This focuses sales in fewer spots across the country, and respondents felt this enabled private middlemen to be the sole accessing party to many rural areas, especially those farther afield.

"They also take advantage ... if they know that ADMARC has run out of buying cash, they set their own prices lower than the ones which are offered by ADMARC. So they [middlemen] take advantage of the situation whereby ADMARC has got a problem." 027

The story of Tanzanian bananas illuminates both sides of the middleman role as perceived by respondents– to fill gaps in the food system as they arise, provide market and street sellers with produce for consumers, but also an unregulated role resulting in poor outcomes for Malawian farmers. Responsibility for managing BBTD was targeted at the national and regional governments, but respondents felt that middlemen played a role in spreading the virus and the government had limited capacity to not only regulate them but to aid banana farmers.

The protein bottlenecks described in the last section of this story demonstrate how respondents felt regarding government responsibility and the capacity to either provide resources or enable

businesses to function efficiently in Mzuzu's food system. In particular, the city government was singled out by vendor respondents as not having either the willingness or capacity to move past enforcement actions into providing or subsidizing market infrastructure, such as abattoirs or dairy processing plants, and being transparent with its use of market fees.

Physical infrastructure was often mentioned as a limitation to business growth. Most vendors remarked on the quality of roads both within and outside of the city as impacting their profits. Many people indicated that the regular 'brown-outs' caused a lack of consistent energy provision and was a major impediment to market infrastructure such as cold storage for protein sources or food processing. One quarter of the total respondents noted energy access and energy consistency as an impediment to business operations and the local economy. These mentions were linked to national government capacity to manage the issue, as well as corruption in contract purchases of diesel generators and poor planning of hydroelectric energy provision.



4.4.3 Land Governance, Urban Inequality, and Farmer Inequality

Respondents, some of them urban formal workers who farm, mentioned the ability of well-off urban dwellers to bypass the more expensive urban markets and directly access rural areas to buy bulk maize at the farmgate, using cars and savings that the urban poor do not have. Some respondents also felt the tendency of the urban middle to upper classes to rent and farmland outside of the city limited people in the peri-urban areas in accessing rural land to farm, making them rely further on economic access to food or on precarious work on these farms. CSO respondents

especially felt that national and regional food security plans and policies missed these processes and were the most aware of growing inequality in the city.

Land inequality is a noted issue in Malawi, with a 'land access' Gini coefficient measured at 0.523 in 2011, which was worse than the existing income inequality at the time (Mussa & Masanjala, 2015). This correlation between land use by the higher income levels of urban residents and their bypassing of urban maize markets adds to the findings of Mussa (2014) who noted the Malawian maize poverty penalty had less to do with seasonality and more to do with the poor's inability to buy in bulk, either in urban or rural markets. This research suggests the possibility that the poverty penalty, as described by Mendoza (2011) and Attanasio & Frayne (2006) can extend to land access and an exacerbation of a reliance on the poor's economic access to food. This reliance on economic access, combined with precarious work, could then exacerbate the poverty penalty further, especially as official measures of poverty in Malawi "do not control for the fact that maize prices are income dependent," therefore missing this impact on poverty levels (Mussa 2014, p. 12), especially in an urban setting where maize prices are the most expensive and volatile (CfSC, 2020).

"... if you drive not far from Mzuzu maybe 50 kilometers outside, you see very good crops. They're not farmers crops. It's people working in Mzuzu. Renting land and growing their own crops. Just like our family we don't buy maize we don't buy because we have our own farm at home, so we cultivate and just bring those things here. So a lot of people who have a bit of money, that's how they live. So you go around you think farmers are doing very well when it's not farmers." 021

The agency gap between high asset farmers and low asset or subsistence farmers continues with the gap in ability to access markets within the city. Whereas some small-scale vendors took it upon themselves to travel and buy wholesale from farmers, the large-scale farmers with trucks, personal connections to larger businesses, their own transport, and electronic communication were more able to sell a larger amount of goods to formal, regulated businesses and institutions. Few programs, both government and private, target famers in the north of the country, with one private enterprise respondent noting that they have no extension officers in the northern area because of the low population density around their shops.

Regarding farming knowledge, farmers who could not access the internet relied upon community and traditional knowledge but noted a lack of assistance and information from the government,

especially from extension services or farm businesses that focused on the south. When extension services were provided, farmers felt it was not enough, co-operative meetings took up too much time, or that other farmers did not accept the proposed practices. The farming community was positive about their relationships with each other, and one high-asset farmer noted how he works with both other high-asset farmers in Mzuzu and with farmers near the village where his farm is located. This statement reiterates the documented dependence of extension services on the 'lead farmer' model in Malawi, (Khaila et al., 2015) even in the informal sense that relies on the good will of highly informed urban-based farmers.

"We should be talking more... I don't participate in meetings, you know. I mentioned some friends whom I discuss prices [and] agricultural methods...and we work together we watch the prices. We provide services to each other...that's in Mzuzu. In the rural area [at the farm] where I spend most of my time I share notes with the villagers. I check what they're doing. I ask them why they're doing what they're doing. I say why don't you follow my farming methods. Some don't think I'm doing the right thing. My farming methods are a bit weird. And then when our crop is very good they come they said but you're doing the wrong thing and yet your crops are so good. Some will copy. So some people copy what we're doing and they come and ask questions. We share information. My approach to agriculture and living in a community is just share as much information as I can. And also I learn from others. But then I am lucky I learn from others here in Malawi. Then I learn from others in other countries, right? I think that's the advantage that I have." 016

This story contributes to our understanding of urban food governance in relation to food supply to Mzuzu. The implications of these points to the literature on food governance is the potential underestimation of national governance actions on urban food systems. The 'ideal' regional food system is impacted by corruption in the maize production and supply and manipulation of maize stocks – productive farmers therefore exclude themselves from the maize market, while lower income farmers are frustrated by low farm gate prices and poor access to both markets and information. It is also impacted by low capacity in crop disease management, as well as low formal communication to farmers of all income levels and a reliance on the good will and knowledge of lead or high asset farmers. High asset farmers are shown to have the agency (money, education) to access resources inside and outside of national systems, relying on cooperation with each other which improves their success as vendors in the city. Respondents in these stories saw the low levels of processing infrastructure and inconsistent energy supply impacting all types of farmers and food wholesalers and they related this to the low levels of accessible protein in the city.

4.5 Story #3 – Food Insecurity from Environmental Shock

In April 2016, floods and landslides impacted 15 neighbourhoods in Mzuzu, killing 7 people and displacing 19,000. Most areas impacted were informal settlements, made more vulnerable through unplanned, precarious housing and a lack of water and sanitation management (Kita, 2017). This story describes the longer-term repercussions of the floods with respect to the urban food system, and the perceived ties between food security and land management in Mzuzu from people in different governance levels.

Except for one national government respondent, the topic of the Mzuzu flood was only raised by those in city government, formal business, or local CSOs, and amongst these respondents it was a common topic. Market and street vendors did not raise this issue. Regarding the perceived cause of the flood, respondents who mentioned a cause pointed to the low levels of planning, the cultivation practices in unplanned areas that are either too wet or too steep, urbanization rates causing the proliferation of informal settlements in 'risky' areas, and a city government that is overwhelmed by the number of unplanned developments.

"But also this dambo (wetland), like because of health habits people are focusing so much on the vegetables that there is a lot of cultivation. The implication that it has led to some degradation of land. In the city you get a lot of floods – people are cultivating anywhere...it means the siltation along the river, siltation siltation siltation, but why are they cultivating? Because there is so much demand in the city for vegetables, because the population going up so it is causing one thing over the other." 018

Government respondents voiced frustration at the low levels of funding provided to the longer-term recovery of flood-hit areas, and how even reactive funding seems to be taken from existing urban planning funds.

"*And the other problem has been to the infrastructure in the city. You find that most of the buildings is just burnt bricks, but they built with mud. Yeah, then during rainy season, buildings collapse. Instead of the government bringing in money that would maybe help us build clinics, schools and what have you, they bring us relief to those whose houses have fallen off or been damaged by floods… there isn't enough funds that we can use to actually rebuild those houses for the people properly.*" 029

"So we've reviewed and have a discussion with them if we finalize the final activities that can be done and can be supported and then we're going to provide some resources. It may not be adequate but maybe some kind of start up a kind of resources that they could use to implement those interventions." 045

Reactive food assistance was also a major governance topic regarding the flood. The limited existing urban programming was characterized as reactionary and dominated by faith-based CSOs. CSO respondents stated that the most prominent urban food governance exists in the form of direct assistance or enforcement once a problem has presented itself. Respondents noted most assistance came in the form of direct, *"one-off"* (038) food assistance after a disaster or during the 'hungry' season.

"Food security in Mzuzu, we seem to… we haven't done that thinking to say there has got to be thinking of food in the urban areas they have got to be food secure, we haven't done that. Unless they are hit by an emergency or a disaster. That one we can initiate to assist." 030

In contrast to the rural areas, the urban area has a larger rental housing stock, some of which are in unplanned areas but owned by higher income people living off site. As the city policy is to assist the *owner* in rebuilding elsewhere in the event of a disaster, this left the many low-income renters without assistance. To resolve this, the city, through discussions of the Town and Country Planning Committee, interacted with the national Ministry of Lands to acquire new land to relocate low-income residents. These residents mostly did not move, citing the distance from the city center where many of them sell informal goods, or that they have urban gardens in their proximity.

Some respondents also felt that the flood victims would use their limited agency to not move locations, perceiving them as taking advantage of the lack of capacity and/or willingness in the city government to enforce relocation, staying in higher-risk areas to receive government assistance or be closer to where they worked. The lack of willingness of people to relocate suggested that a move to the outer reaches of the city would decrease the flood-impacted residents' ability to make money in the informal economy, especially as many street vendors venture to the center of town for the evening market from lower income areas in the city – moving increases their time spent travelling and heightens the risks taken by traveling after sundown.

"A piece of land was identified within the city boundaries in conjunction with the city council and it was surrendered to the so that they can relocate the flood victims...Unfortunately people did not relocate. They are still residing in such

flood prone areas. So many were reluctant to relocate for so many reasons. Some were citing it is very far from the city, some are tied to tribe things and the like. Almost the majority refused to relocate. Then it's the Mandate of the city councils to enforce that one. Other than the national government (Lands Dept) just played the role for providing that land. So if we have other disasters this year they might be affected too." 040

"But in Masasa they are on steep slopes. There is no method for contouring. So we find that the whole layer just wash down, and they are told to move they will not move. Because they know next they will give money to rebuild." 021

"*When people need assistance and people are being advised by government, they should heed advice, such as in the Mzuzu floods. However people chose to stay there and receive help. People need to stand and love our country – if you love your country, then work for it.*" 085

4.6 Story #3 Discussion

Three themes emerged from this story of the impacts of flooding on Mzuzu's urban food system: urban environmental shocks as a new concept to aid and food security, urban inequality, and complex land management and planning.

4.6.1 Urban environmental shocks as a new concept in food security

Urban environmental shocks such as floods are increasing, catching many governments unprepared and looking for sustainable solutions to food security in these conditions (Tiraieyari & Krauss, 2018; UNDRR, 2020). For cities dealing with rapid or unplanned urbanization, the risk of disaster is exacerbated by climate change-induced extreme weather events and development in high-risk areas by low-income residents, such as slopes and floodplains (Campbell-Lendrum & Corvalán, 2007; Hardoy & Pandiela, 2009; Baker, 2012; Santos & Leitmann, 2016). In addition, preventing settlement of these areas requires consistent enforcement, for which many governments do not have the budget or capacity (Winkler & Satterthwaite, 2017; UNDRR, 2020). Molinari et al., (2015) found a compounded effect on developing cities; disasters that are brought on by impacts from climate change and urbanization can effectively erode the financial investment and social expenditures necessary to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, catching cities in a vicious cycle of spending on short-term needs instead of long-term goals. This combination of low budget levels, climate change, and urbanization also magnifies inequalities in urban areas, reflecting this inequality in food security levels (Joshua et al., 2021).

Different levels and types of governance had differing responses to the Mzuzu floods. Aid response came in the form of the Red Cross and local CSOs and NGOs. In terms of direct response, urban areas are more difficult to respond to; often these organizations rely on rural infrastructures (cultural and physical) to disseminate information and resources to those who need it. In the urban areas there is low institutional aid capacity (the Red Cross Mzuzu office was poorly staffed and then closed at the time of interviewing) and a low capacity of city councillors or local representatives to deal with the higher numbers of affected people in the event of an environmental shock. Malawi's national government response to urban shocks is reactive and bureaucratic, particularly in smaller urban centers (Manda & Wanda, 2017). Government responses ensure plans are in place to deal with future disasters, but little is provided in terms of direct funding to prevent future disasters (Kita, 2017). This is reflected in this respondent's comments about budgets and policy choices:

"In terms of what happens after the response phase, these are some of the measures that are taken. In other cases we came up with a recovery framework, like when we had the floods in 2015, the national government came up with a flood recovery framework. So there was a post disaster needs assessment. And then after the post-disaster needs assessment a report was done and then a recovery framework was developed." 045

Respondents cited the lack of city governance resources to respond to the flood, but also highlighted the positive effect and importance of multi-stakeholder governance structures such as the Town and Country Planning Committee in identifying the many needs of people after the floods. The major issue identified by this committee was that of land ownership and consideration of the needs of those renting the land; why they reside in those areas, how more affluent owners came to build on these lands, and how disasters will impact the needs of renters. A review of the literature finds a focus on the impacts of urban disasters on peri-urban populations focus on water, sanitation, and food access (Joshua et al., 2021), however fewer studies have assessed the cultural and employment needs in the spatial planning of the city (Mitlin, 2005).

Considerations when environmental shocks occur often include food security, income needs, and housing. Joshua et al. (2021) advocates for a foundation of urban food security data to improve responses to poor urban households after extreme events. The case of Mzuzu's floods and resulting governance responses also shows that understanding food security levels and knowing the context of urban space is essential to applying proper policy in the wake of environmental shocks. It is important to not only understand the shock's impact on foods security levels, but also the reasons

for the 'pre-shock' urban spatial form. For example, the proximity to informal work was a dominant reason provided as to why victims of the flood would not relocate. Informal work often requires access to those with formal work in areas where low-income residents cannot afford to live, requiring daily travel. Distance is a major impediment to urban opportunities such as employment (Mitlin, 2005; UNHABITAT, 2008) and Mzuzu's floods provide an example of how climate change and environmental shocks can exacerbate this impediment. An understanding of this requirement may have adjusted the policy response of the committee to one that enabled low-income residents to access their areas of work. Urban areas with high rates of informal employment, especially when much of the informal work is within the food system, are likely more vulnerable to food insecurity from environmental shocks.

Respondents suggested that further cultural and economic factors contributed to the outcomes of residents remaining in high-risk areas. The lack of city councillors from 2006-14 increased reliance on traditional chiefs of areas inside the urban boundary and in the peri-urban spaces. These chiefs are often associated with certain ethnic groups, and respondents suggested that tribal allegiance and cultural assemblages may be one of the reasons people do not want to relocate to a different area. Malawi has a historical urban framework of spatial segregation, however documented along races (Caucasian, Indian, and African) and has since narrowed from ethnic groups to families, especially in the urban areas (Chome, 2002; Mwathunga & Donaldson, 2021). If this assumption is correct, cultural groups, or peer groups can ameliorate the feeling of risk in times of stress. Economically, it was suggested that low-income residents in high-risk areas are willing to endure higher risk for both the ease of accessing work areas as well as assuming that they will receive assistance after any extreme shock, such as a flood.

The existing city policies to assist landowners with rebuilding in the event of an environmental shock shows the heavy reliance on city government and the lack of other structures that may take monetary pressure off the city. For example, rates of homeowner insurance are very low due to a lack of trust in the institution and high premiums (Tembo, 2010; Manda, 2014). This leaves the city 'on the hook' for assisting landowners to rebuild, repeating the issue with disaster aid where higher-income groups can capture resources (Pelling, 2012). In Mzuzu's case, the floods revealed many issues with land encroachment by higher-income people who build low-income rental properties often without proper permits, renting them to low-income residents. The existing policy ended up prioritizing higher-income residents who had essentially broken the rules. This is again where multi-

level governance, in the form of the Town and Country Planning Committee, identified an issue – the appropriateness of the existing policies to aid landowners – and shifted aid towards low-income residents. However, city government respondents stated that shifting policy to prevent high income residents from further building on unapproved areas would be more challenging.



Figure 4-5 Flow chart of governance and local resident decision-making in response to urban flooding

4.6.2 Inequality in Governance and Policy Implementation

Urban environmental shocks have different consequences depending on the income levels of residents. As shown in the above theme, even solutions can be burdensome on the poor, such as moving further away from employment areas. In Mzuzu, this solution combined with struggling

satellite markets and a preference for the central market is an additive burden on the income-generation of the low-income residents.

Urban policies around land tenure and infrastructure are intended to attract wealth and build the economy of the city, and therefore are preferential to high-income people. Respondents remarked on the consequences of these unwritten preferences, resulting in the phenomenon of 'urban to urban' flight, where high income residents are fleeing the congestion and high prices of the two primary cities for lower costs of living and doing business in Mzuzu. This is creating a large demand for land, decreasing land plot size and increasing prices. The 2018 Afrobarometer statistics shows how perspectives of northern Malawian residents reflect the quotes below, as a majority (80%) of respondents felt it likely that a rich person could pay a bribe to register land that is not theirs (Afrobarometer, 2021).

"*Mzuzu City they say is cheap, and business is not yet at that level of competition as it is in the other cities. So when they come with a million from Blantyre, they can do some business, but when you have got a million project in Blantyre, you can't do much business, so you find people at that level they are also coming not only this lower income as we were talking from other cities but also people well-to-do who are coming for higher quality of life. And if you look also we also talked about Mzuzu as a fast infrastructure low income city. You'll be surprised that most of the infrastructure is being built by people from the major cities.*" 033

"*Yes, it's complicated. You [interviewer] may easily acquire land than myself. Because just looking at you they will say "no no no no give her, she will develop something for us." Because the idea is that well, these [high-income] guys will go and develop something. Rather than giving it to a Malawian who will go farming it and use it for foodstuff for him and his family. So it's complicated to get a piece of land.*" 048

"Yeah, this part of the country. We as I said as you can even see, we still have what you call, intact nature, the nature is still there. The environment is cool. The water is fresh. It's not as densely populated as Blantyre or Lilongwe. The population is said to be 250,000. If people in the north go hungry, it is not because of the environment. If the people in the north go hungry it is because of the poor systems that we have." 041

"The Land Allocation System is discriminatory – the weak and poor cannot access the system because the system has too many steps and it increases someone's cost through economic cost as well as time." 079

Urban agriculture is zoned to provide for business and not focused on households; zoned urban agriculture is also targeted towards those with assets to develop and provide for the city. Urban agriculture on housing lots is officially discouraged but not enforced, and most residents would prefer to grow food but lack the land and resources to do so (Riley et al., 2018). Applications for formal urban agriculture are rarely requested, perhaps due to available, cheaper land in the outlying areas or the lack of assets amongst those who would like to engage in urban agriculture. Much of the informal urban agriculture outside of housing plots is unplanned, small-scale, and thought to cause issues of erosion and pollution in the city.

Yeah. It's almost reactive because the meeting, like the Town planning committee meetings, technical committee meetings, they normally scrutinize the development applications, whether they can grant approvals or rejection or deferrals and the like, so they are mostly reactive and at times they normally react when something is wrong... "somewhere it's happening like this. What is happening. Can we stop them?' and the like. You see as we go to the University, on the left somebody was building a brick wall fence on waterlogged soil." 040

To organize urban agriculture that takes place in "unused areas" (079) such as ditches or green spaces, one CSO works with city government to ensure proper management of these areas and build assets of low-income urban residents, acting as an intermediary between city council and urban farmers. This program is small but provides a pre-emptive bridge for low-income urban farmers to engage with formal city governance, practice improved agriculture, and engage in small business sales.

4.6.3 The Governance of Complex Land Management and Planning

Discussions of food security in the city often centered around the ability to produce food in the city as discussed above in Theme 2, as well as the complication arising from multiple landlords, governance coordination and uneven power structures between government levels to manage urbanization rates and the resulting food production activities. Much of the responsibility for the existing state of land management was placed on the city government:

"*So the city has to control, because this is the land within their vicinity, they have to control development. But sometimes there is laissez-faire approach, such that the land is just being encroached due to lack of coordination, lack of enforcing the laws that are there. Yeah, so there is lack of coordination. That has also contributed to squatting to encroachments on public land. At times lack of coordination with the utility providers, the people who have encroached*

on public land you go there, you find that that person has been connected with electricity, with water and the like. So there is such coordination, so such tendencies encourage the encroachers to continue doing that." Anon.

The rate of urbanization is putting intense pressure on Mzuzu city government to adapt quickly, but the speed at which money flows between government levels, if at all, and the time for permits to be provided are key impediments to urban planning. The rates of urbanization and need for housing overwhelm the city's low capacity to both provide permits and enforce municipal development laws:

"*The delay for compensation* [for rebuilding or adjusting land tenure]*, because normally we depend on headquarters to provide us funding for compensation then the headquarters itself, it doesn't have its own funds, it's the Treasury that has to provide that funding. Then at times it takes too long for the Treasury to release the funds, by the time the funds are released then the area is heavily encroached, such that you will find no longer have… we can no longer have roads on that piece of land. So we just give up."* Anon.

Respondents remarked that this situation is well-known to residents and that they would build knowingly without permits, knowing that the city government will likely adapt to their structures instead of forcing them to relocate. The lack of control over the rate and quantity of unplanned settlement in Mzuzu are overwhelming the city government to the point where they plan around these informal settlements. The solution in both cases is often to adapt – sometimes changing land designations or adjusting land plots to provide infrastructure for the newly built structures rather than destroying property and creating an untenable situation that would create food insecurity and conflict. In a similar urban scenario, Kihato et al. (2013) found that when urban land markets overwhelmed the city bureaucracy in Maputo, that residents created their own relatively functional local practices that were well-organized and eventually folded into municipal policies and management if they *looked* formal enough and could fit into modern urban forms. How this shifting of municipal policy around land tenure in Mzuzu affects food system outcomes is not fully known, but links to land ownership and proximity to locations where informal sellers can access many customers is important.

"*So the locals take advantage then they squat on that piece of land. At times, we can have the land that has already been encroached. We normally undertake the assessment and the like, but for us to affect the actual permit it takes time. So by the time we are ready for that piece of land to be allocated, then we find that it is heavily encroached and it can't allocated to the prospective developers anymore.*" 040

The issue of modernism and shifting jurisdictions arose in multiple interviews that cited the move from traditional chiefs to the formal and democratically elected governance structure within the urban limits. A recent widening of city limits integrated outlying areas into the formal urban governance structure, creating confusion and conflict over land use rights (Muriaas, 2009; Chasukwa et al., 2014). This issue of traditional chiefs permitting structures outside of the city bureaucracy was noted by respondents in the city government as an added contributor to urban planning woes, especially as the chiefs were the few with authority during the time there were no city elections in Malawi from 2006-2014. City official respondents noted their time spent on educating chiefs about land rights and urban management policies, and indicated things were improving now that the city population has had the experience of electing and interacting with city councillors. Once more, the Town and Country Planning Committee, made up of national, regional, and city government, as well as utilities managers and academics, played a key communicative and facilitating role in addressing these issues.

4.7 Story #4 – Economic Stress: "There is Food There is No Money"

The most common refrain for any respondent from a middle class or low-income background when describing Mzuzu's food system was "there is food, there is no money." This was such a common sentiment that it became its own theme within the analysis of the interview data; this story is mostly told through the direct quotes from respondents.

"If you don't have money, you are not going to eat." 036

"So if you don't have money, it's not easy for you to have food." 014

"The hunger that we have in the city is much big, many people they have it because to us we don't have money." 002

"If you don't have money you cannot buy. That is why you are sleeping on empty stomach." 073

These types of statements emerged when respondents discussed three main topics: employment, personal responsibility, and the governance of the national and local economies. The discussion of this story explores the social, economic, and political forces behind these findings.

4.7.1 Governance Decisions and Urban Employment

When discussing the lack of money in the economy and its relation to Mzuzu's food system, some respondents pointed to the high levels of unemployment and the difficulties in achieving a level of income commensurate with raising a family in the city. Respondents related this problem to structural issues, namely national governance policies and decisions that impacted the level of employment in and around the city. One respondent discussed how national government policies and programs to encourage urban youth to embrace farming are impeded by export policies, frustrating any new farmers from entering the field.

"But there's so many people out there they have their papers, but they're not working because there is not enough job, and from there then it was like encouraged to start farming. If you do farming, you have crops, but there's no way to save it, because the government they cannot manage to buy everything from everyone. So it's like the government they are fed by everything, saying to sell maybe in Zambia or outside of Malawi. They say that you cannot sell your goods outside of Malawi without passing by government. If you pass by government, let's take a crop an amount of maybe 1 million [kwacha] you find that half a million will be for government, half a million will be for you." 014

Other impediments included high interest rates for entrepreneurship and a requirement for high-value assets.

"The cause of poverty in the city is job scarcity, a lack of capital or collateral to start businesses. Also, the banks are expensive for loans and expect large collateral like a deed. Therefore there are food problems. If you have money in the city you can have everything, money scarcity is the problem in not being able to get a balanced diet." 062

Government decisions on pensions were highlighted a few times from different respondents – they mentioned that the national government's decision to devalue the kwacha, while necessary for the economy, also devalued the buying power of pensions, as these were not equalized after the devaluation.

"After devaluation, some institutions did not adjust their retirement pensions – so elders are now left with the same numbers but with so much less." 015

"It was bad [the economic situation], but after devaluation things improved, drastically. So I think devaluation did help. No doubt about that." 049

Further, one respondent highlighted the propensity for retired employees to return as contractors, essentially filling up the formal employment spaces that should be available for newer employees.

"I mean, those people, the government again should think of them. Or maybe I mean advise them to retire so that youths can find jobs. I feel like it's good to make them retire so that those youths should take over... But now with the system the government has come up with is very bad because they tell them to retire, at first it was 50 and now they have increased to 60-65, but still now they don't retire, you find that they're still in the office on contract. You find that maybe in the company there are a lot of people on contract [who have already taken their pension] and then youths are staying there with their qualifications. I mean we're not helping the elderly, those who have retired because they eat their money without thinking. They hope that 'I'll be on contract so I'll continue working even if I spend my money unnecessarily, no problem. Yeah, I'll continue working I'll be paid month by month.'" 036

Over a third of respondents, mostly from within Mzuzu, were clear on their feelings about the supply of food into Mzuzu – that the diversity and amounts of available food were a strength of the urban food system, but the failings began when low-income people tried to access that food.

"Availability maybe food is available but then most of the people are poor to afford it. So there's always difficult to access it. So it is not just maybe from one angle to say okay. It's not just like increase supply, no." 026 (CSO employee)

"They still have hunger. Of course, maybe affordability to buy those produce is not there sometimes. But otherwise supply it's there, especially with the company ADMARC." 027 (National Government)

"*The food is available. It's the purchasing power that is the problem... As an urban area the biggest challenge is the family resource base. Actually the majority of the population actually living on or below the poverty line. So they might have the information on how to prepare nutritious meal, what they need to have, but the challenge comes in with the resources to actually acquire, so they go maybe for sweet potatoes or Maize and vegetables and dry fish. They cannot diversify much because that's what they can afford.*" 025 (City government)

"*Communities in Mzuzu, food might be accessible in the market, but it seems access is one of the major challenges where people find a variety of foodstuff but cannot access them because of their disposable income. So you find there are people who can afford to get whatever they want. And they are people can just watch and can't get much from the market."* 033 (Academic)

"The thing is the food system; the food is there...but the problem is money for them to acquire that food." 013 (Business owner)

"Food is available but what we lack is money." 054 (Market vendor)

"There is a lot of food there, but the problem is money to buy the food. But the problem is getting better comparing the other years." 074 (Vendor Association Representative)

Wages were discussed as a major factor in peoples' inability to afford food. Despite working for local businesses, many employees found themselves unable to afford life in the city. Because of the high demand for employment, those who were employed were hesitant to demand their labour rights, such as minimum wage.

"The economic level of the city is diverse, so not many people actually earn as much as is required to survive. Last time I checked, a family of five required around 90,000 kwacha a month, but the majority of the people actually earn on average 36,000." 025

"About 50% of the people in the city are actually living below the poverty line. That in itself is a big indicator as to how food secure we are as a city. We might have food at the market but people will be not able to purchase." 025

In the informal employment sphere, respondents alluded to the high levels of competition, the lack of formally employed people, and the resulting low profits in informal food sales.

"Someone bring his or her things here in town to sell, he or she will go back home without selling, the way she or he came it's the way they will go back home, they are not selling because money is scarce in town." 002

"Well the good thing with Mzuzu is that if people in the villages have got a lot of produce they cannot sell in those places because there's nobody who's buying from them. So you find that most of the people they carry their produce to the market here so supply in the markets is very high as supply comes higher the prices are usually very low; affordable prices are being offered." 027

4.7.2 Personal Responsibility

Respondents with higher incomes or formal employment were more likely to suggest that personal responsibility was a factor in food insecurity, influenced by factors such as education or cultural norms such as high amounts of spending for Christmas holidays.

"I do not blame somebody else if my family I have made it too big, if my family is so large like we have 10 members of the family which I'm supposed to feed and the earning power is so small, so it means I forgot to plan my family earlier on." 077

"And some of the farmers once they run out of their small amount of food which they produce, they spend most of their time working in farms of other people like us and then payment is just in terms of bucket of flour and then that's the way they live sometimes it becomes very difficult, instead of really working hard and taking this bucket of flour home they prefer to be given money and they drink as if the family is not suffering." 021A

"Some farmers some of them they know that even if I don't cultivate my farm, I will still get maize flour, whatever from government. So they are participating in meetings whatever so they can be registered that they have no food. So there's no spirit for hard work." 021B

"I think a huge part of the society of buying the wrong things, a different kind of food insecurity that maybe they have some means but they think they need this that or the other thing. Yah a lot of budgeting I always wonder you know, the pretty hair and pretty shoes and maybe malnourished kids. It's priorities or misunderstandings. Yeah, but I don't know for sure." 063

4.7.3 Economic Governance Decisions on the Food Economy of Mzuzu

The "flow" or "circulation" of money was a major concern for many respondents who mentioned the financial governance of public funding. Two respondents noted that the flow of money throughout the city, including their sales, was impeded by the national government not enabling cash flow to the city, and city governments not paying their employees. Market vendors suggested that the lack of money or the lack of an economy within the city was caused by the money being 'stuck' in the political capital, Lilongwe. One vendor noted that the city employees had not been paid for two months, and that meant they were not buying goods from the market, and subsequently vendors were not making sales. The money was essentially 'not moving around,' resulting in poor profits for vendors, who rely on daily profits to support their own food security and urban cost of living. Respondents pointed to corruption in the national government and the city government for this outcome.

"Like those who works with city haven't received their salary. The way they received in February, they have just received yesterday. They were struggling to find food since they had no money to buy food. Like maybe you have children, you have a house which needs rent, water bills need to be paid, what are children going to eat?" 070

"The business is not working. Because for the business to work is when people who have money are buying from us. But with the way our country is, it seems that the money is just in the government, people do not have money." 074

"So households like those ones their main focus is not production as such, their focus is on the city. So to those people if anything happens like when the circulation of money is not as good, then you get caught up in the situation where they may not have enough food." 012

The national government's 'laissez-faire' approach to middlemen and the assumed backroom deals by government officials with some larger middlemen were pointed to by respondents as impacting the overall economy, especially when the government was meant to implement policy that regulates maize prices. Instead, they felt government "higher-ups" ensured maize price hikes, upon which these middlemen 're-import' Malawian maize through corrupt government contracts. These price fluctuations impact not only the poor, but the farmers and informal sellers who need to make a profit from middlemen. One respondent related how price fluctuations decreases the willingness of large-scale financing institutions to support farmers to access finance prior to selling their crops. This lack of finance puts farmers at risk of needing to sell to middlemen for lower or close to production cost, leaving farmers in a vulnerable position and one where they are stuck in a cycle from which they cannot build assets – one respondent had left farming because of the nature of money flow and had found a job in the city, despite farming providing more income overall.

4.8 Story #4 Discussion

4.8.1 Governance and Accelerating Urban Inequality

The focus on urbanization in the new millennium has come from international agency reports as well as aid supported local reports on urbanization. These reports highlight the potential of cities to increase well-being through economic development (UN-HABITAT, 2011; World Bank, 2016; World Bank, 2017). The challenge for many cities is to manage the high urbanization rates and the subsequent rise in income inequality. Respondents at the city level voiced concerns over providing a city that is 'too attractive,' and that much of the rural migration is spurred by people who think there is formal employment available. Many scholars have theorized this phenomenon, such as Todaro and Harris' model of wage gaps between the urban and rural (Hatton & Williamson, 2019) and the attraction of the cities' improved living standards. The result, however, is often a population of productive people who find it difficult to pay the high costs of urban living while struggling in the informal economy (Jimu, 2008; Kita, 2017; Pickbourn, 2020), and an average of 65% of the world's urban population living in informal settlements (UNHABITAT, 2020).

