Tenants' Right of Return: Early Experiences from Toronto's Regent Park Redevelopment

by

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AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

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Abstract

Starting around the 1950s, the creation of public housing projects through the North American Urban Renewal period had a tremendous impact on lower income households and racialized minorities. The development of public housing projects resulted in many residents being forcefully moved out of their communities and relocated involuntarily. The displacement faced by households resulted in the abrupt erosion of tightly knit social networks and loss of community. Some 50 years later, the housing projects developed in the period of Urban Renewal are being demolished as part of a large scale public housing redevelopment initiative in the United States, called HOPE VI. The fear of displacement, and loss of community, has negatively framed attitudes towards redevelopment among social housing tenants. Tenants have been sceptical of the proposed benefits of redevelopment because of issues of displacement and loss of their community due to gentrification. Scepticism and fear of displacement from the community has prompted tenants and housing activists to call for a legal Right of Return. The Right of Return is an important policy that has been designed to ensure that social housing residents impacted by the redevelopment of their community have legal right to return to their home once redevelopment has been completed. Previous research on public housing redevelopment has noted that very few tenants have been able to return to their community despite being given a Right of Return. In Canada, a large scale public housing redevelopment plan of Canada's oldest and largest public housing community was initiated in 2005. The redevelopment has placed an emphasis on giving tenants a legal Right of Return. The Right of Return policy in the context of the Regent Park Redevelopment in Toronto has yet to be investigated. As a result, the research explores how the policy of Right of Return has operated in the first two phases of redevelopment. Methodology included interviews with 12 key informants who represent a diversity of actors impacted or involved in the redevelopment, and a review of associated planning documents. The Right of Return has been influenced by a variety of actors and interests, such as the market, and the local government. In Regent Park, the Right of Return operates through a robust and well defined policy framework that has allowed the majority of tenants to return to Regent Park.

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List of Abbreviations

AHA: Atlanta Housing Authority AHA

CHA: Chicago Housing Authority

CMHC: Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation

CSR: Common Sense Revolution

HOPE VI: Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere

HUD: Housing and Urban Development

MTHA: Metropolitan Toronto Housing Authority

NHA: National Housing Act

PHA: Public Housing Authority

RGI: Rent-geared-to-income

RPA: Rental Protection Act

RTA: Residential Tenancy Act

SDP: Social Development Plan

SHA: Seattle Housing Authority

SHRA: Social Housing Reform Act

SSHA: Shelter, Support & Housing Administration

TCH: Toronto Community Housing

TRAIP: Tenant Relocation and Assistance Implementation Plan

List of Key Definitions

Replacement Unit: A social housing unit that replaces one of the 2083 units that existed in Regent Park as of May 2004, and which is located in the Subject Lands or in the East Downtown area.

Relocation Unit: A dwelling unit owned by TCH. This unit is a temporary unit a tenant moves into when they are relocated from their home due to redevelopment.

Right of Return: The right of a tenant to return to one of the 2083 Replacement Social Housing Units on the Subject Lands or in the East Downtown

Subject Lands: The lands that comprise Regent Park, the address is 30 Regent Street

East Downtown: This area is defined as an area generally bound by the Don Valley, Bloor Street, Yonge Street and the Lake Shore. This area contains three off-site buildings**.**

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The creation of Regent Park in the 1950s was a large infrastructure project that housing to low income Torontonians during the post war period. The development of Regent Park introduced a master planned community of 2083 units of social housing to replace a slum community east of downtown Toronto. Regent Park was one of the first large scale modernist designed public housing communities in Canada. The community was characterized by large low-rise buildings, expansive green spaces, and a lack of through traffic (Rose, 1958).

Regent Park was composed of two different sections, Regent Park North and Regent Park South (Purdy 2003). Regent Park North was designed for families and seniors. The development was composed of mostly of three story walk-ups, medium rise apartments and some row homes. Regent Park south was comprised of and five higher density 14 story apartments plus townhomes exclusively accommodating families (Purdy, 2003).

The initial enthusiasm that followed the construction of Regent Park gradually turned into harsh criticism (Purdy, 2003). Drastic changes in housing policy, the retrenchment of the welfare state, and economic restructuring were contributing factors to the decline of Regent Park (Purdy, 2003). As a result, talks regarding the revitalization of Regent Park began in the 1980s. Regent Park soon became an area synonymous with urban blight, with residents often stigmatized.

Many attributed Regent Park's problems to its poor urban design. The modernist design principles of Regent Park created a community alienated from the rest of the City. The modified street grid, which had no through roads, was thought to have contributed to the isolation of community. Soon Regent Park became a haven for crime and drug related violence. The crumbling infrastructure of buildings became a metaphor for the social degradation of the community. As time passed, the idea of revitalizing Regent Park started to gain salience with policy makers.

In 2003, the newly formed public housing authority (PHA) in Toronto and Toronto Community Housing (TCH), planned to revitalize Regent Park. The redevelopment of Regent Park was a city building project that was initiated in 2005. TCH would partner with a

private market partner, Daniels Corporation, to help finance the redevelopment. The plans saw Regent Park transform from a community solely composed of public housing, to a mixed income and mixed used community.

The current plan for Regent Park will see the site continue to provide public housing, but will add 5400 market units, new affordable housing units, and new community amenities such as the Daniels Spectrum Arts and Culture Centre, a Regent Park Aquatic Centre, a grocery store and other retail establishments in the community (Toronto Community Housing, 2015). The new housing is aimed to attract new residents with a diverse range of professions, skills, and incomes (Toronto Community Housing, 2007).

The proposed redevelopment focuses on the physical and social revitalization of the community. The physical changes to the community have largely impacted the density of buildings as well as the design of the street network for the community. The redevelopment plan aimed to replace old decaying units with modernized, energy efficient buildings. Also, as spelled out in the Social Development Plan (Toronto Community Housing, 2007), it was expected that changing the street network would help reintegrate Regent Park into the surrounding community. A unique part of the redevelopment plan has focused on rebuilding the social fabric of the community.

This combined approach represents a new form of community redevelopment which focuses on both the physical and social elements of redevelopment. As a result, the Social Development Plan (Toronto Community Housing, 2007) is a key document that embodies the vision for redevelopment, social goals, and policies designed to improve the community. Ultimately, TCH aims to move away from the traditional brick and mortar style of redevelopment in an effort to address the social issues experienced in Regent Park.

During redevelopment tenants' homes are demolished and rebuilt. During construction, tenants are relocated to temporary housing. A lack of trust between tenants and the newly formed TCH (formed in 2002) was the result of strained relationships with social housing providers in the past (Micallef, 2013). The redevelopment brought about some skepticism from the community in regards to redevelopment (Meagher and Boston, 2003).

Many communities in the past that have gone through redevelopment processes, including projects undertaken during the post-war Urban Renewal period, had been displaced or unduly harmed by the process (Vale, 2013). Urban Renewal was a large infrastructure project that was designed to replace urban slums with high-density residential towers and modern expressways to accommodate increasing use of automobiles. Many low-income neighborhoods were razed to make way for large urban expressways or social housing projects. The tremendous impact of such large scale programs left many permanently displaced from their community in order to accommodate plans that seemed to favour middle income and urban bourgeoisie (Teaford, 2000).

However, one important aspect of the redevelopment of Regent Park is that tenants displaced due to the reconstruction of their homes are given a Right of Return. The Right of Return ensures that tenants who are moved during redevelopment will be able to retain a new unit in Regent Park, or an area close by. Tenants will not be displaced permanently and will continue to receive their rent-geared-to-income (RGI) subsidy. The Right of Return is defined as, "the right of a tenant to return to one of the 2083 Replacement Social Housing Units on the Subject Lands or in the East Downtown" (City of Toronto, 2005a). In theory, every tenant living in Regent Park at the time of redevelopment would be able to return.

1.1 Study Purpose and Research Objectives

Cities across North America, Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand are all dealing with the deteriorating conditions of post-war public housing projects. Redevelopment of these public housing projects is now aimed at attracting affluent residents through the privatization of public land and the sale of market units. The revitalization taking place in cities such as Chicago and Baltimore have struggled to attract new residents while also retaining original residents. In the case study I am investigating, the City of Toronto has taken on a new perspective in redevelopment by guaranteeing the original social housing tenants a Right of Return. The purpose of my research is to better understand the Right of Return policy, and learn how it has operated in the first two phases (out of a planned five phases) of redevelopment. Right of Return is a unique policy designed to ensure that tenants of the Regent Park Revitalization Plan have the legal right to return to their community once

redevelopment is complete (TCH, 2015). This Right of Return can act as a mitigating policy to offset the potential stress of tenants being temporarily displaced and relocated during revitalization. The Right of Return can ease the short term uncertainty and stress associated with involuntary relocation. Revitalization of public housing and blighted communities in Canada is starting to become a more common phenomenon. Within TCH's housing portfolio, other communities such as Lawrence Heights and Alexandra Park are also being revitalized. In cities such as Calgary, there are large revitalization projects happening in the Downtown East Village. In Vancouver, discussions have commenced regarding the Downtown Eastside and East Hastings area. These revitalizations will have a large human impact. As a result, it is important to understand policies and programs that can lessen the impacts of development and try to mitigate displacement.

Provisions similar to Regent Park's Right of Return have been guaranteed in American jurisdictions participating in Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere VI (HOPE VI) redevelopments. In many cases, the American experience with Right of Return has been less than promising (Vale, 2013a). However, some communities such as New Holly Park, Seattle, are an example of redevelopment with high rates of return. This success can largely be attributed to excellent communication and relocation policy implementation (Cohen et al., 2003).

Various reports show that the majority of tenants have been displaced over the decade long HOPE VI revitalization project.[1] The Chicago Housing Authority has particularly struggled with Right of Return. Critics have stated that there have been a multitude of barriers that have impacted CHA's implementation of Right of Return plan and policy (Berg, 2004). The poor implementation process stems from a lack of funding, the lack of monitoring and evaluation of tenants, and lack of communication between tenants and the CHA. Despite tenants having a strong preference for returning, tenants were displaced during reconstruction leading to low rates of return (Joseph and Chaskin, 2012).

As a result of the American experience of Right of Return, a better understanding is needed of Regent Park's tenant experiences with the Right of Return. The main purpose of my research is to gain an understanding, supported by empirical evidence, of how Right of

Return has operated in the first two phases of redevelopment. As such, I will focus on the origins and ideas that have influenced the adoption of Right of Return in Toronto. Also, the issues regarding implementation that were experienced in cities like Chicago make it essential to focus on the process TCH has adopted for tenants Right of Return. Furthermore, I hope to better understand the Right of Return by understanding and contextualizing the rates of return among tenants.

My main purpose is to:

1) Understand and explore the factors and ideas that influenced the adoption of Right of Return.
2) Understand how Right of Return has been implemented in phases 1 and 2.
3) Uncover empirical evidence that represents return rates for tenants in phases 1 and 2.
4) Better understand the metrics used to define success in Right of Return.

1.2 Thesis Organization

The thesis will be broken down into seven chapters that will present my research in detail. Chapter two will consist of a literature review that will review the historical, political, and theoretical contexts relating to Right of Return in Regent Park and elsewhere. Chapter three will go over the methods I have chosen to answer my research questions. The fourth chapter will focus on my findings while chapter five will discuss my results. Lastly, chapters six and seven will conclude my research and provide policy recommendations for phases 3 to 5 of the continuing redevelopment of Regent Park.

Chapter 2
History and Creation of Regent Park

In order to understand the rationale behind TCH's contemporary revitalization plans, one must examine the creation and eventual decline of public housing. Focusing on the history of Regent Park will give close insight into how systemic changes in federal housing policy ultimately impacted the community and its tenants. Federal housing policy has been quite influential on large housing projects such as Regent Park. Regent Park was unique because it was one of the first large scale public housing complexes created in postwar Canada. The creation of Regent Park occurred in an era where housing policy was solely funded by the federal government. Through institutions such as the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC), and legislation such as the National Housing Act (NHA), the federal government granted assistance in order facilitate the construction of Regent Park. The role the CMHC took was markedly interventionist and largely reflected the Keynesian policy that was entrenched in Canadian public policy during the 1950s.

The construction of Regent Park consisted of two sections. Created in 1949, Regent Park North consisted of smaller three story walk-ups, higher density six story buildings, as well as townhouses (Purdy, 2013). Ten years later, Regent Park South was built to house larger families. The development combined five 14-story apartment buildings with townhomes. The Regent Park development was designed to meet a need for affordable housing, to accommodate the growing number of working class families, and ease a housing shortage in the city of Toronto (James, 2010). On a larger scale, the development also represented a methodical social experiment designed by academic technocratic planners looking to socially engineer the ideal environment for lower income individuals.

The development of Regent Park was sparked by the desire to clear Cabbagetown, an overcrowded slum in the eastern part of the Toronto characterized by dilapidating infrastructure and poor living conditions. The organic development of Cabbagetown was in stark contrast to the bustling downtown core (James, 2010). The haphazard subdivisions, and function of the community was seen to contribute to crime and violence in the community.

The creation of Regent Park was designed, in part, to replace an area that had become a haven for crime and anti-social behavior. James (2010) suggests that the initial plan for Regent Park was to act as moral safeguard for lower income tenants. Social critics and planners believed that poor living conditions, which often packed large families into small houses, were a contributing factor to the notoriety of the area (Rose, 1958). As a result, planners employed physical land use planning principles to prescribe moral behavior (Kipfer and Petrunia, 2009).

This adherence to environmental determinism was the main narrative used to justify the slum clearance and construction of Regent Park. These ideas were part of the modernist planning principles that characterized post war redevelopment policy. In 1948, the creation of Regent Park resulted in large sections of Cabbagetown being razed in order to make room for a centrally planned community. The main ideological driver behind the development of public housing was the pseudo-scientific theory of Modernism (James, 2010; Scott, 1998). This theory was widely embraced by planners in Canada and the United States. In the United States, planners such as Robert Moses embraced the modernist ideas of Le Corbusier. These ideas focused on strict segregation of land uses, separation between residential and commercial activity, and large areas of open space. The "Towers in the Park" development style created large housing developments that were situated in large open green fields. James (2010) states that a key rationale behind the urban design behind Regent Park was to create modern, sanitary housing combined with open space for parks and playgrounds which would influence the behaviour of tenants (James, 2010). Providing sufficient living and activity space required that communities be designed to segregate public housing from the problems associated with industry and automotive traffic. As a result, Regent Park was closed off from through traffic thus creating a self-contained community.

However, despite good intentions, the technocratic approach adopted by City Hall gave little consideration to the opinions of tenants living in areas being demolished. The lack of public input, and expert paternalism that was characteristic of post war planning, razed urban communities to create large high density housing projects (James, 2010). Lane (2006) suggests that during this era, public participation was none existent. This era of planning

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theory was dominated by the technocratic and bureaucratic ideas resembling the highly technical task of designing a blue print. Planning was more of an exercise in societal guidance than inclusive planning.

The planning process that created Regent Park reflected the same kind of expert driven paternalism that characterized Urban Renewals across the United States. Expert driven paternalism was considered the only way to improve a community; the slum dwellers did not possess the knowledge of planners and politicians (James, 2010). The rationale behind Regent Park was based on Modernism's assumption that a master planned community based on "scientific principles" could create clean and sanitary living conditions, which would cure the social ills inherent in slum living (Scott, 1998). An overzealous adherence to Modernism placed too much emphasis on the built environment with little in regards to the intricate social networks that characterize these slums. The abrupt destruction of these communities is analogous to uprooting a plant (Fullilove, 2001). The uprooting of people from urban American communities left devastating impacts for many groups that are still seen today. In Canada, the impacts drastically altered Cabbagetown and the lives of those involved in the slum clearance. The early ideas and ideologies which had an influential force in the physical and social development of public housing, ultimately would become the contributing factor to the eventual decline of public housing in the US and Canada.

2.1 Decline of Public Housing

Post war era praise for public housing from local politicians and the media turned to harsh criticism in the 1980s (Purdy, 2003). The large-scale social experiment of North American public housing was deemed a failure. Sites such as Pruitt Igoe, Cabrini Green, and Regent Park became areas that were severely depressed and crime ridden. This can partly be attributed to the physical design of housing, changes to housing policy, and external shocks to the system of governance from large scale economic restructuring (Bloom, 2015; Purdy, 2003; Vale, 2013a). Throughout the 1970s, large scale changes in the economy drastically concentrated the urban poor in public housing (Purdy 2003, Vale 2013). By the 1980s, Regent Park became a territory that was highly stigmatized by outsiders, the media, and politicians (Bloom et al., 2015). This stigmatization combined with the harsh economic

realities related to welfare retrenchment and economic re-structuring created a community with a lack of jobs, educational opportunities, and an overabundance of individuals on social assistance (Purdy, 2003). Ultimately, Regent Park became a community exiled within a city (Purdy, 2003).

The failure of public housing in North America was attributed to the physical design of these communities. Social critics of Regent Park believed that isolated high density towers situated in large fields of open space, physically separated from the surrounding communities, lead to criminal activity. A lack of "defensible" space allowed crime and violence to flourish. Politicians and social critics used the poor physical design as a narrative and symbol for everything that was wrong with Regent Park (Newman, 1972). The planning of the past, which focused heavily on the segregation of land uses and construction of large towers in green space, had fallen out of fashion; critics stated that the physical design of the community created a physical and psychological barrier to the surrounding Cabbagetown. Furthermore, the new design phenomenon of New Urbanism fuelled by the ideas of Jane Jacobs, Andrés Duany, and Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, was highly critical of design principles of modernist communities like Regent Park. By the 1990s, Regent Park became synonymous with the failure of public housing in Canada. However, attributing the decline of Regent Park solely to physical design ignore other factors that led to the decline of public housing, particularly, changes in government and housing policy.

2.2 Government Policy

Since the inception of CMHC, the Crown Corporation has slowly moved away from its interventionist role. In the decades following the creation of Regent Park, federal assistance has focused on the transfers of funds for the operation of public housing rather than the expansion of public housing through capital outlays. In 1985, the Canadian Conservative regime of Brian Mulroney enacted funding cuts for public housing, opting to favour non-profits cooperative housing, and cost sharing with the provinces (Wolfe, 1998). The newly elected federal Liberal government proved to carry forward the same measures of austerity adopted by earlier governments (Hackworth and Moriah, 2006; Hackworth, 2008).

Funding cuts to public housing were initiated by consecutive federal governments aimed at balancing a deficit by slowly retrenching the welfare state through decreased funding for social services and programs such as public housing (Thibert, 2007). As a result, provincial housing agencies were expected to have a larger role in financing and administering public housing (Wolfe, 1998). According to Hackworth and Moriah (2006), conservative governments across Canada took this opportunity to dismantle public housing.

By the early 1990s, the province of Ontario was the sole administrator Regent Park. The responsibility of public housing operations soon shifted towards the newly created municipal PHA of Toronto Community Housing Corporation (now Toronto Community Housing) (Hackworth, 2008). The devolution of responsibility for public housing to municipal governments was a cornerstone of the neoliberal "Common Sense Revolution." The Harris era reforms entrenched neoliberal housing policy in Ontario by cutting funds for public housing and allowing for increased privatization (Hackworth, 2008). Furthermore, the Harris government added further legislation to deregulate housing, dramatically reducing state involvement in housing.

Premier Harris was successful in devolving public housing to local municipalities. Municipalities were encouraged to collaborate with the market in order to generate funds for the creation and operation of public housing (Hackworth and Moriah, 2006). This was necessary because the municipal government was the level of government with the least amount of fiscal power and revenue generating tools (Sharon, 2013; Slater, 2004). The downloading of public housing became complex when the crumbling state of public housing was factored into the situation. This was the result of the dwindling funds endorsed from higher levels of government.

The problem public housing was facing was exacerbated by cuts to social programs in Canada, many which provided assistance to public housing tenants. The cuts to social programs during the Mulroney and Chretien era were deep (Baker, 1997). The gap between lower income Canadians and middle to higher income Canadians widened during this period. As a result, the situation for the extreme poor, which characterized a fair portion of Regent Park tenants, quickly resulted in less funding for day to day living (Purdy, 2003).

2.3 Housing Policy

The failure of Regent Park had been attributed to poor housing policy at all levels of government. The policies employed during the creation of Regent Park, and subsequent changes to housing policies that followed in the 1970s and to the 90s, created an environment that concentrated low income tenants in public housing. In 1954, Regent Park was accessible to most families in Toronto, as the income eligibility was set to a level where the majority of working class and low income families could qualify for public housing (Purdy, 2003). The rent was set to 20% of a household's income (Rose, 1958). This was reflective of an early attempt to provide housing options for the working poor and veterans returning from the Second World War. Furthermore, the minimum income set at 150$ a month was also required for Regent Park. This made it difficult for certain "welfare cases" to be housed in Regent Park (Rose, 1958). As a result, early tenants did not have complex problems, such as deep poverty, and could eventually use public housing as a means to springboard into home ownership (Purdy, 2003).

Changes to housing policy that occurred in the 1970s, refocused the goals of public housing. The eligibility criteria was changed to specifically target low income families. These changes coincided with a broader shift in social policy in Canada. Budgetary pressures from welfare spending forced the policy to shift towards means tested policies targeted at segments of the population, rather than a universal policy (Beland, 2010). As a result, eligibility for housing projects such as Regent Park were increasingly geared towards lower income individuals. The eligibility employed by the Metropolitan Toronto Housing Authority[2] (MTHA) was based on a point system that considers factors such as % of income spent on housing, the physical condition of one's current housing, and size of a household (Purdy, 2003). The early criteria attempted to get large families out of slum like conditions and into newly created units. The changes made to the point system now gave more points to lower income tenants. The category "percentage of income" was now weighted more heavily in the point system. Percentage of income was half of the points system, allowing lowest income families (those who spent a majority of their income on housing needs) to gain a favourable position for public housing (Purdy, 2003; Van Dyk, 1995). In retrospect, changes

to the point system likely increased the concentration of low income individuals in Regent Park, resulting in low income families being over represented in Regent Park in comparison to the rest of the city of Toronto.

The early adoption of a rent-geared-to-income system also created a situation where higher income earners would choose to leave Regent Park as their income rose. Poor policy design incentivised working class families to leave Regent Park. The rent for Regent Park was based on a percentage of a tenant's income, therefore as income rose, middle income and working class tenants had incentive to find cheaper housing in the private market.

Another policy change which built the foundation for public housing policy failure was changes to mortgages. The changes allowed private banks to lend mortgages to the public, encouraging many middle income and working class families to purchase homes. Homeownership was subsidized and supported by the government (Purdy, 2003). In the 1970s, policies that dictated tenant eligibility and rent created an environment that favoured the citizens who were a core needs group. The core needs group is described as "those people who paid more than 30 per cent of their income in rent or less than this for substandard accommodation" (Purdy, 2003). By the late 1980s, a large majority of TCH tenants represented the core needs group. Those who could earn higher wages often opted for renting in the private market, or even homeownership.

The original principles and ideas that shaped the creation of public housing were flawed and set Regent Park on a course towards failure. Despite the normative rhetoric used to justify the creation of Regent Park, the project seemed to facilitate physical and psychological segregation from the surrounding communities. Ultimately, policies associated with occupancy rules and regulation increasingly favoured the extremely poor, transforming Regent Park into an area with a high concentration of poverty. Changes in housing policy were directly related to the massive welfare restructuring of Canadian society. The reduction in funding and support from higher levels of government, the aggressive promotion of home ownership by the CMHC, and the reduction of social assistance from the Federal government all compounded to create a community in quick decline.

Chapter 3
Literature Review

This literature review examines the various themes that have characterized public housing redevelopment in North America. The literature review will focus on two bodies of literature: contemporary themes in community revitalization policy, and Right of Return. The historical examination in the previous chapter has helped me situate my research. This chapter will provide an overview of contemporary revitalization policy highlighting some of the themes and ideas that have been influential in literature regarding housing redevelopment and community revitalization. Throughout this literature review I intend to show gaps in the literature that can be filled with my research.

Very few documents or articles have attempted to better understand Right of Return. The majority of my examples and analysis will come from the HOPE VI housing redevelopment program in the US. The majority of studies that examine HOPE VI only mention Right of Return policy in the periphery of their research. With that in mind, I hope to shed more light on this unique policy. Furthermore, there seems to be a lack of research that examines the formulation, adoption, and implementation of Right of Return by TCH. Little has been published on TCH's experience with Right of Return, making it an essential gap in the literature that must be explored.

3.1 Policy Context

3.1.1 Neoliberal Revitalization Policy

The redevelopment occurring in North American cities such as Toronto, Seattle, and Chicago, has been heavily influenced by the ideology of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is an ideology which favours the privatization and deregulation of public services, and the active retrenchment of welfare spending (Boudeau et al., 2009). The role of local governance shifts from regulating capital to actively facilitating capital development. Neoliberalism also reflects a contemporary application of classical liberalism which believed in individual autonomy, that the common good could be facilitated through the pursuit of self-interest, and

the state should take a minimal role (Hackworth, 2007). The new ideological paradigm that defined public policy dramatically shifted policy discourses to the Right of the political spectrum, proceeding concurrently with downscaling of the welfare state (Smith, 2002).

Neoliberalism is generally understood to occur in two separate phases; rolling back, and rolling out. The "rolling back" phase[3] included the dramatic downscaling of government services such as creation, operation, and funding of public housing. This was a large part of the fiscally conservative Common Sense Revolution (CSR) in Ontario. The "rolling out"[4] phase was the deregulation of social services such as housing to municipal governments. Following the CSR, the Harris government in Ontario passed the Social Housing Reform Act (SHRA), to effectively entrench the newer limited role of the provincial government in public housing. The rolling back and "rolling out" has been formulate force on Ontario's contemporary public housing policy, thus making it essential to understand and explore neoliberalism in the context of public housing. Unfortunately, the shift towards a more market oriented approach to housing policy has often negatively impacted low income tenants (Vale, 2013; Hackworth 2007). The large scale redevelopment of communities has left many dislocated. The neoliberal paradigm that has characterized housing has facilitated the displacement of low income tenants, mostly vulnerable segments of the population, while reclaiming urban cores for real estate developers, middle income residents, and foreign investors (Smith, 2002).

3.1.2 Organizational Learning

Contemporary debates and organizational theory has focused on the need for organizations to ensure that policy implementation is achieving its policy goals. The focus on organizational learning has required public sector services such as PHAs focus on constantly improving and learning from experiences and evaluations. The concept of organizational learning is defined by the literature as the process of changing, tweaking and redesigning policy to work more effectively and to better allocate resources and goals.

The literature suggests that generally, organizationally learning is composed of a few key ideas. First, the process of organizational learning is an endeavour for constant growth and improvement. Second, learning occurs from focusing on evaluation. Third,

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organizational learning is impacted by the type of leadership, corporate culture, and organization type (private sector, non for profit, and bureaucracy) (Torres & Preskill, 2002).

Lastly, organizations have different reasons for engaging in learning. Some organization may be forced to engage in learning after poor performance of their programs or policies. This organization learning focuses on deficiencies and errors in the program or policy. Learning can occur when there is a fundamental disconnect been what is supposed to be achieved and what actually happens. Organizations can also work to possess a culture that is conducive to organizational learning. These organizations work may work in highly competitive and dynamic fields such as technology and sales. Recently, there has been interest in organizational learning in the public sector. The literature identifies participative decision making, openness, learning, orientation, and transformational leadership as variables which contribute to a culture of learning (Flores et al, 2012).

3.1.2.1 Process of Organizational Learning

All organizations have policies and routines which are an expression of the history, mandate, and worldview of that organization. Policies are manifestations of ideology values and past experience which form routines (Levitt and March, 1988). However, these routines can change when direct experience challenges the status quo. Experience with implementation of policy can reveal previously unnoticed trends and issues that can facilitate organizational learning. Organizations can review policy from an outcomes approach, based on their own experience with a policy, to then reformulate their practices (Gilson et al, 2009). Working from experience and conducting research on these experiences are key components in the process of organizational learning that results in routine shift.

Experiential learning is essentially learning by doing, which is one way organizational learning can occur (Huber, 1991). For example, Schulz (2002) "Current approaches to organizational learning emphasize routines as repositories of knowledge and they conceptualize learning as making and updating of routines in response to experiences" (p. 451). Ultimately, working in the field, and actually implementing a policy leads to the agent of change. This process is aided by actively collecting data and communicating with policy beneficiaries (target population or customers) and implementers (Organization in

which learning is taking place) making communication and evaluation important to policy learning.