Wages and employment in Mzuzu have not kept pace with the cost of urban living. This is a factor of increased competition in the labour market as well as national minimum wage policy – both its established rate as of 2021 – up to 50,000 MWK from the previous 35,000 MWK – and the lack of enforcement (Chisamba, 2021). Reports from the National Statistics Office and the Centre for Social Concern show the required income to support a family of six in Mzuzu in April 2018 to be approximately 160,000 MWK (CfSC, 2018). Notably, the amount is now 212,000 MWK in Mzuzu, not including school fees which can reach 150,000MWK per year (CfSC, 2021).

Detailed income levels in Malawi are often undisclosed in national statistics reports and difficult to find, especially in the informal sector (Tostensen, 2017), but national levels and GINI coefficients have been calculated through distributional national accounts. These calculations show that the top 1% of income earners own over 28% of the income wealth in the country, while the bottom 50% of income earners own just over 11% (WID, 2021). In direct income numbers, the top 1% averaged $47,000 USD/year, and the bottom 50% earn an average $400 per year (WID, 2021). On a national level, the income inequality GINI coefficient is higher in urban areas than rural (NSO, 2005; NSO, 2011; NSO, 2019; Tostensen, 2017).

"Well, if you look at the other side, they have the money – they can afford to buy KFC, they can afford to hire a maid and take care of the children. They can afford to get everything. That's why we see that the dynamics around the urban area is so skewed...to the extreme. So in terms of the food systems, I think I would say probably in urban areas it's a bit weak...unless if you have the resources where you could get food." 019

"However, depending on the food situation out there? Then it fluctuates. For example in 2015, I think, we had the flood. Maize was scarce. So the prices of maize actually went up to around 15,000 kwacha a 50 kg bag of maize. So that was way beyond the reach of the majority." 025

The phenomenon of the 'other' urban flight, that of high-income earners moving to smaller, less expensive cities like Mzuzu may also be a factor in growing income inequality. Respondents' previous comments about preferential treatment through the unwritten policy of providing land to those who have assets to develop it indicate that Mzuzu is a city where those with money are preferred.

"Mzuzu city being the remaining cheap city it is growing now and then. Lilongwe is very expensive, Blantyre the same so people are flocking here. People should be coming. The growth of the city is in people coming." 074

The combination of Mzuzu's geography, high competition in informal sales, and low infrastructure quality may add to the expenses of the poor. For example, vegetables for sale at the central market are significantly cheaper than those sold in satellite markets or within outer neighbourhoods like Mchengautuwa or Zolozolo (Figure 4-3). Road quality and transportation costs increase the price of goods available to those living in more informal settings; the choice is to either purchase transportation to buy goods in the center of town, or to pay the premium for local goods. Similar findings occur seasonally in varying maize prices and in the prices low-income earners pay for the same amount of maize. Mussa (2014; 2015) found that inequality measurements were underestimating inequality due to the uncalculated impact of price fluctuations of maize and the premium placed on smaller amounts of goods (Beck, 2015).

This study's interview responses, media articles, and local research have described the higher and higher fluctuations of maize prices, the diminishing services of satellite markets, low capacity to improve market and road infrastructure, and the increased cost of living in Mzuzu. The 'poverty penalty' indicated from the literature and statistics may increase as Mzuzu grows due to these potentially compounding factors.

I assert that the 'bright-lights' theory also applies to non-residents who sell food from the rural areas as well. The higher amount for produce provides many informal sellers with higher wages, however there is a limit to the number of sellers that one city can support. Mzuzu is likely an example of the rural-urban regional food system that functions well in productive capacity but requires regulation and capacity that enables food to be accessed in the city. A specific understanding of Mzuzu's rural-urban regional food system can further acknowledge the limits within the urban sphere brought about by income inequality. The draw of the bright lights of the city can also result in more rural districts unable to attract or even keep food within its boundaries if the promise of higher profits from the city are drawing food away from rural areas.

"We had the situation last year where even if you had money during the drought there was no food on the market. Malawi is a funny place where you can have neighboring districts, one district has an abundance of food of the other one has nothing." 031

Cities attract people who need to make money because cities often house the higher income earners. Vendors focused on the higher income from selling goods in Mzuzu as opposed to rural areas, despite the high amount of informal seller competition.

"I would say food security for Mzuzu City has been constant in the sense that we are normally on the safe side. Yeah, being a regional hub, food comes from all angles. So if everyone whenever he is, whether he's in Rhumpi, or Karonga or Chitipa, he will think of going to Mzuzu and sell his produce." 010

"Someone bring his or her things here in town to sell, he or she will go back home without selling, the way she or he came it's the way they will go back home, they are not selling because money is scarce in town." 002

Lipton's urban bias theory states that the shares of resources in urban settings are inequitable as compared to rural, and while Lipton recognizes the influence of economies of scale in urban areas, he also suggests that this is likely a choice of those in power (Christiaensen et al., 2016). At a national governance level, respondents noted that the delivery of social programming and government services is challenging due to the reliance on traditional structures that exist in rural areas – the chief and associated traditional committees that manage and understand their local population relay their needs to service providers. In the urban area, it was stated that urban services are delivered through a combination of regional and urban employees and locally elected representatives, often with a very low ratio of service provider to citizens that makes it difficult to provide services to all who need it (Makwero, 2018). Understandings of food insecurity rates in urban areas are often the result of residents engaging services themselves, such as health clinics and are therefore seen through the results of health statistics such as stunting. Therefore, those that are on the less severe scale of food insecurity may be missed, and the assumptions of donors and government officials are based in areas where counting is easiest – rural areas. This is an outcome of urban bias that may be overlooked.

Market vendors especially noted the lack of capacity at the government levels to manage high rapid urbanization, especially regarding infrastructure that serves the general population. This viewpoint is echoed as caveats in many of the international reports and guides, such as the World Bank's Malawi Urbanization Review: Leveraging Urbanization for National Growth and Development (2016) – "it is necessary to strengthen the capacity of urban local governments to generate revenues and meet the key infrastructure and service needs in urban areas, which remain challenging even at the current

rate of urbanization" (p. 1). Policy development at the urban level may improve if managers shift their perspective to managing risk in the sense of impacts to income, particularly in the informal sector. Dodman et al. (2017) suggest that risk reduction needs to engage with all elements of urban development, including informality and poverty. In Mzuzu, shifting policies towards ensuring the entitlements of low-risk housing and income for the urban poor may minimize the amount of time on reactionary governance and management.

4.8.2 National Government Fiscal Management

Responses from interviewees suggested they felt that the slow or low flows of funding from national government to the city government impacted economic velocity – the number of economic transactions over time – and thereby impacted the profits they could make from formally employed residents. This was just one example of national or city government corruption provided by respondents, who understandably all wished to comment on this topic anonymously. A decrease in velocity often indicates a decreased demand for money (Simwaka et al., 2012), but in this case the desire for transactions was clear and prohibited by what respondents felt was corruption or slow bureaucracy at the national and city levels of government.

The national government's policy decisions were thought to have an impact on employment and people's ability to make an income. For example, the national government's decision to devalue the Kwacha and its and other institutions' (such as universities) decision to not equalize pension payments after the devaluation would impact the ability of pensioners to access the same level of goods as before 2012, potentially making them more reliant on family members. The national government's decisions to not enforce the mandatory retirement age and the lack of policy and enforcement around contracting former employees was seen as impacting the formal employment levels of employable youth in the city. The Governance Analytical Framework causal chain below (Table 4-3) shows the causal chains as described by respondents.

Table 4-3 Perceived Impacts of Formal Governance Decisions of Urban Incomes

Perceived Social, Economic, Political Context	Governance Processes and Decisions	Perceived Food System Outcome
'Liberal' economic policy; International aid influence on national policy	Devaluation of the kwacha; No enforced adjustment of institutional pensions	Loss of senior citizen income, resulting in low accessibility to food in urban area
Cultural assumptions of old age/senior care being within the family; Seniors as low national government priority (Kazeze, 2008)	Laissez-faire approach to governance of senior social care	Increased burden on retirees and families for food provision
Clientelism, open economic policy, no national senior pension	No enforced retirement age; Minimal contract oversight from national government for retiree contracts	Low employment levels for youth entering workforce, high informal employment, resulting in potentially low access to food

The national government's focus on production was seen by CSOs and some in the national government as a way to skim money from large agricultural programmes as many of them relied on contracts for large equipment or large orders of goods like fertilizer or seed. Many of these respondents felt it was obvious that the national government was ignoring the requirements for asset building throughout the entire value chain. One respondent linked the lack of money and the poor velocity of money in the economy with poor national governance around market management.

"So what has happened is in the past when you put an irrigation system, you are only looking at whether that will produce your rice. But what happens after you produce the rice, nobody cares, so you have buyers come and buy it, take it out. Unfortunately this country doesn't have a strong market system then probably it's exported outside. And that FOREX doesn't come back." 060

4.9 Summary

This chapter argues that governance is a dimension from which we can understand urban food systems, and specific urban sites should be defined contextually through the experiences of those within that system. Chapter 4 provides a qualitative, socio-political frame of reference to the specific quantitative data that already exists for Mzuzu's urban food system. This section summarizes the chapter's four stories in the context of the four pillars of food security and governance.

The first story contributes to our understanding of food governance by both providing a case study of vendor market conflict and more importantly describing the deeper influences on the outcomes of both market vending and street vending in Mzuzu. Market vendors and customers perceive the spatial distribution of markets in the city and within markets themselves to have implications for the economic access of low to middle income residents, both as sellers who need to make profits from their business, but also as consumers who live in outlying areas. The impacts of national discourse, history, and neoliberal norms on governance decisions, such as enforcement of street vendors and non-interference in free market actions of middlemen, were evident in the respondents' stories of how vending manifests in Mzuzu. The clear need for economic access to food from the vendors' point of views shows the influence of high urbanization, low employment levels in the city, the heavy reliance on informal employment, and the potential impact of increasing vendor competition on profits.

From the standpoint of the food security pillars, this story shows the diverse pathways that food takes to arrive and be sold in the city, enabling high levels of availability, albeit in centralized locations. The outer areas of the city have lower levels of available, diverse foods that are more difficult to economically access due to higher prices, impacting food security levels. A decade later, the literature on the spatial arrangements of traditional markets and their importance to food security remains noted by only a few key authors – Battersby (2012) noted their neglect in discussions of food security, despite their clear importance in urban areas and their potential to enable food security across urban space (Rondinelli, 1985; Bertaud & Malpezzi, 2003: Battersby & Crush, 2014).

The second story is also about availability, but the factor of stability is more prominent. Governance decisions around maize prices, banana sources, and protein sources created instability of supply, particularly through bottlenecks. National government decisions to not interfere in maize prices, to

not provide extension services to banana farmers, and to not increase the capacity at the local abattoir created bottlenecks that impeded both access – in the case of maize being too expensive to buy – and availability – in the case of there being limited Malawian bananas and affordable animal protein in the city.

The historical and political influences on the attitudes of government around the freedom of enterprise potentially influence the behaviour of middlemen to act as free agents in a free market. The government's choice to allow middlemen to operate freely influences the price paid to farmers and the prices demanded from vendors, which according to many respondents can be unfair and exploitative, setting up prices for consumers and determining profit (Mango et al., 2018) – and therefore economic food access – of informal and market vendors. This discussion correlates respondents' perspectives with previous findings of the dominance of maize in the food system and adds nuance to the discussion, suggesting that the urban markets that service the majority of Mzuzu's lower income population are more susceptible to price manipulation by politicians, middlemen and vendors, and that price fluctuations have a disproportionate impact on lower income buyers than on those of a higher income for more than the obvious reason of comparative income levels.

The first two stories provide examples of governance choices to enforce or not, to create and implement certain rules in a certain way. Governance impacts from the market and city governance scale were the greatest on market outcomes and functions, but the shadow of the national government influence appeared in comments about party loyalty and potential payoffs. Reactionary governance dominates city governance actions, despite governance structures that are meant to ensure consistent communication – from vendors' perspectives this is due to poor management and corruption; from the city management perspective this is due to a lack of communication and a lack of human resource capacity. Overall, these two stories show a complex bureaucracy with city enforcement dominating and national government politics inserting influence into key parts of the system. Democratic ideals from political history dominates rights-based assertions and influences the interactions of vendors, city government, and national government actors.

The third story amplified the importance of economic opportunities in the city to then enable access to food, particularly when access to land to grow food is either not available to low-income residents or is tenuous either due to environmental shocks or landlord decisions. The Town and Country

planning committee and similar structures that include all levels and types of governance not only enable transparency but communication; in this case highlighting inequalities in urban aid programming and land ownership. This story also suggests a potential impact to future urban management as the potential for increasing disaster management combines with reactive governance to create further strain on urban government resources (Amponsah, 2020). Risk reduction practitioners need to understand and engage with the multiple dimensions of urban development – spatial forms, societies, economies and governance structures (Dodman et al., 2017). In Mzuzu's case, this means finding ways to integrate the voices of informal vendors and low-income residents into urban planning and disaster management.

The last story is the ultimate message from Mzuzu's food system – respondents attributed food insecurity to the lack of economic access, despite the diversity of access points and diversity of food. This story is the culmination of the reasons and problems emerging from the first three stories, with the national government cited as the central actor. The causes attributed to this problem were structural, political, and economic, and according to most respondents they originated with the national government's actions. The stories in this chapter reinforce the importance of understanding interrelations between a range of actors across scales and types of governance (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2013; Candel, 2014) and avoiding 'local' frames that position both problems and solutions within the urban boundary (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2005).

Chapter Four has provided the first part of the results of this study through these four stories and discussions, using the causal chain of the Governance Analytical Framework to show how respondents perceived the influences of multi-level governance on Mzuzu's food system. Chapter Five now compares the perspectives of each actor group through the problems, causes and solutions proposed by respondents.

5.0 Perspectives in the Governance of Mzuzu's Food System

Governance is a system of organization based on rules, both from formal structures such as laws, and informal structures such as norms (Kjaer, 2004; Bevir, 2012). The analysis in this chapter shows key similarities and differences in the perspectives between actor groups regarding what food system governance entails and the agency and responsibilities of the actors involved. Where Chapter 4 is an analysis of what people perceive to be the contextual issues in the governance of Mzuzu's food system, Chapter 5 provides an analysis of these perspectives, summarizing and comparing them in relation to actor groups. The first section of this chapter is a brief review of how the Governance Analytical Framework forms the basis for the data analysis. The second section applies the governance analytical framework categories and the secondary thematic analysis as a lens through which to compare the governance levels. Figures and tables representing this analysis are reported in this section. The third section incorporates existing literature on governance into the discussion of the common themes that have emerged from this research, as well as what this analytical approach contributes to urban food studies.

5.1 The Governance Analytical Framework – the Basis to Understand Mzuzu's Urban Food System

Chapter 3 describes how the application of the Governance Analytical Framework (GAF) aided in the formation of the research methods. This section of Chapter 5 provides a brief review of the components of the Governance Analytical Framework (GAF) to provide context to the results presented thereafter, as well as the assessment and analysis of results.

Once the common themes were identified from the analysis (Table 5-1), the respondent groups were compared for agreement or disagreement regarding problem causes, potential solutions, and who held responsibility for each of these within the food system. The most effective way to compare the perspectives of each governance group regarding common themes was to first identify the theme – such as transportation systems – then examine each group's responses regarding problems, solutions, and responsibility under that theme.

Table 5-1 Ten Common Themes from Respondents Across Governance Groups

Theme
Food Safety
Market Management
Land Governance
Transportation Systems
Energy Systems
Corruption
Government Capacity
Policy Implementation
Civic Education
Economic Management

In reference to the five GAF categories – norms, problems, nodes, procceses, and actors – respondent's perspectives of problems in the urban food system provided much of the data for analysis. The problems category was split into two – causes and solutions, and these are the focus of much of this chapter. Norms emerged in the descriptions of these causes and solutions, including assigning the responsibility of certain problems to certain actors within governance types and levels. Nodal points – where decisions are made – and processes were often mentioned together; nodal points were the least mentioned category in the analysis, but their importance was mentioned by a small number of respondents. Nodes are where actors make decisions, communicate, or interact, sometimes with little transparency. Nodes were also where respondents felt normative processes occurred, indicating who is included and excluded from decision making. I found that with a few exceptions, the nodal points, processes, and actors were inherent to the problems and norms, and further analysis became repetitive after the problems and norms were categorized. The most common category under 'actors' was the perception of who was responsible for solving the identified problems and was linked to the analysis of problems and solutions.

5.2 Results of the Perspectives Analysis – Problems, Causes and Solutions in Mzuzu's Food System

In line with a philosophical position within post-positivism and social constructivism, a major objective of this thesis is to construct a perspective-based picture of Mzuzu's urban food system from multiple governance levels, leading to a qualified understanding of their influences. This section presents results on the perspectives of Mzuzu's food system compared across actor groups. There are four major findings of this analysis – the respondents felt the main problem in Mzuzu's food system is economic access to food; they felt the causes of problems are rooted in the low capacity of governance structures and corruption; and the national government is viewed as being the most responsible for causing the problems and is also viewed as the group responsible for providing solutions. The analysis in this section shows that both problems and solutions are defined within the sociopolitical context of actors' perspectives. Each of the following topics in this section discuss governance in the context of the setting, implementation, and enforcement of rules through norms, laws, power, and language, including the choice to not set, implement, or enforce certain rules.

5.2.1 The Problem: Access to food

The dominant problem in Mzuzu's food system across all governance groups was '*access* to food.' This was discussed in Section 4.7 with the common refrain, "there is food, there is no money." Respondents then often provided what they perceived as the causes of this lack of access and proceeded to identify the deeper forces behind those causes. Figure 5-1 shows the links between the problem of low levels of access to food, and the root causes and forces that lead to it from the perspectives of respondents. These links are explored in the discussions of causes of problems in the food system.



Figure 5-1 Common Perceptions of Causes of Low Levels of Food Access in Mzuzu

5.2.2 Causes of a Lack of Food Access

The most dominant cause of a lack of food access identified by respondents was the low capacity of structures, both physical and social, that could otherwise improve the economic functions of Mzuzu's food system. The remainder of the causes were strongly linked to this low capacity and this section explores this topic. This section presents the overall findings of respondents, with subsequent sections detailing the differences between governance groups.



Figure 5-2 Common Perceptions of Overall Causes of Problems in Mzuzu's Food System

5.2.2.1 Cause: Lack of Capacity of People and Structures

The most cited cause of problems was the poor services experienced within the food system from both social infrastructure such as government services or supports, to the physical infrastructure of road systems, energy systems, and markets.

Respondents noted the lack of incentives or support provided to government workers, as well as the low ratios of government workers to citizens, resulting in workers being overwhelmed. According to a city government respondent, devolution of governing responsibilities increased the burden on some urban-based agencies that already had low capacity.

"Unfortunately in the year because of this decentralization thing some of the [agriculture] functions have been given directly to, within the council...to Parks and Recreation. So like in the distance. So now the thing is those people they cannot be very active in this sector." 001

Respondents discussed that low-level government workers receive low pay, and the lack of funding provided to lower levels of government was a major impediment to implementation – in other words, much of the blame for this was placed on government corruption as well as the slow and low quantity of transfers from the national government to other government levels. The lack of simple assets like computers was cited, as well as the energy cuts that impeded work. One on occasion, I interviewed a government worker in their office where the electricity had been off for the entire day, computer batteries had finally run out, and there was no fuel in the trucks. Their job morale was low, despite their desire to serve their fellow Malawians.

Respondents from the national government saw the same cause of low transfers from national to city governments, but from a different perspective. Their concerns rested upon the slow development of local capacity and the need for them to keep the general ministerial duties at the national level until the local level proved the ability to deliver services.

"...the challenge has always been capacity in the region. Because like devolution, the moving this function to the city started sometime back. The [cities] are responsible for their own planning. And the thinking was that with time they would build capacity then they would be able to take over all the functions and be able to do things on their own, but they have had challenges to build that capacity." 032

Respondents who viewed the current productive solutions as inefficient pointed out that there is no 'room' for everyone to farm, especially with the move towards commercial agriculture. They suggested a refocus to the food value chain would help all of Malawi, with priorities towards increasing the infrastructure capacity for processing, grading, transport, and value-added opportunities, albeit mostly in rural areas. In further discussions on infrastructure, respondents said that food processing infrastructure relies heavily on the capacity to manage physical infrastructure such as water and sanitation systems, energy systems, and transportation. One respondent noted,

> *"I think all these are interlinked and there's not one particular solution that's going to solve urban poverty, all the other elements need to be put in place. So you need to look at the energy issues, infrastructure issues, industrial growth, value addition to all this, and then as your economic footprint of the big economic industry grows, then gets the smaller industries all the suppliers who have like a symbiotic relationship."* 047

National government and international aid respondents stated that improvements to the food value chain needed foreign investment and 'business-enabling' environments. For example, raw products like soybeans and ground nuts cannot be exported unless the capacity of infrastructure and trading systems increases the ability to meet export standards. Again, respondents made similar comments about the lack of capacity, with one respondent noting that *"the food system is just not there yet."* 034

Low levels of rural physical and social infrastructure (banking, health infrastructure, road building and maintenance, and crop diversification) was cited as a major impediment to rural systemic change, which was often presented as a solution to preventing rapid urbanization over time and mitigating the problems in urban spaces. Public-private partnerships in agriculture were often mentioned by national government respondents as good opportunities to employ youth in rural areas, slowing down urbanization and the loss of the labour pool from rural farming while building rural infrastructure.

5.2.2.2 Cause: Lack of Physical Infrastructure

Physical structures both within and outside of the city were cited as a cause of the food system not functioning properly. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) especially named the national government as responsible for causing inconsistent energy provision, impacting business opportunities in Mzuzu. One respondent gave an example:

"Most of the businesses have stopped working and people have been laid off, just because of having no power. You look at the people running bakeries. You have done everything else and you are going to put your loaves into the oven. Now there is no power for two days. That dough you have to throw it away." 021A

Market infrastructure was discussed in Chapter 4, with market vendors citing a need for electricity access to both sell and store goods. The physical state of walking pathways, WASH facilities, and shelter were viewed as keeping customers away and instead buying from street vendors.

The most noted physical infrastructure that impacted food access in Mzuzu was the low levels of road infrastructure. Interestingly, most respondents discussed roads at their scale level – market vendors noted the difficulty for trucks to access small market roads, businesses noted the need for farmers to access smaller roads to get their produce to main arteries, national government respondents interested in exports suggested that poor national and international roads impact the ability of trucks to provide goods to trade partners in a timely manner.

5.2.2.3 Cause: Corruption – The Poorly Understood Influence

The second-most mentioned cause of problems in Mzuzu's food system was corruption (Figure 5-2), which permeated the other top three causes provided by respondents. Low capacity of people and structures, the approach to development, and the low levels of policy implementation were thought to be at least skewed or influenced by corruption at the national and city government levels. Due to its secretive nature, it was unclear to respondents (and therefore unclear in the results) how much of an influence it played in the other causes of problems.

In the context of the Governance Analytical Framework categories, corruption was mentioned both as a problem and a norm. When problems were identified in concurrence with norms, they were most often associated with certain actors – in the case of corruption, it was associated with mostly, but not exclusively, government actors. Respondents suggested that in the context of corruption, these actors apply their agency to reinforce existing norms. By using existing processes (or a lack thereof) and nodal points that are governed in a manner that adheres to existing food system norms, these actors are then thought to provide a benefit to themselves. This was most evident when

respondents discussed corruption in formal government, particularly the national government, and in the context of the maize trade, large agricultural aid packages, and land deals.

The common nodal points – where decisions about the urban food system are made – were the markets, streets, and city offices. City offices were especially important when perceived as a space where others need to assume what is happening behind closed doors. For example, market vendors assumed corrupt practices between vendor association representatives and city officials. The capital city of Lilongwe emerged as a common nodal point that impacts Mzuzu's food system through the impact of national politicians' decisions on the economy as well as corruption. The issue of the northern region electing opposition politicians emerged often in discussions of politics. Pieterse (2020) notes the commonalities between multiple southern African countries where city policies and directives (such as staffing) are under the discretion of national government, and those that divert from existing national guidance face social or political consequences.

Most international aid respondents accounted for the slow progress of development in the country by pointing to corruption all levels of government, detailing that much of their time is focused on ensuring funding is managed properly. National government departments directly handling large agricultural projects around staples like maize were a consistent, but not sole, frustration in this topic. Large status projects like stadiums or hotels as well as commercial agricultural funding from large multilateral organizations were suggested to be preferred by the top tiers of national government to enable skimming of funds or rent-seeking behaviour without much notice. Respondents stated that trust between the national government and agencies has had to rebuild, with the 2018-9 Development Programme Operations (DPO) budget conditionalities being the first formal development budget since the CashGate scandal in 2013-4, which heavily implicated national government actors in theft and corruption and inhibited cooperation between aid agencies and the national government (Adikhari et al., 2019).

5.2.2.4 Cause: Approach to Development

Closely linked with the topic of corruption, the approach to development relates to how respondents directly linked the majority of development aid activities to the national government decisions that enabled either votes or financial graft. Bias towards rural areas and corruption emerged in both topics. Regarding voting, CSO respondents and other anonymous respondents

listed multiple consequences of the rural approach to development as rural areas counted for more constituencies in national elections.

"...when let's say there are issues of a subsidy, you know, government subsidizing fertilizer, you know, ABCD food distribution, most of the times it is in the rural communities...then you know politicians have taken that advantage, you know, looked into the vulnerability of the communities, they are wanting for maize...[politicians] say let's use maize as a tool to woo them to vote for us..." 048

In addition to focusing development money and food assistance on rural areas in return for votes, it was also suggested that the market governance structures were prone to political interference.

"... there was some like politically motivated issues within the market, there were groups of individuals who are being pushed by the party's political parties further interest in as far as attracting votes is concerned. So you find ...they affect how the city manages its food system, infrastructure issues, and issues to do with governance, because mainly it is not issues that come because people are pushing for it, but they are coming because of personal or some hidden interests which are coming from some other channels." Anon.

As discussed in Chapter 4, the national government and international aid approach to food security is mostly focused on productive solutions, especially those that surround the major staple crop of maize. Respondents outside of the national government and city government groups viewed this behaviour as graft, suggesting national politicians target where most of the aid money goes to then skim from government contracts. CSO respondents noted that the majority of Malawi's population is rural, and that the nutrition statistics indicate poorer outcomes than the urban areas. However, these respondents also suggested that the benefits accrued from the productive focus influence the consistent aid focus on rural areas to the detriment of the urban sphere, even as urban areas are showing the strain of managing growing populations.

5.2.2.4.1 Urban Measurement in Development – the impacts of rural bias in approaches to development

In the context of approaches to development, the theme of urban measurement was discussed by respondents from academia, aid agencies, city officials, and CSOs. These respondents were the most aware of the problems with the common practice of applying rural measurements of poverty to urban areas.

The most common sentiment from international aid actors was that although there are urban vulnerabilities and a high rate of urbanization, international agencies remain focused on rural areas due to the greater need, which is determined through socioeconomic indicators and monitoring. Some respondents in this group noted that the focus on rural areas is enabled by the measurement and monitoring tools available for rural livelihoods, providing aid agencies and governments a better understanding of poverty and food insecurity than in urban areas. They attributed these tools to an historical emphasis on rural development in the country as well as social structures in rural areas that enable easy measurement, where people are more connected by family groups, chiefs, and culture. Essentially, rural productivity assessments, such as the National Food and Nutrition Security Forecasts by the Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee (MVAC), dominate poverty assessments, are the basis for national nutrition assessments (Joy et al., 2015), and subsequently poverty assessments; these assessments then influence food policy and development aid resource allocations.

When discussing urban food security, respondents acknowledged the lack of urban assessment metrics for poverty and food security, including that MVAC does not cover urban areas. There is a clear understanding that food insecurity can be hidden in urban food outcomes; city government and international aid groups had the largest conceptual scope in understanding social consequences of urban food insecurity, such as an increase in HIV infections or theft and riots due to urban hunger. Urban areas were perceived as both complex and invisible – international aid respondents were not seeing decisions made about urban spaces within their governance networks, and this was attributed to complex governance boundaries, the lack of resources allotted to urban measurement, and the more diverse nature of urban lives as compared to rural.

Respondents highlighted hidden urban poverty, commenting on the extra expenses of utilities and rent as well as the increased cost of food – that overall "*life is cheaper in the village"* 036. This is not reflected in current poverty measurements, with Mzuzu estimated to have lower than average poverty rates than the rest of the country, with 9.7% in moderate poverty and 2% in extreme poverty (NSO, 2018; World Bank, 2018). When compared with the 2018 AFSUN results on household food insecurity, the 'extreme to moderate' poverty numbers line up with the numbers of people who "often" (>10 times per month) experienced any of the nine categories of the Household Food Access Insecurity Scale.

A deeper analysis of the data from Riley et al. (2018) (Figure 5-3) shows that poverty assessments based on static income may not be an appropriate measure of poverty, and in particular regarding urban poverty. There is a large proportion of Mzuzu's population (over 60%) who worry about having enough food each month, which should indicate to policy makers that much of Mzuzu's urban population is vulnerable to shocks or are adjusting their lives around food to have enough; creating policy around a 2% extreme poverty rate versus a 50% - 60% vulnerability rate requires very different policy approaches.



Figure 5-3 Frequency of Experience of Food Security (adapted from Riley et al., 2018)

In Mzuzu, food security statistics between the Integrated Household Survey (NSO, 2017) and the African Food Security Urban Network Mzuzu-based study (Riley et al., 2018) found very similar numbers along the food security spectrum (see Figures 5-4 and 5-5). The National Statistics Office of Malawi's Integrated Household Survey (2017) assessed food security levels across the country and found a dramatic increase from 2011, with food insecurity rates rising from 32% food insecure to 61% country wide, likely due to the combination of a major drought and poor fiscal management under wa Mutharika's tenure, which included political turmoil and the devaluation of the kwacha

(Cammack, 2012; Innes et al., 2021). These findings, however, did not translate into the similar estimates of poverty levels between the two reports.

In recent studies, food insecurity rates are significantly higher than the 17% poverty level described in the Integrated Household Survey (2017), calling into question the factors considered within the assessments (NSO, 2017; Riley et al., 2018). Extreme poverty as measured by income was reported to have fallen by 4% in urban areas in 2017 (Govt. of Malawi, 2020) but an overall assessment of *relative* urban poverty that incorporates the urban cost of living has not been completed.



Figure 5-4 Food Security Status for Mzuzu, 2016-2017 (NSO, 2017)



Figure 5-5 Food Security Status for Mzuzu – 2017 (AFSUN, 2018)

Malawi has seen recent food price fluctuations, increased urban living costs, and increased income inequality (CfSC, 2021; Chimjeka, 2021; UNDP, 2021). Measuring food security on a detailed spectrum, as done in the AFUSN study (Riley et al., 2018), may provide a more nuanced indicator of urban poverty than one based on a static national income level. Similar findings have been found in urban child health assessments, with Lungu et al. (2019) finding a significant decline in the Malawian urban child health advantage, suggesting the need to rethink the policy assumptions of a disadvantaged rural and better-off urban dichotomy. Tacoli (2017) also emphasizes the importance of disaggregating data across non-income dimensions of poverty in urban areas to uncover the "disturbing levels of ill-health" (p. 2) covered up by deep urban inequalities.

A more recent study by Mkusa & Hendriks (2021) analyzed urban food insecurity across the four main cities of Malawi, including Mzuzu. By assessing the cities through six different food security metrics, they show the difficulties in finding consistent measurements of food security. The study also focuses on comparisons between the cities, which again show Mzuzu as 'better off' in terms of dietary diversity or direct food consumption scores. It is therefore not only rural measurements that can obscure urban food insecurity issues, but also urban comparisons; it may be that Mzuzu is better off overall than other cities in Malawi, but this type of comparison may justify lower levels of funding or continued political sidelining of urban budgets towards the city.

Academia, international aid, and city governance respondents raised concern over the use of measurements of poverty such as the MVAC to determine the flow of national government and aid resources to sub-national governments. Recent literature concurs with these concerns, discussing how new methods of urban measurement can improve understandings of urban poverty and food insecurity (Haysom & Tawodzera, 2018; Blekking et al., 2020). This is important due to the high urbanization rates in southern African cities – improving measurement now will improve policy and planning for the future.