3.1.2.2 Communication and Evaluation in Organizational learning

Evaluation is a key tool that is used to bring about organizational learning. The use of evaluation can aid an incremental learning process (Torres & Preskill, 2002). Evaluation allows an organization develop criteria to judge their policy outcomes and help them monitor progress. Metrics and criteria can be developed by working directly with policy beneficiaries. Organizational learning is not solely linked to experience, a second part of organization learning is contextualizing the information (Levitt & March). Organizations need to contextualize and interpret these experiences and develop changes that address problems. The contextualization of data and research can be done by working closely with customers and the beneficiaries of the policy or program. Organizations can then make sense of how the policy or program has impacted the beneficiaries.

In some cases it is more effective to allow customers and beneficiaries to speak for themselves. For example Levitt & March state (1988), "Unless the implications of experience can be transferred from those who experienced it to those who did not, the lessons of history are likely to be lost through turnover of personnel. Written rules, oral transitions, and systems of formal and informal apprenticeships implicitly instruct new individuals in the lessons of history" (p.328). When organizations who aim to learn and fine tune policy participate with stakeholders this represents a degree of openness and willingness to engage stakeholders. Working with internal and external stakeholders emerges from an organization adopting an attitude of openness in participation in decision making (Pedlar, 1991; Flores, et al, 2012).

3.1.2.3 Organizational learning in Housing revitalization:

Organizational learning is broadly defined as the constant process of improvement through managing knowledge, contextualizing experiences and working with stakeholders. The need to bring about organizational learning can occur in a response to poor policy

performance. This was the case in CHA plan for transformation. The poor performance of relocation of tenants led many tenants and community activists to call for an independent monitor. As a result, the CHA hired a lawyer to act as an independent monitor to conduct an interim evaluation of the early experience of CHA (Berg, 2004). The independent monitor used the initial relocation rights contract as the measure for his evaluation. Also, the independent monitor spoke to community residents, service providers and CHA officials. Through this research and monitoring it became clear that relocation was done poorly and was failing families. In a follow up Sullivan had noted that procedures and processes of relocation had improved greatly from early phases of redevelopment. The next year Sullivan again examined relocation, finding this time that CHA had considerably improved the process. The process of an external audit, which examined processes, and consulted tenants acted as factor to bring about organizational learning.

3.2 Theoretical Context

3.2.1 Poverty Deconcentration

Poverty deconcentration has become a palpable theory of public housing planning that has defined contemporary housing policy in North America and Europe. In order to understand the poverty deconcentration literature, it is important to discuss the work of sociologist William J. Wilson, "The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy". Wilson's findings suggest that structural changes in the economy and society have negatively impacted low income African Americans living in urban areas. Changes in industry, racial segregation, and white flight left a situation where many higher and middle income residents opted to leave the inner city, taking with them tremendous financial and social capital. As a result, high degrees of poverty confined in a spatial area began to amplify the effects of poverty. Negative social indicators such as crime, drug use, family structure, and teen pregnancy have been linked to high concentrations of poverty (Wilson, 1987). Wilson's work was significant as it linked poverty, and the causes of poverty, to a spatial area such as an urban neighborhood (Diamond, 2012). The spatial element to poverty fueled the criticism of inner city living.

Wilson also developed the concept of the "underclass," which was a subculture of urban dwellers who developed their own set of norms to cope with their lack of material power within society. These values and ideas shape others around them, creating destructive behavior (Wilson, 1987). Wilson's critique of concentrated poverty heavily influenced housing policy in the decades to come. However, the influence of Wilson's work came from a selective reading of his theories. Policy makers chose to focus on the impacts of concentrated poverty instead of focusing on Wilson's structural analysis of the causes of poverty (Crump, 2003). In the US, research focused on the structural nature of concentrated poverty has been replaced by research focusing of research consequences of poverty deconcentration. The solutions advanced by this body of research (Bickford and Massey, 1991) believes that concentrated poverty can be addressed via poverty dispersion (Crump, 2003). This solution was popularized by the neo-conservatives in the US who attacked inner city poverty (Wilson, 1987; Crump, 2003). The neo-conservative narrative linked the high concentration of poverty to the violent drug war characterizing the US in the 1980s. As a result, the debate regarding urban poverty has been linked to welfare abuse, and the moral decline of inner cities across the US (Crump, 2002). These have been justified to dismantle the welfare state.

There has been a great deal of criticism regarding some of the underlying assumptions associated with poverty deconcentration. One of the key weaknesses associated with the poverty deconcentration narrative, is that it overstates the impact of neighborhood level indicators on individual factors in the community (Oakland, et al., 2011). Also, the policy tends to paint all minority urban dwellers with a broad stroke and fails to understand the nuisances of their social networks.

Despite the negative assumptions, there have been some positives associated with poverty deconcentration. It has been found in some studies that HOPE VI residents who were given the ability to move from their community ended up in areas that had better social indicators than their previous home. Some residents ended up moving into less poverty stricken areas (Goetz, 2005; Popkin, 2001; Thomas Kingsley, et al., 2003).

3.2.1.1 Poverty Concentration and Public Housing Policy

The policy discourse of poverty deconcentration has become a staple of housing policy in the US. In the US, public housing has only catered to individuals with very low incomes. As a result, the connection between effects of concentrated poverty and the decline of public housing was manufactured by policy makers. This was a simple characterization of the poverty issue, which failed to look at the structural racism that shaped US public housing policy (J. Smith, 1998). Contemporary housing policy has used the dispersal of subsidized public housing as a mechanism to spread large concentrations of poverty. Poverty deconcentration has allowed PHAs to break up large public housing communities such as the Robert Taylor Homes in Chicago, in order to attract economic investment and in migration of wealthy residents. The assumption is that moving people out of traditional public housing communities will lead to mutual benefit for both residents being moved and incoming residents (Oakley et al., 2011).

The largest poverty deconcentration scheme created in the US was the 1992 HOPE VI, which was a large housing program was that was heavily influenced by the policy discourse of poverty deconcentration (Diamond, 2012). Key American housing policy makers, such as Henry Cisneros, felt that the decline of public housing was due to an over concentration of low income residents. As a result, one of the key aims of HOPE VI was to deconcentrate and disperse poverty. This was accomplished through decreasing the number of physical units of public housing in the US (J Smith, 1998). Cities such as Atlanta saw a significant decrease in their public housing stock. The Atlanta Housing Authority (AHA) aimed to demolish all public housing and replace them with vouchers (Oakley et al., 2011).

The HOPE VI program has allowed and facilitated the net reduction in public housing in the US. This has been done through physical design changes in redevelopments, and converting physical units into section 8 housing vouchers. The design and physical characteristics of public housing communities were also largely impacted by poverty deconcentration (Hanlon, 2010). Public housing communities were dramatically redesigned to accommodate less public housing. The density of the redevelopment was much lower than before redevelopment in an effort to deconcentrate poverty. Furthermore, the addition of

mixed income on the sites of former public housing allowed policy makers the chance to dilute some of the impacts of concentrated poverty. The result has seen a net decrease of public housing across the US (Oakley & Burchfield 2009).

Second, the expansion of the section 8 voucher program was designed to encourage public housing tenants to seek housing options elsewhere. The deregulation of HUD policy was a direct response to the need to deconcentrate poverty. As mentioned before, HUD required that when public housing is demolished, it must be replaced. However, this was lifted, and physical units were shifted into tenant subsidies. The process of "vouchering out residents" has seen a fair share of public housing tenants taking subsidies (Jones and Paulsen, 2011). Some residents have had trouble navigating the private market rental. Factors such as discrimination and state of the housing market impact residents to use their vouchers (Popkin et al., 2004b). Ultimately, the demand for affordable housing remains the same while the supply has decreased.

The impacts of poverty deconcentration in HOPE VI have been mixed. In some cases tenants have benefited by moving into better communities (according to community indicators) (Buron et al., 2002). As mentioned above, the analysis of this positive outcome can lead to a fallacy that overstates the impact community level indicators have on individuals. In a certain sense, the policy does move residents out of poverty. Residents living in new communities felt higher levels of safety and moved to better housing conditions (Popkin, et al., 2004a). In some cases, tenants have moved into communities with better social indicators which allowed the tenants to feel safer and less stressed about living in these environments (Buron, et al., 2002). However, some critics stated that these programs can lead to the displacement of tenants. Moreover, residents were often unable to navigate through the private market. Even though tenants are living in marginally better communities, these communities are still areas with high poverty (Popkin, et al., 2004b; Goetz, 2010).

One issue that has impacted HOPE VI residents is being displaced from their community. Residents have been moved out of their communities and have lost vital social networks (Clampet-Lundquist, 2004; Goetz, 2005; Venkatesh, 2000). Poverty deconcentration understates the significance of these social networks in public housing

communities (Popkin, et al., 2004a). For example, Goetz states (2005), "The pattern of benefits to these families is modest, inconsistent, and balanced by measurable costs as well. Most important to note in this discussion is that forced relocation has failed to result in improved economic security, while undercutting the informal support networks that the poor rely on" (p.140). The benefits from poverty deconcentration are unclear and not currently fully understood by research. What is understood, is that tenants may not always benefit from moving. The informal social networks used to help tenants cope with their lack of material and political power will inevitably be shaped and impacted by the HOPE VI redevelopment (Curley, 2009).

The Canadian literature on poverty deconcentration has focused on the redevelopment of Regent Park. Authors such as August (2014) have stated that the poverty deconcentration narrative has been used as a justification to facilitate state-driven gentrification. These narratives put forth by those justifying the redevelopment of Regent Park undermine the valuable and intricate social networks of those individuals living in Regent Park. The assumption by advocates of redevelopment is that mixed communities will directly impact lower income residents. August (2014) argues the justification of poverty deconcentration through social mixing has a weak empirical basis.

The impacts of poverty deconcentration are not fully understood despite being a cornerstone in American housing policy. Poverty deconcentration policy tends to focus on the consequences of urban poverty, rather than focusing on the causes. Ultimately, poverty deconcentration, like modernism, may be another narrative used to facilitate the destruction of a community and the reshaping of urban areas for wealthier residents.

3.2.2 Slum Clearance and Displacement

The literature on public housing redevelopment agrees that the impacts of development have disproportionately impacted the poorest and most vulnerable segments of the population (Manley, 2009; Teaford, 2000; Vale, 2013). Often, attempts to revitalize communities, or clear slums, have created a difficult situation for the residents living in these areas. Since the creation of public housing in North America, revitalization plans have succeeded at clearing blighted communities but has failed in dealing with the impact felt by

residents living in these areas. (Purdy, 2003; Reynolds, 1963). Experiences with slum clearance and urban redevelopment have led many to demand an inclusive planning process, and a way to protect the rights of tenants impacted by public housing redevelopment (Reynolds, 1963; Teaford, 2000; Vale, 2013). This issue is still being seen today in contemporary housing redevelopment programs. Revitalizations taking place across the US have seen a large portions of residents being displaced, resulting in residents struggling to find rental in the private market or moving into high poverty areas (Joseph and Chaskin, 2012; Polikoff et al., 2009; Popkin, 2010; Popkin and Cunningham, 2002; Manzo, et al., 2008; Vale and Graves, 2010; Vale, 2013; Venkatesh, 2002; Venkatesh and Celimli, 2004).

The history of mistrust that has emerged between PHAs and tenants in the US was a by-product of policy that was racist and gave little consideration to the opinions of citizens and tenants impacted by these developments (Berg, 2004). Purdy (2003), Teaford (2000), Reynolds (1963), and Vale (2013), suggest that a centralized process driven by physical demolition, without tenant participation, has displaced many thousands of families across North America from the1940s to the 1970s. Despite rhetoric of improving the lives of those living in slums, empirically the literature has shown housing redevelopment has often displaced residents from their former homes, with only a small percentage of those families moving back to their community (Reynolds 1963; Vale, 2013). In some cases, housing was built to reinforce racial and class segregation in the US.

In the Canadian context, the creation of Regent Park was designed partly to cleanse slums. The motivation to clear slums was characterized by a moral crusade against perceived inner city crime and deviancy (James, 2010; Vale, 2013; Vale, 2013a). The political machine in Toronto was largely dominated by middle class Christians who were critical of the social structure of Cabbagetown (James, 2010). The slum area of Cabbagetown was thought to breed crime, cost tax payers considerable money, and ultimately held the city back from prosperity (Rose, 1958). Despite constructing large improvements in the community, in areas of sanitation, and welfare, the majority of these tenants were displaced. (Rose, 1958). Commencing in the interwar period to the early 1950s, PHAs and federal governments began to clear slums to develop public housing. PHAs in the US aimed to get rid of visual blight,

deviant behavior and encouraged segregating black communities from the white ones (Vale, 2013a).

Often, the slum clearance was more concerned with destruction of dwellings and reconstruction of public housing than the devastating impacts it would have on the original residents. The hubris of planners led them to believe that they were building public housing and clearing slums in the interest of the whole public. Slum clearance policies were motivated by the need to replace costly and dangerous slums with new safe and centrally planned communities. Cabbagetown would need to be destroyed before the development of Regent Park in Toronto could proceed. The process of land accumulation, slum clearance, and redevelopment in the US and Canada had a detrimental consequences on the urban poor.

Two thirds of the slum clearances that characterized Chicago had displaced black Chicagoans (Vale, 2013). Slum clearance in San Francisco directly targeted Japanese Americans and African Americans, who had developed a community in close proximity to City Hall and the Central Business District (Rosen and Sullivan, 2012). In Atlanta, the creation of Techwood largely displaced lower income black households in favour of working class white households (Vale, 2013). On a larger scale, Reynolds (1963) study found that about only 18% of residents displaced by Urban Renewal in the US were eligible to come back to public housing. Hartman (1980) estimates at least a million Americans were displaced by the highway and public housing projects of the 1950s and 60s.

Another factor that has added to displacement is that strict entry criteria prohibited almost half of residents for even applying for housing (Reynolds, 1963). The ideal tenant the PHAs were looking for were white working poor families (Vale, 2013a). Slum clearances also allowed PHAs to legally displace people and ensure that the "troublemakers" were not allowed to move back. Ultimately, housing policy and eligibility was quite draconian; only those who narrowly fit the values and ideas of Urban Renewal were able to qualify for housing. The screening criteria overwhelmingly favoured tenants who were working class, or working poor. Social critics often stated that those who needed housing the most were overlooked (Vale, 2013 and Reynolds, 1963). The impacts of Urban Renewal can never fully be known due insufficient data on the whereabouts of former residents.

Sixty years later, the contemporary redevelopment occurring in cities such as Atlanta, Chicago, and Toronto reflect and adopt the remnants of past developments. The literature suggests the negative aspects of housing redevelopment are still being seen in the latest phase of public housing redevelopments occurring in North America. The literature proposes that policies aimed to help the urban poor seem to follow the trends of the past; the displacement of residents remains a concern in the contemporary revitalization plans (Vale and Graves 2010; Vale, 2013). This displacement has been caused by the direct demolition of public housing, decreased units of public housing, and indirect factors such as gentrification (Crump, 2002; Diamond, 2012; Goetz, Hackworth, 2007; James and Paulsen, 2011).

Communities such as Cabbagetown in Toronto, Northside and Bronzeville of Chicago, West End Boston, and Techwood in Atlanta are communities that have gone through two different revitalizations in the past 70 years. Places such as Regent Park, Techwood and various communities in Chicago, have been "twice cleared," resulting in a high degree of déjà vu to Urban Renewal and slum clearance (Vale, 2013). Tenants in these communities have experienced tremendous hardship (Vale, 2013). However, since the Urban Renewals project, significant strides have been made for the rights of tenants. PHAs, planners, and developers undertaking redevelopment are required to conduct public participation and public outreach (Vale, 2013). Furthermore, legal framework and contractual rights have created a degree of assurance and protection for residents. Tenants have used the courts to bring about legal challenges in the form of class action litigation (Berg, 2004). Despite having a legal framework to protect tenant rights, very few families have been able to return to new mixed income communities (Vale, 2013). The low rates of return in HOPE VI developments across the US reflect similar numbers of those associated with the development of traditional public housing.

Since the creation of public housing in the 1940s, the displacement of slum dwellers and tight knit ethnic communities has been a serious issue. The early slum clearance was designed to transform cities and modernise morally hazardous areas. The impact Urban Renewals had on low-income inner city residents was devastating (Fullilove, 2001). The contemporary inception of housing revitalization programs aims to bring about significant

change to the large concentrations of poverty that now characterize public housing communities. The large scale transformations taking place across North American urban centres require demolishing large towers of public housing, and the involuntarily movement of tenants from their homes. This has left some tenants worried and skeptical of redevelopment. Many have feared being displaced and losing their place in their community. As a result, some tenants and activists have called for a Right of Return after the redevelopment is complete.

3.3 Right of Return

The literature has not fully explored what the Right of Return policy means in the context of redevelopment. The majority of American research mentions Right of Return in part of a larger exploration of contemporary redevelopment. As a result, a gap in the literature exists in regards to Right of Return. The Right of Return is a unique policy that was designed to ensure that residents involved in public housing revitalization projects such as HOPE VI, the Plan for Transformation in Chicago, and the Regent Park Revitalization Plan, have the legal Right of Return to their community once redevelopment is complete (TCH, 2015; Vale, 2013). This policy was partially designed to help protect the rights of tenants during redevelopment. Right of Return can act as a mitigating policy that may offset the potential uncertainty and stress for residents being relocated and displaced during revitalization.

The Right of Return has been adopted in multiple jurisdictions across the world. Locally, HOPE VI revitalizations occurring in Boston, Seattle, and Chicago have all given tenants a Right of Return. Internationally, this policy appears in other countries such as Australia, England, and Ireland (Public-Interest, 2004). These multiple jurisdictions have used different ways to implement Right of Return, resulting in varying levels of success (Public-Interest, 2004). Although the basic principles are the same in these redevelopments, the implementation of Right of Return has been a significant factor which influences whether tenants are given the choice to return.

The earliest example of Right of Return in HOPE VI was in Chicago. The literature suggests that, in Chicago, Right of Return was something fought for by activists (Berg, 2004). A long history of mistrust, segregation, and tension between tenants and the CHA led to fear of displacement (Berg, 2004; Vale, 2013). Despite good intentions only a fraction of the residents where given a chance to return. The complex nature of redevelopment in Chicago had led many to research the redevelopment itself. Research found that the CHA's Plan for Transformation had high expectations for tenants. However, various factors impacted the redevelopment, which ultimately impacted tenants' Right of Return.

Throughout HOPE VI, some sites have had a large portion of residents return while others have had lower rates of return. A study conducted by Holin et al., (2003) revealed that over a selection of 11 sites the rate of return for resident's was average 40%. Holin et al., (2003) study highlighted that the rates of return in the cities Chicago and Atlanta were significantly lower than the national average. A nationwide study of HOPE VI sites conducted by the United States General Accounting Office stated that of all relocates, their estimate was that 46% would return (Government of the United States, 2003). However, tokenistic tenant involvement and the reduction of the physical stock of public housing all hindered the number residents returning. Vale (2013) also states, the rates of return among tenants to newly redeveloped mixed income sites has been low for residents impacted by HOPE VI. A recent study conducted by Ciseneros and Engdahl (2009) revealed that only 24% of relocated tenants have moved backed to HOPE VI mixed income communities, the rest have either accepted a rent subsidy, moved into other public housing, or left public housing.

Within the Canadian context the research has been limited in comparison to HOPE VI studies in cities such as Chicago, Seattle, Baltimore, and Atlanta. In Regent Park, little is written about the Right of Return's origins, and the role it takes within the redevelopment. This policy is unique and its implications may be significant in the future of Canadian public housing policy. It is important to see whether Regent Park had a similar experience with communities like Cabrini Green, New Holly, and Ida B wells. Also, HOPE VI studies have extensively examined the rates of displacement and return across the country. Within the

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research regarding Regent Park, little is known about how many tenants decided to return to Regent Park. Most research has been focused on the relocation processes of TCH rather than return (Schippling, 2007). While other research has focused on the social implications of the redevelopment, the first two phases have commenced making it essential to uncover empirical data in order to better understand the project, and add to the knowledge regarding Right of Return.

3.3.1 Place Attachment

Place attachment is a significant factor which impacts residents during relocation and influences the need for a basis for Right of Return. Place attachment generally refers to peoples' emotional bonds with their community (Giuliani & Feldman 1993). In cities partaking in HOPE VI, there was a lot of excitement and concern by residents involved in redevelopment. According to Vale (2013), housing surveys done by tenants of the CHA showed that over 90% wanted to return to their newly redeveloped community. Chaskin & Joseph (2012) stated that public housing residents in Chicago displaced by the Plan for Transformation wanted to relocate to familiar neighborhoods because of an attachment to place and people. These trends are also consistent across other HOPE VI sites such as Holly Park in Seattle. Reynolds (1963) data suggested that a large majority of slum dwellers displaced during reconstruction of their communities moved within 1 or 2 miles of their old homes. This attachment to place may develop from the intricate relationships with the vital institutions and services in the community. These intricate relationships provide support to low income residents who have been excluded politically and economically from mainstream society (Wilson, 1987).

Place attachment is a significant factor when attempting to understand the need for Right of Return. Tenants housing choices were more influenced by the potential improvements to their communities, rather than the potential improvements to their personal life (Joseph & Chaskin, 2012). New amenities, services, and buildings were more important than the new relationships with middle and high income residents. Residents wanted to return to their community because there was a sense of fondness for their neighborhood.

Place attachment is influenced by pragmatic, material, and emotional factors (Curley, 2009). The literature suggests that relocated residents prefer to live in, or close by, their old neighborhood (Curley, 2009; Joseph & Chaskin, 2012; Reynolds). Those who chose to exercise their Right of Return do so because of the close relationships they have formed in their previous community (Joseph & Chaskin, 2012). Also, they have developed networks and relationships that help them function in their day to day lives (Kissane & Clampet-Lundquist, 2012). These social relationships act as informal supports, which help gives the resident material and emotional support. In an effort to cope with their lack of material wealth, public housing residents often rely on families in their neighborhood to provide informal child care. Pragmatic factors such as proximity to work, transit routes, and local services influence people's desire to return (Kissane & Clampet-Lundquist, 2012). Old inner city communities, in areas such as Chicago and Toronto, had stronger transportation networks in comparison to suburban areas making a car more of a luxury than a necessity. Furthermore, important services to low income families such as religious institutions and non-profits are also considerable factors into an individual's attachment to place (Kissane & Clampet-Lundquist, 2012). The narratives associated with concentrated poverty characterized these as toxic relationships. However, these informal social relationships help give different kinds of supports to low income public housing tenants.

3.3.2 Policy Implementation

Authors such as Berg (2004), and Popkin et al., (2004b), Holin et al., (2003), and Vale (2013), and Vale & Grave (2010), suggest that Right of Return has been impacted because the implementation of Right of Return has been executed poorly. The implementation of policy can be impacted by a variety of contributing factors such as poor communication prior and during the redevelopment process, flawed relocation and return practises, and complex policy design. Policy implementation is the procedure in where government officials, bureaucrats, and PHAs carry out policy in the real world (Sabatier, 1986). The policy implementation of Right of Return can fall into various categories such as the relocation of tenants, dissemination of information, and facilitating the return of citizens.

The implementation of CHA's plan for transformation has shown that implementation of Right of Return can be complex. CHA faced various internal and external barriers that impacted redevelopment and policy implementation (Berg, 2004). Understanding these barriers will potentially help one understand why facilitated Right of Return has been so difficult. When an institution is charged with implementing a policy it has to contend with various elements that emerge from within the organization as well as the external political environment. External barriers to policy implementation emerge from the local political economic context (Berg, 2004). One key external barrier that framed the implementation of the Plan for Transformation was the history of structural racism which fueled the mistrust felt among tenants in regards to the CHA. Local decision making, lack of funding from higher levels of government, or resistance from impacted stakeholders all create barriers to implementation (Burke et al., 2012; Naoom et al., 2005). Understanding implementation requires a firm knowledge of the external circumstances that characterize housing redevelopment.

According to Berg (2004), the implementation of CHA's relocation and Right of Return program was characterized early by intense debates between various stakeholders representing tenant rights, the CHA, and the developers. The relationship between tenants, local advisor councils (tenant's organizations), and the CHA was strained by disagreement over policy which lead to various lawsuits and litigation. Large scale disagreements between tenant organizations known as Local Advisory Committees (LACs), local government, CHA officials, and members of the private sector were so profound it delayed the redevelopment of Roosevelt Square (Boisseuil, 2013). A difference in fundamental political values, goals, and objectives led to a delay of the project. This was a by-product of the "culture of mistrust" that had characterized tenant relationship with the CHA over the past 60 years. Comey (2007), believes that this problem was not just related to the CHA, but rather a problem of mistrust between residents and PHAs on a national scale. Given a history of segregation and institutional racism, and the influence of neoliberal housing policy, many were wary of CHA's commitment to redevelopment.

In addition, internal barriers that can impact implementation emerge from internal processes and relationships that are overly complex (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984). Poor delivery of information, negligence, and mismanagement heavily impacted CHA's operations. The CHA received plenty of criticism because the relocation of tenants was problematic, largely due to the fact that CHA opted to contract out some of their services. As a result, tenants often had to deal with a complex array of bureaucrats, building managers, and social service providers during the relocation process (Polikoff et al., 2009; Vale & Graves, 2010,). The result was a large amount of actors needing to work together; social services played an essential role in helping individuals return to newly developed mixed income sites. These mixed income sites had stringent screening criteria for returning residents. Residents who were unable to meet the requirements such as work limits, relied on Service Connectors (counselors) to help them become lease compliant (Popkin & Cunningham, 2002; Levy & Gallagher, 2006). The CHA contracted out some of their services to private companies and non-profits. The contracts were kept short, one year lengths, so the CHA could make changes to service providers if things were not working (Berg, 2004; Levy & Gallagher, 2006; Popkin & Cunningham, 2002). The high turnover and change among service providers created incomplete data sets, resulting in some tenants being lost in the system.

3.3.2.1 Relocation

The rate of return for residents has been heavily influenced by the implementation of relocation policies. The importance of good relocation processes was highlighted in a study by Buronet al., (2002) regarding eight sites going through HOPE VI revitalization. For example, Buron et al., (2002) states, "Relocation planning is key. It is clear that careful, well thought-out relocation plans and procedures can help promote good outcomes for original residents" (p. 114). The New Holly redevelopment in Seattle, had a much smaller housing portfolio and tenant population, so the Seattle Housing Authority (SHA) was able to be more flexible with tenant move out dates. Tenants would meet with relocation counsellors and work to find mutually agreed upon dates, and notice was given when a moving date was booked (Public Interest, 2004). However, larger PHAs like the CHA had more housing

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stocks and fixed deadlines for construction. The problems Chicago faced were the result of rushed relocation of tenants that was not communicated well. As a result poor relocation processes would often require households to move several times before being able to use their Right of Return. Authors such as Popkin (2004a), Polikoff et al., (2009), Berg (2004), Venkatesh, Levy and Gallagher (2006) have noted that poor information, rushed relocations, and fixed demolition dates for buildings impacted the tenant's ability to return to their former community. The CHA has been criticized by independent monitors, academics, and tenants for focusing too much on the demolition instead of giving adequate notice and suitably relocating tenants. CHA's difficulty relocating tenants stemmed from its fixed schedule for demolition. Berg (2004) suggests that creating a flexible schedule for demolition can help the CHA deal with adequately housing tenants before reconstruction. Furthermore, it also allows PHAs to slow down relocation if construction is taking longer than expected. Poor implementation of relocation policies often pushed families into unsanitary conditions with infestation. (Venkatesh & Celimli, 2002; Polikoff et al., 2009). Conditions were further exasperated as the relocation of tenants was often one month before demolition, leading to a scramble to finding housing for these tenants. In some cases, tenants were moved into other buildings scheduled to be demolished in the future (multiple moving), or housing far from their original community (Popkin et al., 2000; 2004b; Venkatesh, 2002; Venkatesh & Celmini, 2002). In the case of CHA's Plan for Transformation, low rates of return can partly be attributed to poor relocation practises. Relocation divisions were underfunded and lacked the human resources to implement CHA's revitalization program (Joseph & Chaskin, 2012). However, through monitoring and evaluation, changes were made to improve these services. The CHA started to communicate with tenants through workshops in order to help them relocate to an area that was suitable (Vale and Graves, 2010). Ultimately, residents were lost in the process, unable to meet lease compliance or were sick of moving multiple times, and decided not to use their Right of Return.