This need for urban measurement connects to the major theme of rural bias in food system governance (Skinner & Haysom, 2016; Crush & Riley, 2017; Tacoli, 2017; Crush & Riley, 2018; Battersby, 2020). Amongst the international aid respondents, there was a sense of 'development triage' – that there is another group that is worse off or requires more assistance, such as the higher

poverty levels in the south of the country or the rural areas. The levels of poverty in the southern part of the country and in some rural areas have higher rates of malnutrition and poverty (NSO, 2017) but aid respondents understood this does not negate the high levels of food insecurity in Mzuzu and other cities. Both aid and CSO respondents acknowledged these issues as well as feared the lack of focus on *"things we don't pay attention to"* (047), namely the chronic nature of hunger in cities, as well as the growing double burden in urban centres. It was noted that many measurements of health and productivity are rural, production-based, and reliant upon the cultural ties in rural areas to implement the resulting programming. In contrast, relative poverty, although aptly measured by the Malawi Bureau of Statistics and the Centre for Social Concern, is not often applied to larger aid initiatives nor policy.

Challenges in governance coordination between the city and region were emphasized by city government respondents. A city government respondent noted that norms in measuring development progress not only impeded progress in urban food system management, but also in water access:

> *"They are assessing us with a tool that is typically rural-based. They're talking about the village headman, the TA [traditional authority], we don't have those structures here....they [assessors] will treat us [that way]. This is an urban area. We are covered by water board and the water board has got bylaws that purport that nobody can provide borehole within a city... we cannot provide bore holes here. So sanitation programs they encourage people to get connected … now we are talking about people that are already struggling to make ends meet. However, the bylaws still stand, and [performance assessors] will grade the city for the provision of boreholes. They will not see the sanitation program, they will say you did not provide boreholes, your borehole provision is still at zero, and you will get a zero for that. So there are all those challenges, it is not just the MVAC alone." 025*

In southern Africa, the largest increase in urban population is expected to be in secondary cities – those currently with a population of less than 250,000 (UN, 2019; Zimmer et al., 2020). There is an "unrecognized primacy of secondary cities" (Kalwar et al., 2021 p. 53) that could derail development goals in the next 30 years if the focus of urban development remains on primary cities. Overwhelmed city governments could mean stagnating improvements as urban populations grow, particularly in more marginalized income groups. This coincides with the findings of Fanning et al.

(2021) that the three social indicators of nutrition, sanitation and income poverty is projected to slow in the coming decades for low-income countries. Recent findings by Cassivi et al. (2020) show the historical benefits of urban migration to improvements in access to WASH facilities; through highlighting the rural bias of WASH programming, the authors emphasize the importance of continuing to "target vulnerable urban populations" (p. 25), especially under high rates of urbanization like that of Mzuzu.

Respondents suggested that the reliance of national government on the discourse of commercializing agriculture ignored many of the structural and social impediments to urban development. Mitlin and Satterthwaite (2012) explain that urban poverty is frequently underestimated by national governments and aid agencies worldwide for two reasons: blanket poverty measurements that provide misleading income statistics and the low levels of agency of low-income urban residents in governance and policy-making. Battersby (2020) suggests that the fundamental relationship between governance and data, or knowledge, is mutually reinforcing and based on national discourse and assumptions. There is a need to consider if current measurements are misinterpreting urban data due to the use of rural measurements in urban contexts, as well as the assumption that rural needs trump urban needs. Babu and Sanyal (2018) suggest that the strong National Statistics Office vulnerability assessments be expanded into a national early warning system for food insecurity. Based on my analysis, considerations of price fluctuations and urban costs of living that extend past basic rent and utilities (such as transport costs and stability of income) should also be incorporated into a specific urban vulnerability index.

Consistent and real-time measurements of absolute and relative poverty in urban areas are essential to urban governance due to the strong reliance on economic access to all goods, including food. There is strong evidence in fields ranging from income inequality, food access, and health access that show that urban economic growth can exacerbate inequality (Mitlin & Satterthwaite, 2012). The Centre for Social Concern, based in Lilongwe, provides monthly data regarding the cost of living across Malawi, including urban areas. The National Statistics Office uses the data to inform its reports, but it is otherwise unclear how this valuable data informs urban policy or legislation.

Despite the evidence being clear for over a decade that accessibility is the main impediment to urban food insecurity, availability remained a strong discourse amongst the national government respondents especially. There was nuance to the responses however, with many noting that

increasing small-scale farmer productivity by advancing commercialization will lead to improved overall incomes and spending in urban areas. This shows the deeply entrenched beliefs about food systems and food security within government actors. If there is low agency amongst the urban food insecure or other actors to shift this thinking within government actors, this presents a difficulty in breaking the reinforcing cycle of aid and national government structures that are built around large agricultural programmes.

Transitioning data into a form that can influence policy requires attention to sociopolitical context (Biruk, 2018). In a governance system dealing with many issues such as poverty, health and human rights, a food system that *seems* to be functioning will likely be low on the priority list to politicians (Pothukuchi & Kaufman, 1999). The normalization of food poverty and low agency within the urban poor (Haysom, 2020), combined with high diversity and availability of goods (in the case of Mzuzu), is hiding food insecurity in plain sight, highlighting the assumption that 'availability of food equals access to food,' noted by many authors (Battersby, 2011; Battersby & Crush, 2016; Battersby, 2017; Tacoli, 2017; Frayne, 2018).

5.2.2.5 Cause: Low Implementation of Policy

Different food system policies were discussed by respondents, but the commonality between them all was the low levels of implementation.

The policy of national devolution to regional and city levels emerged in discussions with international aid, CSOs, national government, and city government groups, and underscored the other discussions of impeded policy implementation. Since the national devolution policy was created in the late 1990s, it has been in various phases of implementation or political stall (Hussein, 2004). A review of devolution literature from Malawi shows that progress has been slow and piecemeal, depending on the political will at the time, and this remains so to the present day (Jagero et al., 2014; Pieterse, 2020).

In economic policy, respondents noted the strength of the many rules, strategies, and policies that existed to build a functioning, urban, manufacturing-based economy. However, there was little support, bureaucratic communication, or aid focus on the needs of entrepreneurs to access, interpret, and abide by the long list of health and safety requirements to start a food processing business, let alone other policies on how to start and manage a business. Many respondents in the

city business group noted how there was a strong capability for inspections and enforcement at the city government level. They also noted that at times both city and national government officials would inspect similar issues, such as food safety at local businesses. One government employee remarked on how many people engage them to start a business only to realize how expensive and difficult the codes and standards are to meet. However, any government supports to meet the high policy requirements seemed out of reach or non-existent. As an example, I tried to access the Malawi Bureau of Standards *Food and Food Processing Units – Code of Hygienic Standards*. It was not available at the local office, nor on the internet. To access it, I needed to visit the Lilongwe office, housed in a suburb, and pay the equivalent of $20USD; a day long bus ride away and just above the average monthly wage for a low-income earner who may wish to start a small food stall or processing business in Mzuzu.

Supporting entrepreneurship was discussed as a discourse of national government – but according to CSO respondents it was one used to cover up corruption and had little implementation on the ground outside of supporting small loan institutions. This specific topic – the lack of capital or opportunity for entrepreneurship – entered the discussions of low policy implementation in concert with corruption and complex bureaucracy. It was felt that Malawi had strong rules to support an economy, but little capacity to build the economy through implementing supportive programming.

5.2.2.6 Cause: Bureaucratic Complexity and the Placement of Responsibility

The bureaucratic complexity, or 'red tape' of the many government levels, was another impediment to policy implementation. For example, one respondent noted the difficulty to work centrally with the many different layers of governance*:*

"So in government, there are... four layers of decentralization, a national level, and then each national level ministry has zones – health has five zones, agriculture has eight, education has six, but they're still national. And then everyone has districts, they are government districts, but then each sector has their own districts as well, which makes multi-sectoral really really hard" (063).

With a topic such as food security, one that touches many topics like health, education, and economic development, coordinating governance through a food system lens in such a governance context will be a challenge. Other national government and international aid respondents suggested that communication between national government agencies should be prioritized prior to

developing any physical infrastructure, citing a major project supported by the national government and aid agencies that was then discovered had not met national standards of food safety.

Figure 5-6 and Table 5-1 shows that many respondents across groups place the responsibility for solving problems mainly on the national government. This is consistent with the larger context discussed in Chapter 4 regarding the historical deference to a central, national government and the uneven implementation of devolution policy, including the national government's hesitancy to allow for local elections between 2007 to 2014.

As shown in Figure 5-6, the responsibility of food safety fell to the city government, which was cited as enforcement in the form of ordinances controlling the sale of cooked food to prevent cholera, but also included the lack of provision of WASH facilities in markets where most of the fresh food in the city was sold. This responsibility is an example of the influence of scale – the top rows of Table 5-1 show four topics dominated by expectations of city government responsibility. These topics – food safety, market management, urban land governance, and transportation systems – are all discussed at the urban scale and are assigned to city government to solve by most respondents.

Some respondents, particularly those in the CSO and business groups, felt it was the responsibility of citizens to build their country from the bottom up and hold their elected officials responsible as the 'duty-bearers' who should be implementing food system policies that enable people to sell and buy food. This is encompassed in the expectations of governments to solve the problems of the Mzuzu's food system.



Figure 5-6 Highest Incidences of Co-Occurrence of Perceived Causes of Problems in Mzuzu's Food System and the Associated Governance Level Responsibility

Table 5-1 Perspectives of Each Actor Group Regarding Main Themes and Associated Responsibility for Management

Actor Group / **Theme**	International Aid	Academia	National Government	City Government	City Business/National Business	Informal Workers	VA Governance	Civil Society Org.
Food Safety	National Govt. – rural	City Govt.	City Govt., National Govt.	City Govt., Academia; VA Governance	City Govt., National Govt.	City Govt.	City Govt.	City Govt.
Market Management	Regional Govt., City Govt.	City Govt.	Not mentioned	City Business, City Govt.; VA Governance	City Govt.	City Govt.	City Govt., National Govt.	City Govt.
Urban Land Governance	Not mentioned	National Govt., City Govt.	National Govt., City Govt.	National Govt., City Govt.	City Govt.	City Govt.	City Govt.	City Govt., National Govt.
Transportation Systems	Not mentioned	Not mentioned	International bodies, National Govt.	City Govt., National Govt.	City Govt., National Govt.	City Govt., National Govt.	City Govt.	Not mentioned
Energy Systems	Not mentioned	National Govt.	National Govt., International Aid	National Govt.	National Govt.	Not mentioned	City Govt.	National Govt.
Corruption	National Govt.	National Govt., Civic Population	National Govt.; police services	Not mentioned	National Govt., Intnl. Aid,	National Govt., City Govt.	National Govt., City Govt.	National Govt., Intnl Aid, citizenry
Government Capacity	National Govt., Regional Govt., City Govt.	National Govt., Intnl Aid	National Govt., Regional Govt., Intnl Aid	National Govt., Intnl Aid, Regional Govt	National Govt., Intnl Aid; citizenry	National Govt., City Govt., Intnl. Aid	City Govt., National Govt.	National Govt., City Govt. citizenry
Policy Implementation	For markets, Regional Govt. and City Govt.	National Govt., City Govt., citizenry	National Govt., International Aid	City Govt., National Govt., Academia	National Govt., City Govt.	City Govt.	City Govt.	National Govt., Intnl. Aid
Civic Education	All levels of Govt.	National Govt.	Not mentioned	National Govt., Civic Population	National Govt., Civic Population	Not mentioned	Not mentioned	Civil Society Org., National Govt.; citizenry
Economic Management	National Govt., City Govt.	National Govt.	National Govt.	National Govt., citizenry	National Govt., citizenry	National Govt., City Govt.	City Govt.	National Govt., Intnl Aid
Food Production	National Govt. – rural focus	National Govt., Regional Govts.	National Govt.	National Govt., National Business, City Govt.	National Govt., National Business	National Govt., citizenry	Not mentioned	National Govt., Intnl Aid

Table 5-2 discusses specific causes of problems in the food system in reference to the major themes. Even if the reasoning was different, the following influences were common amongst all respondent groups. The first common influence emerged from the strong links between the rural and urban areas, and the fears of 'unchecked' urbanization rates overwhelming city governance, leading to low employment, low food security, and a loss of farming capacity in the rural areas. The second influence also related to urban-rural linkages; rural development and rural bias by the national government and aid agencies. Next, the discourse of the national government's control over the food system from pre-democracy days was often contrasted with the liberalized markets of the current day in both positive and negative lights. Finally, the poor implementation of devolution policy in the country was commonly cited as a major influence on the causes of problems in Mzuzu's food system – particularly with respect to overlapping bureaucracies and low levels of resources flowing to subsidiary levels of government.

Table 5-2 Perspectives <u>from</u> Each Actor Group Regarding Common Themes (3 pgs.)

Actor Group / **Theme**	International Aid	Academia	National Government	City Government	City/National Business	Informal Workers	Vendor Association Governance	Civil Society Org.
Food Safety	Proper pesticide use and hygiene at production level; Food value chain development	Market hygiene needs improvement	Quality control for processed products; Procedural adherence by businesses; Hygienic farm processing	Improve food value chain from farm to market; Hygienic farm processing; Market hygiene	Improve market hygiene; Urban cleanliness is important; Use of city resources on inspections	Loss of business from cooked food sales due to city ordinance on hygiene	Lack of market hygiene facilities; Market waste management	Food value chain should prioritize Malawian products
Market Management	Not mentioned	Markets need access to water and sanitation; Road access to markets is important	Not mentioned	Planning cannot keep up with need; Market hierarchy should enable communication; City does not have enough capacity to manage market needs	Market hygiene, Market space, Transparency of market fee use; all these need improvement	Market space is needed spatially and in quantity; Proximity to customers is essential to sales	Satellite markets need support (structures, WASH, roads) as main market gets too much focus; Poor maintenance of market structures	There is not enough market space for the vendors who want to sell in the city.
Land Governance	Concern over decreasing land size for smallholder farmers, low productivity increases need to purchase food	Noted conflict in urban governance between traditional and bureaucratic levels; Land allocation system costs time and money	Traditional ownership important to national well-being therefore 'renting' traditional land to PPP and commercial farm interests; urban 'idle' land should be used for agriculture	Planning is reactive to urban land management; Land use plans are meant to improve use for commercial urban agriculture	Peri-urban land especially is in high demand and dominated by high income urban farmers; There is not enough land for people to grow their own food.	Use of urban space for sales; urban agriculture is a desired practice.	Market space and proper planning – ownership of market spaces	Peri-urban land is dominated by high income urban earners;
Transportation Systems	Farmers accessing markets requires transportation as well as bureaucratic ease	Roads improve the capacity of farmers to access urban food system	Improved quality of national and international road systems will improve trade and farmer profit	Poor road infrastructure increases food costs; improving local roads can help satellite markets	Improving access to satellite markets can improve business profits; transport costs take away from profits	High transport costs and time lost travelling on poor roads in poor transport impacts profit margins	Poor quality urban roads esp. entries into satellite markets prevent easy drop-off	Roads are arteries for people to buy goods from markets

Actor Group **Theme**	International Aid	Academia	National Government	City Government	City/National Business	Informal Workers	Vendor Association Governance	Civil Society Org.
Energy Systems	Low electricity capacity constrains national food system productivity and economy	Not mentioned	Energy supply is not meeting demand and this impacts the economy	Not mentioned	ESCOM is inhibited by national govt. corruption	Not mentioned	Energy is required for improved sales in markets such as cold storage	Cost and unreliability of energy systems is an impediment to setting up a business
Corruption	Certain food agencies and ministry depts. Are vehicles for corruption, particularly around maize	Large ag. Programs are vulnerable to corruption from chiefs and politicians; Party politics impacts food governance	Corrupt police and border services can impact food trade by increasing costs and allowing in unapproved goods	Not mentioned	Pervasive national government corruption impedes Ec. Dvlpmnt; Because nat. gov. is corrupt, others feel they can be corrupt.	National government corruption causes money to not flow around the urban food economy; VA Governance corrupted by city gov.	MPs only visit and listen when they are asking for votes	National government corruption enables corruption at other levels;
Government Capacity	Centralization causes costs and inefficiencies in food value chain	Centralized govt power impacts capacity of regional and city reps to function; middlemen take advantage of lack of regulation and enforcement of food prices	Incomplete devolution and lack of capacity at lower governance levels requires nat.gov. to govern and impacts implementation; Certain depts. In Ag. Ministry dominate funding to detriment of other depts; Middlemen can take advantage of a lack of gov. capacity	Low funding and staffing impacts city's ability to implement planning; assumptions of urban wellbeing impedes funding; lack of urban measurements, including double burden; urbanization impacts capacity of governments to govern	Corruption and urbanization impacts capacity of govt. to deliver services; Lack of tax collection impedes funding and ability to deliver service; middlemen can hurt or help food security and are unregulated	Both national and city governments are responsible for service delivery but corruption in national capital prevents this; urbanization impacts capacity of governments to govern	Capacity of governments are impacted by corruption, lack of funding flows, and urbanization	Over-enforcement by national gov and city gov results in needless inspections instead of using funding to improve structures; Anti-corruption agency disabled by national government

Actor Group **Theme**	International Aid	Academia	National Government	City Government	City/National Business	Informal Workers	Vendor Association Governance	Civil Society Org.
Policy Implementation	Markets are a potential tax source that needs to be properly managed	Markets are important for food access; Decentralization and low funding flows impact urban management; policies can be based on colonial rules	Food security is integrated throughout each ministry and can get lost; Markets are important for food access but value-added processing is essential to Ec. Dvlpmnt	City government understaffed and underfunded to implement planning needs; food security focused on nutrition only in urban areas	Nat. gov. only focuses on agriculture and nutrition – not the food system or value chain; markets are ignored because they generally function	Improve implementation of market spatial policy; market construction requires road, energy, and WASH infrastructure	Ensure consistent prices for food stuffs; govt. should provide loans, functioning markets; incorporate gender needs into market policies	Maize policy is intended to benefit politicians, particularly export/import policies; Production and rural bias dominates food security policy
Civic Education	Support of city councils to manage markets is essential, including financial transparency; improve household nutrition through education	Literacy impacts population's ability to engage	Behavioural change in food consumption a major challenge in food security; improve rural nutrition through education	Family planning, nutrition, and city councillor education is essential	Population needs to be more independent of national government assistance	Not mentioned	Ensuring market use by vendors is important through both enforcement and education	Civic duty to hold 'duty-bearers' responsible, advocacy is essential; Food is a human right
Economic Management	Improve access to national and international markets for farmers through improvements to food value chain.	Increase manufacturing and urban farming to boost economy	Past focus on smallholder farming does not support Ec. Dvlpmnt, exports and value chain need support; ag. Production is key to Ec. Dvlpmnt	Commercial rural farming would help urban economies	Low capacity for protein processing is impeding Ec. Dvlpmnt; Improving mngmnt of the other parts of the food value chain essential to Ec. Dvlpmnt	Ensuring governments provide payments to employees will ensure employees purchase food	Nat. gov. has funds to ensure Ec. Dvlpmnt but "keeps" it in the capital. Economic velocity in urban food systems is essential	Corruption is the main impediment to improving the economy – intnl aid programs enable theft and corruption

5.2.3 Solutions

This section discusses the respondents' proposed solutions to the challenges in Mzuzu's food system. The most common themes that emerged between actor groups are shown in Table 5-6. Table 5-6 summarizes the main areas of agreement and disagreement between actor groups regarding their general perspectives on solutions to food system problems. The table is not exhaustive, and the written sections elaborate on the commonalities and differences between the solutions within four categories: productive, governance, physical infrastructure, and individual responsibility.

When reviewing the 'disagreement' side of Table 5.6, the reader should keep in mind that it may not be a clear disagreement between the two groups but a different point of view in an approach to a solution, a view on the cause of the problem, or expectations of the responsibility of certain parties. Further, where two points are made in the box between two groups, the opinion of the top row group is listed first, followed by the opinion of the group in the left column.

5.2.3.1 Productive Solutions

Productive solutions were proposed by respondents within two main categories: commercial farming and urban agriculture. Some actor groups' discourses naturally clustered in their perspectives. For example, international aid and the national government both focused on a country-wide agricultural transformation to commercial agriculture as well as the need to improve the physical and policy infrastructure that would support a national food value chain and meeting international standards for trade.

Large-scale rural development to ensure food security was mentioned by both national government and international aid agencies. Their perspectives revolved around improving rural livelihoods and farming production, which would then raise the standards of living in urban areas – in other words, 'the rising rural tide will also float the urban boat' by ensuring an economic flow of money for goods and services between rural and urban areas. In particular, agricultural-based public-private partnerships (PPPs) were suggested by these respondents to be a solution to economic growth in Malawi as a whole, suggesting that improvements in rural areas will trickle over to urban improvements. Large programmes such as the Greenbelt Initiative to commercially irrigate farmland along Lake Malawi were suggested would calm the volatility of maize prices and other major

commodities during hungry season by ensuring a more stable supply of maize throughout the year, thereby mitigating the impact of price fluctuations on urban areas. Although an example of the success of this concept exists (through sugarcane development in Salima, central Malawi), the persistence of agency among the Malawian elite to take advantage of large agricultural aid structures can destabilize the welfare of smallholder farmers that programs like these are meant to improve livelihoods and local economies (Chinsinga et al., 2013; Chinsinga, 2017; Mangulama & Wu, 2022).

Crop development, including increasing farmer income by moving to seed production, was one pathway suggested to improve the national economy by both international aid and national government actors. Other departments of the national government were focused on small-scale farming and improving output to increase rural diet diversity and sustainable farming techniques but received smaller funding pots and less focus from higher levels of bureaucracy than the public private partnerships within the Crop Development section.

Urban agriculture as a solution was mentioned in two contexts. The first was at the household level, where those with space can grow and potentially sell food under the 'blind-eye' of the city government that formally prohibits urban agriculture. The second was in planning and zoning, where the city planners hope to entice entrepreneurs to commercially farm formally zoned larger allotments for the benefit of urban food security. City government and city business groups suggested either commercial or home-based urban agriculture can support Mzuzu's food system.

Some academics, national government, and city officials suggested urban agriculture can provide a boost to urban food security, with one academic noting that *"there is still a colonial planning mentality within governance structures where agriculture is modelled out of urban space"* (079). Urban agriculture was mentioned by respondents in the 2018 AFSUN study of Mzuzu's urban food system (Riley et al., 2018) as a desired activity to improve food security. Of the 62% of those in the study who did not grow food in the city, 80% of them cited a lack of assets and resources – most importantly land, inputs, and water access – as the reason for not farming. This dissertation adds further qualitative information to these data through examining the experiences of those who grow food in the city. The respondents who grew food in the city were of moderate income levels – between those who are too low-income to grow food and do not have land and inputs, and those who are high-income are more likely to rent land or own farms outside of the city. Most often they were vendors who

grew smaller amounts of food to sell or for their own consumption either at their homes or in 'vacant' urban land.

"Yes for the tomatoes which is around here, my house. Yeah, it has helped me a lot because I've saved money on transport and also it has been easier for me to manage, to supervise and manage myself." 015 (Informal vendor)

The desire and ability to farm within the city may be a major difference between Mzuzu and other southern African cities, as well as the enabling environment from a city government that is more open to agricultural activities occurring within the city (Simatele, 2012). While it may not improve the livelihoods of extreme low-asset and low-income residents (Webb & Kasumba, 2009; Riley et al., 2018), the quarter of residents who are of marginal levels of food security and have access to assets may find urban agriculture could improve food security outcomes.

5.2.3.2 Governance Solutions

The concept of transparency ran through governance solutions from all respondent types and levels, particularly in financial management and transactions along the food value chain and with special attention to government actors. For example, international aid, national government, CSO, and city business respondents all suggested improved oversight of the Crops Section of the Department of Agriculture was necessary to reduce the graft from high level politicians in the national government.

Urban food sellers, including farmers who sell in Mzuzu, CSO respondents, and some aid, academia and government officials focused on solutions that would limit corruption in the national government in relation to food. The theme of transparency continued with suggestions to reform the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) and the Farm Input Subsidy Program (FISP). In both cases, suggested solutions required increased oversight on stock management to ensure wholesale maize buyers were not abusing their agency to overbuy, thereby limiting the amount that low-income people can purchase. These solutions include improving the warehouse receipt system to enable farmers early access to financing (thereby providing steadier income, reducing reliance on FISP or the need for them to sell their FISP coupons to high-income farmers) as well as providing oversight of ADMARC warehouse sales in the city. Respondents noted that volatility can result from international trade, but that existing agencies such as ADMARC and the National Food Reserve Agency would mitigate this volatility if their functioning improved.

The large bureaucracy required to ensure the proper storage and movement of food commodities was noted as a major impediment to economic prosperity by international aid and national government respondents. These types of suggestions re-emphasize the assumptions that rural economic improvements will spill over into urban improvements. This discussion was also tied to a norm within the hierarchy of workplace culture, previously discussed in Chapter 4. Improvements or ideas from lower-level bureaucrats are assumed to be viewed as threats by supervisors and are therefore rarely brought up. This cultural impediment was attributed not only to ideas, but also to not challenging corruption or encouraging transparency in food system problems.

All proposed governance solutions indicated the frustration with the governance of 'middle-men' in the food value chain, particularly around maize. All respondent groups suggested that middlemen greatly impact the food value chain; while most comments were negative, the positive comments suggested the diversity and informality of the middlemen enabled the large amounts and diversity of food within the city. On the negative side, CSOs recalled recent stories of how unregulated middlemen were the key to politicians being able to transport large amounts of maize across international borders to then have the national government 'purchase' it through their own businesses. City business respondents also remarked that it is middlemen at the ADMARC warehouses that have the agency to sell to other middlemen (or wholesale traders) who then hold back maize and raise urban prices.

National government respondents suggested that middlemen take advantage of the low numbers of national government officials and presence in the northern rural regions, underpaying low-income farmers for their crops when they have little recourse to transport their goods to a larger market. The result is a smaller number of people holding maize back until the prices rise – CSO and national government respondents suggested regulations to set prices of major goods, but also worried about the impact a set price would have on farmers.

Major differences in perspectives emerged between two clusters of respondents. The first cluster – international aid, national government, and city government – viewed commercial agriculture as the major opportunity to bolster the national (and therefore urban) economy, as discussed above. Their solutions to ensuring a well-functioning economy lay in the governance of the food value chain – the physical and social infrastructure that ensured the movement of goods within the country and between its trading partners. The second cluster, made up of CSOs, business owners, and informal

vendors see the issue as one of certain actors impeding the money that already exists in the economy. These groups saw the food system as stymied by economic mismanagement and corruption. For them, the governance solution is increased transparency in government transactions not only in the food value chain but within transactions around infrastructure, city finance, and international aid. They felt transparency would enable the economic velocity they were hoping for in Mzuzu's food system.

The interpretations of responsibilities in food governance clearly differed between respondents. Overall, city and national government respondents suggested their job was to create and enforce the regulations and laws, while businesses, market vendors, and informal sellers believed it was the responsibility of both levels of government to enable businesses by providing infrastructure, clear and accessible directives, and enforcement when needed. Regarding market space in Mzuzu, market vendors and vendor governance believed that proper governance required transparency and service provision, whereas city government felt providing inspections, regulations, and enforcement are their key governance responsibilities. One city government respondent remarked:

"...if they [market vendors] can be given enough support in terms of regular inspections and regulations they should be able to adapt." 001

Within the international aid and national government respondents, food system governance meant the coordination between the Malawi national government and international aid. The Sector Wide working groups and emergency-driven "clusters" needed to base their work off real-time data, necessitating discussions around improving data access, sharing, and storage. Integrated information systems were suggested to ensure everyone is working from the same data. This work was mostly focused on rural production to predict food availability and identify the rural areas in greatest need of assistance.

5.2.3.3 Physical Infrastructure Solutions

Discussions on physical infrastructure were very common in all levels and types of governance. Two main types of physical infrastructure were discussed: direct food system infrastructure and supportive food system infrastructure.

Direct food system infrastructure was discussed by the national government and international aid in a rural context – farmers required education and access to capital to then increase the value of their

crops through physical farm infrastructure and meeting international standards for trade. The most common topic of direct food system infrastructure at the city level was the markets in Mzuzu. Solutions included improving physical stall space, walkway passability, and increasing available vendor space. Regarding food safety, WASH facilities required improvement. This was another example of where the city government expects to be the rule creator and enforcer, but not the provider, and where market vendors expect to be provided a service for their market fee, showing a dissonance between expectations of governance both in the definition of governance and what that meant for governance responsibilities.

Physical infrastructure that is supportive of the food system included mainly energy and roads, both previously discussed in Chapter 4. Also common amongst respondents in national and international levels was the importance of rural development and farming capacity to slow urbanization rates, ensuring a continual provision of rural food to cities.

As previously discussed, all respondent types and levels agreed that improving roads would improve food system problems, and their perspective reflected their type and level of governance. For example, market vendors noted the quality of market roads, and national government actors remarked on the transportation barriers to international trade. Differences between the governance of urban and rural jurisdictions emerged when discussing the responsibility for road infrastructure and the ease with which rural programming can be implemented compared to urban. Aid agency respondents noted that the rural "food for work" programs that provided employment for rural citizens to improve local infrastructure (such as roads) would not work in the cities, where the government is mandated to govern road maintenance. However, city government respondents also cited the program as one that can work within city boundaries and is already underway; however, it was unclear if this work was on national roads or city-based roads. Clearly there is complexity in jurisdictional governance and a need to clarify governance roles.

5.2.3.4 Solutions based within Individual Responsibility

The agency-based solutions proposed by respondents shows how perspective influences actions within Mzuzu's food system. There were two types of solutions that place responsibility on individual citizens: holding duty-bearers to account and accessing assets and information.

Individual market vendor groups provided strong examples of how their perspectives influenced their use of agency to attempt to shift governance structures in their favour and hold duty-bearers to account. Market vendors recalled an incident that required representation at the city level – however the results of meetings between vendor governance representatives and city government did not produce their desired outcome. Assumptions of corruption and frustration ("*there is nothing they [vendor governance association] do for us"* 072) then led to a collective market vendor protest with a petition delivered straight to city government from market vendors. These assumptions of corruption led to their use of collective agency – as individual market vendor actions are likely to not gain attention – to use democratic norms and structures (protest/petitions/collective refusal to pay daily market fees). These actions created media and government attention. Whether or not this shifts governance structures to provide more transparency regarding the use of market fees is yet to be seen, but these actions keep the issue at the forefront of city government awareness. In addition to these actions, market vendors would also take advantage of the lack of enforcement of street sellers and take their goods outside of the market to sell on slow days.

The amount of assets a business respondent owned directly related to their agency to access more assets and services provided by aid and government. High income or middle-class vendors accessed business-enabling resources more easily than low-income vendors. One middle-class informal vendor noted that they could access the small and medium enterprise development agency in Mzuzu to get help with managing her business. *"It has been very helpful because I know how much I've put in and how much how I can come up with the prices and how much I can calculate for the profit, even the net profit"* 015. High-asset farmers often knew each other and connected over best practices and used their extensive networks to provide goods to local businesses.

CSO and business respondents suggested the citizenry use their collective agency to hold duty-bearers to account and *"work for their country"* (085). Their solutions required actions from themselves (particularly CSO groups) and citizens that actively challenged authorities to provide needed services. They saw the general absence of civic action as a result of poverty and poor education and presumed that governments were interpreting the lack of civic action as there being 'no problem'; not seeing urban food issues as political or requiring a proactive city or state level response. This is in line with Haysom's (2020) finding of the impact of resource constraints on citizens to politically engage in society meant little threat of any citizen mobilization to contest food poverty and insecurity.

Table 5-3 Main Areas of Agreement and Disagreement between Respondent Groups Regarding Solutions to Urban Food System Problems (2 pgs.)