3.3.2.2 Communication

Communication is seen as an essential part of policy implementation. The communicative process impacts how residents and PHAs understand policies such as Right

of Return and redevelopment. When a policy is communicated effectively it can lead to a common understanding among PHAs and tenants. In contrast, when communication breaks down, it can lead to a confusion and a lack of clarity which ultimately, impacts how decisions such as Right of Return are made.

The SHA had good communicative channels which helped inform tenants regarding redevelopment and the Right of Return. The SHA also helped tenants become familiar with the relocation process by creating education and choice workshops (Public-Interest, 2004).In contrast, the poor communication between CHA's counselors and residents, often led to residents making uniformed choices. Authors such as Berg (2004), Polikoff et al., (2009), stated that residents were not fully aware of their relocation decisions. Pre-implementation communication was conducted poorly, leading to many residents receiving relocation notices one month prior to demolition (Polikoff et al., 2009; Berg, 2004; Vale and Graves 2010; Venkatesh 2002). These barriers made it difficult for individuals to redeem their Right of Return. Furthermore, during early relocation, many tenants found it difficult to find desirable units. For families using private market subsidies (housing choice vouchers), relocation counsellors would push tenants towards the easier options for relocation by misconstruing information (Polikoff et al., 2009). This is recognized by Edwards (1980) as a barrier to effective communication. Breakdowns in communication can emerge from bureaucrat's deliberately misconstruing information. In the case of HOPE VI, relocation counsellors tried to find the easiest, not necessarily the best, option for tenants looking for housing. As a result, families were relocated to neighbourhoods with high instances of poverty and racial segregation (Venkatesh & Celimni 2004).

In Chicago, residents who expressed an interest to return to the newly developed mixed income housing were often given poor information, which impacted their housing decisions (Venkatash, 2002). In contrast, the SHA's implementation of relocation and Right of Return was generally viewed favourably by tenants (Cohen et al., 2003; Kleit & Carlson, 2003; Public-interest, 2004). The SHA adopted practices that the literature would agree were conducive to good policy implementation (Cohen et al., 2003; Kleit & Carlson, 2003; Public-interest, 2004). Tenant counselling, good pre-implementation communication on behalf of

the SHA, detailed communication material, and an inclusive process gave all tenants a choice to return (Cohen et al., 2003; Kleit & Carlson, 2003; Public-interest, 2004).

3.3.2.3 Policy Design

One major problem that has impacted the implementation of Right of Return is the policy design. Primarily, authors have determined that the stringent criteria associated with returning to newly redeveloped mixed income communities has significantly affected how many tenants have been eligible to return. In their study of eleven different sites, Holin et al., (2003) found that those PHAs which had the least stringent criteria had the highest rates of return for tenants. For example, one central feature of HOPE VI and CHA's Plan for Transformation was to promote the self-sufficiency of public housing tenants. However, self-sufficiency was solely associated with participation in the market. As well, those who were drug free, and lacking criminal convictions were seen as ideal tenants for the newly redeveloped mixed income sites. Despite having site specific criteria, the CHA sites shared these key standards for eligibility: 1) 30 hour work weeks for all adults, 2) mandatory drug testing, 3) no past criminal convictions, and 4) tenant in good standing (paying rent on time, no violations of rules or regulations) (Vale and Graves, 2011). These criteria were quite strict and often acted as a deterrent for potential tenants. Authors such as Vale (2013), and Venkatesh (2002) stated that the majority of the tenants living in these communities before revitalization would not be eligible to return.

The literature also suggests that those PHAs who allowed on-site relocation had significantly higher rates of return (Holin et al., 2003). In various international projects this had been the case. In Holly Park, on-site relocation allowed tenants to use all the same services they had before redevelopment. On-site relocation was adopted by various council estates in the United Kingdom. Another best practise that emerged from the United Kingdom was the relocation and return process in the Waltham Forest redevelopment. The Waltham Forest council estate redeveloped each section in sequence, ensuring that no tenant was displaced off-site (Public Interest, 2004). In contrast, the CHA opted to simultaneously demolish sites and move resident's off-site, to either private market rental or other public housing units in their portfolio. As mentioned above, Venkatesh and Celimli (2004) suggest

that multiple moves often frustrate and slow down the process of return. Eventually, residents become accustomed to their current living and situation though some residents are fearful moving again.

The Regent Park Revitalization has struggled in the early phases of relocation and return. According to Johnson (2009) and Schippling (2007), tenants viewed the relocation process negatively because some felt the system was unfair. The TCH also changed relocation processes in the middle of phase 1, leading to confusion and anger among residents (Johnson, 2009). Residents felt like the rules were changing in the middle of the game. This was the result of a system that failed to take into account people's needs and schedules. A first come first serve service created a tense situation where people lined up for hours for housing units. A similar sentiment was expressed by Polikoff et al., (2009) in their study of early implementation in Chicago. Johnson's (2009) and Schippling's (2007) studies have laid a foundation for further examination into the processes and policies used by the TCH staff. As a result, it is crucial to explore how the TCH has reacted to perceived failures in the first phase of relocation.

3.3.3 Success

Evaluation is an essential step in the policy process which allows an organization to improve its policy (Weiss, 1999). Evaluation can help provide information regarding the performance of public policy and aid recommendations and changes for the future. At its core, evaluation can help gauge the performance of a policy, and determine overall success or failure. It has yet to be determined whether low rates of return are indicators of success or failure of Right of Return. Throughout much of the US, return rates have been quite low (Vale, 2013). There have been some standout examples which have had a large portion of tenants return. New Holly Park in Seattle, and New Haven in Connecticut, are outstanding examples of redevelopment that had high rates of return (Kleit, 2005; Cohen et al., 2003). The process implemented by the SHA was noted as being inclusive and supportive of tenants. However, collectively in the US, various reports show that the majority of tenants have been displaced over the decade long HOPE VI revitalization project (Comey, 2007; Popkin et al., 2004b). This may be seen as a troubling finding among activists and some

researchers. The evaluation of these results starts to become complex when one considers that a major goal of these programs has been to reduce enclaves and high concentrations of poverty.

There was a lack of consensus of whether low rates of return among public housing tenants was seen as an issue. This is part of a larger issue regarding HOPE VI, because the criteria used to define success are not clear. This issue was also recognized by Popkin et al., (2004). Some authors believe that the low rates of return are considered a failure because they have led to the displacement of thousands of tenants (Keating, 2000). As a result, tenants have experienced tremendous hardship during redevelopment. However, low rates of return were not necessarily an indicator of failure (Popkin et al., 2004). The emphasize that HOPE VI placed on poverty deconcentration and tenant mobility saw low rates of return as a potential success. Many tenants ended up living in census tracts that had better social indicators than their previous census tracts (Buron et al., 2002). These improved social indicators potentially reflected a better quality of life for public housing tenants. In their study, Buron et al., (2002), found that a fair share of tenants ended up in areas that had lower rates of poverty and racial segregation. The lack of consensus within the literature raises an interesting question regarding success. A lack of convergence and agreeance proves that a gap in the literature exists.

3.4 Research Implications

The literature on housing redevelopment in the US is quite extensive. The same cannot be said about the Canadian literature which lacks depth regarding housing redevelopment literature. The literature suggests despite tenants being given a Right of Return many have still been displaced. HOPE VI mixed income redevelopment sites have had a low rates of return among tenants relocated during reconstruction. From a theoretical standpoint, the redevelopments in the US have been heavily shaped by the need to redevelop urban lands for market utilization. The narrative of poverty deconcentration has been part of policy that has attempted to remake urban environments for affluent citizens. The contemporary redevelopments taking place in the US mirror those of the past, large scale demolition and displacement of residents. Despite having a legal Right of Return, the

literature has shown that the rates of return in HOPE VI developments across the United States have been low. The breakdown in the Right of Return policy has been the result of poor implementation policy. The relocation of tenants, the dissemination of information, and the organization of processes heavily impacted whether tenants had the chance to return to their former community.

The Regent Park Revitalization Plan project currently taking place has guaranteed a Right of Return for tenants. It becomes essential to examine how the redevelopment process has incorporated a tenant's Right of Return. This creates an opportunity for my research to add to the Canadian housing literature and bring a new dimension to the research in Regent Park. My research attempts to fill the following gaps in the literature:

- There is little written about the origins of Right of Return in the Toronto redevelopment of Regent Park. I want to particularly focus on the influences and ideas that led to the adoption of Right of Return.

- It became clear that implementation is an important factor which can shape whether a tenant choses to return to their community. As a result, my research will examine how the implementation has taken place in the first two phases of Regent Park redevelopment.

- The literature is unclear with regards to defining success in the Right of Return policy. This research will help to understand this area of concern.

Chapter 4
Research Methods

My research looks at the transformation occurring in the public housing community of Regent Park. The focus is on a policy provision that has been designed and implemented in order to ensure all residents displaced in the redevelopment of their community have a legal Right of Return after redevelopment. As of 2014, residents from both phases 1 and 2 (out of 5 planned) have completed temporary household relocation and the Right of Return resettlement, making it an opportune time to further understand the Right of Return. My findings were largely supplemented by the exploration and examination of key policy documents produced by two municipal entities, the City of Toronto and Toronto Community Housing (TCH). The following section outlines my research design, which touches on various topics including my sample, my data collection methods, recruitment methods, and the methods used for data analysis. This will help the reader understand the process, which led to me answering my research questions.

4.1 Research Objective

The main objective of my research is to better understand the role Right of Return plays in the redevelopment of Regent Park. This policy is a unique element of the Regent Park Revitalization Plan that I intended to better explore by focusing on phases 1 and 2 of redevelopment. Furthermore, my research was also meant to be a descriptive account of how Right of Return operated in this case. A secondary purpose is to add insight to a significant gap in the literature regarding community revitalization and the policy of Right of Return. There is little written in the literature about origins and history of Right of Return in public housing redevelopment, despite being mentioned and used in various jurisdictions across the Global North (ex: Chicago, London, Toronto). The goal of the research is to generate data on Right of Return and provide potential recommendations for future phases of the Regent Park Revitalization Plan, as well as future housing redevelopments that will potentially take place across North America. Furthermore, it is also better to understand how this policy operates

and works in the context of a community revitalization plan. To summarize, the three main objectives of my research are to:

1) Understand the early development, origins, and adoption of Right of Return in the Regent Park Revitalization Plan;

2) Uncover empirical evidence to examine the rates of return for phases 1 and 2 while understanding the process of Right of Return.

3) Understand the metrics used by Toronto Community Housing to define success in regards to Right of Return.

In Toronto, there has been a lack of research on rates of return for those who relocated in the Regent Park Revitalization Plan. At the time of writing (April, 2015) the first two phases were essentially complete, making it critical to uncover empirical data in order to better understand how Right of Return has been implemented. Furthermore, it is also important to understand the ideas that have shaped this unique housing policy. Finally, it is important to learn what is considered a successful result for Right of Return. This is a unique policy because the process and implementation are just as important as the results of Right of Return. As a result, the literature has suggested that one must audit the processes to see whether fair and transparent processes are allowing tenants to make informed decisions and choices in regards to their housing. Looking simply at results/ numbers of returners will ignore the ideas, opinions, and views of key informants involved or impacted by the redevelopment. Understanding Right of Return requires a deep qualitative analysis that I will outline in the following sections:

- An overview of Qualitative Research
- Discussing Validity
- Sample and Sample Recruitment
- Data Collection
- Data Analysis
- Limitations

4.2 Qualitative Research Design

Qualitative research is research that does not rely on quantification to solve or understand the research problem, but instead relies on data generated through observation, interviews, and document analysis. There are a variety of definitions of what constitutes qualitative research. I have relied on the definition created by Creswell (2014):

> Qualitative research is a means for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to the social or human problem. The process of research involves emerging questions and procedures; collecting data in the participants' setting; analyzing the data inductively, building from particular to general themes; and making interpretations of the meaning of data. The final written report has a flexible writing structure. (p.247)

Qualitative research complements my research design because the use of qualitative methods holds the insights and beliefs of key informants as essential to solving the research problem. The lack of knowledge and insight written about Right of Return, and the overall goal of my research favours more of a human centric approach rather than a statistical approach. Qualitative methods attribute to a more human centric approach and also help researchers gain an "insider's view" into a particular phenomenon. This insider's view will be very important to my research, and qualitative research in general. I was able to utilize insider's view by recruiting experts in the field of public housing, community revitalization city planning, and housing research. The nature of my research, which seeks to better understand a policy provision that has not been fully explored in the literature, requires me to rely heavily on the experiences and opinions of key informants and the key documents relating to the Regent Park Revitalization Plan. Relying solely on municipally published materials, by-laws, and zoning documents, will only give the "official" perspective of the redevelopment; thus making it crucial to talk to those involved at a higher level like policy officials, in order to gain a pluralistic view of Right of Return.

My research design method is defined as a qualitative case study focusing on a single case (Yin, 2012). Specifically, my case study is defined as Regent Park, and the area of inquiry will be the Regent Park Revitalization Plan, specifically focusing on the policy of Right of Return through the first two phases of redevelopment. The case study method is particularly appropriate to my research question which is descriptive in nature. In her definition of descriptive research, Given (2007) states, "Researchers engaged in descriptive studies set out to identify who participates in an event, where and when it occurs, and what happens, without exploring the causal relationships involved in that event." The nature of my research does not attempt to study a causal relationship but rather provides an in-depth analysis of the policy of Right of Return. In addition, Given (2007) and Yin (2012) state that descriptive case studies are well situated for studying policy programs.

In addition, the case study method is seen as particularly helpful when exploring a contemporary phenomenon in the real world over which the researcher has no control (Yin, 2012). As well, Gerring (2004) states that case studies are an intense study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger phenomenon. In this case, my intensive study is focused on Regent Park Revitalization Plan phases 1 and 2, while the larger phenomenon I hope to understand is how Right of Return operates in this redevelopment plan. Furthermore, the case study method has been used in a significant amount of research regarding housing redevelopment and displacement. Authors such as Goetz (2010), employed a single case study in Duluth, Minnesota, to analyze poverty displacement and public housing redevelopment. Goetz (2010) stated that the results from this research were by no means meant to be extended beyond the case of Duluth. However Goetz (2010) also states that his findings are similar to those in other sites in the US. Furthermore, this single case study research approach has been used in case studies in other neighborhoods in Toronto. In his study of gentrification and neighbourhood change in Toronto, Slater (2004) focused specifically on the neighborhood of South Parkdale. To summarize, the qualitative case study design embraced data generated through key informant interviews and document review to unveil key themes and concepts associated with Right of Return and the redevelopment of Regent Park.

4.3 Validity

Validity is a research concept which is related to the credibility of one's research method and findings. This is an important concept in any research design. However, the concept of validity is often strongly associated with quantitative research. Authors including Palys and Atchison (2014), and Golafshani (2003), have stated that the concept of validity can be applied to qualitative research and is important to the overall process of the research. The idea of validity has several varying definitions, but the definition by Creswell is simple and precise. Creswell, (2014) states, "Qualitative validity means the researcher checks for the accuracy of the finding by employing certain procedures" (p.247). Creswell (2014) states there are a few measures one can take that that helps the validity of data and research.

The process of triangulation is identified by Creswell (2014), and Creswell and Miller (2000), as one of the ways to improve the validity of one's research. Triangulation is defined as a research strategy that allows the researcher to validate their observations and analysis by consulting a variety of different data collection methods, theories, and methods (Palys and Atchison, 2014). The specific form of triangulation I selected was data analysis triangulation (Palys and Atchison, 2014). The procedure I used to ensure that my research and findings had validity, focused on triangulation of data sources. Combining both key policy documents, the zoning by-laws, and higher level planning documents such as the Official Plan for the City of Toronto, the Regent Park Secondary Plan, and the Regent Park SDP, allowed me to confirm and validate information generated through key informant interviews. Furthermore, analyzing these documents allowed me to gain another perspective on development.

In addition, Gibbs (2007) states that reliability can be increased by working with key informants to ensure that interviews have been transcribed properly and information is correct. I have created an open dialogue with the key informants and have sent them the transcripts of our interviews upon their request. Key informants will be able to read the draft of my thesis to make sure their direct quotations are not taken out of context.

4.4 Sampling and Recruitment

4.4.1 Sampling

The sampling method I used to select participants for my research was targeted sampling. Targeted sampling is supportive of my research design, which favours the detailed understanding of housing policy, specifically Right of Return in Regent Park in phases 1 and 2. As a result, it made sense to only target those individuals who were involved in or impacted by the redevelopment process and Right of Return. The specialized focus made it difficult to find participants that were knowledgeable about Right of Return processes and outcomes. As a result, I chose to rely on key informants because the information required for my research was highly specific and in certain parts very technical. Key informants, defined by Marshall as "Key informants, as a result of their personal skills, or position within a society, are able to provide more information and a deeper insight into what is going on around them" (1996, p.92). This deeper insight Marshall mentions, came from informants being formally involved in the redevelopment, being informally involved, or living in the community and being active in it during redevelopment. Payne and Payne (2004) believe the key informant method is beneficial because a relatively small number of interviews, like the twelve interviews I have conducted, can yield detail and knowledgeable responses to aid research.

Specialized information and narrow criteria really limited the number of key informants I was able to recruit for my study. Despite this, I was able to speak with twelve participants reflecting a variety of key informants who were either involved in the redevelopment or were a part of the community. The sampling method I used is also known as the stakeholder sampling method (Palys and Atchison, 2014). Palys (2008) mentions that

> Particularly useful in the context of evaluation research and policy analysis, this strategy involves identifying who the major stakeholders are who are involved in designing, giving, receiving, or administering the programme or service being evaluated, and who might otherwise be affected by it. (p.1)

The sample is essentially purposeful and targeted (Palys and Atchison, 2014). The key informants I recruited can be categorized into three different groups. This was intentionally

designed to help give a diversity of insights and expert knowledge. Relying solely on the opinions of one group would privilege their views on redevelopment and Right of Return, thus creating a weakness in my research. It was essential to gain a view that was outside of the political and administrative sides of redevelopment.

The first group of key informants were representative of the institutions involved in the formulation and implementation of the Regent Park Revitalization Plan, hereby known as the **Legislator/Administrator group**. These key informants embodied the political elements of both development and revitalization. This group also consisted of members from key municipal institutions relating to TCH and the City of Toronto. The two institutions which were heavily involved in revitalization and tenant mobility services (responsible for relocation and Right of Return) were the City of Toronto, and the PHA TCH. Furthermore, this group was responsible for the formulation and implementation of Right of Return. The second group was composed of three housing experts who were not formally involved with the redevelopment project, hereby known as **Housing Researchers**. The housing researchers group provided a perspective that is outside of the political and administrative sides of redevelopment. The third group were involved in the private sector such as members who were involved in the community during redevelopment, hereby known as **Private Sector** group. Last, I was able to speak with a Community Leader who has a very involved and prominent role in the community hereby known as **Community Leader.**

Table 1: Key Informant Guide

Sample	Code	Key informant Group
American Housing Policy Analyst	AHR	
Canadian Housing Researcher	CHR	Researchers/Advocates
Housing Advocate	HA	
Community Legal Services	CLS	Private Sector involvement
Private Sector Consultant	PC1	
Executive Assistant to Deputy Mayor McConnell	EA	
Government Worker: Social Housing	GWSH	
Local Government Planner	LGP1	
Toronto Community Housing Staff Member	TCHA	
Toronto Community Housing Staff Member	TCHJ	
Toronto Community Housing Staff Member	TCHS	Local Government/PHA
Regent Park Community Member	CLE1	Community Leader

4.4.2 Recruitment

With the help of my advisor, Dr. Laura Johnson, I was able to set up a meeting with the TCH. This meeting allowed me to make contact with a staff member who was responsible for relocation, as well as facilitating return for residents. Furthermore, I was able to interview two more members of the TCH by initiating a dialogue via email and face to face meetings. The second portion of my recruitment process required that I find key informants outside of TCH. This was largely done by preliminary research via the internet. I then proceeded to recruit key informants by cold calling, or sending informational emails with an introduction and outline of my research.

Through this recruitment method I was able to find key actors within the community such as city officials, others who worked in the housing sector, housing policy experts, and academics in the community. In addition, I relied on snowball sampling methods in order to help me gain contact with other key stakeholders involved in the Regent Park Revitalization Plan. This snowball sampling was supplementary to my web research and used towards gaining information in order to recruit others. Palys and Atchison (2014) define snowball

sampling as a purposeful sampling technique which involves recruiting research participants from the social networks of those who have been initially interviewed. At the end of my interviews, I would ask the interview participant if they knew anyone who I might contact for a potential interview. However, snowball sampling is often seen as problematic because it may over represent certain attitudes and beliefs thus hurting the validity of the research. Given the fact that the knowledge and criteria of key informants were so specialized, I felt that tapping into the networks of these key informants allowed access to people I would not otherwise have been able to, and these participants were valuable to my research. Patton (1990) suggests that, "This is an approach for locating information-rich key informants or critical cases" (p. 176). Despite the criticism of snowball recruitment, which states that a reliance on the social networks of key informants replicates and over represents the opinions of likeminded individuals, I made a conscientious effort to find people with varied a roles in the redevelopment process.

4.5 Data Collection

4.5.1 Document Analysis

Document analysis refers to the use of documents in order to aid one in the study of a social phenomenon that researchers hope to better understand (Palys and Atchison, 2014; Scott, 1990). Documents can broadly be defined as objects that have been created by humans in the past and present (Payne and Payne, 2004). Examples of documents can be things such as books, diaries, and official government publications. The documents I have consulted for my research were texts produced by the City of Toronto, and the PHA, TCH. These documents are publically available and accessible to all, and function as primary resources in this research. The documents I consulted entailed the following: official government documents such as by-laws, documents pertaining to the urban planning of Regent Park such as the official plans for the City of Toronto, and secondary plans for Regent Park. I have also relied on reports produced by the PHA, TCH. The documents will be used to help contextualize my research questions. These were used to add supplementary analysis for my research questions. I will not rely on frequency analysis of key words, but instead I choose to

analyze the documents for key themes, alongside with my interview data. I selected the specific documents based on their relationship to my case study (Regent Park Revitalization Phases 1 and 2) and the nature of my research question. I was looking at a policy and therefore, I found it only logical to examine this policy by looking through official reports, as well as legislative and legal documents. When studying documents one must be reflective and critical of the purposes of those who developed the document. It is important to reflect on the purpose, the origins, and the inherent institutional bias that may contribute to these documents (Scott, 1990).

4.5.2 Interviews

The data collection was primarily facilitated by key informant interviews of the sample described in the above section. These interviews were important to my research and allowed me to understand the intricate details, the functions, and the issues surrounding Right of Return in the first two phases of redevelopment. Key informant interviews were recorded using an audio device which was then transferred into digital form. The mp3 files were then transcribed with the aid of Express Scribe Transcription software. Transcription from an audio recording is considered the best way to ensure accuracy of the data collected. The twelve interviews lasted on average 40 minutes each, ranging from 20 minutes to 156 minutes; eleven of which were face to face, and one which was over the telephone.

Interviews were chosen as a data collection method because they were particularly supportive of my research objectives and were designed to generate detailed and in-depth data. Interviews were supportive of descriptive research design, as the common themes and narratives that emerged from key informant interviews helped answer my research questions and formulate recommendations for future phases of the Regent Park Revitalization Plan (Given, 2007). Interviews were both complementary to the data analysis through key documents analysis, and it also allowed me to triangulate my data for validity. Data source triangulation is a method that allows a researcher to validate their observations and analysis by using more than one data source (Palys and Atchison, 2014). When studying public policies it is crucial that one consults various sources of data because often policies can change and be impacted through their implementation in a real world context. In housing

research, various authors such as Vale and Graves (2010), and Berg (2004), all noted that the CHA's Plan for Transformation significantly transformed during implementation. A lesson learned from previous research in the field of housing, has taught me to combine interview data and the information of key documents, in order to bring value and integrity into one's research. In my research, I relied on data source validation. I was able to use the data generated from key informant's interviews in order to help validate my documentary research. I also compared and contrasted the opinions of key informant responses to various legal, legislative, and communicative materials.

The literature on research methods has commonly noted that interviews are time consuming, and difficult to arrange. For example, Gillham (2000) and Palys and Atchison (2014), note that despite the time consuming nature of interviews, they tend to provide rich qualitative data because participants are able to provide their own view in their own words about a specific phenomenon or public policy. Gillham states, "The overpoweringly positive feature of the interview is the richness and vividness of the material it turns up" (p.10). The interview can be used as a powerful tool to understand how a phenomenon or policy impacts people and the community. An interviewer can tap into this knowledge source by carefully constructing and preparing interview questions that aim to produce a nuanced description. Furthermore, Payne and Payne (2004) state that speaking to key informants is an excellent research method for novice researchers such as myself, because the interviews can yield a strong degree of detail and help facilitate a deeper understanding of policy.

4.5.3 Key Informant Interview Structure

The key informant interviews were moderately structured and employed open-ended questions, in order to generate discussion around key themes and topics relating to the Right of Return in phases 1 and 2. I preferred to use open-ended questions because they allowed the interview to be free flowing while still focusing on the key areas of inquiry (Gillham, 2000). Furthermore, as is common procedure in qualitative research, the interview questions were not fixed throughout the research but rather were evolving through my research process. I adjusted my interviews based on what I learned from my previous interviews, and I adjusted interview guides in order to illuminate the particular area of expertise possessed by

each of the key informant. I employed five different interview guides in my research. These interview questions were designed to feed into my three sub-research questions and help probe the knowledge of key informants in my sample. The interview guides were heavily influenced by the factual and conceptual elements of interviewing identified by Kvale and Brinkmann (2008). Factual interviews are more interested in facts rather the opinions and views (Kvale and Brinkmann 2008). These were helpful in understanding the return process of phase 1 and 2 residents, as well as seeing the numbers of who exercised their Right of Return. Before I could dive into conceptual analysis I needed a firm understanding of the processes of tenant relocation and return. In addition, conceptual interview questions are more appropriate to delving deep into how one brings meaning to their reality, opinions, and values of participants (Kvale and Brinkmann 2008). Combining the two interview techniques allowed me to develop a holistic approach.

The interview guides were each composed of a set general interview questions that were included in each of the five different interview guides. This portion of the interview was geared towards conceptual discussion of Right of Return, focusing on the ideas that shaped the policy. An aim of my research was to recruit a diverse sample of key informants each specializing in certain parts of the redevelopment. As a result, a unique set of questions for each key informant group was developed, which were open-ended in order to generate discussion. This was designed to target the specific key informant's areas of expertise (see Appendix C).

4.6 Data Analysis

The data analysis was mainly done through an inductive content analysis of publically available data from Planning documents and key informant interviews. The first step in my data analysis process was to become familiar with the data. This required that I read through the key documents and transcripts several times in order to organize and cultivate the raw data in to thematic categories that relate to my initial research question. Furthermore, I went through and marked and highlighted significant phrases, while also writing notes in the margins. This is what Saldana (2009) refers to "Analytical Memos", which are designed to

allow the researcher to jot down notes and encourages the researcher to be reflexive during the process of analysis. Reading over and interacting with the data is recognized is a key step by authors such as Creswell, (2014) and Gillham (2000). The next step involved using a system of coding to organize the data. Palys and Atchison refer to coding as "a method of data analysis whereby the analyst attempts to simplify observations by way of assigning them to conceptually or thematically relevant categories" (p.413). The particular method in which I did my coding scheme is known as open coding. Open coding entails reading over the data a few times and developing ideas and themes that emerge from the text. The codes and themes emerged organically but it is safe to assume some of this analysis was informed by my review of the literature. Authors such as Saldana (2008) (referring to Sipe and Ghiso (2004)), and Merriam (1998) state that our analysis of and construction of codes is a subjective process which is heavily influenced by our world view, research design and review of the literature.

My initial analysis of the data was completed by organizing my research to form answers to my research questions. My initial set of coding was focused on my sub-research questions, I will call this focused coding. This allowed me to see key themes that emerged in regards to my sub research questions. After this, I moved towards reading and re-reading my transcripts and key documents in order to look for themes that I was not cognisant of during the initial readings of my transcripts. These emergent themes were revealed during the latter process of data analysis. The analysis of data was aided by the qualitative analysis software of NVivo which allowed me to organize the codes and look for themes and concepts.

4.6.1 Theoretical Saturation

Theoretical saturation is a concept that emerges in the field of qualitative data collection. The concept of theoretical saturation refers to, "The continuation of sampling and data collection until no new conceptual insights are generated. At this point the researcher has provided repeated evidence for his or her conceptual categories" (Bloor and Wood, 2006 p.165). It should be mentioned, that one must be weary of a rigid interpretation of theoretical saturation because new interviews can attribute new insight and alternative perspectives. It may be the case that saturation in a master's thesis can be reached for practical purposes and

time constraints. However, after my tenth interview I started to notice many of the same themes emerging from my interview questions. As stated before, this may seem like a small sample, but I was looking for a highly specialized group of key informants. The interview questions were aimed to help sort my data into broader themes and categories. After about the first three interviews, I started to notice a pattern as similar topics were being discussed by the interviewees. Likewise, the following nine interviews also related closely to these thematic categories. I was able to see similar concepts and themes emerge among the different groups, this marked the end of sample which is 12 participants.

4.6.2 Ethical Implications

The nature of my research required that I receive ethical clearance from the University of Waterloo because data collection relies heavily on human participants. This ethical clearance was given in the summer of 2014. When dealing with human subjects it is important to ensure that the views and thoughts of participants are not misconstrued or otherwise altered for purposes different than the original research. I tried my utmost to stay faithful to the words of key informants and have used direct quotations as much as possible. I also had to gain informed consent from participants (Palys and Atchison, 2014). In order to gain informed consent from participants, I sent them an information sheet and a list of possible interview question before I scheduled an interview. It is necessary to anonymize key characteristics of the key informants who are being interviewed. I devised code names to ensure that the names of key informants were protected and their opinions could not be traced back to them. However, some of my key informants also allowed me to use their name as they were speaking specifically about their job and felt comfortable sharing their insight.

4.6.3 Limitations

The limitations of my research stem from my orientation towards a single case study method and as well as real world limitations associated with my case study, Regent Park. My research design may be seen as problematic because a common criticism of the case study is that it is too narrowly focused resulting in a lack of generalizability. Generalizability is defined by Palys and Atchison (2014) as "the ability to extend the results or findings of the

research beyond its original context (ex: sample) to a more general context (the population), other people situations or times" (p.418). Yin (2012) also agrees that when done poorly, case studies lack generalizability. Focusing on a simple portion of a policy may ignore the larger macro level phenomenon associated with redevelopment. However, Yin (2012) also states when case studies are done properly they can offer "analytical" generalizability rather than statistical generalizability (Yin, 2003). Analytical generalizability is a concept where the theoretical framework used to establish the logic in a study maybe used other research situations. The steps and assumptions taken in research have more importance is based on the size of the sample. The orientation of the case study, the design, and the analytical claim can be extended to other studies. Generalizability emerges from results and conceptual claims which stem from a research logic defining the research design and steps of inquiry (Yin 2013).

One fundamental weakness of my research is the fact that I have not been able to talk to residents. This would have been helpful and important to gain the perspective of those whose lives were impacted by redevelopment. It would have added a strong element to my research to see how residents understood Right of Return. The opinions and views of residents would have been important for seeing how relocation and return were implemented. It could have been quite helpful to speak to these residents and attempt to understand the complex nature of their housing choices, and what factors impacted their decision to return or stay in their temporary housing. Choice of housing was a concept that came up multiple times in the research. This could potentially be done in future research, by focusing on the dynamic and nuanced nature of housing decisions during the first two phases of the Regent Park Revitalization Plan. The research makes a lot of inferences on the choices of residents, and whether this relates to them being informed about the processes of relocation and Right of Return. The literature and my findings suggest that there is some correlation between good communication processes and residents being informed about their housing choices. However, this is a finding that needs to be further explored. In order to truly understand if information is processed by tenants and how this impacts their housing decisions, one must talk to the residents themselves.

Initially I had tried to set up a research partnership in the community but this proved to be unfeasible. Working with tenants has been increasingly difficult because the population of tenants living through the Regent Park Revitalization Plan have been heavily researched. The Community seemed to be very wary of student researchers. I believe that research fatigue has characterized much of the tenant population in Regent Park. Research fatigue is when a group of participants, or an individual, feel over researched and avoid participation in further research. There are various reasons that lead to research fatigue, such as increasing apathy or indifference towards engagement (Clark, 2008). In terms of Regent Park, there have been many studies conducted in the community. Residents may feel frustrated and may feel they do not benefit from participating in research. Some have even jokingly dubbed the community "Research Park", because of all the graduate and undergraduate students looking to research tenant issues. I found it difficult to gain access into the community as a result of this. This led me to adopt a more top-down perspective on Right of Return in the community, focusing on policy makers and key members of the Regent Park. A bottom up or grassroots approach would have given more of a voice to the residents in my research. Furthermore, I was unable to contact the tenant association for the neighbourhood because the Regent Park Neighborhood Initiative (RPNI) was involved in ligation resulting in the disbandment of this body. However, I was able to find representatives of key community institutions who had insight on redevelopment and were able to aid me in my research.

Additionally, the use of targeted/purposeful sampling has been criticized because this method has the potential to over represent certain points of views in the data (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981). In research projects that focus on creating statistically generalizable results it is not recommended to use targeted sampling. It is also important to critically reflect on the potential bias of snowball sampling when conducting qualitative research. In this research project the majority of my key informants are outsiders to the community of Regent Park. Furthermore, the majority of my key informants are working within government. This may bring about a potential bias and overrepresentation of certain attitudes and beliefs. Furthermore, many of those key informants may be hesitant to criticize their own organization and government.

All the key informants have different biases and motives for participating in research. It is important as a researcher to be critical of those individuals who may be acting as a proxy for their organization. In my research I was unable to recruit deputy mayor Pam McConnell, but I did interview her executive assistant who was involved in Regent Park and worked closely with the Deputy Mayor. Also, I recruited three bureaucrats from TCH who acted as representatives of the organization. These individuals may have attempted to present their organizations in a favourable way, and give the "official view". It is important to be critical of the potential information given by these key informants. However, I took care to recruit a diversity of actors in order to counteract the potential bias of the public sector employees. The sample contained a diversity of actors such as researchers, advocates, and residents. The bias key informants have can never fully be eradicated from research. The reactive measures I took to combat my own bias and the potential bias of key informants was done through focusing on a variety of key informants, and recruiting key informants who had differing roles in redevelopment.

Last, the proposed policy recommendations for phases 3-5 will be not be applicable if unforeseen changes occur in the policy environment and the economy. The potential for large-scale change, such as changes to public housing policy, may impact how policy is implemented. For example, in the US, the 2008 recession drastically changed the policy environment for PHAs, which deeply impacted research. This could have not been predicted and had dramatic changes on policy in all sectors of society.

Chapter 5
Findings and Results

The following section outlines my research findings and will focus on the analysis of key documents and key informant interviews. The themes that emerged through discussion and analysis are the answers to my three research questions:

- What ideas and influences shaped the adoption of Right of Return?

- In Regent Park, what were the rates of return for phases 1 and 2? And what are they indicative of?

- How does one define success in terms of Right or Return?

5.1 What Ideas and Influences Have Shaped the Policy of Right of Return?

The origins and policy formulation of Right of Return can be attributed to three different stakeholder groups. These areas of influence represented different stakeholder groups, all of whom brought their unique perspectives and interests into the redevelopment process. The origins of Right of Return were seen to emerge from the following three stakeholder groups:

- The City of Toronto: Used its experience regulating private market redevelopment and applied it to public housing. The need to retain a healthy supply of rental property was a key focus of City Planning. The policy framework developed in the private sector rental was changed and applied to public housing, leading to the policy of Right of Return.

- The local community: Fearful of redevelopment, Right of Return represents a formal stake in redevelopment that would guarantee that displacement would not occur for tenants. Right of Return was an important part of redevelopment for tenants who were fond of their community (August, 2014). The policy also helped garner support for redevelopment.

- Local councillor Pam McConnell (please refer to page 67 for more information): wanted to formally enshrine this policy, making it official. This was heavily influenced by her office's experience in the community. As a result, Right of Return became a legally binding policy and not a promise between TCH and tenants.

See Appendix D for flow chart describing the origins and areas of influencing regarding Right of Return

5.1.1 Local Government and Public Housing Authority

The province of Ontario, along with the City of Toronto, helped lay down the early foundations for the Right of Return. This was the result of legislative policy designed to regulate private rental market developments. The ideas that informed private market rental legislation were the precursor to Right of Return. Right of Return was largely shaped by early efforts by the City of Toronto to establish rental control in the private sector, and to ensure that rental housing was preserved when redevelopment was to take place. The City of Toronto's experience with private tenants and recognizing the hardships associated with redevelopment, influenced the policy design of Right of Return. Ultimately, for the City of Toronto, Right of Return emerged from a need and a willingness to protect the supply of public housing units and the subsidies for public housing tenants. It was also the result of a need to protect vulnerable tenants during redevelopment.

5.1.1.1 Private Market Rental

The foundations of the legislative and regulatory regime that defined Right of Return, emerged from a need to ensure that rental housing in the private market was protected and maintained. During the late 1990s, the neoliberalization of the Ontario housing sector resulted in the provincial government of Mike Harris removing rent controls, as well as the legislation aimed at protecting rental property from being converted to for sale condominium property. This would have likely impacted the amount of purpose built rental housing in the community. The termination of the Rental Protection Act (RPA) in 1998 eliminated a strong rental protection framework. Before the termination of the RPA, the Harris government introduced the Tenant Protection Act. The Rental Protection Act's legislative successor had a

relatively weak policy framework. Despite being named the Tenant Protection Act, it did little to protect tenants and rental housing. For example, LGP1 stated, "There are a couple things [that] changed, so the landlord and tenant act got gutted and redone and called the Tenant Protection Act (1997). Which meant less protection for tenants." To fill the void left by the provincial government, the newly amalgamated City of Toronto moved towards enshrining legislation that would protect and support private market rental, and tenants during the redevelopment of their units.

Prior to amalgamation in 1998, the old city of Toronto had a robust regulatory framework to protect rental units, due to the now defunct Rental Protection Act. After the sweeping changes enacted by the Harris government, the city of Toronto had added six separate municipalities to create the new mega city of Toronto. Areas like Scarborough, York, North York, East York, and Etobicoke did not have a rental policy like the old city of Toronto. For example, LGP1 states,

> After amalgamation, which occurred only about one year after the rental housing protection act was terminated, the City Planning division got to work right away trying to do [an] official plan amendment to cover the whole amalgamated city. If Etobicoke or Scarborough didn't have strong rental protection policies and North York had some and the City of Toronto's were excellent in general, we tried to create one official plan amendment in the meantime.

As a result, the amalgamated City of Toronto attempted to make up a private rental framework to ensure that rental housing was protected. This was done on a case-by-case basis that led to many decisions being made by the Ontario Municipal Board, an administrative tribunal in the province of Ontario that dealt with City Planning related issues. Through this process, the City of Toronto and City Planning were able to devise an in-depth rental protection framework. The first official plan of the newly amalgamated City of

Toronto allowed City Planning to enact a private rental housing framework that would cover all areas of the city.

The municipality set out explicit criteria regarding the conversion of private rental to market ownership units in the 2002 Official Plan. City Planning was able to set out some of the policy foundation for Right of Return resulting in consistent regulations across all the boroughs of Toronto. The regulatory regime that emerged ensured that private market rental could not be easily converted to condominiums. This was largely influenced by maintaining a healthy supply of rental housing in the City of Toronto. Shortly after the first official plan of the amalgamated City of Toronto, an amendment was passed in 2007 to make protection of rental housing and the criteria for conversion clearer and stronger. For example, a key informant from the City of Toronto stated,

> Our final 2007 official plan, we have learned the hard way, our method
> was too simplistic we are going to make it much more robust to make
> it clear it's a pretty high bar, the private rental industry would have to
> persuade us that we no longer needs policies protecting existing rental
> housing.

Policy 7 from the official plan was considered the precursor to Right of Return. The right of first refusal, was a policy allowing tenants whose unit had been redeveloped a right to come back and continue their tenancy. It was part of a series of regulations that ensured tenants would be given assistance. The cornerstone of the regulatory legislative framework designed to protect private rental was the RTA.

The RTA was designed as legislation that would set up some of the bases for tenant assistance. For example, LGP1 stated "it's a kind of blunt instrument, it covers all tenant situations, whether it luxury rental being demolished or walk ups in Parkdale; so the city steps in Residential Tenancy Act as the starting point." This was a legislative document acting as a foundation that would address the rules and regulations associated with tenant assistance. The RTA guaranteed private market tenants certain rights and assistance during

the relocation process. Assistance took the form of informational packages, and financial assistance to tenants. LGP1 stated that dealing with tenants involved in private sector redevelopment gave City Planning a good understanding of the troubles tenants faced, as well as the need to provide assistance. LGP1 stated,

> City Planning already had experience dealing with tenants in the
> private sectors whose buildings were going to be torn town and
> negotiating their relocation assistance packages, including their Right
> to Return, and figuring out how that works and why you need
> compensation for moving expense, they are going out in the private
> market for 2 years.

These lessons learned in the private sector would inform how the City of Toronto would influence the Right of Return policy. The City of Toronto developed an approach to regulate the supply of rental housing which also required developers to develop tenant assistance plans. These provisions helped lay down some of the requirements associated with the Right of Return in Regent Park.

The approach that the City of Toronto developed to regulate and preserve the supply of rental housing was primarily accomplished through planning regulations. These planning regulations were an early attempt to resurrect a regime of regulation that was gutted by the neoliberalization of the housing sector by Mike Harris in the late 1990s. As a response, City Planning developed a private market rental protection framework through the first official plan of the newly amalgamated City of Toronto and the Rental Tenancies Act. The origins of Right of Return, are directly related to the need to regulate private sector redevelopment and understanding the difficulty tenants face when relocating. LGP1 states, "to answer your question "where did it come from?" the City of Toronto had built an approach and practice during the Rental Housing Protection act era, in 80s, and 90s, of trying to ensure that tenants would be able to, if possible, return." Their knowledge of the difficulties associated with moving and relocated also helped inform the Right of Return. Ultimately, the local government, through their involvement of decades of regulation of private market

development and rental conversions, understood the importance of having a good supply of rental housing and providing assistance to those involved in the redevelopment of their homes. These early ideas largely influenced the need to give tenants certain rights during redevelopment.

5.1.1.2 Protection of Public Housing

The City of Toronto recognized the importance of public housing and the hardship tenants would face if they lost their unit. As a result, one of the key ideas that has influenced the adoption of Right of Return is the need to regulate and protect the number of RGI units and subsidies in the city. This was part of the good planning principles which were outlined in higher level planning documents. These documents set out the strategic vision for the City of Toronto and other municipalities across Ontario. Maintaining RGI was part of a vision which ensures all different facets of the population have housing. Preserving RGI was a seminal idea which became an important piece to the Right of Return policy in Regent Park. It ensured that the community would still have to continue to provide RGI units after redevelopment was complete.

Discussions about the revitalization and redevelopment of public housing were taking place across Toronto. When the City of Toronto started to think about public housing revitalization, it recognized that its policy framework regarding private market rental conversions needed to be strengthened. For example, LGP1 stated, "…we can try to establish those ground rules when it comes to existing rental housing, and by definition the grounds rules can be no worse if you are talking about the potential demolition or conversion of existing social housing." The regulation surrounding public housing redevelopment was seen to improve and strengthen the private market rental protection framework. Mostly because public housing was seen as a public service catering to some of the most vulnerable segments of the population, such as low income households and recent immigrants. For example, LGP1 stated, "we tidied up the language a bit, there are some minor tweaks with public housing. We talk about mitigating the hardships caused to tenants, recognizing that it's a vulnerable low income population." In part, the vulnerability of public housing tenants is

linked to their lack of economic resources, which seriously limits their ability to find rental housing in the private market, making the preservation of RGI essential. Furthermore, the vulnerability of the population may have amplified the impacts of relocation. For example, a key informant working within local government stated, "but there is also the fact that its public housing, they are vulnerable clients, it's not like you can just move and get RGI, you can also lose the affordability, you cannot move to another rental apartment somewhere else it's going to be a certain amount of money" (GWSH). By virtue of living in public housing, it limits the ability to relocate into a unit during the demolition of one's former housing unit. Looking for accommodation in the private market for low income citizens is difficult in a city with increasingly higher real estate and rental prices, like Toronto.

The City of Toronto wanted to ensure that involuntary relocation through necessary redevelopment would not impact a low income tenant's eligibility to retain a RGI unit. Without this replacement of units, low income tenants would need to rent in the private market where their RGI subsidy would not help them. For example, LGP1 stated, "By virtue of moving they can't use their RGI subsidy. Even if they move you to a new building or a co-op where you are paying low end market rent, no, the concept is you are not going to be harmed unduly" (LGP1).

The difficulty of moving a vulnerable population of tenants in RGI units had prompted the City of Toronto to expand their existing framework to take into account the complexity associated with dealing with vulnerable populations. The City of Toronto wanted to limit the harm incurred by tenants who were involuntarily displaced from their homes. Eventually, the goals of policies created by the city of Toronto regarding the redevelopment of public housing were to a) protect and preserve the RGI housing in the city, and b) to limit the harm and difficulty caused to tenants involved in public housing redevelopment.

All of these ideas started to materialize during the early 2000s when it was recognized that public housing was going to be entering in a phase of redevelopment because these projects were falling into a state of disrepair. City Planning was aware it was entering a new era in regards to large scale revitalizations of public housing. For example, LGP1 stated,

we knew we were entering an era [of public housing

revitalization]…regent park revitalization was already being publically

discussed, reviewed, and consulted on; we all knew it was coming and

Don Mount was happening quietly on the outside,[it] flew under the

radar, it was the first one that preceded, not Regent Park.

In order to respond to the need to redevelop public housing, City Planning and the Provincial

Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing insisted that RGI needed to be maintained and

replaced. For example, a local government planner responsible for housing in Toronto,

The Province of Ontario, through the Municipal social housing service

managers, [the] Minister's approval is needed if you [are] getting rid

of social housing, the basic concept is one way or another we want to

replace, we are trying not to lose social housing stock, so I say we had

a different kind of consensus from different perspectives but there is a

meeting point (LGP1)

Regardless of how the redevelopment turned out, there needed to be a replacement of the

RGI housing stock so that tenants displaced due to involuntary relocation would be able to

retain their unit and subsidy. Not replacing RGI was not permitted and was never seen as an

option in the redevelopment of Regent Park. For example, GWSH stated, "There is also the

fact that we need to maintain a certain level of standard, certain amount of RGI, so knew we

had to replace the RGI, of course we want to replace the RGI." After the dust of

redevelopment settles, regardless of what had happened, all RGI must be rebuilt and

replaced.

The newly enacted public housing rental protection framework ensured that RGI

would be protected and assistance would be given to tenants during revitalization. This

regime was characterized by legislative tools designed to protect RGI housing for public

housing tenants. The legal framework that emerged from City Planning was written into the

official plan. This was an important piece of the Right of Return, which required that RGI be

maintained throughout redevelopment. Preserving RGI units and subsidies for low income

tenants was an important step in establishing a Right of Return. The City of Toronto took their experience in the private sector set and created planning regulations that would eventually form a critical foundation, giving tenants a legal right of return. Changes were made to the regulations in order to strengthen private market unit redevelopment because the City of Toronto recognized that RGI was a valuable service that helped a vulnerable segment of the population.

5.1.1.3 Community Based Redevelopment and Poverty Deconcentration

The City of Toronto chose to maintain the majority of the original 2083 units on-site at Regent Park, ensuring tenants would be able to live in the original footprint or nearby. Maintaining RGI units on-site is a stark difference between the types of redevelopments that have occurred in the HOPE VI revitalizations across the US. The City of Toronto took a more inclusive approach towards redevelopment by focusing on community based redevelopment, rather than poverty deconcentration. Poverty deconcentration was a narrative that had a stronger salience with policy makers and city planners in the US. The deconstruct and de-concentrate model of redevelopment never gained popularity in the Canadian context. A history of racially segregated public housing, and deliberate attempts to isolate black communities, led to large concentrations of poverty in cities like Baltimore and Chicago. A key informant at the City of Toronto reflected on HOPE VI and how these developments fundamentally differed when compared to what was going to happen in Toronto. LGP1 stated,

> I remember seeing presentations in the late 90s early 2000s, on
> Chicago, some of the HOPE VI [sites], certainly Cabrini Green and
> others, and I remember asking those representatives saying well ok, so
> you're talking about the re-investment and the capital coming, and the
> new stuff, but you are also building a lot of the old stuff. What was the
> basic requirement, was there an assumption on behalf of the city of the
> PHA that if you were tearing down 1000 units, were you replacing
> 1000 units. I eventually got an explicit 'no', that's part of what they

are doing, and I'm not saying it's wrong it just startled me, it was not

going to be approach we were going to take in Toronto.(LGP1)

Instead, the idea of community-based redevelopment was the route chosen by the City of Toronto and TCH. Focusing on community-based redevelopment was found as a central policy in substantive policy documents such as the SDP, a plan that was predicated on the notion of improving the social aspects of Regent Park.

The phase 1 bylaw for Regent Park ensured that a minimum of 85% of the units must be replaced in the original footprint of the community (City of Toronto, 2005). While the other 15% were relocated nearby, almost 1.8 km from the original footprint. In contrast, HOPE VI sites in cities such as Baltimore and Chicago aimed at scattering people to eradicate pockets of poverty. Despite the need to deconcentrate poverty, communities, such as Cabrini Green, had given tenants a Right of Return. The City of Toronto and TCH attempted to create a planning process which focused on improving the community for original tenants, new market rate tenants, and affordable housing tenants. For example, a key informant in the community stated, "I think that the essential nature of the redevelopment plan was to make it better for the people for the people who lived there. So, inherent in that, is a return…" (CLS). A community based redevelopment, with social policies, informed key ideas that were associated with the Right of Return. The Regent Park Revitalization Plan was about repairing the community for the original tenants and ensuring that they were able to come back if they choose to do so, not about dispersing poverty. TCH wanted all original RGI tenants to have the choice to return once redevelopment was complete. For example, a TCH worker stated:

So that, is the reason why we have this commitment and this right to

return is really because revitalization is for the community, it is not

about deconcentration poverty it's about actually rebuilding the

extended community so that is an element of the success of

revitalization. (TCHA)

And further stated that "…it's not about building Regent Park and other tenant elsewhere can move in, it's not about that, its first priority for people who lived there…" (TCHA). Key informants believed that redevelopment was about a physical and social revitalization of the community. Instead of following suit with the brick and mortar style urban renewals of the time, the Regent Park Revitalization Plan has incorporated strong social plans and policies. For example, a community service provider stated, "It's a community development that includes social policies and so forth. I think that current thinking [was] that we need to talk to the residents and so forth. If you are going to do that I don't know [how] you can avoid …" (CLS). Key documents such as the SDP, outline ideas of social inclusion and cohesion as goals of redevelopment (Toronto Community Housing, 2007). The goal is to add an important element to the revitalization. For example, the SDP stated, "From the beginning, improving social conditions has been as critical to the redevelopment as the physical reconstruction" (Toronto Community Housing, 2007). Focusing on community redevelopment was supportive of the Right of Return. The goal of redevelopment focused on improving the social and physical environment for the original tenants.

Aiming to decrease concentration of poverty was not the case in Toronto. Instead the city of Toronto opted to take a community based approach to redevelopment. This approach was more supportive of a Right of Return than attempting to disperse vulnerable populations, which was counter to the ideas of Right of Return. By ensuring a certain portion of units were kept in the original footprint of the community and developing robust social plans, the City of Toronto and TCH acted in a way that was supportive of giving tenants a Right of Return. The American model of redevelopment, which did give the Right of Return, did not have the enough units remaining to honour this right.

5.1.2 Community

Right of Return was also influenced by the grassroots ideas and demands of housing activists living in the community. Talks of revitalization had been going on since the 1990s. During this time, calls for the revitalization of Regent Park came from groups both inside and outside of the community. The community was seeing discussions of redevelopment unfold

in front of their eyes and wanted to have a stake in the redevelopment of their community (CLE1; Boston & Meagher, 2003). Collectively, tenants in Regent Park form a strong and diverse community in which many intricate social networks exist. The strong attachment to Regent Park was a factor that led the community to demand a Right of Return.

In the past, public housing redevelopment has given little voice to the low income public housing tenants despite disproportionately impacting their lives (Vale, 2013b; Reynolds, 1963). As a result, tenants have faced displacement, as well as the loss of social networks and supports. These concerns prompted community members and grassroots activists to call for a Right of Return. The idea of Right of Return was mentioned by a few key citizens and activists who were organized and wanted a stake in redevelopment of their community. A Community Leader, mentions early on that there were a small group of grassroots people involved with revitalization and Right of Return. "There are some grassroots people who wanted revitalization and the right to return, and they were very active members who were involved" (CLE1). Right of Return was something wanted by some individuals in the community. These individuals were organized into a sub-committee that worked closely to discuss the idea of revitalization and Right of Return with the TCH.

In addition, a private consulting firm was hired by TCH to facilitate engagement in the community. It became clear, through consultation, that Right of Return was something wanted in the community. However, the challenge was to create a policy and a plan that could work given the site limitations, goals of the plan, and the finances of the project. It was not certain how many units were going to be built on-site, how many tenants wanted to return, or how the policy would be implemented. In order to better understand the context of redevelopment, the consulting firm used key individuals known as community animators to act as a communicative bridge between the TCH and the community. This helped the consulting firm conduct research on the preferences of tenants, and best case practices regarding relocation and Right of Return. As a result, the community came up with a more organized notion of Right of Return. For example, a member of the private sector consulting group stated:

…I don't know if you know the process of how we got to Right of

Return, but the residents we started to engage, the residents identified

Right of Return as a challenge…we were like we can't do it, like

physically can't do it, we don't know how many, we, units are going to

get, when? We don't know about the capacity of the new housing, we

don't know about the ratios of market and everything else, we don't

know how many people are going to capitalize on the Right of Return.

We just don't know if we can actually live up to this, and so we

actually had to go and do research. We got those animators to do a

scientific, statistically reliable, randomly sampled survey in eight

different languages, almost full scope of the population to find out who

would capitalize on Right of Return… (PC1)

By working closely with the community, the idea of Right of Return was moulded from a romantic notion to an articulated policy. With the help of community animators, TCH and the City, were made aware of the wants and needs of tenants impacted by redevelopment. The idea of Right of Return started to become a more tangible policy, rather than simply an idea being discussed in the community.

5.1.2.1 Place Attachment

Regent Park is a unique community composed of a diverse population including many recent immigrants. A Right of Return was seen as necessary within the community revitalization plan because the sense of community is so prevalent in Regent Park. The Regent Park Secondary Plan, and Regent Park Social Development Plan, and the phase 1 zoning by-law, all observed that there is a strong sense of community in Regent Park, and recommended that this sense of community should influence how development is framed. The phase 1 zoning by-law states "As the neighbourhood evolved, it developed many strengths, including cultural diversity and a strong sense of community among its residents" (City of Toronto, 2005). A consultant working to engage the community surveyed 229 households, discovering that the majority of residents wanted to come back to Regent Park

upon completion. This was done to gain a better understanding of the opinions of residents prior to redevelopment conducted (See Appendix E). Interviews, along with the survey, were conducted in eight different languages prior to phase 1 redevelopment to achieve this better sense of understanding. The results confirmed that people felt very much attached to their community. When asked the question, "When the reconstruction is finished in Regent Park would you prefer to live: a) Regent Park b) nearby c) somewhere else in Toronto - or d) Unsure", the majority of the 229 households interviewed (79%) wanted to return once redevelopment was done (PC1, personal communication, April 7th, 2015). However, there was a small minority who felt that redevelopment was an opportunity to move out of Regent Park. Those who wanted to return had affection for their community. They believed the community was a crucial part of their identity, and after revitalization they still wanted to a have a place in the community. For example, GWSH stated, "People also want to maintain their connections to the community." However, this is not unanimous among all tenants as some tenants were happy to leave Regent Park and Right of Return was irrelevant to them. Regardless, a strong sense of attachment existed in Regent Park and tenants wanted a Right of Return to continue their residency in Regent Park after the redevelopment was complete.