Areas of Agreement

Governance Group	International Aid	Academia	National Government	City Government	City and National Business	Informal Workers	VA Governance	Civil Society Org.
International Aid		Overburdened, underfunded lower levels of government require capacity dvlpmnt	Public Private Partnerships to develop rural agriculture, improve ability to reach intnl standards	Decreasing costs of farming improves production; urban nutrition programming is primary concern	PPPs are a way forward in agricultural and business dvlpmnt to ensure urban economic growth	City councils hold responsibility to manage street vending	Market sellers should see benefits from their fees through transparent processes	Holding duty bearers to account, ensuring transparency improves governance
Academia	Work directly with national government to deliver services VS. Avoid running funding through national coffers		Poor urban measurements impact awareness of urban food insecurity and therefore programmes	Advocacy for urban measurement and govt. focus on urban food security	Improve industrial growth in city to improve wages	Food sellers fill the gaps that consumers want	Energy is essential to economic development and market sales	Arbitrary price regulation of maize is a problem; improve capacity of governing officials
National Government	Purchasing power and numbers of bulk buyers of food is overlooked VS. further ag. development programming	Corruption impacts economic dvlpmnt and urban food system VS. need for more ag. dvlpmnt		Improve governance thru devolution to city and increasing city gov capacity; advance commercial farming	PPPs are a way forward in agricultural and business dvlpmnt to ensure urban economic growth	Formalization of food sales is preferred – shopfronts and set locations are desired by some	Improve employment with national agric. Policies aimed at farmers and youth	Low energy access impedes dvlpmnt and economic growth
City Government	Urban programming is nutrition focused VS. urban areas require additional measurement to improve programming	Urban agriculture can assist in food security VS. urban ag must be commercially focused	Idle urban land uses: agriculture VS. environmental management; Capacity low at city gov level VS.		Market spaces need improvement	Improve market infrastructure to encourage vendor sales across city	Increase number and spatial placement of markets in city to improve urban food access	Improved economic access to food and education will improve low income urban diet diversity and health

Areas of Disagreement

			funding flows low from nat gov level					
City and National Business	Urban food systems improve with agricultural dvlpmnt VS. Urban food systems improve with infrastructure dvlpmnt	Diverse food access enables urban food security VS. improving markets increases food security thru food safety	Improve production through inputs VS. Food loss is from poor technique, storage, education needs	Who holds responsibility for market improvement and infrastructure		Street sales negatively impact market sales;	Increased access to energy will improve sales	Transparency in govt. financial management will improve infrastructure
Informal Workers	Agricultural development includes commercialization and education VS. improving roads and access to capital	Improved employment comes from value-added industry VS. market infrastructure will enable sales	Money for market infrastructure should come from national government	Markets should be planned for safety and within urban plans VS. Markets should be placed where people pass by	Low profits are a result of street sales VS. high urbanization and low formal employment		Market space should be provided to street sellers	Improve access to capital to improve entrepreneurship
VA Governance	Agricultural development includes commercialization and education VS. improving market infrastructure and WASH access	Improving city councillor capacity improves governance VS. City govt. should provide market services such as WASH	Improved agricultural productivity will improved UFS VS. Urban food security depends on economic velocity from national govt.	Who holds responsibility for market improvement and infrastructure – VA Governance VS. City Government	The expectations on VA governance interactions with city governance	Some preference to remain with diverse sales pathways VS. market infrastructure needed for all sales		City government financial transparency is key to improved market functioning
Civil Society Org.	Commercial ag. As a vehicle for food security VS. civic eduction as vehicle for food security and holding duty-bearers accountable	Urban ag. Can improve food security VS. improving transparency will improve govt. spending in urban areas	Commercial agriculture as a vehicle for urban food security VS. citizen rights education as vehicle for urban food security	Regulations and inspections: improve food safety VS. create costs and barriers that send consumers to cheaper vendors	Rural agriculture dvlpmnt: improves economic growth VS. buys rural votes	City govt. should provide infrastructure for sales VS. open communication between vendor types and city	Govt. provision of services VS. Citizens demand services through transparency and action	

5.3 Discussion of Mzuzu's Food System in the Context of Food Systems Governance

This research asks, "*What is the qualitative nature of the influences of multi-level governance on Mzuzu's urban food system?"* The results of this chapter are meant to highlight these influences, creating a picture of multi-level urban food governance based on the perspectives of respondents. This section reviews four main findings from the analysis of respondent perspectives in the context of recent literature on food system governance:

1. There are key differences between perspectives on governance between actors of differing governance types and levels.
2. Major governance topics that influence Mzuzu's food system are actions (or inactions) around devolution, capacity building, and government corruption.
3. The lack of physical infrastructure to support food value chains is viewed as a major impediment to development and urban food security, especially in the context of high urbanization rates.
4. Urban food systems are of lower importance to rural food systems due to rural bias, assumed need in rural areas, and a lack of urban measurement.

5.3.1 There are key differences in perspectives on governance between governance types and levels

As discussed in Chapter 1, governance is a system of organization based on rules, both from formal structures such as laws, and informal structures such as norms. The analysis in this chapter shows key differences between different actors in their perspectives of what food system governance entails and the agency and responsibilities of actors involved. The intricate network of so many sectors creates "different framings of the problem of food insecurity" (Pereira & Drimie, 2016 p. 26), which then invites different framings of food system solutions and governance. Based on the Chapter 5 analysis, Table 5-4 summarizes the general perspectives of governance from each governance group of how they view their governance responsibilities.

Table 5-4 General Perspectives of Governance Responsibilities from Each Governance Group

Governance Group	General perspectives on their own governance responsibilities
International Aid	• Normative rule creation based on international or home country norms • Financial control and accountability • Coordination of complex bureaucracy
National Government	• Bureaucratic control and guidance to lower governance levels • Financial control • Rule and policy creation
City Government	• Rule creation • Enforcement • Spatial planning • Supportive health programming
National/City business	• Implement and adhere to government rules • Negotiate and interact with city and national governance
Market Vendor Governance	• Enforcement of market vendor behaviour • Negotiation with city government
Street Vendors	• Informal rule creation based on norms, reciprocity, and negotiation • Vending actions guided by constitutional and cultural norms
CSO	• Use negotiation and directive governance to coerce governments into action • Build capacity of government and citizenry to ensure transparency and other preferred values
Academia	• Provide data and guidance through negotiation • Support national and city government through cooperative programming

Formal rules were cited the most by international aid, national government, and city government respondents. The enforcement of those rules was shared by national government and city government – costs for urban enforcement were often borne directly by the city government, especially when dealing with the removal of street vendors. The concept of 'reactive' governance as opposed to the more controlled actions of long-term planning and implementation was consistent throughout respondent discussions of enforcement. Enforcement was a more relied upon strategy in

the city government than other behaviour modification strategies by governments, such as incentives. According to respondents, the use of enforcement is a factor of low government funding, an overwhelmed bureaucracy, and historical norms for street vending. All groups agreed that rule or policy implementation was the most difficult of the governance actions within the food system.

Reactive governance was presented by some respondents as a 'triage' concept, necessary due to the low resources being channeled to urban areas. Comments from multilateral and bilateral aid agencies suggest that urban food security is not as much a concern as rural areas, focusing on national economics and agriculture to improve national metrics. Reactive governance was also a major topic when enforcing the use of urban space for food sales. A major concern was that urban food insecurity will grow until it reaches a crisis level, upon which reactive governance may emerge in the form of enforcement. This was the assumption of many respondents who discussed concerns of urbanization rates – that there will eventually be too much hunger in the cities, and it will create unrest, theft, violence, and an overreliance on informal vending. Respondents related to how this can be seen in the current reactions to street vending in the city that is met with force and enforcement.

Smit (2019) notes the need for collaborative governance processes that acknowledge power differentials. This dissertation suggests that it may not be enough to acknowledge the differentials – indeed these differences have been clearly defined in Malawian food systems and political economy literature (Quinn, 1994a; Quinn, 1994b; Cammack, 2006; Chinsinga, 2007; Chirwa & Chinsinga, 2014; Banik & Chasukwa, 2019). I assert that to engage in discussions on food security, people must first understand what good food system governance means to each group and the expectations from each governance group to each other. This is clearly exemplified in the conflict between market and street vendors, where there is tension between norms of national government control, service provision, city enforcement, and cultural and democratic norms.

Governance solutions in food system literature emphasize communication and coordination (Candel, 2014; Smit, 2019) – but funding and trust are also needed (Buchan et al., 2019; Sonnino, 2019; Sonnino et al., 2019). Building trust between citizens and governments in Malawi will require unprecedented pathways to transparency, in national fiscal management and particularly in transfers of money and power in the devolution process. One approach is to begin at the smaller levels of

bureaucracy – not only is it a more manageable system to operate, but hierarchical norms are not as strong between city government and citizens as they are in national government. A recent USAID program – the Local Governance and Accountability Project – worked with small towns across Malawi to ensure transparency of market fees and create governance arrangements to support tax collection and responsible city government spending. This program observed improvements in tax revenue when transparency structures were not just put in place, but citizens were educated on how to hold duty-bearers responsible, and information was shared with different actors in the marketplace to create expectations of transparency (Mukute et al., 2021).

In addition to understanding how respondents feel about the urban food system, it is most important to acknowledge the differences in understandings of governance across the actors. It is clear from the data provided in this study, that the way one thinks about a problem influences not only the perception of the causes of the problem, but who is responsible for solving it, and how to solve it. The application of the GAF is useful in this context because it has highlighted not only why certain policies do not create the outcomes they should, but how agency is used (or not used) to create different outcomes in the food system. This implies that governance analysis can improve though integrating social, economic, and political contexts (Bulkely & Betsill, 2013; Haysom et al., 2019). Critically examining the perspectives between actors highlights the "discursive struggles through which urban problems are defined" (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2005, p. 56), and in this case, how they should be solved. This chapter also highlights the potential conflict behind these discursive struggles, elucidating the challenges that could emerge when tackling urban food system issues.

5.3.2 Major Influences on Mzuzu's food system are actions (or inactions) around devolution, capacity, and corruption

Candel (2014) describes how a governance system with low levels of resources, uncoordinated institutions and poor decision making can impact food systems despite it not being a 'direct' cause of food insecurity. Similarly, respondents in this study referenced governance concepts not directly associated with the food value chain. Fragmented devolution and communication from national government, rural bias in development funding, and corruption were all suggested as major reasons for food insecurity in Mzuzu. Respondents perceived impacts to government capacity, such as not having the capacity to deliver government programmes, as the most impactful to Mzuzu's food outcomes.

This finding suggests that a major influence on the outcomes of Mzuzu's food system is actor agency. The fluidity of governance structures and the reliance on ideological and cultural norms in the face of rules that may or may not be implemented or enforced creates an environment where actors will optimize their current options within the structures that bound their choices. Mzuzu's food system is dominated by circulations of decision-making determined by normative aid and national government structures, cultural and political norms, and the agency of certain actors to reinforce or take advantage of the structures in their purview. For example, a national politician may focus an agricultural aid programme towards a rural area where votes mean re-election, or an informal vendor may set up in a more prominent location during elections, knowing that national influence means that they will not be chased away by the city government or police.

Focusing governance analyses only on institutions and structures misses the clear fact that "the effectiveness of reform is determined largely by broad features of the political-economic context in which reform is carried out" (Boone, 2003, p. 356). In other words, it is not effective to only adjust structures, such as implementing a devolution policy or transparency requirements, without acknowledging the agency that powerful figures have to bypass, not implement (or implement), or enforce (or not) such structures without large social or political consequences. The results from this perspectives analysis echo Haysom's (2020) suggestion that urban governance is embedded in interest groups who wield political power, regardless of their position within an urban geographical boundary. Understanding the interplay between agency and structure is essential to approaching contextual food system solutions.

The New Urban Agenda (UN Habitat, 2016) emphasizes the importance of democratizing and empowering local governments to solve problems – a challenge, as many of these problems originate beyond their scale and their traditional institutional ability (Pieterse, 2020). Urban governments now find themselves the center of responsibility for urban sustainability and inclusion, all while managing relationships with significant power imbalances. Concern arises when urban management is already under pressure, as it is in Mzuzu, turning from one reactive management scenario to the next. There is little time and capacity to cultivate the "multi-stakeholderism" management required for inclusive governance to solve these consistent problems (McKeon, 2017). While multi-actor groups such as the Town and Country Planning Committee have uncovered important issues in day-to-day urban management, it is not structured to uncover the power differentials, miscommunications, or cognitive dissonance that may occur between parties meant to cooperatively manage cities.

From the field of development, the governance principle that was most mentioned and valued by many respondents was transparency. The need and desire for transparency in national government processes has been well documented (Tambulasi, 2009, Daka, 2013; Tambulasi & Chasukwa, 2014; Dulani, 2019; Tengatenga & Soyiyo, 2020). There is less attention and research on the transparency needs in other governance levels and types, such as the groups in this study. Market vendors needed transparency and accountability from both vendor governance representatives and the city government – the lack of transparency about negotiations and transactions invoked the perception that the two governing groups were taking advantage of the lack of rule implementation and enforcement regarding the management of vendor fees. CSOs wanted transparency about economic aid between aid agencies and the national government – a factor they saw as essential to both rural and urban well-being. The city government was not only expected to provide transparency but needed transparency from the national government regarding not only the transfer and management of funds, but the devolution of roles and responsibilities.

5.3.3 The lack of physical infrastructure in food value chains is viewed as a major impediment to development and urban food security

The links between infrastructure and urban well-being were clear from respondents – that infrastructure is essential to business and government operations, which is essential to building an economy, which creates employment and thereby improves food security. Smit (2019) shows the how the disruption of transportation systems is a consistent factor in different African urban food

governance contexts – though it is difficult to quantify. This study has qualitatively shown how specific transportation issues form food system outcomes in Mzuzu through descriptions of the impacts of road quality within and surrounding the city, transportation vehicle quality, and market access points. Respondent interviews highlighted Mzuzu's food system infrastructure priorities as well-maintained urban roads and entrances to markets, spacious and safe market environments, and energy.

Haysom (2020) suggests that a key to improved urban food governance is understanding the role that appropriate infrastructures could play in delivering positive outcomes in the urban food system and that fit under their mandate. Each governance level perceived governance needs in their specific context, which is consistent with Haysom et al. (2019, p. 1) findings that "contextual differences and immediate (perceived) needs resulted in very different views on the nature of the challenge and the solutions required." On a positive note, when respondents' perspectives on a problem coalesced, such as with transportation systems, they related to the problem through their own scalar perspective. Their solutions may be different based on their values and surrounding foundational norms, but, for example, the "common position" (Haysom et al., 2019, p. 12) of transportation systems is a major pathway towards an improved food system in Mzuzu. This topic can be viewed as the vehicle through which difference is "celebrated as opposed to censored" (Haysom et al., 2019, p. 12) and through which others' positions not only on transportation, but on governance, are clarified and contextually understood.

5.3.4 Urban food systems are of lower importance to rural food systems due to rural bias, assumed need in rural areas, and a lack of urban measurement

The analysis showed that urban food security is not on the formal governance radar, being absent from most food security analyses in the country, as well as governance structures built around rural national food systems. Rural bias is found within international aid strategy, national government policy, and the political economy of Malawian society. Despite most respondents' acknowledgement of these problems, they felt they had little agency to shift the structures that reinforced the focus on rural areas.

Urban measurements of poverty are not developing in line with the rates of urbanization and the subsequent realities for governance (Lucci et al., 2018). Within the literature on urban food security measurements in Sub-Saharan Africa, major inconsistencies between traditional measurements of

food insecurity and urban levels of poverty and access are emerging, with calls for "comprehensive urban-oriented food security research and policy agendas" (Tuholske et al., 2020 p. 417). As discussed in Section 5.3.2.4.1, the rates of urbanization in Mzuzu warrant a prompt examination of policy and a needs assessment for urban measurement.

5.4 The 'Picture' of Mzuzu's Food System

Chapters 4 and 5 revealed the underlying forces behind the urban food outcomes in Mzuzu, as well as the perspectives on why these outcomes exist and how these perspectives form ideas about solutions to the more problematic outcomes. The food system is dominated by circulations of decision-making determined by normative aid and national government structures, cultural and political norms, and the agency of certain actors to reinforce or take advantage of those structures.

Table 5-5 and Figures 5-7 and 5-8 describe and summarize the important features of Mzuzu's food system governance in the form of a network food system, as previously described in Chapter 2. These features highlight what is important to understand when engaging in discussions about Mzuzu's food system.

Table 5-5 Important Features of Mzuzu's Food System Governance Within the Categories of the Governance Analytical Framework

GAF Category	Context-specific to Mzuzu's Food System Governance
Norms	Bureaucratic hierarchies Deference to National Government norms and power Democratic and cultural norms Local food culture – fresh food access
Problems	Government Capacity Corruption – financial flows Economic Access to Food Energy consistency and access Market conflict Urban Planning
Nodes	Media Meetings between governance levels and types Electronic communication – food sales Mzuzu Central Market – food sales Town and Country Planning Committee
Processes	Devolution – Transfers of government finances to lower govt. levels Transparency – aid contracting, use of market fees Access to Information Transportation and food sales, middlemen interactions
Actors	Diverse types of food vendors Middlemen National politicians City government

Recalling the thematic discussions of Chapter 4, Figure 5-7 shows the descriptions of the major forces behind Mzuzu's food system and how those forces influence the perspectives and proposed solutions for the city.



Figure 5-7 Pathways from Influencing Forces to Perspectives on Solutions in Mzuzu's Food System



Figure 5-8 The Multi-level Influences on Mzuzu's Food System Outcomes (adapted from Hawkes, Parsons and Wells (2019))

5.5 Applying the Findings

This empirical study of complex food system governance provides practitioners with practical starting points to engage in the conversations, policy discussions, and interactions required to manage Mzuzu's food system governance. The emerging themes are connected to the perspectives about the intentions and agency of other groups in food system governance. This analysis therefore provides insights into how to approach problems from a contextual, agency-based perspective. Practitioners within food system governance will benefit from a focus on the interactions between levels and types of governance actors as Mzuzu further urbanizes and encounters other challenges within its food system.

This chapter showed that the governance of Mzuzu's food system is perceived as mostly agency-based. Respondents acknowledged the power of government actors to create rules, implement and enforce rules through stories such as maize price manipulation, rural bias, low devolution, and connections with and low regulation of middlemen. While individuals within any governance type or level may endeavor to transform and/or escape structures, it is more realistic that they develop "beliefs and desires in light of tacit and strategic consideration of the opportunities and constraints they inherit with their positions in the social structure" (Davies, 2011 p. 78) – in other words, the actor, seeing the benefits or drawbacks of certain perspectives, will eventually apply their agency to follow certain pathways that benefit them, eventually viewing these pathways as their true beliefs about the system in which they operate. In Mzuzu's food system, you see this phenomenon emerge through the differing preferences for solutions – from rural agricultural programming or the improvement of market infrastructure to solve food security.

The results of this research allow stakeholders to best decide how to improve food system functions based on their needs and capacity. The stories and tables in the results chapters will provide practitioners with guidance on which themes to engage food system actors. The tables and lists in Chapter 5 highlight issues that are easier to achieve based on similar perspectives. In addition, those tables and lists also show practitioners what topics may be more contentious and require more effort to build trust between actors. The places that a Mzuzu city councillor may choose to start are their own decision, but the hope for this work is to provide them with the context from which they can see their own context in the general recommendations for urban food governance from larger international institutions like the World Bank or the Food and Agriculture Organization.

As implementing the urban Sustainable Development Goals is now designated by the Malawian national government as a city responsibility, it is necessary to understand the power dynamics, commonalities, and differences in strategic approaches to food system governance between all actors. The United Nations (2021) findings on the implementation of the SDGs in Malawi found that the "main challenges hindering progress revolve around central and local governments' ability to design and implement the required systems – including policy frameworks, development plans, and monitoring and evaluation procedures – to effectively deliver critical services to communities." Communication skills, conflict resolution, and diplomacy will be the skills required for practitioners to engage in food system discussions and, more importantly, policy implementation. This study has highlighted starting points and points of conflict regarding both perspectives on problems and responsibility for solutions to food system issues. Frayne et al. (2022), in their review of food governance literature, suggest a shift towards the pillar of 'access' may become instrumental in informing multi-dimensional policies – what will still be needed is the integration of social equity and 'voice equity' as a foundation of urban sustainable development. Further inquiry would ask if the SDG paradigm goes far enough in acknowledging the agency that impacts urban food system outcomes.

This dissertation agrees with Haysom et al.'s argument (2019) that avoiding conflicting ideas finds false solutions – in addition, I suggest that avoiding conflict has potential to create even more silos in an already siloed field of food governance. To build trust, I suggest starting where there is common agreement on a theme to initially build relationships. Next, approach areas of disagreement as examinations of perspectives – what is the problem, who holds responsibility, and how might agencies and structures persist to reinforce the problem? Is the problem one of coordination and communication, or more fundamental differences in goals and interests (Larson et al., 2018)? To be clear, coming to consensus on the answers to each of these questions is not necessary, but understanding each stakeholders' position is. It is also essential to identify the differences in power in each group, along with what people believe are the causes of this inequality (Larson et al., 2018). The structures that already exist in government, international aid, and private partnership such as the Sector wide working groups (SWAPs) may be a vehicle to start conversations, but other structures (such as working groups that incorporate other actors like vendors and medium-sized enterprises), will need to be incorporated.

One of the strongest relationships recorded in this study is between international aid agencies and the national government. While a close and trusting relationship is necessary between these two groups, each should be cognizant of any mutual reinforcement of discourse or actions that continue to build a bubble between this pairing and other governance levels and types. I suggest that practitioners within these groups extend their communication networks outside of the typical working group meetings to directly engage with regional and city governments, vendor associations, and private businesses. This will not only expand their understanding of alternative viewpoints, but also build trust in urban areas, where their positive presence is little felt. The Local Governance Accountability Program from USAID is a strong example of this extension.

Engagement of actors at urban scales and more informal levels has the potential to fall into well-known traps of 'participative' policy that eventually become consultative 'boxes to tick' in development projects. The field of co-productive policy has recently emerged as a concept in participatory urban planning (Watson, 2014). Practitioners and researchers in this field can apply the results of this study to ensure the agency of national and city governments is used to engage food system actors in a way that respects their strengths; their flexibility, their collective power, and their knowledge of local food system processes (Galuszka, 2019). In addition, it is imperative that practitioners build on the strengths of Mzuzu's food system – that any policies towards 'modernizing' the physical infrastructure of the food system enable the diverse pathways that were so valued by all actors to continue into Mzuzu's future food system.

For example, improving access to fresh food throughout the city may involve improving the infrastructure of smaller markets. This research also shows the importance of supporting satellite markets through road and access infrastructure, as well as incentivizing middlemen to drop wholesale foodstuffs at smaller markets. First though, further work on market improvements will require trust building between market vendors and city government. Establishing responsibilities and accountability processes between each party will be essential prior to any physical or policy improvements to market operations in Mzuzu.

In one example, the city has traditionally been responsible for implementing health and safety policies around prepared street food, typically expressed in policy decrees and enforcement. Future priorities based on perspectives from market vendors include implementing improved WASH

facilities in market areas, including waste management (Lazaro et al., 2019). This would not only improve health outcomes, but also has potential to improve trust between market vendors and city government. Including transparency instruments (such as through MOUs that delineate responsibilities) in the process of WASH implementation and waste management could build relationships to further other initiatives such as transparency and accountability in market fee use.

In addition to physical infrastructure, creating the social, bureaucratic, and physical conditions for employment – both formal and informal – is an effective way to build economic growth (Logan, 2014). For example, as of 2020, Mzuzu Dairy Limited opened a dairy processing plant near Mzuzu and is providing a central hub for farmers to process and sell milk. Instead of focusing on the large-scale commercialization of agriculture, aid could be focused on supporting the existing small farmers that should be reaching this dairy, as well as assisting the dairy in their start up needs. This is an example of where a further, more specific application of the Governance Analytical Framework may be useful by identifying specific nodes and processes to this specific food value chain, including where discussions between aid agencies, city governance, and business owners can highlight the physical or social infrastructure needs of emerging value-added businesses. Considering that many Mzuzu residents are eager to start businesses and engage in value-added activities, international aid and governments can support accessibility to policies, legislation, low-interest business loans, physical business infrastructure, and city infrastructure. Essentially, if the governments enable Mzuzu residents to meet the rules and regulations for the food system, Mzuzu residents will fill the entrepreneurial gaps themselves.

Change is difficult, and the amount of effort required to shift a system of such complexity, like an urban food system, is often underestimated. More intractable issues, such as enforcement of minimum wage provision from small businesses, will need persistence and funding to continue discussions of how to provide living wages in the urban areas of Malawi. At an international aid level, past urban initiatives in Malawi have shown promise in the sharing of governance practice, but little aid or national government support is provided for implementation. For example, the Malawian Mayoral Forum (May 2018) run by the United Nations Development Programme was a good opportunity to share experiences. Historically, the UN Habitat Programme had a local representative that enabled research, communication, and policy development amongst the largest cities. The

programme has since been cut and the mayor's forum occurred once, but the opportunity still exists for UN Habitat to re-engage in Malawi.

There is much potential for research and collaboration between the major Malawian cities, particularly in social programming and comparative urban planning. Specifically, two themes that arose in this study could be approached at a cooperative level between Malawian urban sites: urban measurements of poverty and approaches to transparency and accountability. Practitioners of urban planning and policy, particularly from within governments, can develop appropriate and relative urban poverty measurements specific to their cities while comparing their approaches and sharing best practices. In addition, applying findings from programs such as the Local Governance Accountability Project (USAID) and creating transparency policies to build trust between city governance and market operations will also provide opportunities to share best practices.

5.6 Chapter Summary

Chapter 5 provided an analysis of actor perspectives within Mzuzu's food system governance, providing a qualitative, contextual understanding of how perspectives on governance and the agency of actors influence the outcomes of Mzuzu's food system. By applying the concepts of the Governance Analytical Framework to the analysis, contextual themes emerged about the causes of problems in the food system, the solutions, and responsibilities. The themes are shown in the figures, tables and descriptions within the chapter. Comparisons between governance types and levels showed where groups agreed and disagreed on what was a major problem and how to address these themes in the food system. Four major findings are discussed, incorporating existing literature on urban food governance. The chapter then summarizes the social, economic, and political influences that make Mzuzu's food system what it is. The final section suggests considerations and pathways to practically apply the results.

6.0 Contributions and Conclusions

6.1 Review of Thesis Statement and Research Objectives

Food systems are the result of political, economic, and social systems that make up our societies. This is a logical understanding of how our food systems form but it is not necessarily how we have studied them in the past. Food system literature has often focused on outcomes; the premise of this research is that these urban food system outcomes are influenced by the structures and subsequent agency of actors within multiple levels and types of governance. This thesis has asked how to view political, economic, and social systems in a way that helps to clarify the deeper influences behind urban food outcomes, and how this can lead to improved urban food governance.

Specifically, this research asked:

What is the qualitative nature of the influences of multi-level governance on Mzuzu's urban food system?

From this main question, three subsidiary questions were asked:

1. *What does the addition of stakeholder perspectives add to the contextual understanding of Mzuzu's food system governance?*
2. *How can approaching governance analysis using actor's perspectives add to critical urban food studies?*
3. *Can the operationalization of a governance analytical framework provide a contextual understanding of Mzuzu's food system?*

Chapters 4 and 5 qualified the nature of the influences of multi-level governance on Mzuzu's urban food system through examinations of underlying forces and the perspectives of actors. The major findings are listed below in the categories of empirical, theoretical, methodological, and applied policy. The chapter concludes with a list of possible further research and future considerations.

6.2 Major Findings

6.2.1 Empirical Findings

1. *This study found that national and city governments were perceived to have a large influence on food system processes in Mzuzu.*

   Overall, Mzuzu's food system outcomes are perceived by respondents to be dominated by national government decisions. Specifically, Mzuzu's urban food system is characterized by a lopsided power structure, with city government seen as harnessing a small amount of power. The respondents' understandings of centralized power in the national government influence how they perceive governance choices are being made within national governance and about national governance – choices to not regulate middlemen, to focus development aid and the subsequent discourse on rural areas and commercialized agriculture, to politicize vendor conflicts, or to keep financial control and devolution within the national realm.

   The city's creation of rules around Mzuzu's food system are based in formalizing financial transactions within a bureaucratic and 'modernized' tax system, protecting citizens from food pathogens, and adhering to spatial restrictions. The enforcement of rules is where the agency of city government was most apparent, with choices being made about which rules to enforce and when (such as enforcing rules around informal vending outside of elections or not allowing dambo farming), and which ones to gently ignore (such as urban household farming).

2. *The diverse pathways of access are one of the most valued parts of Mzuzu's food system, as is the diversity and availability of food that enters the city from the peri-urban areas, the lakeshore, and the larger regional foodscape.*

   These pathways are a valued aspect of Mzuzu's food system by all levels and types of respondents and are directly linked to the high availability of food in the city. The numbers and types of vendors selling in the city are a function of the high competition between vendors and the selective governance decisions around rule enforcement. The selectivity by the city government is a function of cultural norms and ideologies of free market liberalism and a low capacity to actively manage the city's food system. These decisions sit within boundaries of acceptance by the city government. For example, choices to not enforce certain levels of street food sales create specific food outcomes regarding the availability of food in the urban area. That

is, until pressure from market vendors who provide tax revenue to the city will instigate enforcement around street selling. High-asset farmers bring their goods into the city and sell freely without taxation and are free to drop or sell goods at a location of their choosing. Selective rule enforcement influences the availability of fresh food and informal vending in the city.

3. *The location and quality of physical infrastructure influenced food outcomes in Mzuzu, especially in the context of a high urbanization rate.*

   Most clearly, the main market being centered between two nationally managed highways improves access to this market for both sellers and buyers. Solutions including social and physical infrastructure arose when discussing food processing and value-added activities. Market infrastructure, energy and transportation are critical elements in what people perceive will support a functioning urban food system. Improved communication around market management is key for all actors directly involved when discussing the need for physical improvements, especially as the informal food economy provides a growing percentage of urban employment and as Mzuzu continues to receive high levels of rural to urban migration. Perspectives on the low levels of government transparency and accountability are the resounding factors that influenced how people perceived Mzuzu's food system governance. Underscoring these is the importance of access to information – legislation, rules, processes, and policies that influence people's perceptions and understandings of the food system.

4. *The interpretations of what governance is and who is responsible for it clearly differed between respondents.*

   This finding is an important contribution to policy development. For food policy to function properly, policy makers must understand the beliefs and perceptions behind the actions of those within the food system. Making clear who has responsibility for what parts of the food system is an essential first step to its effective governance.

6.2.2 Theoretical Findings

In this research, I apply the logic of structuration theory to propose that actors apply their understandings and capabilities to maximize their benefits in any situation, including those of governance. This impacts their perceptions and actions within urban food systems. With this in mind, this study applied principles of constructivism to define knowledge as a culmination of

interpretations of a similar phenomenon; therefore multiple 'knowledges' can coexist when equally competent (or trusted) interpreters disagree (Guba and Lincoln, 1994, p. 113). As it applies to governance analysis, the agency that people believe they have or don't have to change the system are as important as their actual agency. Governance decisions are therefore circulations of decisions based on what has happened in the past, the amount of agency decision-makers hold, and their perceptions and beliefs about the system they are making decisions in.

1. *This dissertation, through a constructivist framework and inductive approach, has shown the value of qualitative examinations of urban food systems as they exist, instead of how they should be. Urban food systems are influenced by the agency of actors outside of the urban boundary as well as outside of the typical food value chain.*

The discourse of productivist solutions continues to influence the functions of Mzuzu's food system, with government and aid groups applying their considerable agency to guide financial and social resources towards rural aid and commercial agriculture. That the production narrative in aid and national government circles benefits the few and is a continuation of neocolonial and elite capture has been suggested in Malawian food system literature. White and Kampanje-Phiri (2019) assert that African food system studies should aim to expose the theoretical weaknesses of the existing analytical and conceptual frames, as well as avoid focusing studies on where the system should be headed, eschewing the 'should' for an understanding of 'what is.'

This dissertation's contributions to urban theory provide empirical evidence that scale is essential to urban analysis and provides empirical evidence of the nature of the scalar influences on an urban food system. This research shows the scalar influences on the concept of place and how 'place' manifests itself within local processes. These findings support Mould's (2016) assertion that urban theory is not required to stay in the confines of urban space, and urban processes are a more practical ontology through which we can excavate causes of urban inequalities. Therefore, the applicable scale of analysis for an urban food system problem is contextual – it must be guided by an initial, inductive assessment of the multi-level governance context and it must include actors outside of the formal government systems, lest it be "considered insufficient for grasping the complex webs of power at work" (Lindell, 2007 p. 180).

The focus of this type of research is on the interactions between each group of actors, their perceptions, and their agency. Fan (2019) suggests that in a complex, global system, "effective food policy must be specific to the political, economic, geographic, social, and cultural environment where it takes place." This dissertation combines this suggestion with the assertions of Buckeley & Betsill (2013) that the political, economic, and geographic environment is influenced by the same environment at different scales. The concept of place is a "constructed historical process in which the extralocal is as constitutive as the local" (Biersack, 2006 p. 16). Urban studies must incorporate multi-level governance influences or risk missing major pieces of the puzzle.

6.2.3 Methodological Findings

Fan (2019) emphasizes the need for an integrated food systems approach "that can meet the needs of an urbanizing world impacted by conflict and climate change" (p. 35). This dissertation has reviewed the multiple calls in food system literature to incorporate spatial scale, politics, and power into food system analysis.

1. *By centering the perspectives of the actors within the food system, this dissertation's methods and analysis has naturally flowed away from the direct steps of the food value chain and into the social and political realm of multi-level governance.*

Centering the perspectives of the actors provides a qualitative approach to assessing a food system in a way that engages the social and political realm of multi-level governance in an inductive manner. Essentially, reframing the food system analysis to include actions and processes outside of the direct food value chain allows for a more contextual understanding of the specific factors influencing the food system outcomes. Smit (2018, p. 55) writes it is "vitally important to understand actual urban governance processes, which are about how actors interact to make and operationalise decisions." The results of this research are intended to understand the governance that 'is' instead of 'should be,' in a way that presents context-specific solutions. This dissertation argues that complementary examinations of both food security levels *and* the sociopolitical context of the food system are necessary to implement proper policy, and that one of the reasons for fewer food systems analyses is the lack of methodology to contextually understand a city's food system as a whole, including the multi-level governance influences on that system.