Place attachment is often the result of the informal social networks that form in a community. As a result, Right of Return was influenced by the community members' fears of potentially losing their social support, and networks, through the redevelopment and relocation. People were fearful of leaving because so much of their lives was rooted in the community. For example, HA commented, "it addresses the individual concerns [of] tenants themselves, who are fearful of moving, and have affection for neighbourhood." The affection for Regent Park is influenced by many things such as emotional connections. However, in a more pragmatic sense, affection for one's neighbourhood also comes from the reliance on informal and formal supports such as family and friends. As a result, it was recognized that the Right of Return allows tenants to maintain close proximity to their social supports. For example, Right of Return was influenced by the importance of social networks/ informal networks in the community. For example, PC1 stated, "Right of Return was designed to ensure sufficient geographic proximity to where you started, [so] you could maintain those

relationships." In addition, it is important to stay in sufficient geographic proximity to important services, such as doctors, and religious institutions, such as mosques or churches. For example, PC1 believes the Right of Return was influenced by the need to help individuals retain their important connection to services, "It is important that your relationships to the supports that you have are sustained, informal relationships to neighbourhoods and friends, and formal relationships with schools and community services, physical access to employment and transit, and to your child care, and those things." The tenants' fear of losing their social networks shaped the Right of Return policy. Therefore, a key element of Right of Return was ensuring that tenants would be allowed to return to their community in order to attempt to maintain relationships with in/formal groups and services.

However, giving a Right of Return does not ensure that informal social networks will remain intact. The community changes as a result of redevelopment, and people move during relocation. Maintaining ties can be difficult during a prolonged development, as GWSH states,

> Then depending on the development, how long it takes, the harder it is [maintaining relationships], so it can only do so much for them [tenants]; they also have to keep up communications on a regular basis, having [the] opportunity to meet, trying to keep people as close to their home as close as possible, all things you can do to mitigate, at the end of the day it's harder to maintain formal ties to do that [social support], there things you can do to mitigate it.

The process of relocation and redevelopment is quite abrupt and often relocation can sever tight knit social networks and communities. For example, a CLS stated, "and their community relationships, you do not take a building with a 100 units, and move everyone over there, and to allow them to continue their relationships and to the extent that their relationships are building based, those things are broken" The Right of Return can address the place attachment tenants have towards their friends and families, and their formal and

informal social networks. However, the nature of redevelopment will inevitably create fissures to place-based social networks.

Place attachment was one of the key ideas that influenced Right of Return. Residents had a fondness for the community and feared leaving it. A large number of surveyed tenants indicated their preference to return to the community when redevelopment was completed. The social networks and informal relationships among tenants in the community was a factor, which was tied to place attachment. The need to preserve social networks and proximity to social services is an important factor that is impacted in redevelopment. The Right of Return is heavily influenced by the community's need to ensure that after redevelopment, individuals can retain their social relationships. For a vulnerable population, such as Regent Park tenants, this is critical to their lives. Place attachment was a contributing factor which emerged from the community consultations because a majority of tenants wanted to return to their community.

5.1.2.2 Cost of Entry

Another key factor associated with the community that influenced Right of Return, was that Right of Return was seen by the community as a cost of entry for redevelopment. Right of Return was understood as a necessary for the community, as it gave tenants a formalized stake in redevelopment, a chance to engage in meaningful participation, and a guarantee of return after the redevelopment is complete. Without Right of Return, it is likely that the community would have not accepted the redevelopment process. For the community, Right of Return gives tenants a sense of entitlement and this creates dialogue between the community, local government, PHA, and the developers. When asked whether Right of Return should remain a policy for development, CLS stated, "And I reason I think it should be done is it does create a sense of entitlement so residents can go there and say you have to talk to us about this." As a result, Right of Return residents have the chance to think critically about their community and will have a chance to meaningful participate in redevelopment.

The lead consultant working with the community believed that tenant engagement would have been non-existent without a guaranteed Right of Return, and would have led to

tenants not being cooperative in the redevelopment and going out of their own way to oppose redevelopment. Community members likely would have retrenched and been non-compliant throughout the process. For example, PC1 stated,

> It was a very practical issue of what was the… cost of entry for community engagement, and Right of Return was really clearly a part of that. There was a sense of community, 'Why would I in any way, facilitate, engage and support this process if you are taking my house and giving it to someone else?

The strong sense of place that existed in Regent Park was influential on the need for a Right of Return in the community. Without this essential policy, tenants would likely not have supported the redevelopment politically. For example CLS stated,

> I think it is an essential policy, I think if you didn't have it, you wouldn't get the buy in that you get; in an overall general political perspective, but also from a local perspective it's very difficult to get people to think about their neighbourhood if they're not going to be there.

Right of Return is an important precursor to a community engaging in meaningful participation in regards to their future. Simply put, when tenants have a Right of Return they also have a vested interest in redevelopment.

With the Right of Return in place, the support for community redevelopment increases. The Right of Return can facilitate buy in and political support from the community. Right of Return acts as a necessary policy that allows redevelopment to proceed from the community's perspective. If a Right of Return was not given, many key informants believed that tenants would simply be apathetic to the process, or frustrate, even oppose the redevelopment. For example, a housing advocate (HA) stated,

> Let's see, it allows them [TCH] to proceed, well I think that tenants would overwhelmingly block revitalization period if they did have some sense of ability to return, I think simply the fact that there is an

opportunity is what enables [redevelopment], and if you said we are
just sending people out, here is your voucher, you can't move back, I
think the building would not proceed. Tenants would hate it and would
do everything they could to oppose it and not cooperate with the
process.

Right of Return is essential to the community and its future. The looming uncertainty,
and the possibility of displacement, can lead a community to reject redevelopment. For
example, CLS stated, "If you do not address the issue of Right of Return, then people will
fight it because it is essential to their sense of who they are, their future." Policy makers
realized that the community would oppose this development, and thus worked with tenants to
negotiate a Right of Return. This policy was a necessary step to appease advocates who
would fight redevelopment throughout the whole process, which was also the case in other
jurisdictions, such as Chicago. According to APR, "…this Right of Return phrase was
created in an effort to appease these residents." Ultimately, if the community was not given a
Right of Return this would have negatively affected political support for the project within
the community, and also would have led to a highly confrontational process.

Modern redevelopment projects have a cost of entry and in the case of Regent Park,
the cost was seen as the Right of Return policy. This was seen as a precursor to more
meaningful engagement when embarking on redevelopment in a community with a strong
sense of place; it is essential to give those tenants a Right of Return to their community. The
Right of Return was in part influenced by the community's demands, and in part by the role
of grassroots activists. By giving a Right of Return tenants were able to gain a degree of
meaningful participation.

5.1.3 Ward Councillor

The third area that influenced the formulation and adoption of Right of Return was
the local political ideas of elected Ward Councillor, Pam McConnell. In the late 1980s to
mid-1990s before involvement in politics Pam McConnell was involved in fighting for the
rights of tenants (PamMcConnell.ca; EA). Her own brand of politics, influenced by a history

within Regent Park as a long-time resident, and her political position, were all supportive of the Right of Return policy. She took the articulated ideas associated with Right of Return that emerged from the community and pushed for them to be adopted through the legal processes at City Hall. As a result of Councillor McConnell's advocacy, the Right of Return became a legally binding and contractually entrenched policy.

5.1.3.1 Role in the Community

Pam McConnell had been a strong advocate for housing, and public housing, for lower income tenants. Her history in the community and her style of politics influenced her ideology that aimed at protection of tenants' rights. The importance placed on public housing and Right of Return is a strong part of Councillor McConnell's own political ideology, which was influenced by her strong work in the field of housing and her own history with the community of Regent Park. Councillor McConnell is not only a long-time resident in the Regent Park area, she has also volunteered and worked in various areas of the community. She was heavily involved in the school system and tenant rights in the community. For example, the Executive Assistant to Councillor McConnell stated,

> She started out a neighbour and [then] a champion of Regent Park,
> way back to her days in school board, before she became a Councillor
> and long before this project began, but, so I think what happened was
> with her engagement in the neighbourhood around schools and around
> tenants' rights and even before she was the school board trustee, she
> was a teacher and taught kids from Regent Park out of a small
> storefront school on Parliament that was for kids who had been
> expelled from school. She was always kind of an advocate for the
> community. (EA)

Early involvement within the community allowed the councillor to gain a firm understanding of people's needs, and the identity of the community.

When Pam McConnell was elected a councillor, she took an active role in the redevelopment. Her time in the community in various capacities influenced her role as a

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ward councillor. As a result of her history in the community, she has been heavily in touch with the community members and resources, and acted as an important link between the tenants and City Hall. For example, Councillor McConnell's executive Assistant stated,

> In the first place that's the role of the councillor, I mean not to be totally parochial, and whatever your constituents says goes, that's not the way to govern, to be a good local representative you need to both have the pulse of the community to be accessible to your residents and neighbours and in this case, Pam lives in Regent Park…

Councillor McConnell took an active role in the redevelopment process. She is working closely with TCH to help create a vital link between the community and TCH. TCHS commented,

> …Pam is unbelievable, she is behind this, the whole idea, it was her tireless work, with tenants and us, she was absolutely involved in the process, she's so interested that when we had a problem, tenants refusing to works us, she has been trying to get the project to move forward, she is also trying to protect her constituency and tenants, they are her voters. She lives in the community, she bought the condo in Regent Park, and she is all in.

Councillor McConnell's interest and involvement in the process helped bring compassionate oversight into the process of redevelopment. Furthermore, it allowed Councillor McConnell to have an active role in the redevelopment and to act as a direct channel to discuss key ideas around rights of tenants in her constituency.

Councillor McConnell's role in the community became more entrenched due to her involvement and connections. Her experience and history in the community helped her gain a strong sense of what was needed in redevelopment. Her strong presence in the community and involvement in the revitalization was all a part of her political ideology. That helped the

Right of Return become a formal policy rather than an idea emerging from grassroots political movements, or a loose collection of municipal planning regulations.

5.1.3.2 Political Ideology

The political actions of Councillor McConnell eventually led to the legal entrenchment of Right of Return. Strong support for public housing and overall ideology influenced her advocating for Right of Return and fighting for tenant rights. Early on, when ideas of redevelopment were being discussed by grassroots community members and policy makers, the Councillor, and her office, strongly believed that regardless of what would happen in terms of redevelopment, the people would be given a promise to return. For example, Executive Assistant to Councillor McConnell stated,

> Logic would say that if someone is being asked, forgetting about
> merits or not of the Revit process itself, if we are going down this path,
> an individual who has a home, where now it's rented or owned, if you
> are being asked to leave your home one should have a legal right to
> return to a new home.

Right of Return became a necessary ingredient in the revitalization because Councillor McConnell, and her office, saw public housing as a public value. Thus, from the beginning it became essential to have a discussion of Right of Return in redevelopment. For example, her Executive Assistant stated,

> … and of course the importance of this when we are dealing with this,
> when we are dealing with a public value which is social housing, is far
> more important than your average situation but you can apply it to the
> average situation. Right from the beginning of this process, it was
> always going to be very clear, not just there was a promise that anyone
> who moved out of their home would get a new home somewhere else,
> anyone who choose to would have a right to return to Regent Park.

Housing was going to be preserved for tenants, as redevelopment would not be allowed to leave tenants without a home. Councillor McConnell, and her office, were strongly opposed to the idea of permanent displacement in the community. The displacement that would take place was to be temporary, but a Right of Return would ensure that those choosing to come back would be able to do so. For example, Councillor McConnell's Executive Assistant stated, "The only way to do it, in my opinion it's certainly shared by Pam and everyone involved in this program, displacement was never an option, temporary displacement was a necessity." Her involvement in the community and her own political values made it essential that displacement did not permanently impact tenants.

These views all represented a political ideology that supported Right of Return. As a result, Councillor McConnell took these ideas to City Hall and fought for the Right of Return to be legally entrenched in policy. The Right of Return then transitioned from a promise in the community to a legal policy shaping development. Councillor McConnell saw public housing as a public value which provided an essential service; this impacted the types of politics the Councillor would practise and the types of policies she would bring to City Hall.

5.1.3.3 Policy not a Promise

The idea of Right of Return was being discussed by different stakeholders in the redevelopment. The notion of Right of Return emerged from community engagement, and the private rental housing protection frameworks enacted by the City of Toronto fuelled the promise of Right of Return. However, Councillor McConnell wanted this right to be legally entrenched. Despite having a good working relationship with TCH and City Planning, Councillor McConnell insisted on legal Right of Return. Councillor McConnell's Executive Assistant stated,

> That legal right needed to be enshrined, it was not good enough to say 'well of course everyone will have the opportunity to return to a new home, we are the government: we do good things, we are not going to lie to anyone.' But fair enough, let's put that in writing, [and] that was kind of the genesis of Right of Return.

The promise of a Right of Return was not good enough. What was needed was an official policy where accountability would exist, and other areas of the government could regulate the TCH's relocation and return of tenants.

In contrast, in Chicago, the CHA had given tenants a Right of Return but that right lacked policy status. It was a promise that was written into CHA Leaseholder Housing Choice and Relocation Rights Contract. An American Housing Researcher (APR) stated,

> So, this Right of Return phrase was created in an effort to appease
> these residents, but it was not, I don't think, I don't think it's ever been
> a policy in the sense that, how do we develop policies and what are the
> factors that go into policy development and then you come out with a
> policy statement. This is sort of, well people are agitating for
> something so we will create this language that will lead them to
> believe that they can return to this place when it's rebuilt, and certainly
> I don't think there any formal accountability about how that would.

The Right of Return that was fought for in Toronto was robust. It was a legal policy where tenants had protection from losing their unit and RGI subsidy. The American housing researcher felt like legislatively entrenching this helped bring legitimacy to Right of Return in Toronto. For example, the American housing researcher stated, "It sounds like it's been effective, it sounds like in Toronto it has been effective" (AHR). By legally entrenching Right of Return there was a degree of accountability and legitimacy for tenants' rights.

Furthermore, legally entrenching Right of Return ensures that institutions outside of the TCH can oversee the Right of Return. Oversight came from the Ward Councillor, as well as City Planning, and the Support Shelter & Housing Administration Division. All of the ideas and influences that shaped Right of Return were important in creating a unique policy that protected tenants' rights. The final step from taking this idea of a Right of Return from an idea and into official policy was to have it go before council, and be written into a contract between tenants and the TCH. This was largely the product from the work of Councillor

McConnell. Formalizing Right of Return was an expression of her history and work in the community and her brand of politics which favours tenants' rights.

5.1.4 Policy Framework

The policy framework that developed to support tenants' Right of Return emerges from a variety of legislative sources. The various components of the Right of Return policy framework sought to regulate redevelopment and ensure that tenants would be able to return to Regent Park after redevelopment. The concepts and ideas that informed Right of Return flowed from higher level planning documents such as the 2005 Provincial Policy Statement (PPS), the Official Plan for the City of Toronto, and the Regent Park Secondary Plan. These documents outlined a vision for the redevelopment, which influenced the need to limit hardship on tenants and protect the housing supply of RGI. These higher level planning documents had a prominent role in guiding and shaping the redevelopment of Regent Park and the agreement for Right of Return.

Right of Return was not a single policy, it was a framework composed of zoning by-laws, and a Section 37, and an agreement between the City of Toronto and TCH. These documents all set out the details relating to the redevelopment. Furthermore, they all created a set of expectations and regulations which monitored TCH's process of tenant relocation and return. Through these various documents, the City of Toronto has had significant oversight over the relocation and return of tenants. These policy documents brought a certain degree of accountability to the Right of Return policy. Substantive policy tools such as zoning by-laws allowed Right of Return to be a legally binding policy rather than a promise. The following section will go over the policy framework of Right of Return.

5.1.4.1 Planning Documents

Higher level planning documents set out goals and visions for the future of Toronto, as well as the redevelopment of Regent Park. These goals aim at promoting and protecting a diversity of housing types such as RGI in Toronto. For example, the 2005 Provincial Policy Statement (PPS) stated,

> Planning authorities shall provide for an appropriate range of
> housing types and densities to meet projected requirements of
> current and future residents of the regional market area…, and,
>
> a) Establishing and implementing minimum targets for the
> provision of housing which is affordable to low and moderate
> income households (Government of Ontario, 2005).

The PPS broadly stated that a diversity of housing is needed and ensured that rental types such as RGI must be preserved. The City of Toronto Official Plan also stated the necessity of protecting a diversity of housing while preserving the existing stock. The Official Plan goes into more detail and gives specific policy recommendations. For example,

> Preserving what we have as long as there is no new supply to meet the
> demand for rental housing, our existing stock of affordable rental
> housing is an asset that must be preserved. In this sense, rental housing
> is not unlike our heritage buildings - we need to do all we can to
> prevent losses (City of Toronto, 2010).

These overarching goals focus on ensuring that there is a diverse supply of housing, which meant housing types such as RGI, and affordable housing, must be protected.

Building on the 2005 PPS, the City of Toronto clearly stated that RGI must be protected and preserved in the City. Specifically, in the context of redevelopment, the City of Toronto developed a policy that would protect RGI units during the reconstruction phase. One key policy that the City of Toronto has placed in their official plan, is Housing policy 7. When public housing is being redeveloped, the City of Toronto requires, "a) full replacement of the social housing units; b) Replacement social housing units at rents similar to those at the time of the application, including the provision of a similar number of units with rents geared to household income" (City of Toronto, 2010). The Official Plan stated that redevelopment of social housing should not impact the existing supply of RGI in the city. In addition, the Regent Park Secondary Plan also stated that RGI should continue to be an

integral part of the community. Specifically, "The neighbourhood will continue to provide social and rent-geared-to-income housing". The Regent Park Secondary Plan builds on policies that the Official Plan outlined, going into more depth. One policy in the Regent Park Secondary Plan explicitly stated the nature of the neighbourhood would still accommodate social housing. For example,

> Development in Regent Park will secure full replacement of social
> housing units that are demolished or converted to uses other than
> social housing as a result of the redevelopment of the lands. At least
> 85% of the replacement social housing units will be provided either
> within the Regent Park Secondary Plan area or within that area
> together with the lands known in the year 2004 as 30 Regent Street.
> (City of Toronto, 2007a)

Both the Official Plan and the Secondary Plan want to preserve public housing in Toronto and Regent Park. The Secondary Plan builds a more detailed vision for the redevelopment of Regent Park, requiring that the majority of housing is replaced on-site.

These key planning documents all touch on the importance of protecting RGI and ensuring that Regent Park kept housing on-site. These ideas were instrumental in establishing Right of Return. These higher level policy documents essentially formed the ideas behind Right of Return. Ultimately, it was through these plans the ideational foundation Right of Return emerged. For example, GWSH stated,

> Right of Return flowed from the plan… refers specifically to
> protecting tenants, it's a rental protection by-law that doesn't
> necessarily give people a right of return the same way it's played out
> here, it's more general statements, the Right of Return kind of flows
> from that.

Official plans and high level planning documents guide the development of cities and set a strategic vision for the future. These documents are not statutes, and are not legal documents,

so these requirements are enacted through land use tools and other implementation tools. In order to enact these policies, the City of Toronto used various planning tools to implement Right of Return through zoning by-laws and a Section 37 Agreement.

5.1.4.2 Planning Tools

The planning tools used by the City of Toronto were essential in achieving the goals outlined in higher level planning documents. These documents helped preserve public housing and facilitate Right of Return. The Right of Return was enacted through various key planning tools such as the Section 37 Agreement between the City of Toronto and TCH, the Tenant Relocation Implementation Plan (TRAIP), and the phase 1 zoning by-law. The city of Toronto's regulatory regime was composed of rigid planning tools which gave the SSHA (Shelter, Support & Housing Administration) and City Planning a great deal of control in the regulation of site guidelines, unit location, tenant communication schedules, and tenant assistance. These planning tools all combined to help ensure that a tenant's Right of Return was fulfilled.

5.1.4.2.1 Section 37Agreement

The Section 37 is a legal agreement between the City of Toronto and TCH, which outlines various aspects of redevelopment, such as minimum requirements for assistance and regulations regarding communication between TCH and their tenants throughout redevelopment. The Section 37 agreement sets up the requirements for a tenant's Right of Return to Regent Park, and the support and assistant required throughout redevelopment. For example, GWSH, stated, "The Section 37, outlines the legal obligations for right to return…" The Section 37 agreement outlines various aspects of Right of Return, such as the location of replacement social housing units. Also, the Section 37 agreement requires that TCH develop a dynamic plan of communication that will be used during the relocation and return of tenants. A separate plan of action must be created for the implementation of tenant relocation and assistance. This is known as a Tenant Relocation Implementation Plan (TRAIP). The TRAIP outlines communication requirements such as the notice TCH must give to tenants

during the redevelopment. It also outlines the obligations TCH has in regards to assisting tenants throughout redevelopment.

The Section 37 agreement warrants that all RGI units demolished during redevelopment must be replaced, ensuring that the goals set out in the 2005 Provincial Policy Statement are met. After the redevelopment is complete, all 2083 units and the tenant RGI subsidies will be preserved. Furthermore, the Section 37 agreement sets out detailed criteria that TCH must meet throughout redevelopment regarding unit mix, and unit sizes. In order to ensure that all families could redeem their Right of Return, the Section 37 agreement has required TCH to ensure all Replacement housing reflects a similar unit composition as those that were demolished. This was done to ensure all households are given the right unit size for their family composition. It also ensured that around 1000 three, four, and five bedroom apartments were also constructed. For instance, the Section 37 states that

> The Replacement Social Housing Units will generally be of a similar
> mix of sizes and unit types by bedroom type as the Existing Social
> Housing Units they are replacing. The Parties acknowledge that the
> General Manager of the SSHA, as the City of Toronto Service
> Manager under the provincial Social Housing Reform Act will be
> monitoring the detailed unit mix and sizes of the Replacement Social
> Housing Units (City Toronto, 2005a).

These ensure that the developer, Daniels Corporation, and TCH, will construct a variety of housing units to accommodate larger families, rather than replacing them with one or two bedroom units.

The Section 37 agreement also stipulates the amount of RGI units that have to be built on-site. In order to preserve housing and maintain a balance within Regent Park of RGI units, affordable housing units, and market rates condominiums, TCH has to rebuild a minimum of 85% of the original 2083 social housing units on-site. Up to 15% of the physical units in Regent Park can be built off-site in an area known as Downtown East. This is nearby Regent Park, about a kilometre to the west (See Appendix). This allows TCH a little room to

implement income mixing if they choose to do so. This also increases the choice for families that return to Regent Park, as there will be units in their old community or nearby. Furthermore, the Section 37 also stated that a minimum of 65% of the RGI subsidies have to remain in the original footprint (See Appendix F). Section 37 creates rules and regulations to ensure that units will be preserved on-site, and that there is a diverse mixture of units so that larger families are not penalized and unable to redeem their Right of Return. This should ensure that all original tenants in good standing will have the choice to live in Regent Park once construction is complete. When the construction is done, all the subsidies and units that existed in Regent Park will be preserved in Regent Park and Downtown East.

5.1.4.2.2 Tenant Relocation Assistance Implementation Plan

Section 4 of the Section 37 agreement states that TCH needs to develop a Tenant Relocation Assistance Implementation Plan. The Section 37 agreement outlines what kinds of requirements are needed by TCH when they are moving tenants into relocation and replacement housing. The TRAIP goes into detail regarding tenant notices for demolition, relocation and return, and the types of assistance available to tenants throughout redevelopment. For example, "The purpose of the Tenant Relocation and Assistance Implementation Plan (the TRAIP) is to list Toronto Community Housing Corporation (TCH) requirements for the relocation of tenants to and from Regent Park for all phases of the redevelopment" (City of Toronto, 2008). The TRAIP requires a plan of action for communication and tenant assistant during relocation and return. This plan of action is monitored by the General Manager of the SSHA and the City of Toronto.

The Section 37 requires that the TRAIP outlines the tenant relocation plan in detail. As a result, there is strict oversight on the communicative materials and notice periods for tenants in redevelopment. The Section 37 requires that TCH's TRAIP for Regent Park gives notice of demolition before a demolition date is set. For example, the TRAIP stated, "The Notice to Tenants will be sent, at a minimum of 5 months before TCHC's required date of vacancy" (City of Toronto, 2008). When a tenant has selected their relocation unit, they are given a notice prior to their move out date. For example, the TRAIP stated, "Notice of

Moving Date: Tenants will be given a moving date by TCHC. The moving date will be at least 60 days after the tenant lets TCHC know, in writing, that they have selected a unit. TCHC will guarantee to hold a unit available for at least this 60-day period" (City of Toronto, 2008). When tenants are eligible for return, the TRAIP requires that TCH give at least 90 days' notice. When tenants have selected a Replacement unit, they are again given 60 days' notice prior to the moving date.

Both the TRAIP and the Section 37 outline Right of Return in detail, focusing on the eligibility criteria for Right of Return, as well as the types of assistance tenants will receive throughout the redevelopment. For example, the TRAIP defines Right of Return eligibility as "All tenants moved from Regent Park due to the redevelopment have the Right to Return to a Replacement Unit within Regent Park or in the East Downtown Area within a reasonable time period. Returning tenants will be able to indicate a Regent Park location as their first preference" (City of Toronto, 2008). In addition, both the Section 37 and the TRAIP set out the minimum requirements for tenant assistance in the redevelopment process. At the very least, the Section 37 agreement between the City of Toronto and TCH, requires that financial assistance is given to tenants to help them with moving and reconnecting utilities costs. Other non-monetary services are required as well, such as counselling, and a comprehensive communication program. It also stipulates that persons with special needs will receive extra assistance when required.

These rules created a set of expectations and accountability, and it gave guidance to TCH about what was required for a tenant's Right of Return. For example, TCHS stated, "The city is the one who created Section 37, with all the rules and regulation and the part that all tenants return was in Section 37 and we had to follow those rules, so the tenant relocation agreement that the tenant signed with us was based on the Section 37." Having the oversight of the City of Toronto, and the General Manager of the SSHA involved in the process ensures that processes will be monitored and subject to scrutiny, if necessary.

5.1.4.2.3 Phase 1 zoning by-law

The Phase 1 by-law reiterates what is largely mentioned in the Section 37. The phase 1 by-law outlines the need to preserve housing on-site and assist tenants during relocation. In addition, the zoning by-law implements a powerful policy tool design to hold TCH accountable to the Section 37 agreement. The phase 1 zoning by-law introduced a holding provision to act as a tool to monitor the redevelopment and provisions associated with Right of Return. The holding provision acts as a monitoring tool and adds an external accountability to policy framework of Right of Return. It also allows TCH the chance to critically reflect on their processes and make improvements in later phases. The holding provision gives significant oversight and regulatory power to City Planning and the SSHA, which holds TCH accountable to City Council.

The holding provision is a planning tool which must be lifted before every new phase of redevelopment. As such, TCH must satisfy several criteria. A hold is defined in the Phase 1 by-law as,

> Hold: To provide for the orderly sequencing of development and appropriate infrastructure and Services, the holding symbol provisions of Section 36 of the Planning Act, as amended, may be utilized within the Secondary Plan Area. Where a holding symbol is in place, development may not take place before the holding symbol is removed through a by-law amendment. The Zoning By-law may specify certain existing uses, interim uses and minor alterations that are permitted without requiring the removal of the holding symbol. (City of Toronto, 2005a)

One requirement specifically relating to Right of Return is the housing issues report (see table below). This is the primary vehicle to monitor RGI replacement, location of units, and the composition of units. In order to achieve planning approvals for the phase under review, TCH must ensure the housing issues report is completed. Generally, the housing issues report is used during redevelopment phase by phase to monitor how many replacement units are built and what their unit type/size is. The housing issues report has to be completed before

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each phase and must address certain criteria. Ultimately, this report examines the achievements of replacement of RGI from each phase. The report requires that social housing must comprise 25% of the units constructed each in phase. The report also has to discuss the progress of the redevelopment and the amount of social housing that has been demolished and the amount that has built as replacement housing. The housing issue report must discuss following:

Table 2: Housing Issues Report Criteria

a. The number of existing social housing demolished to date, breaking this down by bedroom type.
b. The number of replacement units that have been built to date, and the unit mix (the report requires units bedroom types to be included), and the report must list whether the replacement housing is built in Regent Park or Downtown East,
c. The housing issues report most also mention how many units are going to be demolished, and the number of replacement housing being built in the upcoming phase, mentioning location (Regent Park or Downtown East)
d. The combined total of (a), (b), and (c), displaying the unit breakdown, (bedrooms and location)
e. The total number of replacement RGI subsides achieved to date, the number proposed for the upcoming phase under review, listing the locations (Regent Park or Downtown East)
f. Location of buildings, street address.
Source: Toronto Community Housing, (2013). Housing Issues Report, Official Plan Amendment and Re-zoning Application for Phases 3, 4, 5 Lifting of the Holding Symbol Phase 3, Toronto ON.