2. *By applying a case study of Mzuzu, this research provides clearer methods around how to understand an urban food system that includes the influences of multi-level governance, including governance outside of the direct food value chain.*

To incorporate all governance factors from all levels and types into one study is impossible – but incorporating actor's perspectives of the food system incorporates these factors as well as highlights which of these factors are important to each actor. This statement supports my decision to apply an inductive methodology to this problem to be more open to unorthodox findings. I believe that this type of study is an essential part of research – inductive research can both confirm existing research as well as add further research inquiries to the field that are based in context. The inductive nature of the study proved essential to the interview process; almost all respondents did not believe they were qualified to discuss urban food systems. The inductive questioning allowed them and the researcher to understand their perceptions of where they fit into Mzuzu's food system.

Using perspectives as the basis for one's findings may invite criticism that you are not receiving the 'objective truth' – therefore I applied constructivist methods. This approach elicits the power differentials, norms, and perspectives of actors, which highlights governance problems like miscommunication and cognitive dissonance. This research helps to understand contextual impediments and suggests improvements specific to Mzuzu's food system. By applying this methodology, this study provides a response to Moragues-Faus & Battersby (2021) who propose a trialectic frame of physical, material, and relational urban properties. This study responds to this proposal by viewing the urban as a site of "complex socio-spatial relations where agents shape food system processes through actions and discourse" (p. 4) and stretching past urban boundaries.

6.2.3.1 Methods of Analysis

With this study, I provide a method of analysis that is replicative. This method relates back to the assertion that the non-normative approach of the Governance Analytical Framework holds methodological value. Hufty (2011b) states that the GAF should meet the criteria of "realistic (non-normative), interdisciplinary, reflexive, comparative, generalizable, and operational' (p. 405).

1. *This framework adds value to the field of comparative urban research; replicating the same methods in another city will see different results, but the common methods and analytical strategies could help to fill the gap of that middle ground between a generalizing narrative and a case study* (Riley & Legwegoh, 2014).

In this dissertation, the main methodological interrogation is to understand what commonalities between separate places can help to understand the idiosyncrasies of an urban space (Nijman, 2007). So much complexity requires the use of perspective to minimize the noise of complexity and pinpoint the processes, norms, and problems that affect the daily lives of food system users.

Nijman (2007) suggests that urban spaces are similar in certain ways, and that our focus as researchers should be interrogating the factors that create these similarities. This dissertation asserts that one of these universal similarities is the influence of multiple levels and types of governance on urban spaces and processes. Another commonality is governance itself. One may contest these assertions by suggesting that rural spaces have similar influences upon them – however the concentrations of processes, additional value-added roles, and transactions that are inherent to urban spaces are what makes them unique from rural areas and similar to each other. Cities are not only a manifestation of the different levels of power, but a concentration and amalgamation of norms, culture and values. It is this concentration and addition of services and roles that create urban complexity – and this concept arose often in discussions of problems in the food system.

The debate between the urban Global North and the urban Global South centers around criticisms of policy transfer and assumptions that universal urbanism will provide universal urban solutions (Battersby, 2017). This dissertation instead suggests universal urbanism temporarily shift from theoretical to a methodological standpoint. By focusing on consistent qualitative methods, such as those employed in this study, contextual urban analyses could eventually get to a number of studies where comparison between urban sites leads to a universal understanding of the commonalities of urban food system processes.

2. *Although applied through a case study, my adaptation of the GAF criteria through both the interview methods and analysis provides a common approach to understanding the drivers behind food system outcomes.*

In such a complex system, it is necessary to focus the researcher on factors that require deeper analysis from the perspectives of actors within the system. This focus builds on the concept that people's beliefs about opportunities and constraints are connected to their inherent positions in societal and governance structures (Davies, 2011). Not only did this analysis show the prominent issues arising in Mzuzu's food system, but also the commonalities and differences between food system actors; how they perceive problems arising and how they could be solved.

The arrangement of the data into the five GAF categories and the subsequent levels of thematic coding posits the data into a 'problem-solving' format, where actor-defined problems, solutions, and processes highlight the themes to address in a food system. Originally, the results section was a listing of each stakeholder group's general observations, but I felt this was too much information for one person to take in and to create policy from – it required a more practical analysis, which resulted in the stories of Chapter 4 and the comparative tables and discussions of perspectives in Chapter 5.

If this method proves useful in future assessments of urban food systems, two methods of analysis are potentially beneficial to building theory: longitudinal studies of the same city, and comparative studies. Initially, direct comparison between two cities may not have as much value as analyses of trends through a critical mass of this type of research. Studies of specific factors that are known to impact food systems (such as transportation) may be a starting place for comparison across urban spaces, particularly for intra-national comparative studies.

6.2.3.2 A Note on COVID-19

This study was completed prior to the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. McCordic et al. (2022) found that "the resource access disruptions inflicted by COVID-19 will likely have a heterogeneous impact on urban food security dependent upon the affected resource and the city in which a given household resides" (p. 1). This finding suggests that a framework such as the one developed for this study may be a helpful tool in understanding the varied outcomes and adaptations that urban spaces have encountered during the pandemic.

6.2.3.3 The Governance Analytical Framework as a tool for analysis

The benefit of using the Governance Analytical Framework (GAF) was its easy integration into inductive methodology and the conceptual framework based in structuration and constructivism. The GAF questions, adapted to the system one is examining, are a good inductive guide for semi-structured interviews for governance contexts. By allowing respondents to voice their perceptions of influences on Mzuzu's food system, the GAF provided scalar, political, economic, and social context to the results.

There are multiple directions for applications of the Governance Analytical Framework (GAF) in further empirical research. Here, the GAF modified easily to a larger, more inductive study than for what it was originally intended. It fit the required methods and is useful as an analytical tool for a large diverse data set. It provides categories, which can then each be analyzed within each theme. The organization of respondents by categories allowed me to see where agreement or disagreement lay along the themes.

6.3 Recommendations for Practitioners

Trying to 'see' such a complex system such as an urban food system can be overwhelming. The world is urbanizing in different ways, and "African decision-makers face very different challenges and opportunities than their counterparts in other parts of the world did at equivalent levels of urbanization" (Dodman et al., 2017 p. 12). This inductive research found contextual 'entry points' for intervention in Mzuzu's food system. Addressing these issues requires the time, capacity, and resources to see a larger viewpoint and not get distracted by day-to-day reactive governance and problem solving. Chapter 5 summarized these points in detail; this section reviews the deeper considerations practitioners can keep in mind when approaching Mzuzu's food system issues.

First, practitioners can acknowledge the deep connection between 'outside' influences on the food system and local food system outcomes. Here, norms of centralized power, the discourse of market liberalism, and democratic ideology formed many perspectives on how Mzuzu's food system functioned. Second, people's choices about interacting with the food system were influenced by high urbanization rates and the subsequent competition that arose in informal food sales, national political history, and beliefs about capacity and corruption in formal government structures.

Thirdly, the strengths of Mzuzu's food system lies in the productivity of its outlying rural areas and the diversity of pathways through which people access food. The strength in communication through existing multilateral governance groups like the Town and Country Planning Committee allowed for further understanding of stakeholder perspectives. As Mzuzu further urbanizes, communication, policy co-creation and implementation, and institutional flexibility will be required to provide the transparency and accountability that most respondents needed. Overall, patience and advocacy will be required for food policy practitioners to engage the many governance actors that influence Mzuzu's food system – especially when many of them may think they have little influence at all.

6.4 Recommendations for Researchers

Part of the benefits of an inductive study is allowing many themes to emerge, and sometimes those themes are larger than one study can contain. Inductive studies, therefore, provide the larger generalizations and routes for other studies, including deductive studies that can test theory (Hyde, 2000). Table 6-1 below lists potential studies that emerged from this dissertation's inquiries. These topics suggest that further inquiry is warranted regarding the impacts of multi-level governance on Mzuzu's food system.

Table 6-1 Potential Future Topics of Study as a Result of this Study

General Area	Specific Topic
Urban Studies	The 'other' urbanization – examining the flight of high-income earners from primary to secondary cities in Malawi
	How can the SDG Urban Goal (and sub-goals) integrate urban context and actor agency in regard to urban food systems?
Urban Planning and Food Systems	Comparison of major Malawian cities' spatial distribution of markets, considering topography and road quality
	Is topography a major factor in food system function in cities with low car ownership?
	Do walkways and passable thoroughfares improve access to markets?
	What proportion of Mzuzu's peri-urban area is farmed by high income urban residents? What are the trends here?
	What role does informality play as 'invisible' actors in the formal food value chain? How do transnational corporations integrate informality into their sales models? How do informal processes integrate themselves into the 'modern' food value chain?

Urban Markets/Vending	Given the different types of food vendors and their many avenues, how are they spread across the food security spectrum? Which approaches/strategies are more successful and why? What approaches require existing assets from other sources, such as a spouse within the formal employment system or existing land tenure outside of the city?
	What was the reason for the Chibavi Market choosing to be independent? What are the pros and cons to being independent of city management?
	Discourse analysis of perspectives on vending, of economic development and democracy (vendors are street sellers, gap fillers, illegal; the economy is liberal, free, democratic)
	The Assumption of Abundance – if everyone had money, would there be enough food in Mzuzu? Does the market infrastructure and surrounding rural areas hold enough capacity to manage that level of demand and the growing demand from urbanization?
	Governance decisions and interactions between formal open air market vendors, their representatives, and city governments (White & Kampanje-Phiri, 2019)
Urban Well-being Metrics	A quantitative comparison of urban and rural measurements of food insecurity, urban poverty, and urban health
	Quantitative assessment of urban poverty over a specific time period – repetition of AFSUN (2018)
	Incorporate into a specific urban vulnerability index: considerations of food price fluctuations and urban costs of living that extend past basic rent and utilities to include transport costs, stability of income, WASH access, etc.
Food Access and Availability	Climate change impacts on Lake Malawi fisheries and access to fish protein in the city
	Climate change impacts to orphan crop such as banana and the impacts of EU/FAO aid program on import and Malawian crop success
	Protein sources in Mzuzu – what are the main sources and where do they come from? What are governance barriers and enablers of protein sources into the city? What is quantitative output from the one city abattoir? What are the bottlenecks in this abattoir? What are the obstacles to more abattoirs in Mzuzu?
Economic Access to Food	In the high-income brackets, how is maize accessed?
	Compare perspectives of maize price fluctuations with Fuje and Pullabhotla's (2020) findings of low impact of trade bans and government intervention on poverty alleviation.
Infrastructure	The role of energy in urban food processing – a case study of the challenges and strengths of Mzuzu's new dairy processing business.

	The influence of topography on road quality and the spatial distributions of city markets.
	Analysis of market infrastructure needs across Mzuzu
Multi-level Governance	The influence of international private food sector on government actions and international aid decisions, specifically on Parliament actions and writing legislation (Battersby et al., 2019).
Political Interactions with Maize Trading	Governance interactions between vendors, the large-scale urban traders, middlemen, and the "top" of the maize market (Ochieng et al., 2019)

6.5 Final Reflection

Food systems are reflections of our social, economic, and political systems. This dissertation finds that an understanding of the contextual nuances of an urban food system must include the influences of actors at multiple levels of governance; this is essential to developing wholistic urban food system policy. This study's use of the Governance Analytical Framework has provided a unique perspective to understanding an urban food system through the perspectives that influence people's actions within the food system. I hope this dissertation's contributions provide opportunities for communication and understanding at all governance levels, leading to more inclusive and secure urban food systems.

Works cited

Abay, K. A., Chamberlin, J., & Berhane, G. (2021). Are land rental markets responding to rising population pressures and land scarcity in sub-Saharan Africa?. *Land Use Policy*, *101*, 105139.

Abwe, F. G., & Daniel, K. (2020). Local public markets infrastructure and urban food systems in African small cities: insights from Arusha, Tanzania. *Cities & Health*, 1-4.

Acquah, B., Kapunda, S., Legwegoh, A., Gwebu, T., Modie-Moroka, T., Gobot-swang, K., & Mosha, A. (2013). The State of Food Insecurity in Gaborone, Botswana. AFSUN Food Security Series, (17).

Adams, E.A. (2018) Intra-urban inequalities in water access among households in Malawi's informal settlements: Toward pro-poor urban water policies in Africa. Environmental Development 26, 34-42.

Adams, T., Gerber, J. D., Amacker, M., & Haller, T. (2019). Who gains from contract farming? Dependencies, power relations, and institutional change. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, *46*(7), 1435-1457.

Adelman, S. (2018). The sustainable development goals, anthropocentrism and neoliberalism. In *Sustainable Development Goals*. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Adetula, V. (2011). Measuring democracy and 'good governance' in Africa: A critique of assumptions and methods. *Africa in focus: Governance in the 21st century*. K. M. Kondlo (Ed.). HSRC.

Adhikari, R., Sharma, J. R., & Smith, P. (2019). Foreign aid, Cashgate and trusting relationships: Key factors contributing to (mal) functioning of the Malawian health system. *Health Policy and Planning*, *34*(3), 197-206.

Adhikari, U., & Nejadhashemi, A. P. (2016). Impacts of climate change on water resources in Malawi. *Journal of Hydrologic Engineering*, *21*(11), 05016026.

Afrobarometer. (2021). Online Data Analysis Tool. R 2016/2018 Northern Region – Malawi. [Dataset]. Afrobarometer.org. https://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online

Åhs, J. (2017). The policy process behind the adaptation of Urban Agriculture policy in Cape Town and Johannesburg: Academic activists and NGO´ s as policy actors.

Akkoyunlu, S. (2015). The potential of rural-urban linkages for sustainable development and trade. *International Journal of Sustainable Development & World Policy 4*(2), 20-40.

Alkire, S. (2005). Measuring the freedom aspects of capabilities. Global Equity Initiative. Harvard University. Cambridge, MA. *Unpublished paper*. Retrieved from: http:// www.sciencedirect.com.proxy.lib.uwaterloo.ca/science/article/pii/S1053535706001090

Allen, J. (2004). The whereabouts of power: politics, government and space. *Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography*, *86*(1), 19-32.

Amadu, F. O., McNamara, P. E., & Miller, D. C. (2020). Yield effects of climate-smart agriculture aid investment in southern Malawi. *Food Policy*, 92, 101869.

Amin, A., & Thrift, N. (2002). *Cities: reimagining the urban*. Polity Press.

Amin, A., & Thrift, N. (2017). *Seeing like a city*. John Wiley & Sons.

Amponsah, E. I. (2021). Approaching an efficient means of addressing urban environmental challenges: a review of Ghana's "reactive" measures to "proactive" measures. *Local Environment*, *26*(11), 1364-1378.

Anders, G. (2008). The Normativity of Numbers: World Bank and IMF Conditionality. *PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review*, *31*(2), 187-202.

Andrews, M. (2008). The good governance agenda: Beyond indicators without theory. *Oxford Development Studies*, *36*(4), 379-407.

Angel, S., Lamson-Hall, P., Guerra, B., Liu, Y., Galarza, N., & Blei, A. M. (2018). Our not-so-urban world. *The Marron Institute of Urban Management, New York University: New York, NY, USA*.

Anku, E.K., & Ahorbo, G. K. (2017). Conflict between Supermarkets and Wet-Markets in Ghana : Early Warning Signals and Preventive Policy Recommendations. *International Journal of Business and Social Research,7*(9), 2017.

Anríquez, G., & Stamoulis, K. (2007). *Rural development and poverty reduction: is agriculture still the key?* https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.289048

Arias, J. (2019). Informal Vendors in Johannesburg, South Africa. *Penn IUR Series on Informality Informal Vendors in Johannesburg, South Africa*.

Asuru, S. (2017). *The new philanthropy and smallholder farmers' livelihoods. A case study of the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) in the northern region of Ghana* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Bradford).

Atiglo, D. Y., Christian, A. K., Okyere, M. A., & Codjoe, S. N. (2020). Rural out-migration from Ghana's development zones and household food security. *Migration and Development*, 1-15.

Atkinson, S. J. (1995). Approaches and actors in urban food security in developing countries. *Habitat international*, *19*(2), 151-163.

Attanasio, O., & Frayne, C. (2006). Do the poor pay more?. Working Paper Series. Paper No. 06-06. April 2006.The Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies. Retrieved from: https://ecommons.cornell.edu/bitstream/handle/1813/55021/2006_WP6_Attanasio_Frayne.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Ausloos, M., & Local Burden of Disease Child Growth Failure Collaborators. (2020). Mapping child growth failure across low-and middle-income countries. *Nature. 577,* 231–234.

Babu, S., & Sanyal, P. (2018). Persistent food insecurity from policy failures in Malawi Case Study 7-2. *Case Studies in Food Policy for Developing Countries: Domestic Policies for Markets, Production, and Environment*, 7(*2*), 1-12. Cornell University. Retrieved from: https://ecommons.cornell.edu/bitstream/handle/1813/55700/7-2.pdf?sequence=1

Baeumler, A., D'Aoust, O., Das, M.B., Gapihan, A., Goga, S., Lakovits, C., Restrepo Cavadid, P., Singh, G., Terraza, H. (2021). *Demographic Trends and Urbanization.* Washington, DC: World Bank.

Bairoch, P. (1991). *Cities and economic development: from the dawn of history to the present*. University of Chicago Press.

Baker, J. L. (Ed.). (2012). *Climate change, disaster risk, and the urban poor: cities building resilience for a changing world*. World Bank Publications.

Banda, A. (2017). Mzuzu Vendors want Malawi Defense Force to remove illegal traders.https://www.maravipost.com/mzuzu-vendors-want-malawi-defense-force-remove-illegal-traders/.

Banerjee, A. V., & Duflo, E. (2011). *Poor economics: A radical rethinking of the way to fight global poverty*. Public Affairs.

Banik, D., & Chasukwa, M. (2019). The Politics of Hunger in an SDG Era: Food Policy in Malawi. *Food Ethics*, *4*(2), 189-206.

Barker, C. (2003). *Cultural studies: Theory and practice*. Sage.

Barker, Chris (2005). *Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice*. London: Sage.

BASF (2019). BASF Global Agriculture. Retrieved from: https://industries.basf.com/images/global/corp/Agriculture/Crop%20Protection/Services%20and%20Tools/Food%20Value%20Chain/FVC_Graphic_FIN.jpg/_lcr_content/renditions/cqSdam.web.16-9.12.jpg

Battersby, J. (2011). Urban food insecurity in Cape Town, South Africa: An alternative approach to food access. *Development Southern Africa*, *28*(4), 545-561.

Battersby, J. (2013). Hungry cities: A critical review of urban food security research in sub-saharan African cities. *Geography Compass*, *7*(7), 452–463.

Battersby, J. (2017). MDGs to SDGs–new goals, same gaps: the continued absence of urban food security in the post-2015 global development agenda. *African Geographical Review*, *36*(1), 115–129.

Battersby, J. (2020). Data gaps and the politics of data. *Sustainable Food System Assessment: Lessons from Global Practice*. Blay-Palmer, A., Conaré, D., Meter, K., Di Battista, A., Johnston, C. [Eds]. Routledge.

Battersby, J., & Crush, J. (2014). Africa's urban food deserts. *Urban Forum*. *25*(2),143-151.

Battersby, J., & Crush, J. (2016). The making of urban food deserts. In *Rapid Urbanisation, Urban Food Deserts and Food Security in Africa* (pp. 1-18). Springer, Cham.

Battersby, J., & Muwowo, F. (2018). Planning and governance of food systems in Kitwe, Zambia: A case study of food retail space. In *Urban food systems governance and poverty in African cities* (pp. 128-140). Routledge.

Battersby, J., Muwowo, F., Battersby, J., & Watson, V. (2019). Unacknowledged food systems governance in Kitwe, Zambia. *Urban food systems governance and poverty in Africa. London, Routledge*, 128-140.

Battersby, J., & Watson, V. (2018). Addressing food security in African cities. *Nature Sustainability*, *1*(4), 153-155.

Battersby, J., Watson, V., & Haysom, G. (2019). *Governing Food Systems in Secondary Cities in Africa*. Retrieved from: https://consumingurbanpoverty

Beck, U. (2015). *Keep it real: Measuring real inequality using survey data from developing countries* (No. 2015/133). WIDER Working Paper.

Benna, U., & Benna, I. (Eds.). (2017). *Urbanization and its impact on socio-economic growth in developing regions*. IGI Global.

Benson, B. L. (1999). An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Governance and the Emergence of the State. *The Review of Austrian Economics*, *12*, 131–160.

Berg, C. N., Blankespoor, B., & Selod, H. (2018). Roads and rural development in Sub-Saharan Africa. *The Journal of Development Studies*, *54*(5), 856-874.

Bertaud, A., & Malpezzi, S. (2003). The spatial distribution of population in 48 world cities: Implications for economies in transition. *Center for urban land economics research, University of Wisconsin*, *32*(1), 54-55.

Betsill, M. M., & Bulkeley, H. (2006). Cities and the multilevel governance of global climate change. *Global governance*, *12*, 141.

Beunen, R., Van Assche, K., & Duineveld, M. (2016). *Evolutionary governance theory*. Springer International Pu.

Bevir, M. (2012). *Governance: A very short introduction*. OUP Oxford.

Bevir, M., & Rhodes, R. A. (Eds.). (2016). *Rethinking governance: Ruling, rationalities and resistance*. Routledge.

Bevir, M., McKee, K., & Matthews, P. (Eds.). (2017). *Decentring urban governance: narratives, resistance and contestation*. Routledge.

Bezner-Kerr, R. (2013). Seed struggles and food sovereignty in northern Malawi. *Journal of Peasant Studies*, *40*(5), 867-897.

Biersack, A. (2006). Reimagining political ecology: culture/power/history/nature. Introduction. *Reimagining political ecology*, 3-40.

Biruk, C. (2018). *Cooking data: Culture and politics in an African research world*. Duke University Press.

Blackie, M. J., & Mann, C. K. (2005). The origin and concept of the starter pack. *Starter packs: Strategy to fight hunger in developing countries*, 15-27.

Blackstone, A. (2012). *Principles of Sociological Inquiry – Qualitative and Quantitative Methods*. Maine: Saylor Foundation.

Blekking, J., Tuholske, C., & Evans, T. (2017). Adaptive governance and market heterogeneity: An institutional analysis of an urban food system in sub-Saharan Africa. *Sustainability*, *9*(12), 2191.

Blekking, J., Waldman, K., Tuholske, C., & Evans, T. (2020). Formal/informal employment and urban food security in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Applied Geography*, *114*, 102131.

Blesh, J., Hoey, L., Jones, A. D., Friedmann, H., & Perfecto, I. (2019). Development pathways toward "zero hunger." *World Development*, *118*, 1–14.

Blunt, P. (1995). Cultural relativism,'good'governance and sustainable human development. *Public Administration and Development*, *15*(1), 1-9.

Boamah, E. F., Amoako, C., & Asenso, B. K. (2020). Spaces of market politics: Retailscapes and modernist planning imaginaries in African cities. *Applied Geography*, *123*, 102265.

Boone, C. (2003). Decentralization as political strategy in West Africa. *Comparative Political Studies*, *36*(4), 355-380.

Born, B., & Purcell, M. (2006). Avoiding the local trap: Scale and food systems in planning research. *Journal of planning education and research*, *26*(2), 195-207.

Boutayeb, A. (2009). The impact of HIV/AIDS on human development in African countries. *BMC Public Health*, *9*(S1), S3.

Brenner, N., & Schmid, C. (2014). The 'urban age' in question. *International journal of urban and regional research*, *38*(3), 731-755.

Bricas, N. (2019). Urbanization issues affecting food system sustainability. In *Designing Urban Food Policies* (pp. 1-25). Springer, Cham.

Brisbois, M. C., & de Loë, R. C. (2016). Power in collaborative approaches to governance for water: a systematic review. *Society & Natural Resources*, *29*(7), 775-790.

Brown, A. M. (2013). Uganda's National Urban Policy: The Emerging Response to Poverty, Food Security, and Gender in Urban Uganda. CIGI Africa Portal. Policy Brief No. 6. May 2013. Retrieved from: https://media.africaportal.org/documents/Africa_Initiative_-_Policy_Brief_No__6.pdf

Brown, A. M. (2014). Uganda's Emerging Urban Policy Environment: Implications for Urban Food Security and Urban Migrants. *Urban Forum*, 1–12.

Buchan, R., Cloutier, D. S., & Friedman, A. (2019). Transformative incrementalism: Planning for transformative change in local food systems. *Progress in Planning*, *134*, 100424.

Bulkeley, H., & Betsill, M. (2005). Rethinking sustainable cities: Multilevel governance and the 'urban' politics of climate change. *Environmental politics*, *14*(1), 42-63.

Bulkeley, H., & Betsill, M. M. (2013). Revisiting the urban politics of climate change. *Environmental politics*, *22*(1), 136-154.

Bulkeley, H., & Schroeder, H. (2012). Beyond state/non-state divides: Global cities and the governing of climate change. *European Journal of International Relations*, *18*(4), 743-766.

Burr, V. (2015). *Social constructionism*. Routledge.

Burr, V., & Dick, P. (2017). Social constructionism. In *The Palgrave handbook of critical social psychology* (pp. 59-80). Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Busse, H., Covic, N., Aakesson, A., & Jogo, W. (2020). What is the role of civil society in multisectoral nutrition governance systems? A multicountry review. *Food and Nutrition Bulletin*, *41*(2), 244-260.

Caesar, M., Crush, J., & Hill, T. (2013). The State of Food Insecurity in Msunduzi Municipality, South Africa (rep., pp. i-42). Kingston, ON and Cape Town: African Food Security Urban Network. Urban Food Security Series No. 16.

Campbell-Lendrum, D., & Corvalán, C. (2007). Climate change and developing-country cities: implications for environmental health and equity. *Journal of Urban Health*, *84*(1), 109-117.

Cammack, D. (2006). Malawi: the politics of hunger. *ODI Opinion*, *69*.

Cammack, D. (2007). The logic of African neopatrimonialism: What role for donors? *Development Policy Review*, *25*(5), 599–614.

Cammack, D. (2012). Malawi in crisis, 2011–12. *Review of African Political Economy*, *39*(132), 375-388.

Cammack, D. (2017). Malawi's Political Settlement: Crafting Poverty and Peace, 1994–2014. *Journal of International Development*, *29*(5), 661-677.

Cammack, D., & Kelsall, T. (2011). Neo-patrimonialism, Institutions and Economic Growth: The Case of Malawi, 1964–2009. *IDS Bulletin*, *42*(2), 88-96.

Candel, J. J. (2014). Food security governance: a systematic literature review. *Food Security*, *6*(4), 585-601.

Candel, J. J., & Pereira, L. (2017). Towards integrated food policy: Main challenges and steps ahead. *Environmental Science & Policy*, *73*, 89-92.

Capone, R., Bilali, H. E., Debs, P., Cardone, G., & Driouech, N. (2014). Food system sustainability and food security: connecting the dots. *Journal of Food Security*, *2*(1), 13-22.

Caprotti, F., Cowley, R., Datta, A., Broto, V. C., Gao, E., Georgeson, L., Herrick, C., Odendaal, N., & Joss, S. (2017). The New Urban Agenda: key opportunities and challenges for policy and practice. *Urban Research and Practice*, *10*(3), 367–378. https://doi.org/10.1080/17535069.2016.1275618

Cassivi, A., Tilley, E., Waygood, E. O. D., & Dorea, C. (2020). Trends in access to water and sanitation in Malawi: progress and inequalities (1992–2017). *Journal of Water and Health*, *18*(5), 785-797.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). (2018). The World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/349.html

Centre for Social Concern. (2021). Urban BNB Data, 2018-2021. Retrieved from: https://www.cfscmafr.org/urban-bnb-data/.

CGIAR. (2020). Food Systems Analysis. Retrieved from: https://a4nh.cgiar.org/2020/01/21/food-systems-analysis/

Chasukwa, M., Chiweza, A. L., & Chikapa-Jamali, M. (2014). Public Participation in Local Councils in Malawi in the Absence of Local Elected Representatives-Political Eliticism or Pluralism?. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, *49*(6), 705-720.

Chavula, J. (2015, July 6). Mzuzu vendors boycott market fees. *The Nation.*

Chekenya, N. S., & Dzingirai, C. (2020). Distributional effects of distinct aid types on local economic development in Malawi: new evidence. *Journal of Economic Studies*. *48*(7), 1299-1322. https://doi.org/10.1108/JES-09-2020-0461.

Chhotray, V., & Stoker, G. (2009). Governance: From Theory to Practice. In *Governance Theory and Practice* (214-247). Palgrave Macmillan UK.

Chilanga, E., Riley, L., Ngwira, J., Chalinda, C., & Masitala, L. (2017). Food Insecurity in Informal Settlements in Lilongwe, Malawi (rep., pp. i-33). Kingston, ON and Cape Town: African Food Security Urban Network. Urban Food Security Series No. 25.

Chikaipa, V. (2019). Caring mother or weak politician? A semiotic analysis of editorial cartoon representations of president Joyce Banda in Malawian newspapers. *Critical Arts*, *33*(2), 14-28.

Chimjeka, R. (2021). *Government ignored on maize prices – Traders buying grain below K150 per kg.* The Times Group Malawi. https://times.mw/government-ignored-on-maize-prices/. June 19, 2021.

Chinsinga, B. (2006). The Interface between Tradition and Modernity. *Civilisations*, *April 2009*, 498.

Chinsinga, B. (2007). The social protection policy in Malawi: Processes, politics and challenges. *Future Agricultures Working Paper. Zomba, University of Malawi.*

Chinsinga, B. (2011). Seeds and subsidies: The political economy of input programmes in Malawi. *IDS bulletin*, *42*(4), 59-68.

Chinsinga, B. (2012). The political economy of agricultural policy processes in Malawi: A case study of the fertilizer subsidy programme.

Chinsinga, B. (2012). Deconstructing the Success Myth: A Case of the Malawi Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP). Conference Paper nº 11. III Conferencia Internacional Do Iese – Mocambique: Acumulacao E Transformacao Em Contexto De Crise Internacional, Sept 4-5, 2012.

Chinsinga, B. (2017). The green belt initiative, politics and sugar production in Malawi. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, *43*(3), 501-515.

Chinsinga, B., Chasukwa, M., & Zuka, S. P. (2013). The political economy of land grabs in Malawi: Investigating the contribution of Limphasa Sugar Corporation to rural development. *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics*, *26*(6), 1065-1084.

Chinsinga, B., Matita, M., Chimombo, M., Msofi, L., Kaiyatsa, S., & Mazalale, J. (2021). Agricultural Commercialisation and Rural Livelihoods in Malawi: A Historical and Contemporary Agrarian Inquiry. Agricultural Policy Research in Africa. Working Paper. November 2021. Retreived from: https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/20.500.12413/16945/APRA_Working_Paper_75_Agricultural_Commercialisation_Rural_Livelihoods_Malawi_Historical_and_Contemporary_Agrarian_Inquiry.pdf?sequence=1

Chirwa, E. (2008). Land tenure, farm investments and food production in Malawi. *Institutions and Pro-Poor Growth (IPPG) research programme, University of Manchester. Discussion Paper*, (18).

Chirwa, E. & Chinsinga, B. (2013). Dealing with the 2007/08global food price crisis: The political economy of food price policy in Malawi. WIDER WorkingPaper, No. 2013/030, The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), Helsinki.

Chirwa, E., & Chinsinga, B. (2014). The political economy of food price policy in Malawi. *Food price policy in an era of market instability*, 153.

Chirwa, J. (2017, July 27). Vendors ask APM to intervene in illegal vending. *The Nation.*

Chisamba, T. (2021). Employers still paying Malawians MK18,000 as monthly stipends in Mzuzu. Malawi 24 News. July 9, 2021.

Chome, J. (2002). Behavioral and Spatial Impacts of Title Registration in Informal Settlements: The Case Study of Blantyre City, Malawi. Masters Thesis. International Institute for Geo-information Science and Earth Observation. Enschede, The Netherlands. Retrieved from: https://webapps.itc.utwente.nl/librarywww/papers/msc_2002/upla/chome.pdf.

Chondoka, Y., & Bota, F. F. (2015). *A History of the Tumbuka from 1400 to 1900*. Xlibris Corporation.

Clapp, J. (2009). Food Price Volatility and Vulnerability in the Global South: considering the global economic context. *Third World Quarterly*, *30*(6), 1183-1196.

Clapp, J. (2012). *Hunger in the Balance*. Cornell University Press.

Clapp, J. (2014). Financialization, distance and global food politics. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, *41*(5), 797-814.