The criteria above ensure that number of housing units demolished and replaced is monitored. All the construction and redevelopment is subject to planning approvals. If for some reason, the replacement units were not being built, City Planning had the legal authority to ensure intervention. The policy framework designed to ensure a tenant's Right of Return emerged from a need to protect and promote a diversity of housing in the City of Toronto. The 2005 PPS supported this policy which ultimately, informed the City of Toronto to require the redevelopment of social housing to devise a plan of action to replenish social housing. The stock of social housing was to be maintained and protected. Using powerful

planning tools such as a legally binding agreement, the Section 37 agreement, the City of Toronto was able to ensure that tenant's Right of Return would be honoured. The holding provision required that a detailed housing issues report will need to be published. Furthermore, through the use of zoning by-laws the City of Toronto was able to regulate and monitor the process of redevelopment.

5.2 Regent Park: How was Right of Return Implemented and What are the Rates of Return for Phases 1 and 2?

The following will outline the themes that emerged through my data analysis. First, I will discuss phase 1, then I will discuss the changes made in phase 2. The following section will also focus on the rates of return for each phase. Additionally, it will look at how Right of Return was applied in the context of redevelopment.

5.2.1 Rate of Return:

The phase 1 demolition started in 2005, and was completed in 2006 (Toronto Community Housing, 2013). Phase 1 buildings were completely occupied by 2011. During phase 1, 418 units were torn down and 705 were built in the Secondary Area plan, at 30 Regent Street and East Downtown.

Table 3: Phase 1 Unit Breakdown Prior to Redevelopment 2005

Apartments						Townhouses			Totals
Bach	1-bed	2-bed	3-bed	4-bed	5-bed	3-bed	4-bed	5-bed	
31	114	138	129	3	3	0	0	0	418
Source: Toronto Community Housing, (2013). Housing Issues Report, Official Plan Amendment and Re-zoning Application for Phases 3, 4, 5 Lifting of the Holding Symbol Phase 3, Toronto ON.									

Table 4: Phase 1, Replacement Unit Breakdown and Location

Location	Apartment					Grade-related			Total
Replacement Social Housing Units	1-bed	2-bed	3-bed	4-bed	5-bed	3-bed	4-bed	5-bed	
Secondary Plan Area and 30 Regent St. and East Downtown **(See Appendix G for maps)**	246	183	151	60	3	3	16	43	705
Source: Toronto Community Housing, (2013). Housing Issues Report, Official Plan Amendment and Re-zoning Application for Phases 3, 4, 5 Lifting of the Holding Symbol Phase 3, Toronto ON.									

The results for phase 1 are broken down into four categories:

1) Households who returned
2) Households who left TCH housing
3) Households who waived their Right of Return and chose to stay in their relocation unit
4) Households are waiting to return and are deferring their Right of Return.

Of phase 1 tenants 207 households returned, 84 households left TCH. 73 waived their Right of Return, and 18 households are still waiting to return. The following section will contextualize the choices made by tenants. In order to better understand the Right of Return, it is important to understand how tenants were relocated.

The relocation processes were a part of system designed to help tenants leave their unit and eventually return. The processes used to move people out of their housing can have a large impact on their ability to use their Right of Return. Relocation processes implemented in phase 1 were seen as problematic by, workers in the local government (LGP1) and TCH (TCHS) because lining up negatively impacted some individuals. Tenants viewed this

process as unfair because they were required to line up for a relocation unit. The first come, first served line up was initially thought to be the best way to create a simple system of relocation which was fair and egalitarian. According to that system tenants would be able to select their relocation units by lining up in a first come, first served basis.

5.2.2 Selecting a Relocation Unit

Early on, TCH wanted to create a simple system of relocation and return so that tenants could understand the process. The aim of a simple system was to ease some of the apprehension and lack of trust in the community with regards to TCH. TCH wanted to gain the trust of the community, so a "fair" system of relocation was adopted. TCH wanted to treat tenants equally, ensuring that tenants could pick their relocation unit in a first come, first served basis. TCHS stated that Phase 1 relocation processes were not as great as anticipated,

> So we had to encourage people to cooperate with us. That was a bit
> hard, because people did not want to move. Now if I cooperate, and I
> line up, I will get the first unit? I am not sure, I was not behind that. So
> every Monday morning we would list the new vacancies on the board,
> and people would come to choose, some people would be offered 15
> units, some got none. If I am not working or [have the] time, I will be
> the first one in line every week, you can pick and choose. For a single
> mother with small kids who can't stand in line, I am choosing from the
> bottom of list, [The choices that] no one wanted.

The use of a first come, first serve line up for selection of relocation units had unforeseen circumstances. This system penalized those who could not line up for long periods of time including parents who had small children, and those who were working during the day. Ultimately, this system failed to achieve its goals of being fair and simple. In reality, it favoured those who had the time and physical capacity to wait in line for their housing choices. Often tenants would line up days before the new units were posted. For example, TCHS stated,

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When [TCH] saw people lining up to wait till Monday [for the

following weekend] outside of the office, that's when we realized

something was wrong. I was going through the files and saw some

people could have 10 offers, for phase 1 tenants, some had 1. So it's

really not fair. They couldn't change it in the middle, and it was hard.

With only a limited number of housing choices posted every Monday, those who had spare
time could have their pick of the best units. A Community Leader felt that the relocation
lines were penalizing families with small children. For example, CLE1 stated,

You have to line up three in the morning, who are [we]? Are we a third

world country? All of that it was kind of experiment, I would [see in]

phase 1, even though they were had staff to protect or whatever, it was

not working, how do you let families with young kids line up and who

are you going to leave the kids with? The seniors and older people, if

you don't come right at 1 o clock you cannot pick a unit, what is that?

Key informants felt that the system of relocation unfairly impacted vulnerable segments of
tenants. Many were frustrated with the process, and others ultimately felt that the system was
unfair. The initial failure of relocation processes created both confusion and frustration for
tenants.

5.2.3 Return Process

TCH quickly realized that this system would not work when phase 1 tenants wanted
to select units for return. Key informants such as CLE1 and TCHS saw lining up for units as
an unfair system. Key actors from TCH came together and devised a change to the unit
selection process. For example, TCHS stated,

Let's do something because this is not working, and now we have

[new] buildings being built. How are you going to rent them, first

come first serve? What? [Or] give floor plans for the units? We had to

[create] a system so it was the [work of] community agents, Toronto

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Housing tenants, everybody was involved, and I remember being
involved [the first] meetings where we started discussing this, the fair
system that we should [have].

These early discussions would influence a new system of relocating tenants, which
created a simple process for return and relocation. In phase 2, a system was created where
tenants would participate in a random draw and based on that number they would work with
TCH to find available units.

5.2.4 Off-site Housing

The off-site housing consists of three buildings about a 1.8 km west of the original
footprint of Regent Park. After phases 1 and 2, a total of 196 households moved into
replacement off-site housing (TCHA, Personal communication, 2015). As previously
mentioned, a portion of the original 2083 RGI units were built off-site. As a result, all tenants
were given the option of moving nearby Regent Park as an alternative to new housing in the
original footprint. However, it is important to note that when a tenant chose an off-site unit,
they gave up their Right of Return within the original footprint of Regent Park (City of
Toronto, 2005b). Off-site housing originates from City Planning's zoning regulations, which
allowed flexibility in the distribution of units in the redevelopment (City of Toronto, 2005a).
For example, policy 3.1.1 of Zoning by-law 140-2005 states,

Development in Regent Park will secure full replacement of social
housing units that are demolished or converted to uses other than
social housing as a result of the redevelopment of the lands. At least 85
% of the replacement social housing units will be provided either
within the Regent Park Secondary Plan area or within that area
together with the lands known in the year 2004 as 30 Regent Street.

TCH was allowed to construct a maximum 15% of the 2083 units off-site (City of Toronto,
2005a). Of the original 2083 RGI units in Regent Park, the maximum 15% replacement units
were built off-site in Downtown East, about 1.8 km away from the footprint of Regent Park.

This area would also be allowed to take 35% of the RGI subsidies. Thus, 35% of RGI subsidies and 15% of the original 2083 units could be placed off-site. The subsidies were no longer fixed to the physical units and as a result, income mixing was allowed. The three buildings, 92 Carlton, 60 Richmond, and 501 Adelaide East, had a mixture of social housing units and affordable housing units. A portion of households chose to relocate to an off-site unit and had mixed feelings because they felt pressure to relocate off-site (CLE1). Other households were happy because they could leave Regent Park, and the off-site units were closer to their social networks and social services (Johnson, 2010). A Community Leader stated some people in the community were initially surprised about the off-site units, but eventually chose to relocate because it was a better fit for them. For example CLE1 stated "…some of those people were fine, 'Oh Carlton, oh that's close to my school' or close, they wanted it, but some people were not happy…" Off-site housing unexpectedly became a complex issue for TCH and phase 1 tenants, which caused a great deal of controversy among certain tenants.

There were various issues that came to light through the interviews about the off-site units and how it was related to a tenant's Right of Return. Off-site housing was used as a way to help reduce wait time for tenants, and reduce difficulty and the potential of being moved far away from Regent Park. Economic factors dictated construction schedules, unit distributions (off-site vs. on-site) led to some housing being replaced off off-site units. When tenants first learned about these sites, they were confused about the off-site housing and how it related to Right of Return. This started a conversation about what Right of Return actually entailed, and how off-site housing would fit into the vision of redevelopment.

5.2.4.1 Practical Implementation

Implementing the Right of Return was difficult. For example, CLS stated, "There's a question of the right to come back and then you can establish that, but how do you implement that? And part of the implementation was, well, where do you come back to?" This was a significant question that came up in my interview with a key informant, which highlighted the importance of implementation. TCH attempted to use the addition of off-site housing in phase 1 as one of the ways to efficiently relocate and allow tenants to claim their Right of

Return. Thus, off-site housing became a key implementation piece in phase 1. Off-site housing was seen as a way to potentially reduce the distance tenants would be relocated to, and allowed for smoother relocation processes in Phase 2.

The three buildings off-site were designed give phase 1 tenants the options to move directly into a new replacement unit close to Regent Park rather than going to a temporary relocation house then waiting for a replacement unit in the footprint to become available. . Also, these units were ready for immediate occupancy by displaced tenants. This would allow tenants to skip one step of the process, and move immediately into their replacement unit. As a result, the incorporation and construction of off-site housing was a critical implementation piece, which largely impacted the relocation and Right of Return, for phases 1 and 2 tenants. Incorporating three off-site buildings into the supply of new replacement units allowed TCH more flexibility in relocating and re-housing tenants.

This process was considered to be better for tenants and was critical to the implementation of Right of Return in phase 1. A key informant from TCH stated, that "In phase 1 return, we built eight buildings, we built much more than what we relocated" (TCHS). As a result, 705 units were constructed in order to replace 418 units. Building more units than the ones torn down allowed better relocation of tenants because tenants had the choice to move into a new unit rather than going to a relocation unit (which was temporary), and then moving into their replacement. This whole process could take years. If tenants selected a replacement unit off-site they would only move once but they would not be able to get a new unit within Regent Park. For example, LGP1 stated, "so it gave us the opportunity to narrow the gap of time that tenants would be displaced, or they could move into new units even if it were two, four, five blocks ways, and it also gave potentially a [permanent] place for tenants to land."

The three off-site buildings also, gave tenants the choice to avoid having to live temporarily in a relocation unit. It would also limit the distance tenants would be moved from their community. Incorporating the three off-site buildings allowed those who didn't get a spot in the new phase 1 buildings within the footprint, such as 246 Sackville or 1 Oak Street,

the choice to get replacement housing off-site. This eliminated the need for waiting and moving into a relocation housing unit, and then again waiting for their replacement unit. For example, a worker from TCH stated, "… we only had 246 Sackville, and 1 Oak and some townhouses…" Therefore making it necessary to provide an alternative housing option. In theory, three off-site buildings were offered to as a choice for tenants who did not receive new housing in original footprint and did not want to wait for later phases. Ultimately, these sites were progressing faster and it gave another housing option for tenants. For example, LGP1 states "…the additional buildings were coming along quicker but they both came out the same time, but not everybody could fit back into the first building that opened up in RP" (LGP1). The off-site housing was used to build more units than were torn down and also give tenants more options in regards to location.

5.2.4.2 Site Economics and Limits

The choice to incorporate off-site housing into the permanent replacement units was also dictated by the economics of the redevelopment. In mixed income developments, areas with higher land value have a higher ratio of market rate housing when compared to social housing. Mixed income redevelopments are constrained by economic factors (cost of redevelopment, and portion of for sale market units), which influences the number of RGI units that can be replaced on a site. AHR stated, "but I mean I think it really, it depends on the political economy of the development, places with lower land values, the intention might be more open to allowing residents to return and then in other places it's clear you can upgrade and there [is] some pressure to upgrade from the residents at the top of the income mix…" In the case of Regent Park, the economics of the site are largely dictated by the profits generated by the developer since these profits act as the main source to finance the redevelopment of social housing. The private public partnership between TCH, and Daniels Corp, requires that Daniels Corp generate profit in order to redevelop RGI units. The limited supply of public funding for redevelopment required that market oriented decisions be made during the redevelopment. For example, HA stated "The purpose of the revitalization is to replace crumbling buildings [in] an environment where there is no direct public funding for new redevelopment of public housing. So, the device of leveraging property would bring in

people who have the capacity to pay, [it] was a way to attracting private investment and public investment." (HA). The market oriented nature of redevelopment made it essential for some units to be built off-site. The financial element of redevelopment was a central component of the revitalization. For example, HA stated, "Mixed income neighbourhoods is a by-product, this was never the driver, and the driver is money." In order for development to be economically viable, more private market housing needed to be on the original footprint. The need to generate profits was a driving factor in the redevelopment, which ultimately, impacted tenants' ability to return to the original footprint and the location of replacement housing.

Building all of the 2083 units on the original footprint would not have been feasible because it would have drastically impacted the design and density of the project. This would have ultimately impacted the finances of the project. For example, CLS stated that site economics was a key motivator in the incorporation of off-site housing,

> I think that was motivated or driven by economics of the site. If you
> had to come up with 2000 social housing units on Regent Park, then it
> would either drive the height, the intensity, [this] would drive the
> density of the site up, more than they thought. It was a way of
> ameliorating that issue. That was driven by the need to maintain a
> profit for the developers and that was necessary, without profit they
> weren't going to build the project.

The site specific criteria of the original footprint, and the costs associated with increasing the density to include all 2083 public housing on-site, would result in less profit for the private market developer. The demands of the market, and working within a private-public partnership, as well as site specific limitations, all factored into the decision to add three off-site buildings. The choice to incorporate three off-site buildings was designed to help improve tenant mobility, and limit the chance for tenants being moved or displaced far from the original footprint of Regent Park. The utilization of off-site building allowed for front ending construction, leading to better implementation practise for future phases.

5.2.5 Communication

Communication was seen as an essential factor that dictated how tenants understood the process of relocation and Right of Return. The process of being relocated from one's community is stressful; however, a good channel of communication can help ease stress by providing accurate information and support for tenants. The importance of communication in redevelopment was stated by a Community Leader. CLE1 states, "Communication, communication, communication will clear all [the] assumptions people have and anxieties that they have. The moving itself is not easy, if you communicate in a [good] way, people they will trust you, and the process, the decision making process." This was also recognized by CP1 and AHR in regards to American experience with HOPE VI. One of the key failing points of the Plan for Transformation and HOPE VI in Chicago, was that the communication was done so poorly that many tenants were confused with the process, resulting in CHA losing many of their tenants. A consultant working with the community recognized that TCH needed to communicate effectively because simply giving a Right of Return is not enough; the process and caveats of the policy must be widely understood by households involved in revitalization. For example, PC1 stated,

> There were two things that were really important that we saw from looking at the Chicago model for example. 1) It's not enough to tell people that you can come back, you have to actually stay in touch with them otherwise you lose them and there is no way to tell them to come back. Right of Return doesn't work if you do not maintain communication with the returners, but if you do that, yes, it seemed to have worked quite well both to build confidence in the process and to knit the community back together again after redevelopment. No way of telling them to come back. 2) So right of return doesn't work if you don't make that effort to maintain communication to the returners, but if you do that yah it seems it to have worked quite well, both to build

confidence in the process, and knit the community back together after redevelopment.

Communication had a critical role in the redevelopment of Regent Park. As outlined previously, early on there were many issues regarding communication that directly impacted how tenants viewed Right of Return. The controversy regarding off-site housing was exacerbated by poor communication between TCH and tenants.

5.2.5.1 Early Experiences

Prior to phase 1 in 2005, the Right of Return was not clear and did not seem realistic to members in the community. The message of Right of Return was muddled because the there was no consistency from TCH, early on. The lack of clarity impacted people's belief in the redevelopment and the Right of Return policy. A phase 1 tenant stated, "I'm not sure if we believed them or whether, it was realistic, we used to go to the meetings, [with] all the updates there was no consistency with the staff presenting" (CLE1). As a result, many felt they did not fully understand Right of Return. The poor channel of communications caused stress for some of the tenant population. The frustrations, fears, and disbelief of some tenants led them to decide to leave the community, rather than retain their Right of Return and participate in redevelopment. One key informant said:

> Those communications are tricky, maintaining a good system of communication is always something you can improve on and you should. The other is that, how people respond, to some extent, are conditioned by expectations and comfort, and supporting those things was important and not done terribly well. In particular, some people threw up their hands and said is so complicated, I don't know how to deal with it. My life is already stressful enough, I can get up and leave. In ways that probably were not good for them [tenants] but were simpler. (PC1)

There was a strong degree of disbelief regarding the Right of Return; despite being a legal policy, many were still skeptical. The skepticism was fueled by a lack of consistency in the message by TCH. This impacted how tenants understood Right of Return and impacted their housing choices, to either participate in, return, or leave TCH.

The decision to incorporate three sites off-site was made by a small committee consisting of a few key stakeholders. This subcommittee acted as liaison between the community, the developer and TCH (CLE1).As a result, the information was not broadcast throughout the community, and it came as a shock to tenants to learn about the off-site buildings The communication channels between key stakeholders and the tenant population did not exist, resulting in tenants learning about the three off-site units, 501 Adelaide, 92 Carlton, and 68 Richmond, abruptly without understanding the reason for these sites. A Community Leader felt communication between the tenants and the sub-committee of key stakeholders was not great. This resulted in confusion over the facts around these three off-site buildings. For example,

> There are good and bad things in having a committee, in some cases
> they may update you on what is taking place, oh we are going to have
> 3 building Richmond, etc. You [committee member] know about [the
> off-site housing] and the rest of the community does not, if that
> committee doesn't share that with the rest of the community, those
> people who know were fine with. There are sub committees, on
> redevelopment, and those who started revitalization, or those who
> produce Right of Return documents, those committees have access to
> information about building Carlton, Adelaide and Richmond, but the
> rest of the community members don't have that information. (CLE1)

The decision to move some housing off-site was perceived a top down process in which the subcommittee and other stakeholders did not engage in dialogue with the community (CHR). Tenants became aware of the off-site housing when they met with relocation counsellors. The option of the three off-site buildings appeared as potential replacement units. There was little

context given regarding these units. For example, CLE1 stated, "When you got to pick you unit, Adelaide Carlton and Richmond, where is this? Richmond [street] in not in Regent, that's how a lot of people found out how those units existed," The issues that plagued communication emerged from a top-down model of communication that inadequate, as the information did not reach the majority of the community.

Off-site housing was used as a means to create social mix and replace housing nearby; however, the policy fell victim to bad circumstance because it was never properly explained to the community or its tenants. The lack of dialogue created confusion and apprehension. For example, LGP1 at the City of Toronto stated

> So I think some of the bad press, and the disappointment and
> misunderstandings, and maybe outright miscommunication, and I'm
> not [an] expert to unravel that …Oh yeah, I think it was partly the
> accident, in a way they were, the circumstances fell victim to actually
> what was a good thing initially which is as I described they were front
> end loading new building.

Poor communication influenced how the option of off-site housing was perceived by tenants because the benefits of off-site housing were not fully explaining to the phase 1 tenants. The message that should have been given, is that the community had the choice to live off-site close by to Regent Park (PC1). Instead the communication created more stress for tenants. For example, PC1 stated,

> Part of it, was it was very badly communicated by Toronto
> Community Housing, I was at the meeting when they first announce it.
> I was shaking my head because what instead of saying to people look
> we are going to have to think about the footprint as a little bit bigger,
> they said we can't live up to Right of Return, the numbers just don't
> add up, and so people understandably freaked out, because they didn't
> know what the perimeters, what this was for, then they gradually
> rolled out the perimeters of the bigger footprint.

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The community was apprehensive at the idea of moving some of the 2083 units demolished in Regent Park to Downtown East, because it was seen as a breach of trust of the community. Hence, the benefits and rationale were not explained adequately to the tenants resulting in friction.

Tenants were upset, and felt threatened, and that they were misled despite being promised 2083 units would be replaced on-site. A Canadian housing researcher who spent significant time in Regent Park, believed that off-site housing fundamentally changed the meaning of Right of Return that was understood in the community (CHR). For example, CHR stated,

> …then subsequently it has been reinterpreted when they changed the
> plans to allow for off-site housing. People signed a Right of Return,
> understanding their Right to Return to Regent Park, and then the kind
> of loophole in the language was that Regent Park was defined
> anywhere to encompass this east downtown area…

The addition of off-site housing replacement units caused a great deal of controversy in the redevelopment, leading many to question what this meant for Right of Return. Some felt this was a huge breach of trust within the redevelopment because the idea to include off-site housing as a part of the original 2083 replacement RGI units, was not discussed with the community. This was seen as disingenuous to the meaning of Right of Return that was negotiated prior to development. The off-site housing became a particular issue with certain tenants, partly due to the fact that the communication from TCH was not done adequately. The top-down approach to information was not helpful to the community of phase 1 tenants.

5.2.5.2 Misinformation

The problems regarding communication were also seen in the relocation process, particularly when tenants were selecting their relocation units. One of the key informants mentioned that TCH relocation counsellors were not providing accurate information in their meetings with tenants. Furthermore, some felt that there was gentle nudging of tenants, to

accept units off-site. In some cases, the communication between tenants and relocation counsellors was problematic. CHR stated, "I interviewed one tenant, she was told not to bother writing on-site units in her preferences, [they] vetting for whatever reason trying to get people [tenants] to accept the off-site units, [TCH said] you are not getting Regent Park units, because you have a better chance of getting your unit type off-site." Some tenants felt they were pushed into taking a less popular option, having their replacement housing off-site, thus relinquishing their Right of Return. A Community Leader also touched on the issues of misinformation. CLE1 stated, "That's what I said, they were not friendly, they told them, "you can choose or defer to the next phase", they didn't communicate with them. Some of [the tenants] felt like it was take it or not, some of them felt like that, some of the community members felt pressured to take a unit." The misinformation that was given to tenants was the result of poor communication and led to confusion among tenants. Some tenants ended up in an off-site replacement unit and did not fully understand that this would relinquish their Right of Return.

Issues that impacted communication of Right of Return were the result of a failure to give a clear and consistent message prior to phase 1. People were frustrated with redevelopment and the Right of Return. There were also communication struggles with adequately presenting the role and merits of off-site housing. Ultimately, there was never an open dialogue regarding off-site housing with the community.

5.2.5.3 Rumours

A community of vulnerable individuals lacked trust with their PHA; the policy of Right of Return did not feel real to them, and it felt like a false promise. There were a number of misconceptions and miscommunication about the policy. This eventually led some tenants to leave Regent Park because of the uncertainty with revitalization and the Right of Return (CLE1). Even with a contractually binding Right of Return, many tenants still did not believe in the policy. The misconception associated with redevelopment and Right of Return was the result of the rumours and misinformation among tenants in the community. Misinformation became a powerful force in how tenants viewed revitalization and the

feasibility of Right of Return and this shaped housing choices throughout the redevelopment process. One Community Leader outlined the skepticism felt towards Right of Return,

> You think you are going to be returning," I don't think so. There is a
> media aspect, there are rumours in the streets and at the same time they
> were making sure that they did communicate that people have a Right
> of Return. But when you come out of the meeting and you hear
> something else, who are [you] going to believe, it was uncertain until
> people started moving back.CLE1

As a result of this skepticism, some people left the community for fear of being displaced. They did not understand the revitalization and did not see the end of it. For these tenants, the Right of Return seemed like a false promise. A Community Leader stated, "For sure, yes, for sure, some people already made [up] their mind; because of all the rumours they ended up moving far away and waived their Right of Return. Some of them bought a house or moved far away." (CLE1)

And

> Yeah, in a way they didn't see the end of revitalization, they didn't see
> what it could bring them. Everybody wants a new unit but at the same
> time you hear a lot of — which ones are true? For those people, it's
> not sinking [in], this is not true, it is not reality that yes, there will be
> new buildings built and you are going to come back, and you have the
> right to return. (CLE1)

Tenants were unable to see the merits of revitalization resulting in some people choosing to depart from Regent Park. Rumours became a palpable force within the community, ultimately influencing some to opt to leave Regent Park, and not have to deal with the uncertainty of redevelopment. The community perception of Right of Return was also shaped by the misinformation within the Community. Despite having a legal agreement and contract

signed from TCH, the rumours in the community persisted and seriously framed the communication between TCH and Phase 1 tenants with mistrust and confusion.

5.2.5.4 Confusion

Within the community, key informants mentioned that there was confusion regarding Right of Return as some tenants felt that moving off-site did not relinquish their Right of Return. Furthermore, the misconceptions associated with Right of Return created false expectations for tenants. Though the Right of Return was defined in the Section 37 agreement, poor communication throughout the redevelopment may have hindered people's ability to understand the policy. Right of Return was a policy that gave tenants the choice to return and retain their RGI subsidy. Tenants could return to the original footprint of Regent Park, or live nearby in the Downtown East area. For example, the Section 37 agreement between the City of Toronto and TCH stated that a Right of Return is defined as, " "Right to Return" means the right of a tenant to return to one of the 2083 Replacement Social Housings Units on the Subject Lands [Regent Park] or in the East Downtown" (City of Toronto, 2005a).

The confusion associated with the meaning of Right of Return became an issue with the inclusion of the three off-site buildings, 92 Carlton Street, 60 Richmond Street East, and 501 Adelaide East. The notion of Right of Return may have been interpreted as having a right to return to a specific unit, specific street address, or returning back to one's old community, but a community housing advocate stated the Right of Return it was a Right of Return to an RGI subsidy and a location (HA). For example, HA stated

> Yes, you are returning to a location, that's what you are actually doing, to an
> affordable unit that's the return, other than that, it's a changed neighborhood, and the
> community, and many people will not return. Maybe your best friend will not return,
> that's one thing, the neighborhood is broken up, people living in different units.

However, some tenants fundamentally interpreted the Right of Return differently, leading to confusion and bad feelings between tenants and the TCH. A few tenants felt they retained

their Right of Return to the original footprint of Regent Park, despite taking a replacement unit off-site. There had to be clarification with tenants about what Right of Return meant in terms of the original footprint of Regent Park. For example, a key informant in Councillor McConnell's office stated,

> so that kind of started a conversation about this, and clarifying, not
> being much upfront with residents in future phases in terms of what
> that really meant, if they choose a new unit that was being built as part
> of Revit that wasn't a part of the original footprint that would
> relinquish their Right of Return (EA)

The notion of Right of Return, and the addition of off-site housing, made some individuals in the community question what Right of Return actually meant for them.

In, summary, the expectations tenants had about Right of Return was the result of poor communication between TCH and tenants. Off-site replacement housing in Downtown East was misinterpreted by some tenants as a place where tenants could live temporarily while other units in Regent Park were being built—when in reality opting to move off-site was seen as relinquishing a tenant's Right of Return. The issues surrounding off-site housing proved to be an important aspect of phase 1. Poor communication, and a restricted flow of information from TCH to tenants, resulted in confusion about Right of Return and resistance from the community regarding off-site housing. Despite these setbacks, some aspects of the communication in phase 1 were done effectively.

5.2.5.5 Good Practise

Despite issues communicating with tenants in, some of the previous communications processes were done well, which helped tenants adjust to the changes and difficulties associated with redevelopment. Communication between TCH and tenants started well before the demolition. When a date for demolition was finalized, the TCH started communicating one year prior in order to inform tenants that their building is coming down. This allowed tenants to begin mentally preparing for redevelopment. A Community Leader stated, "one thing that was helpful is that they [TCH] started communicating one year before

your building is coming down, at least mentally you are prepared and whatever that needs to done, they [TCH] give them enough time to prepare for it" (CLE1). Maintaining a good system of communication was not only for those wanting to return to Regent Park, but for all tenants involved in revitalization. If tenants did not respond to correspondence the TCH would make several additional attempts to inform tenants about their Right of Return. For example a worker at TCH stated, "we tried everything to get in touch with them, those letters are invitations inviting them back are registered mail, because it's just that then it's not enough, then we call, then we knock on the door, we send the Super to knock on the door, they just don't want to come back, they don't even want to notify us, they just ignore us" (TCHS). The TCH makes several attempts to contact people in order to ensure that an open line of communication is established and changes are received in a timely manner.

Even when individuals moved far away from Regent Park, TCH maintained good communication with its tenants. The TCH was generally well informed about the whereabouts of all tenants. For example, a Community Leader stated,

> One of my neighbours, she moved out to Sheppard and somewhere,
> and they did communicate to her. The reason she moved far away, she
> didn't think she was going to come back but she did come back, she
> choose to take her relocation place far away, but they did communicate
> with her and sent her all the documents, even though she never came
> to any of those meetings, she did return. (CLE1)

TCH worked hard at reaching all tenants and preparing tenants well before demolition to ensure they understood the process of relocation and their Right of Return.

Despite early issues, the effort on part of TCH to maintain communication with tenants was good. In my interview, AHR highlighted how starkly different this was than the relations between CHA and its tenants. CHA tenants were not given information and a majority of those tenants were considered lost. AHR reflected on "how tenants' rights would be maintained and enforced, so that they could exercise that right of return. I know that they, several things happened, they lost track of people as they left, they lost track of who was

leaving." Crucial communicative pieces regarding CHA tenants' Right of Return were never communicated.

5.2.6 Summary

- Early on, a poor explanation of the Right of Return policy to tenants caused difficulty in implementation.

- The addition of off-site housing was not adequately explained to the community, resulting in tenants mistaking off-site replacement units for temporary relocation units. Also, there were allegations that TCH relocation counsellors purposefully misinformed tenants in order to pressure the tenants into taking off-site units.

- Rumours became a factor led tenants to question the Right of Return. Despite it being a legal agreement between TCH and tenants, some tenants still felt that this was a false promise. This led a few people to leave the community, contributing to displacement.

- Some aspects of the research finding touched on positive aspects of Phase 1. For example, TCH did employ good practises in their communicative process, ensuring all tenants were given information despite some living long distances away from Regent Park. TCH started to reach out to tenants about one year prior to the demolition of their building.

5.2.7 Community Support

The rumours started to settle when people started to move back to Regent Park. It was not until some friends and neighbours came back to Regent Park that the Right of Return seemed real. CLE1 stated, "It took about three years for the rumours to settle…it took more than three years when they started moving in, it was real, and people are coming back." Seeing tenants come back instilled confidence in the phase 2 tenants who were going to be going through the relocation and return process. As the process became more established, the initial apprehension and fears regarding relocation were lessened when tenants saw neighbours go through the latter end of the process. Executive Assistant to Councillor

McConnell explains, "I mean it peaks at every new phase because there is a new group of people that have to move… but those peaks get less and less as we go through, because they have now seen their neighbours go through it on the other end" (EA). Before every new phase there is anxiety and excitement. As the process evolved, tenants gained more faith in the Right of Return and their fears and apprehension slowly dissipated.

Phase 2 tenants have had a different outlook about Right of Return. Seeing people come back eased a lot of scepticism around Right of Return. For example, PC1 "the tenants in phase 2 were more enthusiastic than the tenants in phase 1… they saw it [the success of Right of Return] in phase 1, it gave them more confidence in the process than the phase 1 people had just based on the promises that they were given." Phase 1 tenants had little on which to base their trust, because they were the first phase of tenants and did not have the benefit of observing others go through the system of relocation and return. For example, CLE1 stated, "yes, even though you sign the paper, and all that, there is no concrete belief. This is the first [revitalization] that took place in Canada, and there is no place where you can ask "Oh how was it, did you sign?" "Did you return?" All of that wasn't clear, which community do you go and ask, you just learn it the hard way yourself, you believe in your guts, you have a bad feeling and then you go on that". In contrast, phase 2 tenants had the benefit of seeing the process unfold before them.

Phase 2:

The transition from phase 1 to phase 2 was characterized by drastic change, resulting in the creation of a uniform and simplified relocation and return process. TCH devised a ten-step relocation and return process (see Appendix H). Also, TCH has worked with the community to improve the issues tenants faced in phase 1. The dialogue between tenants and TCH focused on improving areas such as communication, and the policy design of relocation and return. As a result, the number of households returning were higher in phase 2 than in phase 1 (See Appendix I). The rate of return for phase 2 tenants was 65% (287 households), and 23% (101 households) have been waiting to return. Furthermore, 4% (19 households) have chosen to leave TCH, while 8% (33 households) have waived (chose to remain in their

temporary housing) their Right of Return. The portion of tenants who left TCH in phase 1 was almost quadruple that of phase 2, at 22%, representing 84 households.

Phase 2 tenants had the benefit of watching phase 1 tenants go through the entire relocation and return process. The concerns phase 2 tenants had were partially alleviated by seeing their neighbours return. There were a few changes in the design of the relocation and return system that improved and simplified the Right of Return. Some tenants were able to move into their replacement units on-site without moving into relocation housing, making the process streamlined, easier, and less stressful for tenants. These proactive changes limited the chance for displacement because tenants would not have to leave their community

Table 5: Phase 2 Unit Breakdown and Location

Apartments						**Townhouses**			Totals
Bach	1-bed	2-bed	3-bed	4-bed	5-bed	3-bed	4-bed	5-bed	
0	18	136	156	23	0	27	81	58	**499**
Replacement Unit Breakdown All in the Secondary Area Plan:									
Apartments						Townhouses			
0	33	185	165	0	0	10	29	23	**445**
Source: Toronto Community Housing, (2013). Housing Issues Report, Official Plan Amendment and Re-zoning Application for Phases 3, 4, 5 Lifting of the Holding Symbol Phase 3, Toronto ON.									

5.2.8 Communication

The issues that plagued relocation and Right of Return in phase 1 were brought to the attention of TCH through their own internal reviews and extensive dialogue with the community. The internal review came from perceived failures in the system of relocation.

This audit was one of the first steps in improving the system of relocation For example, TCHS stated,

> We are learning. Oh my goodness how much we learned from the first
> time, when we relocated people based on first come first serve basis.
> And we had to build tents around them, they were waiting in line for 2-
> 3 days to grab the best units, we learned that's why we started with the
> draw system.

The underlying goals of creating a fair and equal system were not reached. This prompted TCH to have an extensive overview of their program for relocation and Right of Return. For example, TCHS stated,

> We had to have a system, so it was the community agents, Toronto
> Community Housing tenants, it was everybody involved, and I
> remember being [there] the first time, involved with [the] meetings
> where we started this, discussing the fair system that we developed for
> the relocation and return process.

Unsatisfactory performance of the relocation and return of tenants prompted the TCH to talk with tenants about the problems associated with phase 1. Tenants were able to air grievances about the process. The dialogue that opened up between the TCH and tenants was the first step towards implementing change. For example, TCHS stated, "Tenants complaints, and [ours], when you go through the process you see what's not working." This was done by TCH via formal meetings, and informal chats with tenants. For example, TCHS stated, "100 meetings, building visit, we stop in their buildings and tell them what's going on, they tell us what's going on. We have community relocation consultants who work with TCH who are engaged with the community, the agencies, and the community." Community animators were instrumental in gaining feedback from phase 1 tenants about their experiences. This was a key piece that helped aid communication. For example, TCHS states, "we had a good communication channel with our tenants, we always had one. Because in all our revitalizations sites we engaged tenants, [and] there are our revitalization animators, they were our ears in the community, we worked with the tenants through the tenant meetings."

Tenants also felt that communication between TCH and tenants had improved since phase 1. For example, CLE1 stated, "They do communicate better than before, in terms of ongoing communication, what is taking place what needs to be done, and so on. That helps so much". Creating a dialogue between tenants and the TCH helped expose the issues within Phase 1, and provided a roadmap for improvement. The conversations between TCH and tenants led to key changes that impacted the design of the relocation and return system.

5.2.9 Policy Design

Phase 2 of relocation and Right of Return was a vast improvement over the previous phase. Improved communication between TCH and tenants led to modifications in the design of the relocation and return of tenants. Also, TCH made administrative changes to their process of tracking and grouping tenants. In contrast to phase 1, phase 2 was divided in to five groups. In addition, TCH opted to stream-line relocation processes, allowing some tenants to move straight into their replacement units rather than moving into relocation housing. As well, TCH did not opt to put replacement housing off-site, so all the units from phase 2 have been built on the original footprint of the community and not Downtown East. The changes to policy design were substantive and ultimately, helped improve the implementation of Right of Return.

5.2.9.1 Relocation and Right of Return Lottery System

The issues that occurred in the relocation of phase 1 led to changes in the relocation of phase 2. In fact, an entirely new system of tenant relocation and return was created. The return process of phase 1 tenants was bolstered and extended to include the relocation of tenants. The changes to policy design resulted in a ten step system that would help tenants easily navigate through the relocation and Right of Return processes. The definitive feature of the ten step system was instead of having tenants line up for units, a random draw for unit selections would occur. The choice to change the relocation system was the result of the issues associated with phase 1, such as poor communication, off-site housing, and line ups for relocation units. These issues prompted key actors in TCH to critically reflect on the previous system of relocation. For example, TCHS stated,

It was a big group of all of us brainstorming and analysing, and we came [up with] the random draw number, where the choice is taken from us, we do not decide where you going to go, you are the one who is deciding. We created the system that was part of relocation and return, [you] will get a draw number that is publically done. What we do is put your name into a jar, into a clear jar in a public meeting, we do the draw one by one. Somebody from the community is doing the draw. We don't want to be accused of anything, even though the community is looking.

The goal of the lottery draw was to generate a fair and transparent system that would ease the relocation and return process. The new lottery system created a uniform process that was would streamline relocation and return.

The new system for tenant relocation and return is broken down into ten steps. Tenants are given a letter or notice inviting them to participate in the lottery for a relocation unit (Toronto Community Housing, 2014). Tenants then participate in a random draw during a public meeting. After tenants have selected a draw number, they meet with TCH relocation counsellors who work to match them to available units (Toronto Community Housing, 2014). At this point, tenants are given communicative material and time to think about the types of housing available to them. For example, TCHS stated, "So they take home that package and they have time to think, to go through which units they like, then they come for a one on one meeting with us, this when they put in order how they like the units, what is the unit they like the most, that's number one, two, three, and so on." Once a mutually agreeable unit is selected, the tenants are given an offer letter. Once a timeframe for moving has been agreed upon, the TCH would help tenants with their move. The assistance can take the form of funds for moving, or even reconnection of utilities. For example TCHS stated, "Also, it costs us money because we are paying moves, packing material, we are paying for everything, we are also paying the reconnection fees for the services they have. All extra expenses the tenant has, we pay for it." The process of moving is almost identical when tenants are looking to

return. Once the return phase is initiated, the tenants receive a letter inviting them to participate in the return process. The tenants then attend a draw similar to the first draw, and meet a relocation counsellor to discuss their housing choices. Lastly, tenants select a unit and eventually move in with the assistance of TCH.

The lottery system has been well received by both workers at TCH and the tenants of Regent Park. The changes have made the relocation return process open and more transparent. It also allowed tenants to rebuild trust their TCH and in the process of relocation and return. Trust in the system has been demonstrated by the rate of compliance when tenants are asked to move out for relocation; Tenants in phase 2 have been moving out faster than those in phase 1, representing tenant confidence in the lottery system. For instance, PC1 stated,

> And if you look at the rate of compliance with Phase 2 move out, it's a
> pretty strong signal of the view of tenants. The rate of compliance in
> Phase 2 move out was accelerated ahead of rate of compliance with
> phase 1 move out. Tenants moved out ahead of the scheduled move
> out [date], which means tenants saw moving out [as] something with a
> very low risk and a good return.

PC1 linked faster move out to tenants having more faith in the system. The risk associated with redevelopment and relocation is becoming less of a factor because the tenants are starting to trust the process of relocation and return.

Another benefit of the lottery system is it allows tenants to have a lottery draw for their relocation unit and a different lottery draw for their replacement unit. If a tenant has a bad lottery draw number for relocation, and their unit is not their ideal preference, they will have another chance to draw when they go to a community meeting for returning. For example, TCHJ stated, "So people who are relocated don't just go into a giant pool, you are offered a new unit by phase, each phase has its own random selection numbers that get updated during the return process. So if you had a bad number leaving, then you have an opportunity to have a different number on your way back in." The random lottery draw took

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place before tenants received their relocation and replacement units. This ability to re-draw added an element of fairness to the redevelopment.

The random lottery draw does not pool all tenants together; rather, households are broken into groups based on their family size and housing needs. For example, TCHS stated,

> We separate by the bedroom size, we start matching based on the draw number … my draw number is five, and I am before you. People one, two, three, four are for different unit sizes, they are not competing for the same unit, so my first choice was unit 205. I'm getting unit 205. Now we [come] to you, your first choice is 205, what is your second choice, unit 310, you're getting unit 310.

Allowing tenants to compete in two separate draws as opposed to lining up, has created a system that treats everyone equally. It does not penalize those who are not able to stand in line. All tenants, except those who needed special accommodations, were all considered equal in the system. Seniority of tenancy did not give tenants priority in the process. For example, TCHS stated, "it's fair because I think that everybody has to have the same opportunity… it doesn't give you any advantage. Because some people are saying, why would you have an advantage for 20 years you have already enjoyed the benefits of living in a subsidized unit." The entire system is built on the idea of treating everyone equal and not giving advantages to those who have seniority of tenancy, or who are first in line.

The lottery system intended to simplify the relocation and return process for tenants. It was also intended to be a fair and transparent system that would attempt to remedy some of the problems associated with phase 1 relocation and return (such as lines and off-site housing). All tenants were given the same chances in getting the unit they desired. The new ten step system has been viewed as favourable by tenants and TCH. This system was a profound improvement over phase 1. The goal in phase 1 was to achieve a simple system that would foster trust by treating households equally. However, as stated before, this was not achieved. With the subsequent changes and the addition of the lottery systems, phase 2 is better aligned with the goals of redevelopment.

5.2.9.2 Sub-Phases

TCH decided to divide phase 2 into four sub-phases. The choice has been seen as an advantage in terms of management of the tenants. Instead of 499 households, the households are broken down into four phases which are organized and further categorized by buildings, so it becomes easier to organize and conduct meetings, and provide building specific information. However, one possible disadvantage of this breakdown, is the difficulty to track all the different groups. For example, TCHS stated, "administratively speaking, it is really hard because now we have to follow all those returns by groups; who is sooner, who is later. It's really hard for us to do it, but [in an] other way, it's easier because we are dealing with smaller groups, you can actually manage the groups easier. It does have advantages and disadvantages." Sub-phasing was one major changes of phase 2, and as a result, TCH was able to track the sub-phases in-depth. The following table outlines phase 2 rates of return in each sub phase.

Table 6: Phase 2 Rates of Return: Broken Down by Sub-Phases

Rate of Return Phase 2	PHASE 2A		PHASE 2B		PHASE 2C		PHASE 2D	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
TOTAL HOUSEHOLDS RELOCATED	46	100	41	100	19	100	334	100
MOVED OUT OF TCH	6	13	1	13	0	0	12	4
WAITING TO RETURN	3	7	1	7	2	11	95	28
WAIVED	0	0	0	0		0	33	10
RETURNED	**37**	**80%**	**39**	**95%**	**17**	**89%**	**194**	**58%**
Source: Toronto Community Housing (2014b). Relocation and Return. Retrieved on August 16, 2015								

In each sub-phase, some tenants were given the chance to move straight into a replacement unit, rather than moving into a relocation unit and then again moving into their replacement unit. Allowing tenants to move straight into new housing was the result of the front ending of construction which occurred in phase 1. Front ending construction refers to the practise of constructing more units then are being demolished. The key benefit of this was it allowed households the chance to move straight into their replacement units. For example, in phase 1 there were 418 units demolished, however, the amount of units created was 705. This was done so Phase 2 households could move straight into their replacement homes. 8 buildings were constructed in Phase 1 allowing some phase 2 households the chance to move into their new housing right away. TCHS stated, "Many of them moved into temporary units. So what we did in phase 1 return, [was] we built 8 buildings. We built much more than what we relocated, having in mind that the next group will move straight into their new units," A smaller portion of the tenant population had to move into a relocation unit in Phase 2, which made moving less stressful for tenants.

In phase 2A the rate of return for tenants was 80% of households, and phase 2B was 95%. TCHS explains that in, "Phase 2A, we relocated 46 households, 38 returned. So that is 80%; Phase 2B: 95% return, the reason for this is, many of these households moved straight into new units, so they are in a way returning but they were not relocated." Phase 2C was smaller, having 17 out of 19 return to housing. Phase 2D was the largest phase by far, it had 58% of tenants coming back. For example, TCHS, stated,

> We offered to phase 2D tenants, many of the tenants went straight into
> the new buildings, out of 334 households, and 186 have already
> entered new units. Which is 58%, the number is really high and now
> this group will take probably majority of 180 Sackville

Simplifying the system, and moving tenants straight into their housing, has improved the rates of return since phase 1. The majority of tenants were not forced to move off-site, resulting in a fair majority of tenants remaining in Regent Park throughout the entire redevelopment process.

The benefits of moving tenants directly into replacement housing is substantial. This reduces the hardships associated with moving far from one's community. It also allows one move, rather than two, which reduces stress in vulnerable segments of the tenant population. For example, a Canadian housing researcher stated, "Sure you don't have people moving twice, there are ways to do the phasing of the construction that would reduce negative impacts on tenants and would eliminate off-site relocation and the displacement that comes with that, you always lose people who move off-site. It can be hard to move" (CHR). Phase 2 tenants faced less disruption in their lives in comparison to phase 1 tenants. For example, CHR stated,

> For people in phase 2 for Regent Park, more units were built than …
> knocked down, lots of people from phase 2 moved straight into their
> new buildings. Those people, there was obviously less disruption
> because they have moved once, you are moving right into a new unit.
> From them, you are moving from an old unit in Regent Park to a new
> unit in Regent Park, which leads to less disruption.

Allowing tenants the chance to skip relocation housing, and move straight into their replacement housing on-site, can reduce the potential hardship and displacement associated with public housing revitalization.

The choice to breakdown phase 2 into four sub-phases, combined with allowing tenants the chance to move straight into a replacement unit within Regent Park, allowed for improvements in phase 2 relocation and return processes. These two significant changes to Right of Return allowed the rates of return to improve from phase 1. The hardships felt by tenants would also decrease, allowing many to stay in their community rather than moving off-site. The difficulties will not disappear overnight, but these changes are a step in the right direction.

5.2.9.3 No More Off-site Housing

One key implementation piece associated with phase 1 was the development and incorporation of three buildings off-site. As a result, 85% of the 2083 units were built on-site, and 65% of the RGI subsidies were replaced on-site. TCH decided to keep all new replacement housing and subsidies from phase 2 onwards, to remain on-site. This was a direct result of consultation and feedback from tenants. For some, the off-site housing worked, but others were not happy with it. For example, TCHJ stated,

> But after phase 1 particularly, and from feedback from people
> returning, we considered returning to a building nearby, but we made a
> decision at TCH, but I can't remember who was responsible for that
> decision, we made the decision for all the replacement subsidies which
> we could have replaced off-site we were going to replace on-site, so
> that ensure that anyone off-site will have a unit built for them within
> the boundaries of Regent park, no more subsidies would go off-site, as
> part of the revitalization.

The decision to keep all of the remaining replacement housing on-site was seen as a positive one because it would not lead to any issues in the future. For example, Executive Assistant to ward Councillor McConnell stated, "after those three building for the remaining phases there isn't a single one that will be built outside of the original footprint, that won't be an issue going forward." As a result, TCH will work to accommodate all of the replacement housing on-site ensuring that all will be able to use their Right of Return on-site.

5.2.10 Summary

In Phase 1, TCH aimed at creating a fair system of relocation and return. However, was poorly designed. The poor policy design emerged from two main areas because the first come, disadvantaged older individuals, or households with smaller children, and tenants who worked long hours. Also, the addition of three off-site buildings was not well received by the community. Tenants also felt that they did not relinquish their Right of Return when they

moved to off-site replacement housing. Furthermore, some tenants felt pressure from TCH to choose the less popular option of off-site housing.

Throughout phase 1, communication was poor between the tenants and TCH. The top-down model of communication resulted in major issues. Confusion about Right of Return was a central issue during phase 1. Many tenants did not understand the process of relocation, and some even questioned whether the Right of Return would be fulfilled. The addition of off-site housing was not communicated effectively. Many tenants were not directly involved in key decisions regarding redevelopment. The poor communication between TCH and phase 1 tenants led to rumours and misinformation, that began to impact how tenants perceived Right of Return.

Phase 2 changed due to consultation with the community. The changes that emerged in phase 2 aimed to fulfill the goals outlined in phase 1, of creating a simple, fair, and transparent relocation and return process. As a result, TCH developed a ten step process which focused on two random lottery draws. These draws ensured that all tenants would be treated equally when selecting their relocation unit and replacement unit. Both the tenants and TCH have viewed this process as an improvement. In addition, TCH will not move anymore replacement housing off-site. This was a decision made after speaking with tenants. Therefore, all of the remaining RGI units will be placed in the original footprint of the community. Last, TCH allowed tenants the chance to move straight into their new units rather than moving to a temporary relocation housing unit, then moving again to their final replacement unit. This was set up by construction schedules in phase 1, which planned for more units to be built than were torn down. These changes from phase 1 to phase 2 collectively helped improve the system of relocation and return.

5.3 What are the Criteria for Success When Evaluating Right of Return?

When defining success in terms of Right of Return, one must examine the process of implementation, and the subjective experiences of tenants impacted by redevelopment. The rates of return are not the sole indicator if success is achieved in Right of Return. As a result, an evaluation needs to take a holistic approach in understanding the processes associated

with Right of Return. In order to contextualize rates of return and non-return, researchers must examine various factors associated with the relocation. Defining success in Right of Return is unique, because if tenants opt not to return, the policy is not necessarily seen as a failure. Key informants mentioned that the success of Right of Return hinged on whether tenants were more or less happy with their housing choices during redevelopment. Ultimately, Right of Return is a choice, so if tenants have been given the chance to choose their housing, then the policy is a success. It is impossible to guarantee the happiness of all tenants with their housing choices. So the process of right of return should give everyone the chance to get their ideal housing. The tenant's satisfaction with the system can only be judged by the community itself, making the communities own subjective experience a critical criteria of success. The interviews revealed three main themes which form the main metrics that should define success in the implementation of Right of Return. The metrics should closely examine the Right of Return, understanding the housing choices made by tenants, and last, should focus on community involvement.

5.3.1 Process

When examining how the policy of Right of Return operates in redevelopment, it is important to understand how its success is defined and measured. The success and evaluation criteria of Right of Return placed more importance on the process and implementation, than the actual rate of return. The metrics used to define success should focus on the implementation process. A good process entails a system of implementation that gives information diligently, facilitates and supports tenants throughout the process. All tenants should also be given the chance to use their Right of Return. A good process can lead to meaningful choice for tenants. If tenants choose not to return and are happy living off-site, than this scenarios is not seen as a failure but rather success. It is important to understand the context behind the rates of return rather than simply using those numbers as the measure of success. For example, PC1 stated,

> If you measure those who wanted to come back, came back, that's not
> very good either, because some people left, started a life somewhere

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else, wanted to keep those relationships and choose not to come back.
The real test is, were all of tenants who wanted to come back contacted
about returned, and those ones wanting to return, able to return. That's
the real test, I do not know if we have hit that bar. I don't know what
the denominator is and the numerator to measure it with.

Ultimately, the rates of return are of secondary importance. It is however, essential to
contextualize the numbers by looking at the processes put in place for Right of Return. A
simple and transparent process which allows tenants to make informed choices is considered
to be a part of the definition of success for Right of Return.

As a result, TCH focuses on constantly making tweaks to the implementation process
to ensure that tenants are well supported throughout the process. The system will respond to
changes as well as issues that arise, and the process will then change in order to improve for
tenants. TCHA stated,

It's about where people are relocated… its having people return and
about supporting them in the process, and there are tweaks in the
process, if [TCHS] says this is happening and if there is an issue we
bring it up and go from there, it's really about ensuring those
implementation pieces are important and we will try to tweak them as
the process goes along, success is ultimately getting people relocated
and mostly happy with where they were relocated, and bringing people
back.

The success comes from all tenants having an opportunity to return. HA stated, "I don't think
the measure of the effectiveness is how many people come back, people who move and don't
return but had the opportunity, it tells me they are satisfied by where they are or they just
want to deal with the hassle with moving again, neither of those are bad outcomes." A key
informant at TCH also shares this view, for example, TCHA stated, "but our success, and I
would say the measure of success, is in our commitment to our implementation of a Right of

Return policy." The success of Right of Return is not about having every single tenants return, but rather the measure of success should focus on how well TCH relocated tenants, how well the information was communicated, and how well the process was implemented. The main criteria that key informants believe defines success, is creating a process that allows everyone the opportunity to return if they choose to do so. If one tenant is not given this choice, the policy is not successful. For example, Executive Assistant to Councillor McConnell stated,

> the first would be, if you're strictly looking at the right to return
> policy, I would say success can only achieved in one way, everyone
> had their right to return honoured, choices they make for whatever
> reason they can make, if one household is told they cannot come back,
> that would be failure, caveat being there is also a process in public
> housing wherein if you do not fill the obligations, and if there is anti-
> social behaviour, those sorts of things are legitimate reasons, they are
> being moved out of that portfolio entirely, putting that piece aside, it's
> a small slice, if one family was told they were not able to come back
> because we could not accommodate them, it would be a 100% failure.
> (EA)

Success comes from creating a fair and equal system. Right of Return is a policy where the process is more important than the results. It would be very hard to assume that 100% of tenants would come back. However, one thing that policy implementing institutions can do is focus on creating a process that ensures information is given to all tenants, and tenants are able to make informed choices regarding housing within the redevelopment.

5.3.2 Choice

Choice is an important aspect when attempting to define success in revitalization and Right of Return. TCH was required to give information to tenants, and then allowed them to decide their housing choices. It is important to see what choices were made and why, because the Right of Return is ultimately one out of three options: 1) return to replacement unit, 2)

leave TCH altogether, or 3) make relocation housing permanent. For example, LGP1 stated, "They are guaranteed the right to social housing, and then the right to return to a replacement social housing, so it's their choice." Ultimately, the definition of success should look at choice, and whether tenants are able to make informed choices regarding their housing. Informed choices are heavily impacted by how well a policy has been implemented. Thus, the two concepts are closely related.

Success comes from tenants being able to make a choice about where they want to be. If tenants do not return, this is not necessarily seen as a failure. For example, "at least reviewing the question, the metrics of success that we do have are not in number of houses who have return, but in the fact that we are guaranteeing absolutely a 100% right to return. Should people choose not to return, that's their prerogative and there might be, whatever reason whether they are invalid or valid, there are reasons that people wouldn't return or choose not to return" (TCHJ). This view was also shared by TCHS, "So that to me is success too, then they have choice of choosing, we don't choose for them, they are choosing for themselves, and what I like in this process, in not choosing your unit, and if you did not write it in, we will never offer to you.". For TCH, success partially meant that tenants were able to make housing choices. The TCH wanted to avoid making housing related decisions for tenants and they supported the tenant's pursuit of their own choice. This was ultimately, a key to factor which one must consider when developing metrics for evaluation.

Choice is an important aspect that must be understood and it is important to understand whether these choices were informed. When choices are not informed, due to poor communication and stress, it can lead to tenants making choices given the circumstances they are facing. Success comes from meaningful choice, rather than poor choices made by living in a stressful environment. For example, CHR stated,

> there is a choice between staying where you are for another 4 or 5
> years in your relocation unit, or moving into a brand new unit., That's
> not a choice when you are low income person living in some
> substandard conditions in some cases often in communities where you

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do not feel comfortable, being told you can stay in Moss Park, for
another 5 years, your apartment may be in bad condition, maybe there
are people on your floor who you are not comfortable with, or you can
have a brand new sparkling unit, people make these choices,

Right of Return is ultimately a choice for tenants. A part of the success comes from tenants being able to make their own choices. However, these choices can be shaped and hindered by factors out of a tenant's control. Living in poor conditions, or feeling uncomfortable in an environment can seriously impact the choices tenants make.