Clapp, J. (2016). *Food*. Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity.

Clapp, J. (2020). *Food*. 2nd Edition. John Wiley & Sons.

Clapp, J., & Scott, C. (2018). The global environmental politics of food. *Global Environmental Politics*, *18*(2), 1-11.

Clapp, J., & Cohen, M. J. (Eds.). (2009). *The global food crisis: Governance challenges and opportunities*. Wilfrid Laurier Univ. Press.

Clapp, J., & Fuchs, D. (2009). Agrifood corporations, global governance, and sustainability: a framework for analysis. *Corporate power in global agrifood governance*, 1-26.

Cohen, B. (2006). Urbanization in developing countries: Current trends, future projections, and key challenges for sustainability. *Technology in Society*, *28*(1), 63-80.

Cohen, M. J., & Garrett, J. L. (2010). The food price crisis and urban food (in) security. *Environment and Urbanization*, *22*(2), 467-482.

Collinge, C., & Srbljanin, A. (2003). A network paradigm for urban governance?. In *Globalism and Local Democracy* (pp. 169-184). Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Connolly-Boutin, L., & Smit, B. (2016). Climate change, food security, and livelihoods in sub-Saharan Africa. *Regional Environmental Change*, *16*(2), 385-399.

Conrad, A. (2014). *We are farmers: Agriculture, food security, and adaptive capacity among permaculture and conventional farmers in central Malawi*. Doctoral Dissertation. Faculty of the College of Arts and Sceinces, American University. Retrieved from: https://www.proquest.com/openview/9b058d66973b366a10d4e2a7b24895e9/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750

Conroy, A.C., M.J. Blackie, A. Whiteside, J. Malewezi and J.D. Sachs. 2006. *Poverty, AIDS and Hunger: Breaking the Poverty Trap in Malawi*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Corbett, J., & Mellouli, S. (2017). Winning the SDG battle in cities: how an integrated information ecosystem can contribute to the achievement of the 2030 sustainable development goals. *Information Systems Journal*, *27*(4), 427-461.

Creswell, J. W., & Miller, D. L. (2000). Determining validity in qualitative inquiry. *Theory into practice*, *39*(3), 124-130.

Christiaensen, L., De Weerdt, J., & Kanbur, R. (2016). Urbanization and poverty reduction: the role of secondary towns in Tanzania.

Christiaensen, L., & Kanbur, R. (2017). Secondary towns and poverty reduction: refocusing the urbanization agenda. *Annual Review of Resource Economics*, *9*, 405-419.

Crush, J. (2016). *Migration, development and urban food security*. Southern African Migration Programme.

Crush, J., & Caesar, M. (2014). City without choice: urban food insecurity in Msunduzi, South Africa. *Urban Forum, 25* (2), 165-175.

Crush, J., & Fayne, B. (2010). *The invisible crisis: Urban food security in Southern Africa*. Cape Town: rban Food Security Series No. 1. Queen's University and AFSUN: Kingston and Cape Town.

Crush, J., & Frayne, B. (2011). Supermarket expansion and the informal food economy in Southern African cities: implications for urban food security. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, *37*(4), 781-807.

Crush, J., Hovorka, A., & Tevera, D. (2011). Food security in Southern African cities: The place of urban agriculture. *Progress in Development Studies*, *11*(4), 285–305.

Crush, J., Nickanor, N., & Kazembe, L. (2019). Informal food deserts and household food insecurity in Windhoek, Namibia. *Sustainability*, *11*(1), 37.

Crush, J., & Riley, L. (2017). No. 11: Urban food security, rural bias and the global development agenda. Hungry Cities Partnership. Retrieved from: https://hungrycities.net/publication-category/hungry-cities-papers/page/5/.

Crush, J., & Riley, L. (2018). Rural bias and urban food security. In *Urban food systems governance and poverty in African cities* (pp. 42-55). Routledge.

Cuéllar-Padilla, M., & Calle-Collado, Á. (2011). Can we find solutions with people? Participatory action research with small organic producers in Andalusia. *Journal of Rural Studies*, *27*(4), 372-383.

Dabalen, A., De La Fuente, A., Goyal, A., Karamba, W., Nguyen, N. T. V., & Tanaka, T. (2017). *Pathways to Prosperity in Rural Malawi*. The World Bank.

Daka, D. D. (2013). Challenges to the successful implementation of anti-corruption measures: the case of political corruption in Malawi. Research Paper submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Laws: Transnational Criminal Justice and Crime Prevention. Faculty of Law, University of the Western Cape, South Africa.

Dangour, A. D., Mace, G., & Shankar, B. (2017). Food systems, nutrition, health and the environment. *The Lancet Planetary Health*, *1*(1), e8-e9.

Davies, J. S. (2011). *Challenging governance theory: From networks to hegemony*. Policy Press.

Davies, J., Hannah, C., Guido, Z., Zimmer, A., McCann, L., Battersby, J., & Evans, T. (2021). Barriers to urban agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Food Policy*, *103*, 101999.

De Bruyn, T. (2014). Challenging the Status Quo? The Impact of the Emerging Economies on the Global Governance of Development Cooperation. Paper Number 13. March 2014. Brazil, India, China and South Africa in Agriculture and Food Security in Malawi.

De Bruyn, T. (2016). 'New friends, easier partners and bigger brothers': The influence of the emerging powers on agriculture and food security in Malawi. *South African Journal of International Affairs*. *23*(1), 39-68.

De Bruyn, T. (2019). Challenging Development Cooperation? The South-South Development Cooperation Partnership. The approaches of Brazil, India and the PR China with Malawi and Mozambique.

De Cunto, A., Tegoni, C., Sonnino, R., Michel, C., & Lajili-Djala, F. (2017). Food in cities: study on innovation for a sustainable and healthy production, delivery and consumption of food in cities. European Union. July 2017. Eurocities, City of Milan, Cardiff University. Retrieved from: https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/113329/1/food_in_cities.pdf.

Delaney, A., Evans, T., McGreevy, J., Blekking, J., Schlachter, T., Korhonen-Kurki, K., ... & Rist, S. (2018). Governance of food systems across scales in times of social-ecological change: a review of indicators. *Food Security*, *10*(2), 287-310.

Devereux, S. (2001). Sen's entitlement approach: critiques and counter-critiques. *Oxford Development Studies*, *29*(3), 245-263.

Devereux, S. (2002). The Malawi famine of 2002. *IDS Bulletin.* 33,(4), 70-78.

Devereux, S. (2009). Why does famine persist in Africa?. *Food security*, *1*(1), 25-35.

Díaz-Castro, L., Arredondo, A., Pelcastre-Villafuerte, B. E., & Hufty, M. (2017). Indicadores de gobernanza en políticas y programas de salud mental en México: una perspectiva de 231frica clave. *Gaceta Sanitaria*, *31*(4), 305–312.

Dickovick, J. T. (2014). Foreign aid and decentralization: Limitations on impact in autonomy and responsiveness. *Public Administration and Development*, *34*(3), 194-206.

Diriye, M., Nur, A., & Khalif, A. (2013). Food aid and the challenge of food security in 232frica. *Development*, *56*(3), 396-403.

Dixon, J., & Richards, C. (2016). On food security and alternative food networks: understanding and performing food security in the context of urban bias. *Agriculture and human values*, *33*(1), 191-202.

Dodman, D., Leck, H., Rusca, M., & Colenbrander, S. (2017). African urbanisation and urbanism: Implications for risk accumulation and reduction. *International journal of disaster risk reduction*, *26*, 7-15.

Donovan, J., & Gelli, A. (2019). Designing interventions in local value chains for improved health and nutrition: Insights from Malawi. *World Development Perspectives*, *16*, 100149.

Dubey, A. (2010). India and Indian Diaspora in Africa: Diversity and Challenges. *Indian Diaspora in Africa: A Comparative Perspective*, 1-24.

Dulani, B. (2019). Political parties, campaign financing and political corruption in Malawi. In *Political Corruption in Africa*. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Duminy, J., Watson, V., & Odendaal, N. (2013). Doing research in African cities: The case study method. In *Handbook of Research Methods and Applications in Urban Economies*. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Duranton, G. (2008). Cities: engines of growth and prosperity for developing countries? Spence, M., Annez, P. C., & Buckley, R. M. (Eds.). *Urbanization and growth*. World Bank Publications.

ECI Africa (2008). Malawi: Final Evalution of UNDP and UNCDF's Local Development Programme: Executive Summary. Report for United Nations Capacity Development Fund. Malawi: ECI Africa.

Edelman, B., & Baulch, B. (2016). *Are Malawi's maize and soya trade restrictions causing more harm than good?: A summary of evidence and practical alternatives* (Vol. 25). Intl Food Policy Res Inst.

Edkins, J. (2000). *Whose hunger?: concepts of famine, practices of aid* (Vol. 17). U of Minnesota Press.

Ekpenyong, A. S. (2015). Urbanization: its implication for sustainable food security, health and nutritional nexus in developing economies-a case study of Nigeria. *Journal of Studies in Social Sciences*, *11*(1).

Ericksen, P. J. (2008). Conceptualizing food systems for global environmental change research. *Global environmental change*, *18*(1), 234-245.

Esposito, B., Sessa, M. R., Sica, D., & Malandrino, O. (2020). Towards circular economy in the Agri-food sector. A systematic literature review. *Sustainability*, *12*(18), 7401.

Fafchamps, M., Gabre-Madhin, E., & Minten, B. (2005). Increasing returns and market efficiency in agricultural trade. *Journal of Development Economics*, *78*(2), 406-442.

Fagernas, S. & Schurich, C. (2004). The Fiscal Effects of Aid in Malawi. Working and Discussion papers. May, 2004. Overseas Development Institute.

Fan, S. (2019). Some lessons from a life in food policy. *Global Food Security*, *22*, 33-36.

Fanning, A. L., O'Neill, D. W., Hickel, J., & Roux, N. (2021). The social shortfall and ecological overshoot of nations. *Nature Sustainability*, 1-11.

Fanzo, J., Covic, N., Dobermann, A., Henson, S., Herrero, M., Pingali, P., & Staal, S. (2020). A research vision for food systems in the 2020s: defying the status quo. *Global food security*, *26*, 100397.

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). (1996). Declaration on world food security. World Food Summit, FAO, Rome.

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). (2009). The state of food and agriculture. FAO: Rome.

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). (2010.) *Global forest resources assessment 2010*. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). (2011). *Food for the Cities*. Policy Brief. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 2018. Food loss and waste and the right to adequate food: making the connection. Rome. 48 pp. Licence: CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO.

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). (2019). *FAO Framework for the Urban Food Agenda*. Food and Agriculture Organization. Rome, Italy. Retrieved from: https://www.fao.org/urban-food-agenda/en/.

FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2021. *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2021. Transforming food systems for food security, improved nutrition and affordable healthy diets for all.* Rome, FAO.

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). (2021). FAO 70th Anniversary Portal. http://www.fao.org/70/1945-55/en/.

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). (2021). Food and Agriculture Statistics. Retrieved from: http://www.fao.org/economic/ess/ess-fs/ess-fadata/en.

Food and Agriculture Organization (2022). About the Urban Food Agenda. Retrieved from: https://www.fao.org/urban-food-agenda/about/en/

Fotso, J. C., Madise, N., Baschieri, A., Cleland, J., Zulu, E., Mutua, M. K., & Essendi, H. (2012). Child growth in urban deprived settings: does household poverty status matter? At which stage of child development?. *Health & place*, *18*(2), 375-384.

Foucault, M. (1994). Omnes et Singulatim:'Toward a Critique of Political Reason.‖ In Power: The Essential Works of Foucault: 1954-1984, Vol. III, edited by James D. Faubion, translated by Robert Hurley, et. al, 298-325.

Ferguson, J. (1990). *The anti-politics machine:'development', depoliticization and bureaucratic power in Lesotho*. University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis.

Ferree, K., & Horowitz, J. (2010). Ties that bind? The rise and decline of ethno-regional partisanship in Malawi, 1994–2009. *Democratization*, *17*(3), 534-563.

Fjeldstad, O. H., Ali, M., & Goodfellow, T. (2017). Taxing the urban boom: Property taxation in Africa (CMI Insight, No. 1). *Bergen, Chr. Michelsen Institute*.

FBA (Food Business Africa). (2020 January 14). Malawi launches US95 Million Agriculture Commercialization Project. *Food Business Africa.com.* https://www.foodbusinessafrica.com/malawi-launches-us95m-agriculture-commercialization-project/.

Fonchingong, C. C. (2005). Negotiating livelihoods beyond Beijing: the burden of women food vendors in the informal economy of Limbe, Cameroon. *International Social Science Journal*, *57*(184), 243-253.

Fouilleux, E., Bricas, N., & Alpha, A. (2017). 'Feeding 9 billion people': Global food security debates and the productionist trap. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *24*(11), 1658-1677.

Fox, N. J. (2008). Post-positivism. *The SAGE encyclopedia of qualitative research methods*, *2*, 659-664.

Fox, S. (2014). The Political Economy of Slums: Theory and Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa. *World Development*, *54*, 191–203.

Frayne, B. (2010). Pathways of food: mobility and food transfers in Southern African cities. *International Development Planning Review*, *32*(3/4), 291.

Frayne, B. (2018). *Food and nutrition security in southern African cities*. J. Crush, & C. McCordic (Eds.). London: Routledge.

Frayne, B., Crush, J., & McCordic, C. (2017). Divorcing food and agriculture: towards an agenda for urban food security research. In *Food and Nutrition Security in Southern African Cities* (pp. 1-8). Routledge.

Frayne, B. & McCordic, C. (2015). Planning for food secure cities: Measuring the influence of infrastructure and income on household food security in Southern African cities. *Geoforum* 65: 1–11.

Frayne, B., McCordic, C., & Shilomboleni, H. (2014). Growing out of poverty: Does urban agriculture contribute to household food security in Southern African cities?.*Urban forum*. *25*(2), 177-189.

Friedmann, J. (2014). Becoming urban: On whose terms?. *Implosions/Explosions: Towards a Study of Planetary Urbanization*, 552-560.

Fresco, L. O. (2009). Challenges for food system adaptation today and tomorrow. *Environmental science & policy*, *12*(4), 378-385.

Fuje, H., & Pullabhotla, H. K. (2020). Impact of Grain Trade Policies on Prices and Welfare: Evidence from Malawi. Poverty and Equity Global Practice. World Bank Group. October 2020. Retrieved from: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/34631/Impact-of-Grain-Trade-Policies-on-Prices-and-Welfare-Evidence-from-Malawi.pdf?sequence=1

Fukuyama, F. (2013). What is governance? *Governance*, *26*(3), 347–368.

Fukuyama, F. (2016). Governance: What do we know, and how do we know it?. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *19*, 89-105.

Gabre-Madhin, E., Fafchamps, M., Kachule, R., Soule, B., & Kahn, Z. (2001). Impact of agricultural market reforms on smallholder farmers in Benin and Malawi. *IFPRI, Washington DC.*

Galuszka, J. (2019). What makes urban governance co-productive? Contradictions in the current debate on co-production. *Planning Theory*, *18*(1), 143-160.

Garrett, J. L., & Ruel, M. T. (1999). Are determinants of rural and urban food security and nutritional status different? Some insights from Mozambique. *World development*, *27*(11), 1955-1975.

Garrett, James L., ed. And Ruel, Marie T., ed. (2000). Achieving urban food and nutrition security in the developing world. 2020 Vision Focus 3. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). Retrieved from: https://ebrary.ifpri.org/digital/collection/p15738coll2/id/92784.

Garschagen, M., Porter, L., Satterthwaite, D., Fraser, A., Horne, R., Nolan, M., ... & Schreiber, F. (2018). The New Urban Agenda: From Vision to Policy and Action. *Planning theory & practice*, *19*(1), 117-137.

Gehl, J. (2013). *Cities for people*. Island press.

Gelli, A., Aberman, N. L., Margolies, A., Santacroce, M., Baulch, B., & Chirwa, E. (2017). Lean-season food transfers affect children's diets and household food security: evidence from a quasi-experiment in Malawi. *The Journal of Nutrition*, *147*(5), 869-878.

Gelli, A., Donovan, J., Margolies, A., Aberman, N., Santacroce, M., Chirwa, E., ... & Hawkes, C. (2020). Value chains to improve diets: Diagnostics to support intervention design in Malawi. *Global Food Security*, *25*, 100321.

Gengenbach, H., Schurman, R. A., Bassett, T. J., Munro, W. A., & Moseley, W. G. (2018). Limits of the New Green Revolution for Africa: Reconceptualising gendered agricultural value chains. *The Geographical Journal*, *184*(2), 208-214.

Getis, A., & Getis, J. (1966). Christaller's central place theory. *Journal of Geography*, *65*(5), 220-226.

Gibson-Graham, J. (2002). Beyond global vs. local: economic politics outside the binary frame in Herod A and Wright M W.[Eds] *Geographies of power: placing scale*. Blackwell, Oxford 26–60.

Giddens, A. (1984). *The constitution of society: Outline of the theory of structuration*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Giddens, A. (2006) Sociology. Fifth Edition. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Giddens, A. & Stones, R. (2005). *Structuration theory*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gilbert, C. L., Christiaensen, L., & Kaminski, J. (2017). Food price seasonality in Africa: Measurement and extent. *Food policy*, *67*, 119-132.

Gillespie, S., Haddad, L., Mannar, V., Menon, P., & Nisbett, N. (2013). The politics of reducing malnutrition: Building commitment and accelerating progress. *The Lancet*, *382*(9891), 552–569.

Giroux, S., Blekking, J., Waldman, K., Resnick, D., & Fobi, D. (2020). Informal vendors and food systems planning in an emerging African city. *Food Policy*, 101997.

Gizaw, Z. (2019). Public health risks related to food safety issues in the food market: A systematic literature review. *Environmental health and preventive medicine*, *24*(1), 1-21.

Glover, D. (2007). Monsanto and smallholder farmers: A case study in CSR. *Third World Quarterly*, *28*(4), 851-867.

Godfray, H. Charles J., Ian R. Crute, Haddad, L., Lawrence, D., Muir, J.F., Nisbett, N., Pretty, J., Robinson, S., Toulmin, C., & Whiteley, R. (2010). The future of the global food system. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B.365,* 2769–2777.

Gomez, M., Mejia, A., Ruddell, B. L., & Rushforth, R. R. (2021). Supply chain diversity buffers cities against food shocks. *Nature*, *595*(7866), 250-254.

Gondwe, S. V., & Shukla, S. H. (2020). Mapping Flood Risk of Nsanje District in Malawi Using Sentinel-1 Data. *Journal of Remote Sensing & GIS*. *11*(3), 11-34.

Goodfellow, T. and Jackman, D. (2020) Control the capital: Cities and political dominance. ESID Working Paper No. 135. Manchester, UK: The University of Manchester. Available at www.effective-states.org.

Gore, C. D. (2018). How African cities lead: Urban policy innovation and agriculture in Kampala and Nairobi. *World development*, *108*, 169-180.

Gottdiener, M., Budd, L., & Lehtovuori, P. (2015). *Key concepts in urban studies*. Sage.

Government of the Republic of Malawi. (2002). Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. April 2002. Retrieved from: https://www.imf.org/External/NP/prsp/2002/mwi/01/043002.pdf

Government of the Republic of Malawi. (2007). Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper: Growth and Development Strategy. February 2007. Retrieved from: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2016/12/31/Malawi-Poverty-Reduction-Strategy-Paper-Growth-and-Development-Strategy-20417

Government of the Republic of Malawi. (2012). Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. IMF Country Report No. 12/222. August 2012. Retrieved from: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr12222.pdf

Government of the Republic of Malawi. (2015). Malawi HABITAT III Report. Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development. October, 2015. Retrieved from: http://uploads.habitat3.org/hb3/Malawi-Final-Habitat-3-Report-Oct2015-1.pdf

Government of the Republic of Malawi. (2016). Physical Planning Act 2016. Retrieved from: http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/mlw170909.pdf

Government of the Republic of Malawi. (2005). The Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS). Retreived from: http://acpclima.dev4u.it/document/acp_policies/MW/Malawi%20Economic%20Growth%20Strategy%20(MEGS).pdf

Government of the Republic of Malawi. (2011). The Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) II. Retreived from: https://www.resakss.org/sites/default/files/Malawi%202012%20Malawi%20Growth%20and%20Development%20Strategy%20(MGDS)%20II%202011%20-%202016.pdf

Government of the Republic of Malawi. (2017). The Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) III – Building a Productive, Competitive and Resilient Nation. Retireived from: http://www.reforms.gov.mw/psrmu/sites/default/files/Malawi%20Growth%20and%20Development%20Strategy%20III.pdf

Government of the Republic of Malawi. (2018). National Multi-Sector Nutrition Policy. Department of Nutrition, HIV and AIDS. April 2018. Retrieved from: https://extranet.who.int/nutrition/gina/sites/default/filesstore/MWI_2018_National-Multi-Sector-Nutrition-Policy.pdf

Government of the Republic of Malawi. (2018). National Multi-Sector Nutrition Strategic Plan. Department of Nutrition, HIV and AIDS. April 2018. Retrieved from: https://dnhamalawi.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Malawi-National-Nutrition-Strategic-Plan-FINAL-June-2018.pdf

Government of the Republic of Malawi. (2018). National Resilience Strategy (2018 – 2030). Breaking the Cycle of Food Insecurity in Malawi – Department of Disaster Management Affairs. http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/mlw190927.pdf

Government of the Republic of Malawi (2020). Voluntary National Review – Report for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). June 2020. Retrieved from: https://malawi.un.org/index.php/en/52003-malawi-2020-voluntary-national-review-report-sustainable-development-goals

Government of the Republic of Malawi. (2020). Malawi's 2020/2021 Budget Statement by Minister of Finance Felix Mlusu, September 2020. Retrieved from: https://malawiwire.com/2020-2021-mw-national-budget/

Graham, J., Plumptre, T. W., & Amos, B. (2003). *Principles for good governance in the 21st century*. Ottawa: Institute on governance.

Griffin, L. (2007) All Aboard: Power, Participation and Governance in the North Sea Regional Advisory Council. *International Journal of Green Economics, 1* (3/4), 478–93.

Griffin (2012). Where is Power in Governance? Why Geography Matters in the Theory of Governance. *Political Studies Review, 10* (2), 280-220.

Grindle, M. S. (2004). Good Enough Governance: Poverty Reduction and Reform in Developing Countries 1. *Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions*, *17*(4), 525–548.

Grindle, M. (2007). Good Enough Governance. *Development Policy Review*, *25*(5), 553–574.

Grindle, M. (2012). Good governance: The inflation of an idea. *Planning ideas that matter*, 259-282.

Grindle, M. S. (2016). Good Governance, R.I.P.: A Critique and an Alternative. *Governance*, *0*(0).

Grindle, M. S., & Thomas, J. W. (1991). *Public choices and policy change: the political economy of reform in developing countries*. JHU Press.

Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1994). Competing paradigms in qualitative research. *Handbook of qualitative research*, *2*(163-194), 105.

Gunde, A. M. (2017). The political economy of the media in Malawi: news coverage of agricultural input subsidies. *African Journalism Studies*, *38*(1), 19-39.

Haddad, L. (2015). Equity: Not just for optimists. *Development Policy Review*. *33* (1), 5-13.

Hannah, C., Davies, J., Green, R., Zimmer, A., Anderson, P., Battersby, J., Baylis, K., Joshi, N. and Evans, T.P. (2022). Persistence of open-air markets in the food systems of Africa's secondary cities. *Cities*, *124*, 103608.

Hardoy, J., & Pandiella, G. (2009). Urban poverty and vulnerability to climate change in Latin America. *Environment and urbanization*, *21*(1), 203-224.

Harrison, G. (2002). *Issues in the contemporary politics of sub-Saharan Africa: The dynamics of struggle and resistance*. Springer.

Hart, K. (2009). On the informal economy: the political history of an ethnographic concept. *Universite Libre de Bruxelles Working Papers CEB 09/42*.

Hatton, T. J., & Williamson, J. G. (2019). *Labour Market Integration and the Rural–Urban Wage Gap in History* (pp. 89-109). Routledge.

Hawkes, C., & Parsons, A. (2019). Rethinking Food Policy: A Fresh Approach to Policy and Practice Brief 1: Tackling food systems challenges: The role of food policy. Centre for Food Policy. *City University of London*.

Hawkes, C., Parsons, K., & Wells, R. (2019). Brief 2: Understanding the food system: Why it matters for food policy. London: Centre for Food Policy. Retrieved from: https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/22795/1/.

Haysom, G. (2010). Urban agriculture in the city of Cape Town. Chapter 12. 211-226. In *Sustaining Cape Town: Imagining a Livable City*. Sustainability Institute. Sun Press.

Haysom, G. (2015). Food and the city: Urban scale food system governance. *Urban Forum 26*(3), 263-281.

Haysom, G. (2020). Perspectives on urban food-system governance in the Global South. In *Handbook on Urban Food Security in the Global South*. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Haysom, G. (2020). Urban Food Governance Perspectives in Changing African and Southern Cities HCP Discussion Paper No. 39, Waterloo and Cape Town.

Haysom, G., Olsson, E., Dymitrow, M., Opiyo, P., Taylor Buck, N., Oloko, M., ... & Agong, S. G. (2019). Food systems sustainability: An examination of different viewpoints on food system change. *Sustainability*, *11*(12), 3337.

Haysom, G. & Tawodzera, G. (2018). Measurement drives diagnosis and response: Gaps in transferring food security assessment to the urban scale. *Food Policy*. 74. 117-125.

Healey, P. (2012). Communicative planning: Practices, concepts, and rhetorics. *Planning Ideas That Matter: Livability, Territoriality, Governance, and Reflective Practice*, *333*.

Hendrix, C. S., & Haggard, S. (2015). Global food prices, regime type, and urban unrest in the developing world. *Journal of Peace Research*, *52*(2), 143-157.

Henson, S., & Reardon, T. (2005). Private agri-food standards: Implications for food policy and the agri-food system. *Food policy*, *30*(3), 241-253.

Heynen, N. (2006). Justice of eating in the city: the political ecology of urban hunger. In *In the Nature of Cities* (pp. 144-157). Routledge.

Hickel, J. (2014). The 'girl effect': liberalism, empowerment and the contradictions of development. *Third World Quarterly*, *35*(8), 1355-1373.

Hinrichs, C. C. (2003). The practice and politics of food system localization. *Journal of rural studies*, *19*(1), 33-45.

Holden, S. T., & Lunduka, R. W. (2013). Who benefit from Malawi's targeted farm input subsidy program?. *Forum for Development Studies, 40*(1), 1-25.

Holdsworth, M., & Landais, E. (2019). Urban food environments in Africa: implications for policy and research. *Proceedings of the Nutrition Society*, *78*(4), 513-515.

Holt-Gimenez, E., Altieri, M., & Rosset, P. (2008). Ten reasons why the Rockefeller and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundations' alliance for another green revolution will not solve the problems of poverty and hunger in Sub-Saharan Africa. Institute for Food and Development Policy. AGRIS. Retreived from: https://agris.fao.org/agrissearch/search.do?recordID=GB2013203243

Holzner, B. (1972) [1968]. Reality construction in society. Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Company.

Hommann, K., & Lall, S. V. (2019). Cities and Towns Are Growing, yet the Potential Benefits of Urbanization Remain Distant. In Which Way to Liveable and Productive Cities? : A Roadmap for Sub-Saharan African Cities. World Bank Group. March 2019. Retreived from: https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/978-1-4648-1405-1_ch1

Horton, P., Banwart, S. A., Brockington, D., Brown, G. W., Bruce, R., Cameron, D. (2017). An agenda for integrated system-wide interdisciplinary agri-food research. *Food Security*, *9*(2), 195–210.

Hospes, O., & Brons, A. (2016). Food system governance. A systematic literature review. In *Food systems governance* (pp. 13-42). Routledge.

Hubbard, M., & Onumah, G. (2001). Improving urban food supply and distribution in developing countries: the role of city authorities. *Habitat International*, *25*(3), 431-446.

Hufty, M. (2011a). Governance : Exploring Four Approaches and Their Relevance to Research. *Research for Sustainable Development: Foundations, Experiences, and Perspectives*, 165–183.

Hufty, M. (2011b). Investigating policy processes: The Governance Analytical Framework (GAF). In: Wiesmann U, Hurni H (Eds.), *Research for Sustainable Development: Foundations, Experiences, and Perspectives*. Perspectives of the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North-South, University of Bern, Vol. 6. Bern, Switzerland: *Geographica Bernensia*, 403–424.

Hussein, M. K. (2004). Decentralisation and development: The Malawian experience. *Africa Development*, *29*(2).

Hutton, M. J. (2013). A dystopian democracy: discourses on leadership failure and national transformation in Malawi's urban public sphere. *A dystopian democracy: discourses on leadership failure and national transformation in Malawi's urban public sphere*. Leiden University Thesis. Submitted for the Research Masters African Studies.

Hyde, K. F. (2000). Recognising deductive processes in qualitative research. *Qualitative market research: An international journal. 3*(2), 82-89.

IFPRI. (2017). *2017 Global Food Policy Report*, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC, available at http://ebrary.ifpri.org/utils/getfile/collection/p15738coll2/id/131085/filename/131296.pdf.

Ingram, J. (2011). A food systems approach to researching food security and its interactions with global environmental change. *Food security*, *3*(4), 417-431.

Innes, E. J., Trogrlić, R. Š., & Beevers, L. C. (2021). Social vulnerability to drought in rural Malawi. In *Understanding Disaster Risk* (81-107). Elsevier.

International Monetary Fund (IMF). (October 2011). Federal Democratic Republic *of Ethiopia : Poverty Reduction* Strategy *Paper:* Growth and Transformation Plan 2010/11-2014/15. IMF Country Report No. 11/305. Retrieved from: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr11305.pdf

International Monetary Fund (IMF). (August 2012). *Malawi: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. IMF Country Report*. No. 12/222. Retrieved from: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr12222.pdf

Iossifova, D., C. Doll & A. Gasparatos. 2017. Defining the Urban: Why do we need definitions? In Defining the Urban: Interdisciplinary and professional perspectives, eds. D. Iossifova, C. Doll & A. Gasparatos, 1-7. London: Routledge.

IPES – Food (2017). "Unraveling the Food-Health Nexus: Addressing Practices, Political Economy, and Power Relations to Build Healthier Food Systems." Thematic Report 2. International Panel of Experts on Sustainable Food Systems.

Jacobs, J. (1961). *The Life and Death of Great American Cities*. Routlege.

Jagero, N., Kwandayi, H. H., & Longwe, A. (2014). Challenges of decentralization in Malawi. *International Journal of Management Sciences*, *2*(7), 315–322.

Jarosz, L. (2011). Defining world hunger: scale and neoliberal ideology in international food security policy discourse. *Food, Culture & Society*, *14*(1), 117-139.

Jayne, T. S., Sitko, N. J., Ricker-Gilbert, J., & Mangisoni, J. H. (2010). *Malawi's maize marketing system* (No. 1093-2016-88020).

Jayne, T. S., Strauss, J., Yamano, T., & Molla, D. (2002). Targeting of food aid in rural Ethiopia: chronic need or inertia?. *Journal of Development Economics*, *68*(2), 247-288.

Jibao, S. and Prichard, W. 2015. The political economy of property tax in Africa: Explaining reform outcomes in Sierra Leone. African Affairs, 114 (456): 404–431. https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/114/456/404/24597/The-political-economy-of-property-tax-in-Africa

Jimu, I. M. (2005). Negotiated economic opportunity and power: perspectives and perceptions of street vending in urban Malawi. *Africa Development*, 30(4), 35–51.

Jimu, I.M. (2008). *Urban Appropriation and Transformation: Bicycle Taxi and Handcart Operators*: *Bicycle Taxi and Handcart Operators*. Langaa RPCIG.

Jones, K., Schnurr, M. A., Carr, E. R., & Moseley, W. G. (2015). Should I stay or should I go? Incorporating a commitment to fieldwork throughout an academic career. *African Geographical Review*, *34*(1), 55-68.

Jongh, L. (2015). Street vending in urban Malawi: Strategies and practices of vendors and local authorities. *The Ideal City: between myth and reality. Representations, policies, contradictions and challenges for tomorrows urban life*.

Joshua, M. D. K., Stathers, T., Chirwa, R. K., Ngongondo, C., Lamboll, R., Monjerezi, M., ... & Liwenga, E. T. (2021). A Comparative Study of the Impacts of Flooding on Food Security of Urban and Rural Households in Blantyre City and Chikwawa, Malawi. In *Cyclones in Southern Africa* (pp. 35-58). Springer, Cham.

Joy, E. J., Kumssa, D. B., Broadley, M. R., Watts, M. J., Young, S. D., Chilimba, A. D., & Ander, E. L. (2015). Dietary mineral supplies in Malawi: spatial and socioeconomic assessment. *BMC nutrition*, *1*(1), 1-25.

Kadokera, D. (2017). The influence of media on agricultural policy decisions in Malawi : a political economy analysis. MSc (Agric) Dissertation, University of Pretoria, Pretoria.

Kalwar, S., Memon, I. A., & Qureshi, S. (2020). Significance of National Spatial Planning for Economic Development of Secondary Cities in India: Critical Analysis of JNNURM Programme. *Sukkur IBA Journal of Computing and Mathematical Sciences*, *4*(2), 49-60.

Kaika, M. (2017). 'Don't call me resilient again!': the New Urban Agenda as immunology… or… what happens when communities refuse to be vaccinated with 'smart cities' and indicators. *Environment and Urbanization*, *29*(1), 89-102.

Kankwamba, H., & Kornher, L. (2020). Business registration and firm performance: a case of maize traders in Malawi. *Development in Practice*, *30*(7), 850-861.

Kasaila, F., Sanga, K., Njikho, L. (2018). *Mzuzu Vendors want DPP governor fired. Face of Malawi.* https://www.faceofmalawi.com/2018/04/16/mzuzu-vendors-want-dpp-governor-fired/. April 16, 2018.

Kaspin, D. (1995). The politics of ethnicity in Malawi's democratic transition. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, *33*(4), 595-620.

Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. (2009). Governance matters VIII: aggregate and individual governance indicators, 1996-2008. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4978.

Kayambazinthu, E. (1998). The language planning situation in Malawi. *Journal of multilingual and multicultural development*, *19*(5), 369-439.

Kayira, G. W., Banda, P. C., & Robinson, A. L. (2019). Ethnic associations and politics in contemporary Malawi. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, *13*(4), 718-738.

Kayuni, H. M., & Tambulasi, R. I. (2009). Political transitions and vulnerability of street vending in Malawi. *Theoretical and Empirical Researches in Urban Management*, *4*(3 (12), 79-96.

Kazeze, Z. (2008). Social protection and ageing in Malawi. *UNICEF (Ed.)*. Retrieved from: https://www.eldis.org/document/A40036.

Keith, M., & de Souza Santos, A. A. (2021). Introduction: urban presence and uncertain futures in African cities. In *African Cities and Collaborative Futures*. Manchester University Press.

Kelsall, T. (2012). Neo-patrimonialism, rent-seeking and development: Going with the grain?. *New Political Economy*, *17*(5), 677-682.

Kenyon, L., Brown, M., & Khonje, P. (1997). First report of banana bunchy top virus in Malawi. *Plant Disease*, *81*(9), 1096-1096.

Kerr, R. B., Nyantakyi-Frimpong, H., Dakishoni, L., Lupafya, E., Shumba, L., Luginaah, I., & Snapp, S. S. (2018). Knowledge politics in participatory climate change adaptation research on agroecology in Malawi. *Renewable Agriculture and Food Systems*, *33*(3), 238-251.

Kessides, C. (2006). *The urban transition in Sub-Saharan Africa: Implications for economic growth and poverty reduction* (p. 116). Washington, DC: Cities Alliance.

Khaila, S., Tchuwa, F., Franzel, S., Simpson, S. (2015). The Farmer-to-Farmer Extension Approach in Malawi: A Survey of Lead Farmers. ICRAF Working Paper No. 189. Nairobi, World Agroforestry Centre.

Kihato, C. W., Royston, L., Raimundo, J. A., & Raimundo, I. M. (2013). Multiple land regimes: rethinking land governance in Maputo's peri-urban spaces. *Urban Forum*. *24*(1), 65-83.

Kilby, P. (2019). *The green revolution: Narratives of politics, technology and gender*. Routledge.

Kita, S. M. (2017). Urban vulnerability, disaster risk reduction and resettlement in Mzuzu city, Malawi. *International journal of disaster risk reduction*, *22*, 158-166.

Kjaer, A. M. (2004). *Governance: key concepts*. Cambridge, UK.

Kjaer, A. M. (2009). Governance and the urban bureaucracy. *Theories of urban politics*, *2*, 137-152.

Kjaer, A. M. (2011). Rhodes' Contribution to Governance Theory: Praise, Critcism and the Future Governance Debate. *Public administration*, *89*(1), 101-113.

Koc, M. (1999). *For hunger-proof cities: Sustainable urban food systems*. IDRC.

Koch, R., & Latham, A. (Eds.). (2017). *Key thinkers on cities*. Sage.

Kumwenda, I., & Madola, M. (2005). *The status of contract farming in Malawi*. Food, Agriculture, and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network (FANRPAN).

Khunga, S. (2018, October 17). Health budget at donor's mercy. *National News*.

Kutengule, M., Nucifora, A., & Zaman, H. (2006). Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation Reform. *Poverty and Social Impact Analysis of Reforms*, 415.

Larson, A. M., Sarmiento Barletti, J. P., Ravikumar, A., & Korhonen-Kurki, K. (2018). Multi-level governance: Some coordination problems cannot be solved through coordination.

Lawrence, F. (2011, November 23). Alarm as corporate giants target developing countries. *Global Development, The Guardian*.

Lazaro, J., Kapute, F., & Holm, R. H. (2019). Food safety policies and practices in public spaces: The urban water, sanitation, and hygiene environment for fresh fish sold from individual vendors in Mzuzu, Malawi. *Food Science and Nutrition*, *7*(9), 2986–2994.

Ledger, T. (2016). *An empty plate*. Jacana Media.

Leduka, R., Crush, J., Frayne, B., McCordic, C., Matobo, T., Makoa, T., Mphale, M., Phaila, M., Letsie, M. (2015). The State of Poverty and Food Insecurity in Maseru, Lesotho (rep., pp. i-80). Kingston, ON and Cape Town: African Food Security Urban Network. Urban Food Security Series No. 21.

Legwegoh, A. F., & Fraser, E. D. (2015). Food crisis or chronic poverty: metanarratives of food insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Journal of Hunger & Environmental Nutrition*, *10*(3), 313-342.

Leroy, J. L., Ruel, M., Frongillo, E. A., Harris, J., & Ballard, T. J. (2015). Measuring the food access dimension of food security: a critical review and mapping of indicators. *Food and nutrition bulletin*, *36*(2), 167-195.

Levy, B. (2014). *Working with the grain: integrating governance and growth in development strategies*. Oxford University Press.

Li, T. M. (2007). *The will to improve: Governmentality, development, and the practice of politics*. Duke University Press.

Lindell, I., Hedman, M., & Verboomen, K. N. (2013). "The World Cup,'World Class Cities,'and Street Vendors in South Africa. In Street Economies in the Urban Global South, by Walter E. Little, B. Lynne Milgram [Eds.] 179-199. Santa Fe, New Mexico: School for Advanced Research Press.

Lipschutz, R. D. (2010). *Political Economy, Capitalism, and Popular Culture*. Lanham:Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Liverman, D. (2004). Who governs, at what scale and at what price? Geography, environmental governance, and the commodification of nature. *Annals of the Association of American geographers*, *94*(4), 734-738.

LoBiondo-Wood, G., & Haber, J. (2010). Integrating the processes of research and evidence-based practice. *Nursing research: methods and critical appraisal for evidence-based practice,* 5-26.

Logan, C. (2014). Developing Africa's infrastructure: The rough road to better services. Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 3. November 18, 2014.

Loux, W. A. (2020). The impact of global commodity prices on the Wilson government's attempted CAP reform, 1974–1975. *Agricultural History Review*, *68*(1), 86-108.

Lucci, P., Bhatkal, T., & Khan, A. (2018). Are we underestimating urban poverty?. *World development*, *103*, 297-310.

Lukes, S. (1974). Power: A radical approach. *London: McMillan*.

Lukes, S. (2021). *Power: A radical view*. Bloomsbury Publishing.

Lungu, E. A., Biesma, R., Chirwa, M., & Darker, C. (2019). Is the urban child health advantage declining in Malawi?: evidence from demographic and health surveys and multiple indicator cluster surveys. *Journal of Urban Health*, *96*(1), 131-143.

Lusaka, M. (2019). Culture, History and Politics in Malawi: The Production of National Heritage, 1964-2009. Doctoral Thesis. University of Western Cape. Nov. 15, 2019. Retreived from: https://etd.uwc.ac.za/bitstream/handle/11394/7438/Lusaka_PhD_Arts_2019.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

MacAuslan, I. (2009). Hunger, Discourse and the Policy Process: How do Conceptualizations of the Problem of 'Hunger'Affect its Measurement and Solution?. *The European Journal of Development Research*, *21*(3), 397-418.

Makinda, S. M. (1996). Democracy and multi-party politics in Africa. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, *34*(4), 555-573.

Makwero, M. T. (2018). Delivery of primary health care in Malawi. *African Journal of Primary Health Care and Family Medicine*, *10*(1), 1-3.

Malawi, Office of the President and Cabinet. (1980a). National Rural Growth Centres Programme, Planning Regions, Proposals for Phase I. Lilongwe.

Malawi, Office of the President and Cabinet, Development Division. (1980b). German Technical Assistance Project: Rural Growth Centre Project: Monthly Report: February 1980. Rural Growth Centre Project, Lilongwe.

Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee (MVAC). 2014 Annual Assessment and Analysis.

Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee (MVAC). 2015 Annual Assessment and Analysis.

Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee (MVAC). 2016 Annual Assessment and Analysis. Retreived from: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/malawi/document/malawi-vulnerability-assessment-committee-mvac-food-security-assessment

Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee (MVAC). 2017 Annual Assessment and Analysis.

Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee (MVAC). 2019 Annual Assessment and Analysis.

Manda, M. A. (2013). Situation of urbanisation in Malawi report. *Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, Lilongwe*.

Manda, M. Z. (2014). Where there is no local government: addressing disaster risk reduction in a small town in Malawi. *Environment and Urbanization*, *26*(2), 586-599.

Manda, M., & Wanda, E. (2017). Understanding the nature and scale of risks in Karonga, Malawi. *Environment and Urbanization*, *29*(1), 15-32.

Mango, N., Mapemba, L., Tchale, H., Makate, C., Dunjana, N., & Lundy, M. (2018). Maize value chain analysis: A case of smallholder maize production and marketing in selected areas of Malawi and Mozambique. *Cogent Business & Management*, *5*(1), 1503220.

Mangulama, J. A., & Wu, J. (2022). Land Reform or Continued Social Exclusion? Land Occupations, State Responses and Neoliberal Policies in Southern Malawi. In *Capital Penetration and the Peasantry in Southern and Eastern Africa* (pp. 101-116). Springer, Cham.

Marsden, T. & Sonnino, R. (2012). Human health and wellbeing and the sustainability of urban-regional food systems. *Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability*. *4*, 427–30.

Martín, D., & de la Fuente, R. (2022). Global and Local Agendas: The Milan Urban Food Policy Pact and Innovative Sustainable Food Policies in Euro-Latin American Cities. *Land*, *11*(2), 202.

Martin, D., McCann, E., & Purcell, M. (2003). Space, scale, governance, and representation: Contemporary geographical perspectives on urban politics and policy. *Journal of Urban Affairs*, *25*(2), 113-121.

Martin-Prevel, Y., Becquey, E., Tapsoba, S., Castan, F., Coulibaly, D., Fortin, S., ... & Savy, M. (2012). The 2008 food price crisis negatively affected household food security and dietary diversity in urban Burkina Faso. *The Journal of nutrition*, *142*(9), 1748-1755.

Marx, B., Stoker, T., & Suri, T. (2013). The economics of slums in the developing world. *Journal of Economic perspectives*, *27*(4), 187-210.

Mason, J. (1997). *Qualitative researching*. Sage Publications.

Maxwell, D. (1999). The political economy of urban food security in Sub-Saharan Africa. *World Development*, *27*(11), 1939-1953.

Maxwell, S. (1996). Food security: a post-modern perspective. *Food policy*, *21*(2), 155-170.

Maxwell, S. (1998). Agricultural development and poverty in Africa: some issues. *Reducing poverty through agricultural sector strategies in eastern and southern Africa*. Overseas Development Institute/CGIAR. Retrieved from: https://cgspace.cgiar.org/bitstream/handle/10568/63708/938_Reducing_poverty_through_agricultural_sector_strategies.pdf?sequence=1#page=27

Maye, D. (2019). 'Smart food city': conceptual relations between smart city planning, urban food systems and innovation theory. *City, Culture and Society*, *16*, 18-24.

Mayhew, S. (2009). A Dictionary of Geography: Oxford University Press. Retrieved from: https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199231805.001.0001/acref-9780199231805.

McArthur, J. W., & McCord, G. C. (2017). Fertilizing growth: Agricultural inputs and their effects in economic development. *Journal of development economics*, *127*, 133-152.

McCalla, A. F. (2007). *FAO in the Changing Global Landscape* (No. 1570-2016-133580).Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics. University of California Davis. Working Paper 07-006. March 2007.

McCann, J. (2005). Maize and Grace: Africa's Encounter with a New World Crop, 1500-2000, Cambridge (Mass), Harvard University Press pp. 220-1.

McCracken, J. (2008). *Politics and Christianity in Malawi, 1875-1940: the impact of the Livingstonia Mission in the* Mitlin, D., & Satterthwaite, D. (2012). *Urban poverty in the global south: scale and nature*. Routledge.

McCracken, J. (2012). *A history of Malawi, 1859-1966*. Boydell & Brewer Ltd.

McFarlane, C. (2008). Urban shadows: materiality, the 'Southern city' and urban theory. *Geography Compass*, *2*(2), 340-358.

McGuigan, J. (2005). Neo-liberalism, culture and policy. *International journal of cultural policy*, *11*(3), 229-241.

McKeon, N. (2014). *Food security governance: Empowering communities, regulating corporations*. Routledge

McKeon, N. (2017). Are equity and sustainability a likely outcome when foxes and chickens share the same coop? Critiquing the concept of multistakeholder governance of food security. *Globalizations*, *14*(3), 379-398.

McMichael, P. (2005). Global Development and The Corporate Food Regime. *Research in Rural Sociology and Development*, *11*, 265–299. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1057-1922(05)11010-5

McMichael, P. (2020). Political economy of the global food and agriculture system. In *Rethinking Food and Agriculture* (pp. 53-75). Woodhead Publishing.

Mdee, A., Ofori, A., Chasukwa, M., & Manda, S. (2021). Neither sustainable nor inclusive: A political economy of agricultural policy and livelihoods in Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, *48*(6), 1260-1283.

Mendoza, R. U. (2011). Why do the poor pay more? Exploring the poverty penalty concept. *Journal of international development*, *23*(1), 1-28.

Merriam, S., Johnson-Bailey, J., Lee, M., Kee, Y., Ntseane, G., & Muhamad, M. (2001). Power and Positionality: Negotiating Insider/Outsider Status within and across Cultures. *International Journal of Lifelong Education*, *20*(5), 405–416.

Mertens, Donna M. (2007). Transformative Paradigm Mixed Methods and Social Justice. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research* 1 (*3*): 212–25.

Mikwamba, K., Dessein, J., & Kambewa, D. (2020). Fighting banana bunchy top disease in Southern Malawi. The interface of knowledge systems and dynamics in a development arena. *The Journal of Agricultural Education and Extension*, *26*(2), 163-182.

Milan Urban Food Policy Pact (MUFPP). (2021). Milan Urban Food Policy Pact: About. Retreived from: https://www.milanurbanfoodpolicypact.org/the-milan-pact/

Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development. (2013). Revised October, 2013. Guidebook on The Local Government System in Malawi. https://www.resakss.org/sites/default/files/Malawi%20MLGRD%202013%20Guidebook%20on%20the%20Local%20Government%20System%20in%20Malawi.pdf

Mitlin, D. (2005). Chronic Poverty in Urban Areas. *Urbanization and Environment, 17*(2): 3-10.

Mitlin, D., & Satterthwaite, D. (2012). *Urban poverty in the global south: scale and nature*. Routledge.

Mkweu, J. (2020). Maize prices up 22%. The Malawi Times. September 23, 2020. Retrieved from: https://times.mw/maize-prices-up-22/

Mkusa, L., & Hendriks, S. (2021). How food insecure are residents in Malawi's major cities?. *Development Southern Africa*, 1-17.

Mockshell, J., & Birner, R. (2020). Who has the better story? On the narrative foundations of agricultural development dichotomies. *World Development*, *135*, 105043.

Molinari, D., Ballio, F., Berni, N., & Pandolfo, C. (2015). Input Paper Prepared for the Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2015. Towards More Effective Flood Early Warning Systems: The Italian Experience. United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR).

Moos, A. I., & Dear, M. J. (1986). Structuration theory in urban analysis: 1. Theoretical exegesis. *Environment and Planning A*, *18*(2), 231-252.

Moragues-Faus, A., & Battersby, J. (2021). Urban food policies for a sustainable and just future: Concepts and tools for a renewed agenda. *Food Policy*, *103*, 102124.

Moragues-Faus, A., Morgan, K., Moschitz, H., Neimane, I., Nilsson, H., Pinto, M., Rohracher,H., Ruiz, R., Thuswald, M., Tisenkopfs, T. & Halliday, J. (2013). Urban Food Strategies: the rough guide to sustainable food systems. Document developed in the framework of the FP7 project FOODLINKS (GA No. 265287). Retrieved from: https://orgprints.org/id/eprint/28860/1/foodlinks-Urban_food_strategies.pdf

Moragues-Faus, A., & Marsden, T. (2017). The political ecology of food: Carving 'spaces of possibility' in a new research agenda. *Journal of Rural Studies*, *55*, 275-288.

Moragues-Faus, A., & Morgan, K. (2015). Reframing the foodscape: The emergent world of urban food policy. *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space*, *47*(7), 1558-1573.

Moragues Faus, A., Sonnino, R. and Marsden, T. K. (2017). Exploring European food system vulnerabilities: towards integrated food security governance. *Environmental Science and Policy* 75: 184-215.

Morgan, K. (2013). The rise of urban food planning. *International Planning Studies*, *18*(1), 1-4. *Northern Province* (No. 8). African Books Collective.

Moseley, W. G. (2016). The new green revolution for Africa: a political ecology critique. *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, *23*, 177.

Mould, O. (2016). A Limitless Urban Theory? A Response to Scott and Storper's 'The Nature of Cities: The Scope and Limits of Urban Theory'. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, *40*(1), 157-163.

Mpesi, A. M., & Muriaas, R. L. (2012). Food security as a political issue: the 2009 elections in Malawi. *Journal of contemporary African studies*, *30*(3), 377-393.

Mtawali, 2021. Mzuzu Mayor Nyasulu frowns upon reduced funding. May 4 2021. Nyasa Times.

Mukute, M., Burt, J., Colvin, J., & Msukwa, C. A. (2021). Governance in Malawi: Impact Evaluation of the 'Kutukula Umwini pa Chitukuko Cha m'maboma Ang'ono Project: Enhancing Communities' Capacity in Tracking Development Resources at Local Council Level'.

Mungai, L. M., Messina, J. P., & Snapp, S. (2020). Spatial pattern of agricultural productivity trends in Malawi. *Sustainability*, *12*(4), 1313.

Muñoz-Dela Cruz, A. (2017). Norm Diffusion and Local Governance: Exploring the Philippine Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction (CCA-DRR) Policies and Institutions. Masters Thesis. Institute of International and Development Studies. The Graduate Institute Geneva.

Mulenga, C. (2013). The State of Food Insecurity in Lusaka, Zambia (rep., pp. i-48). Kingston, ON and Cape Town: African Food Security Urban Network. Urban Food Security Series No. 19.

Muriaas, R. L. (2009). Local perspectives on the 'neutrality'of traditional authorities in Malawi, South Africa and Uganda. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, *47*(1), 28-51.

Mussa, R. (2014). Food Price Heterogeneity and Income Inequality in Malawi: Is Inequality Underestimated?. Economics Department, Chancellor College, University of Malawi 16 May 2014. Retrieved from: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/56080/1/MPRA_paper_56080.pdf

Mussa, R. (2015). Do the Poor Pay More for Maize in Malawi?. *Journal of International Development*, *27*(4), 546-563.

Mussa, R. & Masanjala, W. (2015). A Dangerous Divide: The state of inequality in Malawi. *Oxfam Policy and Practice*. Retrieved from: https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/dangerous-divide-state-inequality-malawi

Mvula, P., & Chiweza, A. (2013). The State of Food Insecurity in Blantyre City, Malawi (rep., pp. i-28). Kingston, ON and Cape Town: African Food Security Urban Network. Urban Food Security Series No. 18.

Mwathunga, E., & Donaldson, R. (2021). Urban planning history of Malawi: case study of the capital Lilongwe. *Planning Perspectives*, 1-21.

National Statistics Office of Malawi (2005). Second Integrated Household Survey (I2-2004-2005). Retrieved from: https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/2307

National Statistical Office of Malawi. (2011). Third Integrated Household Survey 2010-2011 (MWI_2010_IHS-III_v01_M). Retrieved from: https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/1003

National Statistical Office of Malawi. (2019). 2018 Malawi Population and Housing Census, Main Report. May 2019. Retrieved from: http://www.nsomalawi.mw/images/stories/data_on_line/demography/census_2018/2018%20Malawi%20Population%20and%20Housing%20Census%20Main%20Report.pdf

National Statistics Office of Malawi (2020). Fifth Integrated Household Survey (I5-2019/2020). Retrieved from: http://www.nsomalawi.mw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=230&Itemid=111

National Statistics Office of Malawi & World Bank (2018). Methodology for Poverty Measurement in Malawi (2016-2017). The National Statistics Office of Malawi and The World Bank, Poverty and Equity Global Practice – Zomba, Malawi.

Nestle, M. (2012, January 6.) How Big Food Takes Advantage of the Poor in Emerging Markets. *The Atlantic.*

Neves Alves, S. (2021). Everyday states and water infrastructure: Insights from a small secondary city in Africa, Bafatá in Guinea-Bissau. *Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space*, *39*(2), 247-264.

Nijman, J. (2007). Introduction—comparative urbanism. *Urban Geography*, *28*(1), 1-6.

Niles, M. T., Ahuja, R., Barker, T., Esquivel, J., Gutterman, S., Heller, M. C., ... & Vermeulen, S. (2018). Climate change mitigation beyond agriculture: a review of food system opportunities and implications. *Renewable Agriculture and Food Systems*, *33*(3), 297-308.

Nisbett, N., Gillespie, S., Haddad, L., & Harris, J. (2014). Why worry about the politics of childhood undernutrition?. *World Development*, *64*, 420-433.

Njuguna, C. Kigaru, D.M.D. (2020). Chapter Two – Unerstanding the Livelihood Challenges of Food Vendors in Three Markets in Selected Informal Settlements in Nairobi County. *Food Safety, from Farm to Fork: Emerging and Re-emerging Issues*, 16. Juliana Kiio, Christine Njuguna (Eds.) Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Oct 12, 2020.

Nyseth, T. (2008). Network governance in contested urban landscapes. *Planning Theory & Practice*, *9*(4), 497-514.

Ochieng, D. O., Botha, R., & Baulch, B. (2019). *Structure, conduct and performance of maize markets in Malawi: Synopsis* (Vol. 35). Intl Food Policy Res Inst.

OECD/SWAC (2020), Africa's Urbanisation Dynamics 2020: Africapolis, Mapping a New Urban Geography, West African Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b6bccb81-en

Omiti, J. M., Otieno, D. J., Nyanamba, T. O., & McCullough, E. B. (2009). Factors influencing the intensity of market participation by smallholder farmers: A case study of rural and peri-urban areas of Kenya. *African Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics*, *3*(311-2016-5509), 57-82.

O'Neil, T., Cammack, D., Kanyongolo, E., Mkandawire, M. W., Mwalyambwire, T., Welham, B., & Wild, L. (2014). Fragmented governance and local service delivery in Malawi. *London: Overseas Development Institute*. Retrieved from: https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8944.pdf

Opiyo, P. O., & Agong, S. G. (2020). Nexus between Urban Food System and Other Urban Systems: Exploring Opportunities for Improving Food Security in Kisumu, Kenya. JOO Univeristy of Science and Technology Repository. Retrieved from: http://ir.jooust.ac.ke:8080/xmlui/handle/123456789/9290

Osei-Hwedie, B. (1998). The role of ethnicity in multi-party politics in Malawi and Zambia. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, *16*(2), 227-247.

Parkinson, Dubelaar, C., Carins, J., Holden, S., Newton, F., & Pescud, M. (2017). Approaching the wicked problem of obesity: an introduction to the food system compass. *Journal of Social Marketing*, *7*(4), 387–404.

Parnell, S., & Oldfield, S. (Eds.). (2014). *The Routledge handbook on cities of the global south*. London: Routledge.

Pieterse, D. E., & Parnell, S. (2014). *Africa's urban revolution*. Zed Books Ltd.

Parnell, S., & Robinson, J. (2012). (Re) theorizing cities from the Global South: Looking beyond neoliberalism. *Urban Geography*, *33*(4), 593-617.

Pendleton, W., Nickanor, N., & Pomuti, A. (2012). The State of Food Insecurity in Windhoek, Namibia (rep., pp. i-37). Kingston, ON and Cape Town: African Food Security Urban Network. Urban Food Security Series No. 14.

Pelling, M. (2012). *The vulnerability of cities: natural disasters and social resilience*. Routledge.

Pearson, M. (2010). Impact Evaluation of the Sector Wide Approach (SWAp), Malawi. Final Report for DFID. Retrieved from: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08a6aed915d3cfd000754/Impact-Evaluation-of-the-SWAp-Malawi.pdf

Pereira, L., & Drimie, S. (2016). Governance arrangements for the future food system: addressing complexity in South Africa. *Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development*, *58*(4), 18-31.

Pereira, L. M., & Ruysenaar, S. (2012). Moving from traditional government to new adaptive governance: The changing face of food security responses in South Africa. *Food Security*, *4*(1), 41-58.

Pérez-Escamilla, R., Shamah-Levy, T., & Candel, J. (2017). Food security governance in Latin America: Principles and the way forward. *Global Food Security*, *14*, 68-72.

Peters, P. (2006). Rural income and poverty in a time of radical change in Malawi. *Journal of Development Studies. 42(*2), 322–345.

Peyton, S., Moseley, W., & Battersby, J. (2015). Implications of supermarket expansion on urban food security in Cape Town, South Africa. *African Geographical Review*, *34*(1), 36-54.

Phiri, H., & Edris, A. K. (2013). *Neopatrimonialism and agricultural protection: The case of maize in Malawi* (No. 1). International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).

Phiri, H. (2016). Understanding the Drivers of Policy Reforms in Africa: The influence of Neopatrimonialism on food policies in Malawi.Developing Country Studies www.iiste.orgISSN 2224-607X (Paper) ISSN 2225-0565 (Online) Vol.6, No.9.

Piaseu, N., & Mitchell, P. (2004). Household food insecurity among urban poor in Thailand. *Journal of Nursing Scholarship*, *36*(2), 115-121.

Pieterse, E. (2011). Building New Worlds: Design and the Second Urban Transition. *Design with the Other 90%. Cities*, 41–53.

Pieterse, D. E. (2013). *City futures: Confronting the crisis of urban development*. Zed Books Ltd.

Pieterse, M. (2020). Devolution, Urban Autonomy and Local Governance in the Cities of the SADC. *African Journal of International and Comparative Law*, *28*(4), 612-635.

Pickbourn, L. (2020). When Women Go to the City: African Women's Rural-Urban Migration and the Sustainable Development Goals. In *Women and Sustainable Human Development* (pp. 245-263). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

Pinstrup-Andersen, P., & Watson, D. D. (2011). Towards a dynamic global food system. *Food policy for developing countries: The role of government in global, national, and local food systems*. Cornell University Press.

Popenoe, D. (1965). On the meaning of" urban" in urban studies. *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, *1*(1), 17-33.

Popkin, B. M., & Reardon, T. (2018). Obesity and the food system transformation in Latin America. *Obesity Reviews*, *19*(8), 1

Pothukuchi, K., & Kaufman, J. L. (1999). Placing the food system on the urban agenda: The role of municipal institutions in food systems planning. *Agriculture and human values*, *16*(2), 213-224.

Poulsen, M. N., McNab, P. R., Clayton, M. L., & Neff, R. A. (2015). A systematic review of urban agriculture and food security impacts in low-income countries. *Food Policy*, *55*, 131–146.

Pradhan, P., Kriewald, S., Costa, L., Rybski, D., Benton, T. G., Fischer, G., & Kropp, J. P. (2020). Urban food systems: How regionalization can contribute to climate change mitigation. *Environmental Science & Technology*, *54*(17), 10551-10560.

Proctor, F. J., & Berdegué, J. A. (2020). Food systems at the rural-urban interface. In *Handbook on Urban Food Security in the Global South*. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Quinn, V. J. (1994a). *Nutrition and national development: an evaluation of nutrition planning in Malawi from 1936-1990*. Wageningen University and Research.

Quinn, V. J. (1994b). A history of the politics of food and nutrition in Malawi: The context for food and nutritional surveillance. *Food Policy*, *19*(3), 255-271.

Qureshi, M. E., Dixon, J., & Wood, M. (2015). Public policies for improving food and nutrition security at different scales. *Food Security*, 393–403.

Raimundo, I., Crush, J., & Pendleton, W. (2014). The State of Food Insecurity in Maputo, Mozambique (rep., pp. i-38). Kingston, ON and Cape Town: African Food Security Urban Network. Urban Food Security Series No. 20.

Raimundo, I., Crush, J., & Pendleton, W. (2016). Food insecurity, poverty and informality. In *Rapid Urbanisation, Urban Food Deserts and Food Security in Africa* (pp. 71-83). Springer, Cham.

Reardon, T., Henson, S., & Gulati, A. (2010). Links between supermarkets and food prices, diet diversity and food safety in developing countries. *Trade, food, diet and health: perspectives and policy options*, 111-130.

Resnick, D. (2012). *Two steps forward, one step back: the limits of foreign aid on Malawi's democratic consolidation* (No. 2012/28). WIDER Working Paper.

Resnick, D. (2014). Urban governance and service delivery in African cities: the role of politics and policies. *Development Policy Review*, *32*(s1), s3-s17.

Reynolds, A. (1999). Electoral Systems and Democratization in Southern Africa (Oxford Studies in Democratization. Oxford University Press, United Kingdom.

Riley, L. (2012). The political economy of urban food security in Blantyre, Malawi. *The African Institute Occasional Paper Series, University of Western Ontario*, *1*, 1-16.

Riley, L. (2014). Operation Dongosolo and the geographies of urban poverty in Malawi. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, *40*(3), 443-458.

Riley, L. (2020). Malawian urbanism and urban poverty: geographies of food access in Blantyre. *Journal of Urbanism: International Research on Placemaking and Urban Sustainability*, *13*(1), 38-52.

Riley, L., & Chilanga, E. (2018). 'Things are not working now': poverty, food insecurity and perceptions of corruption in urban Malawi. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, *36*(4), 484-498.

Riley, L., & Legwegoh, A. (2014). Comparative urban food geographies in Blantyre and Gaborone. *African Geographical Review*, *33*(1), 52-66.

Ritchie, H. (2018). "Urbanization". *Published online at OurWorldInData.org.* Retrieved from: https://ourworldindata.org/urbanization

Roberts, B.H. (2014). Managing systems of secondary cities: Policy responses in international development. Nairobi: UN-Habitat.

Roberts, B., & Hohmann, R. (2014). *The Systems of Secondary Cities: the neglected drivers of urbanizing economies, CIVIS; No. 7. Sharing knowledge and learning from cities. Washington, DC* Robin, E., & Acuto, M. (2018). Global urban policy and the geopolitics of urban data. *Political Geography*, *66*, 76-87.

Robin, E., & Acuto, M. (2018). Global urban policy and the geopolitics of urban data. *Political Geography*, *66*, 76-87.

Robinson, J. (2002). Global and world cities: a view from off the map. *International journal of urban and regional research*, *26*(3), 531-554.

Robinson, J. (2006). *Ordinary cities: between modernity and development*. Routledge.

Robinson, J. (2014). Putting comparison to work for global urban studies. *The Routledge handbook on cities of the global South*, 57-70.

Robinson, J., & Roy, A. (2016). Debate on Global Urbanisms and the Nature of Urban Theory. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, *40*(1), 181–186.

Roever, S., & Skinner, C. (2016). Street vendors and cities. *Environment and Urbanization*, *28*(2), 359-374.

Rogerson, J. M., Kotze, N., & Rogerson, C. M. (2014). Addressing South Africa's urban challenges. *Urbani izziv*, *25*, S1-S4.

Rondinelli, D. A. (1983). *Secondary Cities in Developing Countries: Policies for Diffusing Urbanization*. California: Sage.

Rondinelli, D.A., (1985). Population distribution and economic development in Africa: The need for urbanization policies. *Population Research and Policy Review*, *4*(2), 173-196.

Rousseau, M., Boyet, A., & Harroud, T. (2020). Politicizing African urban food systems: The contradiction of food governance in Rabat and Casablanca, Morocco. *Cities*, *97*, 102528.

Roy, A. (2004). Urban informality. In *The Oxford handbook of urban planning*.

Roy, A. (2009). The 21st-century metropolis: New geographies of theory. *Regional Studies*, *43*(6), 819-830.

Roy, A. (2011). Slumdog cities: Rethinking subaltern urbanism. *International journal of urban and regional research*, *35*(2), 223-238.

Roy, A. (2014). Toward a post-colonial urban theory. *The Routledge handbook on cities of the Global South*, 9-27.

Rubin, O. (2008). The Malawi 2002 famine–destitution, democracy and donors. *Nordic journal of African studies*, *17*(1), 19-19.

Rudolph, M., Kroll, F., Ruysenaar, S., & Dlamini, T. (2012). No. 12: The State of Food Insecurity in Johannesburg. (rep., pp. i-34). Kingston, ON and Cape Town: African Food Security Urban Network. Urban Food Security Series No. 12.

Ruel, M. T., Garrett, J. L., & Yosef, S. (2017). Food security and nutrition: Growing cities, new challenges. *IFPRI book chapters*, 24-33.

Ruel, M. T., Garrett, J., Yosef, S., & Olivier, M. (2017). Urbanization, food security and nutrition. *Nutrition and Health in a Developing World*, 705-735. [Eds] de Pee, S., Taren, D. and Bloem, M. 3rd edition. New York: Springer.

Ruhanen, L., Scott, N., Ritchie, B., & Tkaczynski, A. (2010). Governance: a review and synthesis of the literature. *Tourism Review*, *65*(4), 4–16.

Sabola, T. (2019). India to Boost Malawi Agriculture. Article in Business Malawi Magazine. Retreived from: https://www.businessmalawi.com/india-to-boost-malawi-agriculture/

Saghir, J., & Santoro, J. (2018, April). Urbanization in Sub-Saharan Africa. In *Meeting Challenges by Bridging Stakeholders. Washington, DC, USA: Center for Strategic & International Studies*.

Sahley, C., Groelsema, B., Marchione, T., & Nelson, D. (2005). *The governance dimensions of food security in Malawi* (Vol. 20). Washington, DC: USAID.

Sangala, T. (2016). https://times.mw/6000-flood-victims-risk-cholera-in-mzuzu/6,000 flood victims risk cholera in Mzuzu. April 12, 2016.

Sangala, T. (2019). Mzuzu grapples with child street vendors. *The Nation.* August 24, 2019.

Santos, V. J. E., & Leitmann, J. L. (2016). *Investing in urban resilience: protecting and promoting development in a changing world* (No. 109431, pp. 1-120). The World Bank.

Sassen, S. (1991). *The Global City*. Princeton University Press.

Sassi, M. (2018). Food Security Basics. In *Understanding Food Insecurity* (pp. 1-30). Springer, Cham.

Satterthwaite, D. (2007). The transition to a predominantly urban world and its underpinnings. Human Settlements Discussion Paper Series. Urban Change – 4. London: IIED.

Satterthwaite, D. (2016). Missing the Millennium Development Goal targets for water and sanitation in urban areas. *Environment and Urbanization*, *28*(1), 99-118.

Schwartz-Shea, P., & Yanow, D. (2012). *Interpretive Research Design: Concepts and Processes*. Routledge.

Scott, A. J., & Storper, M. (2006). Regions, globalization, development. *Regional studies. 37*(6-7), 579-593.

Scott, A. J., & Storper, M. (2015). The nature of cities: The scope and limits of urban theory. *International journal of urban and regional research*, *39*(1), 1-15.

Scott, J. C. (2017). *Against the grain: a deep history of the earliest states*. Yale University Press.

Sen, A. (1981). *Poverty and famines: an essay on entitlement and deprivation*. Oxford university press.

Sen, A. (1983). Development: Which way now?. *The economic journal*, *93*(372), 745-762.

Sen, A. (1999). *Development as Freedom*. Oxford University Press.

Sen, A. K. (2009). *The Idea of Justice*. Harvard University Press.

Sgro, J., Frayne, B., & McCordic, C. (2019). Linking the sustainable development goals through an investigation of urban household food security in Southern Africa. *Journal of Sustainability Research*, *1*(3).

Shaw, D. J., (2007), *World Food Security: A History Since 1945*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK and New York, USA.

Short, J. R., Breitbach, C., Buckman, S., & Essex, J. (2000). From world cities to gateway cities: Extending the boundaries of globalization theory. *City*, *4*(3), 317-340.

Simatele, D., Binns, T., & Simatele, M. (2012). Urban livelihoods under a changing climate: perspectives on urban agriculture and planning in Lusaka, Zambia. *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities*, *13*(2), 269-293.

Simatele, D. M., & Binns, T. (2008). Motivation and marginalization in African urban agri- culture: The case of Lusaka, Zambia. *Urban Forum, 19*(1), 1–21.

Simone, A., & Pieterse, E. (2018). *New urban worlds: Inhabiting dissonant times*. John Wiley & Sons.

Simwaka, K., Ligoya, P., Kabango, G., & Chikonda, M. (2012). Money supply and inflation in Malawi: An econometric investigation. *Journal of Economics and International Finance*, *4*(2), 36-48.

Sineta, Abraham T. (2002). The Decentralization of Services in Malawi: Perceptions of Key Actor Groups on the Devolution of Primary Education. Master's Capstone Projects. 107. Retrieved from: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cie_capstones/107

Singini, G. (2018, August 17). Council courts traders to end street vending. *The Nation.*

Skinner, C., & Haysom, G. (2016). *Informal Sector's Role in Food Security: A Missing Link in Policy Debates*. Working Paper 44. The PLAAS Working Paper Series. Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western Cape. September 2016.

Smale M. and Heisey P., W. (1997). Maize Technology and Productivity in Malawi. In *Africa 's Emerging Maize Revolution.* [Eds.] Byerlee, D. and Eicher, C. K. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado.

Smit, W. (2016). Urban governance and urban food systems in Africa: Examining the linkages. *Cities*, 58, 80–86.

Smit, W. (2018). Urban governance in Africa: an overview. *African Cities and the Development Conundrum*, 55-77.

Smith, D. W. (1998). Urban food systems and the poor in developing countries. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, *23*(2), 207-219.

Smith, L. C., Alderman, H., & Aduayom, D. (2006). *Food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa: new estimates from household expenditure surveys* (Vol. 146). Intl Food Policy Res Inst.

Sonnenfeld, D. A. (1992). Mexico's "Green Revolution," 1940-1980: Towards an Environmental History. *Environmental History Review*, *16*(4), 29-52.

Sonnino, R. (2016). The new geography of food security: exploring the potential of urban food strategies. *The Geographical Journal*, *182*(2), 190-200.

Sonnino, R. (2019). The cultural dynamics of urban food governance. *City, Culture and Society*, *16*, 12-17.

Sonnino, R., & Coulson, H. (2021). Unpacking the new urban food agenda: The changing dynamics of global governance in the urban age. *Urban Studies*, *58*(5), 1032-1049.

Sonnino, R., Marsden, T., & Moragues-Faus, A. (2016). Relationalities and convergences in food security narratives: towards a place-based approach. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, *41*(4), 477-489.

Sonnino, R., Tegoni, C. L., & De Cunto, A. (2019). The challenge of systemic food change: Insights from cities. *Cities*, *85*, 110-116.

Sriram, U., & Tarasuk, V. (2016). Economic predictors of household food insecurity in Canadian metropolitan areas. *Journal of Hunger & Environmental Nutrition*, *11*(1), 1-13.

Statistics Canada (2012). Canadian Community Health Survey (CCHS), 2011-2012. Retrieved from: https://www.statcan.gc.ca/en/survey/household/3226

Statistics Canada (2018). Canadian Community Health Survey (CCHS) 2017-2018. Retreived from: https://www.statcan.gc.ca/en/survey/household/3226

Steel, C. (2013). *Hungry city: How food shapes our lives*. Random house.

Storeng, K. T., Palmer, J., Daire, J., & Kloster, M. O. (2019). Behind the scenes: International NGOs' influence on reproductive health policy in Malawi and South Sudan. *Global public health*, *14*(4), 555-569.

Storper, M., & Scott, A. J. (2016). Current debates in urban theory: A critical assessment. *Urban studies*. *53*(6):1114-1136.

Strasser, P. G. (2016). An Anti-Corruption Bureau's Inexorable Endeavor: A Study of Malawi's Cashgate Sandal. *Wash. & Lee L. Rev. Online*, *73*, 303.

Stren, R. E. (2019). Urban local government in Africa. In *African Cities in Crisis* (pp. 20-36). Routledge.

Sulemana, I., Nketiah-Amponsah, E., Codjoe, E. A., & Andoh, J. A. N. (2019). Urbanization and income inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Sustainable Cities and Society*, *48*, 101544.

Tadros, W., Naguib, S., Wellenstein, A., Maitreyi, D., Pamarini, N., D; Aoust, A.,...Gapihan, AT. World Bank Group. (2021). Demographic Trends and Urbanization.Washington, DC. Retrieved from: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/260581617988607640/Demographic-Trends-and-Urbanization

Tacoli, C., Thanh, H. X., Owusu, M., Kigen, L., & Padgham, J. (2013). *The role of local government in urban food security*. IIED Briefing. Retrieved from http://pubs.iied.org/17171IIED

Tacoli, C. (2017). Food (in) security in rapidly urbanising, low-income contexts. *International journal of environmental research and public health*, *14*(12), 1554.

Tacoli, C. (2019). The urbanization of food insecurity and malnutrition. Editorial. Environment and Urbanization. 371-374.

Tambulasi, R. I. (2009). The public sector corruption and organised crime nexus: The case of the fertiliser subsidy programme in Malawi. *African Security Studies*, *18*(4), 19-31.

Tambulasi, R. I. C., & Chasukwa, M. M. (2014). "Substitute is gonna put you down": An analysis of effectiveness of emerging actors as substitutes of local councillors in Malawi's decentralised system. *Journal of Development Effectiveness*, *6*(2), 196–210.

Tawodzera, G., Zanamwe, L., & Crush, J. (2012). The State of Food Insecurity in Harare, Zimbabwe (rep., pp. i-42). Kingston, ON and Cape Town: African Food Security Urban Network. Urban Food Security Series.No. 13

TEEB. (2018). TEEB for agriculture & food: Scientific and economic foundations. UN Environment, Geneva.

Tefft, J. F., Jonasova, M., Adjao, R. T. O. A., & Morgan, A. M. (2017). *Food systems for an urbanizing world: knowledge product* (No. 122014, pp. 1-1). The World Bank. Retrieved from: https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/454961511210702794/pdf/Food-systems-for-an-urbanizing-world-knowledge-product.pdf

Tegoni, C., & Licomati, S. (2017). The Milan Urban Food Policy Pact: The Potential of Food and the Key Role of Cities in Localizing the SDGs. *JUNCO - Journal of Universities and International Development Cooperation*, (1).

Tembo, P M (2010). Factors hindering residential property insurance in Karonga township. Research Report for BSc Degree in Land Management, Mzuzu University.

Tengatenga, J., & Soyiyo, S. (2020). Drivers of corruption and anti-corruption policies in Malawi. *Journal of Public Administration and Development Alternatives (JPADA)*, *5*(3), 49-61.

Termeer, C. J. A. M., Dewulf, A., & van Lieshout, M. (2010). Disentangling scale approaches in governance research: Comparing monocentric, multilevel, and adaptive governance. *Ecology and Society, 15*(4), 29.

Termeer, C. J. A. M., Drimie, S., Ingram, J., Pereira, L., & Whittingham, M. J. (2018). A diagnostic framework for food system governance arrangements: The case of South Africa. *NJAS - Wageningen Journal of Life Sciences*, *84*(August 2017), 85–93.

Tevera, D., Simelane, N., Peter, G., & Salam, A. (2012). The State of Food Security in Manzini, Swaziland (rep., pp. i-35). Kingston, ON and Cape Town: African Food Security Urban Network. Urban Food Security Series No. 15.

Tew, M. (2017). *Peoples of the Lake Nyasa Region: East Central Africa Part I*. Routledge.

Thindwa, T. C. (2014). China-Malawi relations: an analysis of trade patterns and development implications. *African East-Asian Affairs* 4.

Tione, S. E., & Holden, S. T. (2020). Urban proximity, demand for land and land shadow prices in Malawi. *Land Use Policy*, *94*, 104509.

Tiraieyari, N., & Krauss, S. E. (2018). Predicting youth participation in urban agriculture in Malaysia: Insights from the theory of planned behavior and the functional approach to volunteer motivation. *Agriculture and Human Values*, *35*(3), 637-650.

Tonda, N., & Kepe, T. (2016). Spaces of contention: tension around street vendors' struggle for livelihoods and spatial justice in Lilongwe, Malawi. *Urban Forum* 27, *(3),* 297-309.

Tomlinson, I. (2013). Doubling food production to feed the 9 billion: a critical perspective on a key discourse of food security in the UK. *Journal of rural studies*, *29*, 81-90.

Tostensen, A., Tvedten, I., & Vaa, M. (2001). The urban crisis, governance and associational life. *Associational Life in African Cities: popular responses to the urban crisis*, 7-26.

Tostensen, A. (2017). Malawi: A political economy analysis. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Retrieved from: https://nupi.brage.unit.no/nupi-xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2461122/NUPI_rapport_Malawi_Tostensen.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Tuholske, C., Andam, K., Blekking, J., Evans, T., & Caylor, K. (2020). Comparing measures of urban food security in Accra, Ghana. *Food Security*, *12*(2), 417-431.

Tschirley, D., Bricas, N., Sauer, C., & Reardon, T. (2020). Opportunities in Africa's growing urban food markets. Africa Agriculture Status Report. AGRA. Feeding Africa's Cities: Opportunities, Challenges, and Policies for Linking African Farmers with Growing Urban Food Markets. Retreived from: https://agritrop.cirad.fr/596464/1/Chap2-AASR-2020-Feeding-African-Cities.pdf

United Nations. (2014). World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision, Highlights (ST/ESA/SER.A/352). Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2014). Retrieved from: https://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Publications/Files/WUP2014-Highlights.pdf.

United Nations. (2017). United Nations Habitat III. *Draft Urban Agenda.*

United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR). (2020). Highlights: Africa Regional Assessment Report 2020 (forthcoming). Nairobi, Kenya.United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR). Retrieved from: https://www.undrr.org/publication/highlights-africa-regional-assessment-report-2020

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA). (2018). World Urbanization Prospects. New York: UN DESA.

United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (UNDESA) (2019). World Urbanization Prospects: The 2018 Revision (ST/ESA/SER.A/420). New York: United Nations. Retrieved from: https://population.un.org/wup/Publications/Files/WUP2018-KeyFacts.pdf).

UNDP. (2005). Malawi Human Development Report 2005: Reversing HIV/AIDS in Malawi. United Nations Development Programme.

UNDP (2021). Human Development Indicators. Malawi, 2020. Inequality Index Data. Retrieved from: https://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/MWI

UN-HABITAT. (2008). Castes, S., & Tribes, S. (2010). The intangible dimensions of spatial inequality. *State of the World's Cities 2010/11: Cities for All: Bridging the Urban Divide*.

UN-HABITAT. (2011). Global report on human settlements 2011: Cities and climate change. *United Nations Human Settlements Program, Earthscan*. Retrieved from: https://unhabitat.org/global-report-on-human-settlements-2011-cities-and-climate-change

UN-HABITAT. (2016). Urbanization and development: Emerging futures. World Cities Report 2016. Nairobi: UN-Habitat.

UN-HABITAT. (2020). Malawi Overview. Retrieved from: https://unhabitat.org/malawi.

United Nations Population Division. (2018) World Urbanization Prospects: 2018 Revision. Urban Population as a Percentage of Total Population, 2018. World Bank. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS

USAID (2021). U.S. Foreign Assistance by Country – Malawi. https://www.foreignassistance.gov/cd/malawi/ July 26, 2021.

United States State Department (1948). *Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1-22, 1944*. Washington, DC, United States Government Printing Office.

Valencia, S. C., Simon, D., Croese, S., Nordqvist, J., Oloko, M., Sharma, T., ... & Versace, I. (2019). Adapting the Sustainable Development Goals and the New Urban Agenda to the city level: Initial reflections from a comparative research project. *International Journal of Urban Sustainable Development*, *11*(1), 4-23.

Van Assche, K., Beunen, R., & Duineveld, M. (2013). *Evolutionary governance theory: An introduction*. Springer Science & Business Media.

Van Assche, K., Beunen, R., & Duineveld, M. (2014). Formal/informal dialectics and the self-transformation of spatial planning systems: An exploration. *Administration & Society*, *46*(6), 654-683.

Van der Heijden, T., & Vink, N. (2013). Good for whom? Supermarkets and small farmers in South Africa–a critical review of current approaches to increasing access to modern markets. *Agrekon*, *52*(1), 68-86.

Van der Ploeg, F., & Poelhekke, S. (2008). Globalization and the rise of mega-cities in the developing world. *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society*, *1*(3), 477-501.

Vaughan, M. (1987). *The story of an African famine: Gender and famine in twentieth-century Malawi*. Cambridge University Press.

Verduzco-Gallo, Í., Ecker, O., & Pauw, K. (2014). *Changes in food and nutrition security in Malawi: Analysis of recent survey evidence* (Vol. 6). Intl Food Policy Res Inst.

Verpoorten, M., Arora, A., Stoop, N., & Swinnen, J. (2013). Self-reported food insecurity in Africa during the food price crisis. *Food Policy*, *39*, 51-63.

Von Braun, J. (1993). *Urban food insecurity and malnutrition in developing countries: Trends, policies, and research implications*. Intl Food Policy Res Inst.

Walls, H. L., Johnston, D., Tak, M., Dixon, J., Hanefeld, J., Hull, E., & Smith, R. D. (2018). The impact of agricultural input subsidies on food and nutrition security: a systematic review. *Food Security*, *10*(6), 1425-1436.

Walls, H., Baker, P., Chirwa, E., & Hawkins, B. (2019). Food security, food safety & healthy nutrition: are they compatible?. *Global Food Security*, *21*, 69-71.

Warren, E., Hawkesworth, S., & Knai, C. (2015). Investigating the association between urban agriculture and food security, dietary diversity, and nutritional status: A systematic literature review. *Food Policy*, *53*, 54–66.

Warshawsky, D. N. (2016). Civil Society and the Governance of Urban Food Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Geography Compass,10*(7), 293–306.

Watson, V. (2009). Seeing from the South: Refocusing urban planning on the globe's central urban issues. *Urban Studies*, *46*(11), 2259-2275.

Watson, V. (2014). Co-production and collaboration in planning–The difference. *Planning Theory & Practice*, *15*(1), 62-76.

Webb, N., & Kasumba, H. (2009). Urban agriculture in Ezibeleni (Queenstown): Contributing to the empirical base in the Eastern Cape. *Africanus*, *39*(1), 27-39.

Wedel, J. (2012). Rethinking Corruption in an Age of Ambiguity. Annual Review of Law and Social Science 2012 8:1, 453-498.

Wei, C. (2020). Agroecology, information and communications technology, and smallholders' food security in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, *55*(8), 1194-1208.

White, S., & Kampanje-Phiri, J. (2019). From "informal" to "local": The role of data in legitimizing and supporting the local food economy in Malawi. *Journal of Agriculture, Food Systems, and Community Development*, *9*(A), 251-252.

Whittington, R. (2010). Giddens, structuration theory and strategy as practice. *Cambridge handbook of strategy as practice*, 109-126.

Willis, J. W. (2007). *Foundations of Qualitative Research | SAGE Publications Inc*. London: SAGE Publications. https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/foundations-of-qualitativeresearch/book228788.

Winkler, I. T., & Satterthwaite, M. L. (2017). Leaving no one behind? Persistent inequalities in the SDGs. *The International Journal of Human Rights*, *21*(8), 1073-1097.

Wiskerke, J. S. (2015). Urban food systems. *Cities and agriculture* (pp. 19-43). Routledge.

Wiskerke, J. S., & Viljoen, A. (2012). *Sustainable urban food provisioning: challenges for scientists, policymakers, planners and designers* (pp. 19-35). Wageningen Academic Publishers: Wageningen, The Netherlands.

Wise, T. (2017 August). Op-Ed. Did Monsanto Write Malawi's Seed Policy? *FoodTank.com.* https://foodtank.com/news/2017/08/monsanto-malawis-seed-policy/

Wise, T. (2020a), "Failing Africa's Farmers: An Impact Assessment of the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa," available at https://sites.tufts.edu/gdae/files/2020/10/20-01_Wise_FailureToYield.pdf.

Wise, T. (2020b). Africa's Choice: Africa's Green Revolution has Failed, Time to Change Course https://www.iatp.org/africas-choice. July 28, 2020. Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy.

World Data Atlas (Knoema) (2022). Malawi Prevalence Rates of Undernourishment from 2000-2020. Retrieved from: https://knoema.com/atlas/Malawi/Prevalence-of-undernourishment

World Bank. (2016). Malawi Urbanization Review: Leveraging Urbanization for National Growth and Development. World Bank, Washington, DC. World Bank. Retrieved from: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/24391

World Bank. (2017). *Malawi Economic Monitor, May 2017: Harnessing the Urban Economy*. World Bank.

World Bank (2020). Second Agriculture Sector Wide Approach Support Project. Retrieved from: https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P164445?lang=en

World Bank. (2020). Malawi Launches 95 Million Agriculture Commercialization Project. Retrieved from: https://alternativeafrica.com/2020/01/15/malawi-launches-95-million-agriculture-commercialisation-project/

World Bank. (2021). Urban Population (Percent of Total Population). https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS

World Inequality Database (WID). (2021). Malawi Income Inequality. Retrieved from: https://wid.world/country/malawi/.

Wroe, D. (2012). Donors, dependency, and political crisis in Malawi. *African Affairs*, *111*(442), 135-144.

Wu, C., Wilkes, R., Silver, D., & Clark, T. N. (2019). Current debates in urban theory from a scale perspective: Introducing a scenes approach. *Urban Studies*, *56*(8), 1487-1497.

Yin, R.K. (2014). *Case Study Research Design and Methods (5th ed.)*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Zerbe, N. (2004). Feeding the famine? American food aid and the GMO debate in Southern Africa. *Food Policy*, *29*(6), 593-608.

Zeze, W. S. (2015). Democratic constitution and ethnic organizations in Malawi: Preserving good culture or promoting regionalism, nepotism and tribalism. *History Research*, *5*(3), 169-187.

Zgambo, M. (2020). Mzuzu vendors back on the streets. https://malawi24.com/2020/10/15/mzuzu-vendors-back-on-the-streets/ Oct. 15, 2020.

Zimmer, A., Guido, Z., Tuholske, C., Pakalniskis, A., Lopus, S., Caylor, K., & Evans, T. (2020). Dynamics of population growth in secondary cities across southern Africa. *Landscape Ecology*, *6*.

Zuze, L., Riley, L., Chilanga, E., Dhakal, A. (2022). Food Security in Africa's Secondary Cities: No. 5. The Informal Food Sector in Mzuzu, Malawi. No. 31. Retrieved from: https://afsun.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/AFSUN31.pdf

Appendices

Appendix 1: Interview Guide

Topic	Main Questions	Probing Question
Introduction (~ 5 minutes)	Please introduce yourself	Please describe the nature of your work. How long have you been at this position or how long have you been doing this type of work?
Food System (~20 minutes)	[Preamble and provided visual about the components of a food system] [based on parts of the food system mentioned in the above answer…] In your work, where along the food system is most of your focus? Who fits where in the food system? What are the challenges that exist in Mzuzu's food system? What is good about Mzuzu's food system?	Using a visual aid , list the players along a food value chain Are there any other parts of the system that you work on? Who or what creates these challenges? How are these challenges currently dealt with? Which government level (municipal/regional/traditional/national/international) should or does deal with these challenges? Who is responsible for these positive components of the food system? What makes this system work?
Governance (~15 minutes)	Let's say you were being promoted and had to train someone to take over your position. What would you tell them?	1. The other organizations you work with? Who are your main partners? 2. How many levels of government you work with? 3. What are the challenges in your position? What are the successes you have had in your position and why did they work?
Food governance (~20 minutes)	What kind of role does the local assembly play in Mzuzu's food system?	What policies exist around food?
	What kind of role does the national government play in Mzuzu's food system?	What policies exist nationally that play a part in how people access food in Mzuzu? In Mzuzu, these are the programs that are active (at each governance level). How do they jive with the PRSP?
	What kind of role do regional/traditional authorities play Mzuzu's food system?	Do you have examples of how these authorities have influenced Mzuzu's food system?

	What role do development agencies play in Mzuzu's food system?	Is there a difference between local/national/international development agencies?
	You mentioned these key players in the food system. What makes them key players?	You have mentioned _____, _____, and _____ as key parts of Mzuzu's food system. What positive aspects do they contribute to Mzuzu's food system? What negative aspects? What happens when these players interact?
	Do you think that urban food security is an important issue in Mzuzu? In Malawi?	
Food security (~10 minutes)	Do you think food insecurity is a problem in Mzuzu?	Is it getting worse or better? In what ways? Who is affected by the situation? What do you think causes the situation?
	If you were given everything you needed to fix the issues of Mzuzu's food issues, what would you have and what would you do?	Who else would be involved? How does that compare with the resources that are currently being employed to deal with the issues?
Wrap up (5 minutes)	Is there anything else you would like to tell me about Mzuzu's food system?	

Appendix 2: Confidentiality Statement for Research Assistants

Department of Geography and Environmental Management
Faculty of Environment
University of Waterloo, Canada

CONFIDENTIALITY STATEMENT

I understand that as an interpreter / transcriber / translator/ research assistant (circle one) for a study being conducted by Amanda Joynt of the Department of Geography and Environmental Management, University of Waterloo, Canada under the supervision of Professor Bruce Frayne, I am privy to confidential information. I agree to keep all data collected during this study confidential during both transcription and translation and I will not reveal it to anyone outside the research team.

Name: _____ Signature: _____

Date: _____

Witness Signature: _____

Appendix 3: English Consent Forms – Written and Verbal

Department of Geography and Environmental Management
Faculty of Environment
University of Waterloo, Canada

Letter Seeking Informed Consent for Interview

Dear _____,

This letter is an invitation to consider participating in a research study I am conducting as part of my thesis-based PhD degree in the Department of Geography and Environmental Management at the University of Waterloo, Canada under the supervision of Dr. Bruce Frayne. I would like to provide you with more information about this project and what your involvement would entail if you decide to take part.

The name of the study is *Examining Food System Governance in Mzuzu, Malawi.* This study aims to understand the urban food system of Mzuzu, Malawi through the perspectives of the people who participate in its governance. As the world becomes more urban, food security in cities has become an important aspect of global development. As the world becomes more connected, decisions from international, national, and other governance scales can influence urban food systems in positive and negative ways. It is important, therefore, to find ways to understand how urban food systems are governed. This knowledge can inform policy makers as they work to develop urban food systems that benefit all who live urban lives.

Participation in this study is voluntary. It will involve an interview of approximately 45 minutes to 1 hour in length. The topic will center around Mzuzu's food system; how it works, how decisions are made, and how it may be improved. The length of the interview is entirely up to you, and you may end the interview at any point. This interview will take place by telephone or in a mutually agreed upon location. You may decline to answer any of the interview questions if you so wish. Further, you may decide to withdraw from this study at any time without any negative consequences by advising the researcher. With your permission, the interview will be audio recorded to facilitate collection of information, and later transcribed for analysis. Shortly after the interview has been completed, I will send you a copy of the transcript to give you an opportunity to confirm the accuracy of our conversation and to add or clarify any points that you wish.

I may use information from our discussion in papers or articles that I write on this topic. You will not be identified in any publication unless you give permission for attribution of information you disclosed in our discussions. If you give consent to use the information but not to be attributed, I will cite a "confidential interview." In other instances I will cite an interview with an individual, giving the place and date of our conversation. Before publishing any passage that includes information you give me, whether attributed to you or not, I shall submit that passage to you for comment. If I do not hear back from you in two weeks I will assume you do not object to this. Please indicate to me if this is acceptable.

Data collected during this study will be retained for at least seven years in a locked office, and locked cabinet and electronic data will be password protected. The dataset without identifiers may be shared publicly. Your identity will be kept confidential. If you have not agreed to attribution, all information that could identify you will be removed from the data collected. I will be the only person who will have access. You can withdraw consent to participate and have your data destroyed by contacting myself at any time during the seven years if it has not yet been submitted to publishers. It is not possible to withdraw your consent once papers and publications have been submitted to publishers. All records will be destroyed according to University of Waterloo policy. I foresee minimal risks to you as a participant in this study. The minimal risks include repercussions from the sharing of information relevant to your work. This risk will be mitigated by ensuring you have final say on the content that is used in the research as well as regarding your anonymity. There is no commercial application of these results, and there is no conflict of interest.

If after receiving this letter, you have any questions about this study, or would like additional information to assist you in reaching a decision about participation, please feel free to contact me. You may also contact my advisor, Bruce Frayne, [redacted] or [redacted]

I would like to assure you that this study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through a University of Waterloo Research Ethics Committee, as well as through the University of Livingstonia Research and Ethics Committee. However, the final decision about participation is yours. This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through a University of Waterloo Research Ethics Committee (ORE #22700). If you have questions for the Committee contact the Chief Ethics Officer, Office of Research Ethics, at [redacted] or ore-ceo@uwaterloo.ca.

I hope that the results of my study will be of benefit to those organizations working on the governance of urban food systems, particularly those focused on urban food insecurity, as well as to the broader research community, including researchers at the University of Livingstonia.

I very much look forward to speaking with you and thank you in advance for your assistance in this project.

Sincerely,

Amanda Joynt
PhD Candidate
Department of Geography
University of Waterloo
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
[redacted]
Local number and WhatsApp:

Department of Geography and Environmental Management
Faculty of Environment
University of Waterloo, Canada

VERBAL SCRIPT AND CONSENT FORM

This letter is an invitation to consider participating in a research study I am conducting a research study as part of my PhD degree at the University of Waterloo, Canada. I would like to provide you with more information about this project and what your involvement would entail if you decide to take part.

The name of the study is *Examining Food System Governance in Mzuzu, Malawi.* This study aims to understand the urban food system of Mzuzu, Malawi through the perspectives of the people who participate in its governance. Cities are constantly growing, and food security in cities has become an important part of global development. As the world becomes more connected, decisions from international, national, and other governance scales can influence urban food systems in positive and negative ways. It is important, therefore, to find ways to understand how urban food systems are governed. This knowledge can inform policy makers as they work to develop urban food systems that benefit all who live urban lives.

Participation in this study is voluntary. It will involve an interview of approximately 30 minutes to 1 hour in length. The topic will center around Mzuzu's food system; how it works, how decisions are made, and how it may be improved. The length of the interview is entirely up to you, and you may end the interview at any point. This interview will take place in a location that is safe and comfortable for both you and the researcher. You may decline to answer any of the interview questions if you so wish. Further, you may decide to withdraw from this study at any time without any negative consequences by advising the researcher. With your permission, the interview will be audio recorded to facilitate collection of information, and later transcribed for analysis. Shortly after the interview has been completed, I will review the transcript with you to give you an opportunity to confirm the accuracy of our conversation and to add or clarify any points that you wish.

I may use information from our discussion in papers or articles that I write on this topic. You will not be identified in any publication unless you give permission for attribution of information you disclosed in our discussions. If you give consent to use the information but not to be attributed, I will cite a "confidential interview." In other instances I will cite an interview with an individual, giving the place and date of our conversation. There may be risks associated with attribution, including impeded work relationships with your colleagues. Before publishing any passage that includes information you give me, whether attributed to you or not, I shall review that passage with you for comment. Please indicate to me if this is acceptable.

Data collected during this study will be retained for at least seven years in a locked office, and locked cabinet and electronic data will be password protected. The dataset without identifiers may be shared publicly. Your identity will be kept confidential. If you have not agreed to attribution, all information that could identify you will be removed from the data collected. I will be the only person who will have access. You can withdraw consent to participate and have your data destroyed by contacting myself at any time during the seven years if it has not yet been submitted to publishers. It is not possible to withdraw your consent once papers and publications have been submitted to publishers. All records will be destroyed according to University of Waterloo policy. I foresee minimal risks to you as a participant in this study. The minimal risks include repercussions from the sharing of information relevant to your work. This risk will be mitigated by ensuring you have final say on the content that is used in the

research as well as regarding your anonymity. There is no commercial application of these results, and there is no conflict of interest.

I would like to assure you that this study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through a University of Waterloo Research Ethics Committee, as well as through the University of Livingstonia Research and Ethics Committee. However, the final decision about participation is yours.

I hope that the results of my study will be of benefit to those organizations working on the governance of urban food systems, particularly those focused on urban food insecurity, as well as to the broader research community, including researchers at the University of Livingstonia.