The choice of tenants can also be impacted by poor policy implementation, and communication. This was seen as one of the issues regarding off-site housing in Phase 1. For example,

"Choices" right, I use the air quotes because they are not meaningful
choices when people are circumstances that are constraint by property.
The pressure and coercion on the part of TCH is a very big part of it,
people are scared of TCH, and they live in fear of their landlord for
whatever reason. They don't feel, there is a power dynamic and power
differential that is very important and that's the context for all of these
interactions.

Meaningful choice is a key measure of success. The housing decisions made are often complex and limited, or inhibited by a variety of factors. When looking at the Right of Return it essential to understand whether the process of relocation or return effects into how tenants make housing choices. Right of Return is a choice, these choices are heavily impacted by the process implemented by TCH. When there are problems with communication and relocation, this has the ability to negatively impact and hinder tenant choice. Thus, when looking to define success it is important to get feedback from tenants regarding the housing choices they have made throughout redevelopment. Success should

partly take into account the decisions made by tenants, and what factors impacted these decisions.

5.3.3 Community Based Evaluation

The metrics and definition of success should be decided by the community rather than those from the outside. In order to truly understand how the policy impacted tenants, the tenants must have an active part in defining success. Success is ultimately defined by the subjective experience of the community and tenants. As mentioned above, choice is a significant criteria when defining success in the implementation of Right of Return. As a result, engaging with those tenants can help shed light on the factors which impacted their choices. For example, PC1 stated "so, I would define success again in subjective terms, according to what the tenants think, because that's the purpose of the Right of Return, was not anything else absolute, it was just a subjective experience of those who were involved." An institutional or top down approach to evaluating Right of Return would be easier and more cost effective. However, without the community element involved, an important portion of feedback and knowledge would be missing. It would be difficult to understand the factors that impact housing choices for tenants. The internal institutional approach to implementation would leave a critical component out of the process. For example, Executive Assistant to Councillor McConnell stated, "Community based, I mean we can evaluate it from various official, from left, right, and centre, we can use different metrics, and provide a report to council and say, yay, and we got it right. But that is the easy way out, it really has to be at the community level, and I think you know, the proof is in the pudding, it's based on how people feel" (EA). The perspective of the tenant should be a central part to help define the metrics of success. The redevelopment and the Right of Return were touted as a means to improve the lives for the original tenants. It is important to create a dialogue with those tenants to see whether the impacts have been positive or negative.

This would entail an ongoing dialogue that starts before revitalization and follows up throughout the process. For example, an American housing researcher stated, "I think you have to latest try some triangulation between understanding what the population wanted at

the time of redevelopment, and you have to go from there, you would have to go and actually talk to people, the displaced people and find out what's producing this dynamic"(AHR). One factor in defining success will emerge from the community's subjective experience.

5.4 Chapter Summary

The origins of Right of Return reflect the ideas and influences of three key groups of streams of influence, the Local Government/PHA, Pam McConnell, and grassroots members of the community. The City of Toronto wanted to retain a healthy supply of rental housing and limit the hardship on tenants in redevelopment. Experiences in the private sector rental field allowed the City of Toronto to develop a cursory framework which was changed and applied to social housing. This framework set down the foundation for Right of Return. In addition, the community, through grassroots engagement, demanded a Right of Return that would ensure that redevelopment would not lead to displacement. Furthermore, without a Right of Return, local support from the community would be non-existent, leading to staunch opposition from the tenants impacted. Another key actor involved in the formulation of Right of Return was the elected Councillor McConnell. Her long involvement in the community, and history with tenants, allowed her to formally enshrine the Right of Return through City Hall. As a result, Right of Return became a policy, rather than a promise.

The policy framework of Right of Return was the result of higher level goals and visions for community planning listed in the 2005 PPS, The City of Toronto Official Plan, and the Regent Park Secondary Plan. The principles outlined in these documents promoted rental protection, RGI preservation, and maintaining a full stock of affordable housing. In order to achieve these goals, the City of Toronto relied on a variety of planning tools such as a Section 37 agreement with TCH and a holding provision. The holding provision was built into the zoning by-law for redevelopment and acted as a powerful tool to monitor and regulate construction throughout the redevelopment. These documents ensured that the majority of housing remained on-site, rather than move off-site. It also ensured that tenants would be assisted throughout redevelopment.

The implementation of Right of Return faced some difficulty early on, but the changes from phase 1 to phase 2 improved the relocation and return of tenants. In phase 1, TCH aimed at creating a fair and simple system of relocation and return. However, line up for unit selection were seen as a problem by both tenants and TCH because it penalized older individuals, families with smaller children and those with mobility issues. In addition, poor communication plagued phase 1. Tenants felt information regarding the three off-site buildings was muddled and unclear. Also, some tenants felt pressured off-site, while others misunderstood that choosing these sites did not relinquish their Right of Return. The confusion and poor communication caused hardship on tenants leaving many to question the Right of Return.

Tenant consultation prompted TCH to develop a ten step relocation process which used random lottery draws for the selection of units. Tenants participated in a draw, where they choose their relocation unit and their replacement unit. Furthermore, changes to policy design such as front ending, and creating sub phases, allowed TCH to have better results relocating tenants. The front ending construction reduced the complexity of relocation and return, and allowed tenants to move straight into their replacement unit.

Last, the benchmark of success regarding Right of Return cannot simply be defined by the number of tenants who have been able to return. When evaluating this policy it is important to understand the decision making process of the tenant. Success is more about the process rather than the outcome, therefore this policy should be about people making meaningful choices. As a result, information must be given, people must be treated fairly, and an ongoing dialogue must occur in redevelopment.

Chapter 6
Discussion

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the significance of my findings. The rebuilding of Regent Park is a historic redevelopment in the context of Canadian public housing. The aim of my research was to examine how the policy of Right of Return operated in the Regent Park Revitalization Plan. This model of redevelopment has been watched closely by a variety of stakeholders across the country. The billion dollar infrastructure project represents a significant investment from the both public and private sectors. This is an important project whose success or failure will inform the future of municipal infrastructure projects, and Canadian housing policy for decades to come. The redevelopment of public housing is a key policy area that impacts large Canadian metropolitans such as Toronto, Calgary, and Vancouver. Gaining a deeper understanding of public housing redevelopment will allow me to shed light on policies geared towards preventing tenant displacement, as well as limiting hardship during redevelopment. The development programs occurring in the Downtown East Village of Calgary, and East Downtown in Vancouver, will also have large impacts on the residents currently residing in these communities.

The findings of my research were generated through key informant interviews with twelve community members, and an analysis of key documents relating to Regent Park Revitalization Plan. The key informant interviews allowed me to understand how various segments of the community felt about Right of Return. The data generated from my study will help discover and touch on larger issues that impact redevelopment and community development policy. The following will present a discussion of the findings and also will orient my findings in the existing literature.

6.1 Summary of Key Findings

Redevelopment was a new experience for Regent Park tenants. This was also since s one of the first public housing redevelopment projects taking place in Canada, leading tenants to have little faith in the process. The policy of Right of Return was the result of a

variety of interests either involved or impacted by redevelopment. The various planning tools used by the City of Toronto ensured that Right of Return was a well-articulated policy which gave tenants a legal means to return to their community after redevelopment.

Phase 1 of redevelopment had issues resulting in some tenants being displaced during redevelopment. However, the second phase of redevelopment adopted better policy practises that allowed most tenants to stay on-site during redevelopment or move straight into their new homes. Simplifying the relocation and return process helped clear up some of the confusion in phase 1. As well, key changes to policy design allowed better tenant relocation and return processes. Furthermore, front end loading construction was a key difference that was used by TCH in phase 2. This was a positive policy change because the stress of moving twice was avoided and tenants could move into new units faster (CHR). In the end, the changes from phase 1 to phase 2 helped streamline the process of relocation and Right of Return, resulting in a system that improved delivery of information to tenants about their housing choices. The changes from phase 1 to phase 2 were seen as positive, and the system improved largely due to ongoing communication between tenants and TCH.

6.2 Communication and Housing Choices

The importance of communication in the execution of public policy is essential to its success. Authors such as Makinde (2005), have mentioned that communication is important to policy implementation because it allows the limitations, benefits, and caveats of policy to be fully understood. Communication was a large factor in how tenants perceived and understood their Right of Return. If information is given diligently and clearly, it can lead to tenants being able to make informed choices.

The Right of Return at its core is a choice for tenants to make (TCHA). A critical factor in the success of Right of Return comes from tenants making informed choices, which is intrinsically related to effective communication. Key informant CLE1 also shared this view, who believed the communication process was the single most important thing regarding tenant relocation and return. Good communication can help manage the stress of being temporarily displaced for tenants. Furthermore, it can allow tenants to make their own

informed decisions throughout the process leading to residents being happy with their housing choices and outcomes.

In phase 1, TCH had a few issues communicating to their tenants about the Right of Return policy. Many tenants were critical and, fearful of being displaced by redevelopment. TCH communicated in an inconsistent manor, leading to prior to phase 1 demolition in 2005. Tenants were confused and uninformed about the redevelopment. The confusion led many to question the legitimacy of the Right of Return, influencing the decision for some to leave Regent Park permanently (PC1, CLE1). The problem of communication was amplified when the addition of off-site housing was introduced, leading to mistrust and skepticism in the community. TCH faced similar challenges that had plagued HOPE VI sites in cities such as Chicago. Communication in HOPE VI was seen as an issue that impacted the implementation of tenant relocation and return (Joseph & Chaskin, 2012). Common criticism emerging from studies focusing on the CHA's Plan for Transformation, was that information was not given diligently; the communication was muddled and residents were not given adequate notice regarding the demolition of their buildings. In some cases tenants were only given a one month notice that their building was slated for demolition (Venkatesh, & Celimli, 2004). The rushed relocation dates did not allow tenants enough time to mentally prepare for a stressful move. One of the harsher criticisms directed at the CHA operations of relocation and return, was that information was deliberately misconstrued to limit housing choices for tenants. Critics also mentioned that some residents were pushed to certain locations, and were pressured to pick certain housing locations (Polikoff, 2009). The misconstruing of information led many tenants to make uninformed choices because the logistics were seen as easier for relocation counsellor.

The research stated that some Regent Park residents felt that communication between TCH and the tenants was unclear at times. Furthermore, the issue of off-site housing highlights some problems associated with communication between TCH and phase 1 tenants. Tenants were sceptical regarding the redevelopment and did not believe the Right of Return was not a genuine policy (CP1, CLE1, TCHS). The caveats and details of the policy were not explained to tenants prior to phase 1 demolition in 2005. The issues in phase 1 were similar

to what Vale and Graves (2010), Popkin et al., (2004a), and Joseph & Chaskin (2012) had seen in HOPE VI, communication was a factor that impacted how tenants made decisions regarding housing. The poor communication regarding off-site housing, and the allegations of deliberately vetting residents for off-site housing hindered the tenant's ability to make informed choices (CHR). The role and status of off-site housing as replacement housing was not communicated effectively, resulting in a controversy among a few tenants and the TCH. Issues regarding communication at the beginning of phase 1 ultimately impacted various tenants' perception of redevelopment and the Right of Return policy. However, changes were made and an open dialogue with the community following phase 1. This helped TCH make build a basis of trust with the community. Overall, the process improved. The use of community animators created a direct link between TCH and the tenant population. Phase 2 was seen as an improvement in terms of communication between tenants and TCH.

TCH also exhibited excellent communicative practises. The TCH had significantly better communication policies regarding demolition notices than the CHA. Though the Section 37 agreement required that TCH notified tenants five months prior to demolition, TCH started communicating about one year prior to redevelopment, stark contrast to CHA practises (TCHS). Alongside Section 37, the City of Toronto and SSHA required that TCH inform residents well before demolition. This oversight from the City and the SSHA helped keep TCH accountable in delivering information diligently. The monitoring ensured that tenants were given at least five months' notice prior to the demolition of their home. The result of this allowed tenants one year to mentally and physically prepare for the demolition of their home, which was considered a good practise (CLE1).

6.3 Ideas Framing Right of Return

HOPE VI aimed at decreasing high concentrations of poverty and this narrative gained significant political clout with policy makers in American cities. The result was the dispersal of large pockets of constructed poverty and the deconstruction of large housing projects such as Robert Taylor Homes in Chicago. The concentrated poverty thesis has had a palpable force in policy circles and fit into the urban neoliberal discourse that has been

prominent in US cities since the 1980s (Goetz, 2000). Instead of examining the structural causes of poverty in public housing communities, poverty deconcentration has over-simplified the problem and related poverty to a spatial condition (Wilson, 1987). Furthermore, this narrative has made it politically acceptable to displace urban poor in an attempt to reclaim urban space for affluent users (Crump, 2002). As a result, addressing a high concentration of poverty has allowed local governments in the US to gain significant funds from the federal government to create mixed income communities and deconcentrate pockets of urban poverty.

The HOPE VI program allowed public housing to be transformed into mixed income housing. The remaking of urban space has resulted in the attraction of affluent residents. Thus, municipalities have benefited from selling underutilized high value land. The motivations and desires of city planners and policy makers in the US seems counter to those advocating for a Right of Return. The ideological rift between activists and the local government led to a policy that was designed to fail (Berg, 2004). Poverty deconcentration required that communities that are characterized by a large amount of poverty and public housing reduce the number of public housing units by physical redevelopment and dispersing tenants. As a result, the net number of public housing units in the US decreased leaving many unable to redeem their Right of Return (Diamond, 2012). From a theoretical perspective, the ideas behind Right of Return, which represent the preservation of social housing, and limiting displacement among tenants were not a definitive foundation of HOPE VI in cities like Chicago and San Francisco. In contrast, key informants in Toronto felt that part of the theoretical foundation that informed Right of Return, focused on preserving housing for the original residents of Regent Park.

If a PHA aggressively chose to focus on poverty deconcentration, such as the CHA, and hoped to institute a Right of Return, they could not achieve both goals as they are contradictory. The goals of poverty deconcentration contradicted the vision of the community activists had when they fought for a Right of Return. As a result, the use of Right of Return in certain developments was not a genuine policy but instead a promise in order to gain support in the community (AHR). Across HOPE VI sites, lower rates of return are attributed

partly to a net decrease in the actual number of physical housing units in the US. On-sites with higher rates of housing on-site, the rates of return were also higher (Holin et al., 2003). The fair majority of traditional public housing was converted to Housing Choice Vouchers (subsidizing market rental) or market units. The HUD lifted the one for one replacement of public housing units prior to HOPE VI. This left little incentive for housing to be preserved on-site. This deregulated housing allowed PHAs to transform the space from solely public housing to new mixed use and tenure communities.

In Toronto, the Regent Park Revitalization Plan unfolded quite differently than HOPE VI. The narrative of poverty deconcentration was not a definitive element of public housing redevelopment. Although it was recognized that high concentrations of poverty were a problem facing Regent Park, the solution embraced by TCH and the city of Toronto was not defined by the poverty deconcentration thesis. In contrast to the HOPE VI, the policy of Right of Return was reflected the values and policy framework that was developed by the City of Toronto and TCH. Key informants all felt that preserving social housing was necessary (TCHS, TCHA, TCHJ, LGSW, LGP1). Furthermore, key political actors were strong advocates for preserving housing. Also, the values of those policy makers reflected a socially democratic outlook towards public housing. This is represented through a willingness to regulate development strictly, and focus on the rights of lower income tenants rather than push for redevelopment and displacement.

TCH opted to commit to a one for one replacement, replacing 100% of the RGI units and subsidies into Downtown East and Regent Park. The City of Toronto took a managerial role in the redevelopment rather than facilitating a large scale marketization of Regent Park. Harvey (1989) found that the rise of neoliberalism has impacted how local governments operate. The shift has seen more local governments enter an entrepreneurial role, which aimed to facilitate investment through deregulation, rather a managerial role focusing on regulation. Throughout the Regent Park Revitalization Plan, the City of Toronto has managed to find a balance between the managerial and entrepreneurial role of government. The regulatory regime surrounding redevelopment in Regent Park, has much more regulation in

terms of planning than HOPE VI sites. This has resulted in policies and plans that are supportive of Right of Return.

6.4 Changes from Phase 1 and 2:

The changes from phase 1 to phase 2 were a significant finding in the research. The first come, first served line up for relocation housing from phase 1 was criticized by key informants (TCHS, TCHA, CLE1). The need to line up for temporary relocation housing had negatively impacted those who were parents with small children, elderly, differently abled, and those who worked during the day (CLE1, TCHS, Schippling, 2007). After phase 1's relocation and return had occurred, the TCH reflected on the issues regarding the first come, first served line ups. The implementation revealed that this system of relocation was not adequate. Consequences such as individuals lining up days before were not anticipated (TCHS). TCH revamped their system of relocation and return by creating a 10 step program of relocation and return. The 10 step relocation system allows tenants to participate in a random draw to assign their housing choices. The lottery system was a definite improvement. In their study of tenant relocation systems, Public-Interest (2004) stated that the use of a lottery system to designate housing choices was considered a best case practice. The lottery system was perceived to be far better than the line ups by key informants (TCHS, CLE1).

During phase 2 some tenants were able to move straight into their new units. The process building more units than were torn down, allowed some phase 2 tenants to move straight into their on-site replacement unit. These improvements to policy design aided tenants Right of Return. According to the Hollins (2011), tenants experience less stress when they are able to live and remain on-site. Furthermore, the front ending of construction in phase 2 ensured some tenants would only have to move once, from their old unit to their new replacement unit. In contrast, phase 1 tenants would move from their original unit to a relocation unit and finally, to their replacement unit. The changes that were made in phase 2 reduced the number of times some households. These changes have been attributed to mitigating the frustrations associated with multiple moves (Venkatesh and Celimli 2004).

When a tenant is able to move straight into their new unit from their previous home, the complexity of relocation and return is simplified.

Comparing the results of housing choices from phase 1 and phase 2, it appears that in phase 2 more residents were able return, and less residents opted to leave TCH RGI housing. The higher rate of return among tenants can be attributed to better communication on the part of TCH, as well as better policy design, which was mentioned above. Below is a breakdown of changes from phase 1 and 2, as well as relocation statistics for both phases to highlight the changes.

Table 7: Changes Between Phase 1 and 2

	PHASE 1	PHASE 2
Relocation	Line ups first come first serve	Relocation lottery system
Communication	Muddled and confusing	Active dialogue with tenants, supportive
Return	Off-site housing	On-site return, moving straight into new unit

Figure 1: Relocation Statistics Phase 1

|	
■	Moved out of TCH
■	Waiting to Return
■	Waived
■	Returned

Phase 1: Numbers of Households Relocated= 381

Up to date as of November 19th, 2014

Source: **Toronto Community Housing (2014b) Regent Park Relocation Statistics**

Figure 4: Relocation Statistics Phase 2

■	Moved out of TCH
■	Waiting to Return
■	Waived
■	Returned

Phase 2: Numbers of Households Relocated= 441

Up to date as of November 19th, 2014

Source: **Toronto Community Housing (2014b) Regent Park Relocation Statistics**

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6.4.1 Organizational Learning in Toronto Community Housing

The change that occurred from phase 1 and phase 2 was largely attributed to the organizational learning that occurred after phase 1. Prior to redevelopment, the TCH (known then as TCHC) was a relatively new organization that had little experience with revitalization or the smooth relocation of tenants (TCHS, CLE1). When the TCH devised their relocation system they aimed to create a system that treated everyone equally, and was also simple to understand. This was done to ease the stress of relocation, but primarily to build trust with a community that was already skeptical of redevelopment (Meagher and Boston, 2003). The experience of implementing this system of relocation identified the deficiencies and unforeseen circumstances of having people line up. The problems experienced by the TCH, led them to reflect on their processes, thus beginning the process of organizational learning (Levitt & March, 1988). The negative results associated with the first come, first served line up, prompted TCH to change the policy of relocation and return. This was the impetus that sparked the organizational learning that would take place in TCH between phase 1 and phase 2 (Levitt & March, 1988).

Contrasting between their goals and what happened on the ground, the TCH discovered there was a disconnect between what was intended and what actually occurred in terms of tenant relocation (Levitt& March, 1988). After their negative experience, the TCH took an opportunity to evaluate the policy. They opted to change the policy so that it would better serve the goals of fair and easy to understand relocation (TCHS). The TCH engaged in intense public engagement and dialogue to gain perspective and understand the views of those people who participated in the original system of relocation. The TCH participated in hundreds of meetings that were both formal and informal. This was important to the organizational learning because tenants could reflect on the process of relocation and how it has impacted them. Talking to tenants allowed the TCH to see how specifically the system failed, and how tenants perceived it (TCHS) (Levitt & March, 1988). This added an important dimension to the learning process because the TCH incorporated the views of additional stakeholders rather than focusing solely on the internal stakeholders. The TCH

took the experience of tenants into regard when retooling their relocation policy. The learning that did take place was attributed to the willingness of the TCH to actively engage with tenants. The literature has identified that stakeholder communication and openness to stakeholder participation represents an organizational culture which helps facilitate policy learning (Elkjaer, 2003; Huber, 1991; Levitt & March, 1988; Pedlar, et al, 1991).

The lottery system was viewed favourably among key stakeholders. Tenants also agree that the system of relocation has improved profoundly (TCHS, CLE1). The lottery is more in line with the initial goals of creating a simple and fair system of tenant relocation; it was random and treated all tenants equally. One's ability or time to wait in line for unit selection was no longer the determining factor of the system of relocation. Instead the system gave two separate chances for individuals to potentially gain their first housing choice. Having a random draw when tenants selected their relocation unit and a separate draw for their replacement unit helped add a degree of fairness to the process.

Ultimately, working with tenants and facilitating communication was a strong aspect of the TCH organization. The issues of phase 1 were addressed mainly through direct dialogue between tenants and the TCH. TCH allowed tenants to speak freely and help contextualize the events that occurred in phase 1. The insiders view brought a new dimension to the analysis of the first phase of redevelopment. Working with tenants and having an open approach to learning allowed changes to better suit the TCH and align with their vision for relocation.

6.5 Policy Implementation and Policy Framework

The Right of Return in Toronto has operated in different ways from other regions and redevelopments. The effectiveness of the policy framework was a unique feature of the Right of Return in Regent Park. The willingness of City of Toronto, and TCH made the Right of Return into a well-defined policy which allowed the majority of tenants to come return. The policy framework that was designed in the City of Toronto was robust and well supported across a variety of stakeholder groups. Key officials at the City of Toronto were strong advocates for tenant Rights. The work of the SSHA, City Planning, and Councillor Pam

McConnell as advocates for tenants allowed a powerful coalition to help lay down the foundation for a Right of Return. The City of Toronto recognized the importance of RGI and the vulnerability of the population of Regent Park tenants. These streams of influence came together and tenants recognized that regardless of how redevelopment turned out, the Right of Return would be present for them.

In contrast, a study by Berg (2004) showed that Right of Return in Chicago's Plan for Transformation and was ambiguous and vague policy. The symbolic nature of the policy was the by-product of tension and conflict between the CHA and tenants. According to Matland (1995), symbolic policies are often policies that are created due to conflict among stakeholder groups. The goals and objectives were vague to appease the various stakeholders who differing visions for redevelopment. In Chicago, the CHA's Right of Return was largely a symbolic policy because Right of Return was promised to residents, despite decreasing on-site housing and placing strict eligibility criteria for tenants hoping to return to mixed income housing. The symbolic policy was the result of a poor relationship between CHA and the tenants, fueled by a history of institutional racism and poor management. These all factored into the implementation of Right of Return, resulting in poor processes which lost residents in the development (Berg, 2004). The Right of Return lacked a legislative aspect, making it a false promise rather than a policy. The lack of policy framework, contributed to a policy promise that lacked accountability (AHR). Ultimately right of return lacked institutional support from policy makers.

The logic and consistency inherent through the policy framework made sure tenants had a right of return. The documents which frame and inform planning in City of Toronto such as the 2005 PPS, the City of Toronto Official Plan and the Regent Park Secondary plan all contributed to the vision of preserving RGI housing in the City of Toronto and specifically the community of Regent Park. In comparison to HOPE VI, the logic in the policy framework was flawed. The higher level planning documents set the ideational foundation for Right of Return. However, these policies lack legal clout, they are not legal documents rather documents that shape redevelopment. The substance of the policy framework emerges from policy tools that combine legal agreements, zoning by-laws.

The bulk of Right of Return policy operates through a mixture of legal and land use planning tools. Collectively these documents were rigid legal tools that were well defined and unambiguous. According to Sabatier & Mazmanian, (1980), when policy is ambiguous, and lacks clarity, implementers can interpret this policy differently in order to best serve their needs, leading to a policy not achieving initial goals. One key part of the policy framework for Right of Return was the Zoning by-law for phase 1. According to Hodge and Gordon (2014), zoning by-law is an effective tool used to regulate the structure, location and type of dwelling units. The City of Toronto employed the Phase 1 by-law to ensure that 85% of the original 2083 units in Regent Park must be built in the original footprint effectively preserving social housing in Regent Park. Furthermore, the Phase 1 by-law also had a holding provision. The zoning by-law Hold would require a studies to be done before the next phase of redevelopment could proceed. This acted as a mechanism to hold TCH externally accountable to the public and city of Toronto. Also, it would ensure that interim monitoring and evaluation would have to occur. The key document that relates to Right of Return and the zoning hold is the Housing Issues Report (Toronto Community Housing, 2013). This report required an in-depth investigation of how many houses have been torn down and will be built, the dwelling types and the location of replacement housing. Furthermore, The Section 37 agreement contained the TRAIP guidelines. The TRAIP set out rules, and regulations so that communication is clear and diligent. In Chicago, poor communication was attributed to CHA communicating in an ad-hoc fashion, only a few weeks before tenants were supposed to move (Venkatesh and Celimi, 2004). In order to avoid these issues, the City of Toronto and the SSHA required at least 5 months' notice be given before tenants were required to move. The phase 1 zoning by-law, and the Section 37 agreement made Right of return a highly regulated, and ensuring the proper number of units were built, and people would be relocated and informed diligently was linked to land use planning approvals. Ultimately, the effectiveness of this policy in Regent Park was largely due to the policy framework embedded in the redevelopment.

6.6 Implications for Planning Theory

As time has progressed, planning theory has strived to incorporate better citizen participation practises within the planning process. The early style of blue print planning that created communities like Cabrini Green, and Regent Park, lacked public input (Lane, 2006). The redevelopments that created public housing communities like Regent Park were characterized by expert driven modernism. In the past, city officials and technocratic city planners took a top down approach to redevelopment which did not take citizen input into consideration during the planning process and when participation was present it was tokenistic (Arnstein, 1969; Lane, 2006). As a result, residents were heavily impacted by redevelopment and they were unable to advocate their concerns. The Urban Renewals gave little consideration to the ideas and opinions of the community members whose community was being redeveloped. The lack of political power of lower income minorities led to the large scale displacement of many (Jourdan, 2008; Reynolds, 1963).

An interesting finding that came up in my research that was not touched on by the literature was the fact that Right of Return was a policy that had the potential to facilitate meaningful engagement between tenants and TCH. When citizens saw that they had a role in their community's future, they were more interested in participating in the planning process (PC1, CLS). The legal Right of Return for residents represents a formalized stake in redevelopment for tenants. As a result, TCH and Daniels Corporation would be required to consult with the tenants in the redevelopment. The Right of Return policy allows TCH to gain acceptance from the community regarding redevelopment. Without this policy, many tenants may frustrate the process because they were ultimately going to be displaced (CLS). When one does not see his/her future in a community, his/her want to participate in the planning process is diminished, and the participation that does take place is regarded as rhetorical participation. The Right of Return represents a critical first step to giving tenants more power during the negotiations of redevelopment. When a large portion of residents are given a Right of Return, engaging and facilitating cooperation becomes essential to the future of the project.

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It is important not to overstate the role tenants play in the Regent Park Revitalization Plan because the forces of the market tend to shape the redevelopment. As Arnstein (1969) stated, meaningful public participation only takes place when power has been redistributed to the people with the lowest position in society. The current style of planning and municipal governance focuses on public private partnerships. However, the key stakeholders in contemporary housing redevelopment are private sector shareholders. This was the case in Regent Park, where key decisions were made out of the hands of the public and tenants. In an era of neoliberal urban governance, public participation is bound and limited by the market logic of neoliberalism. Often the public participation is limited and tokenistic and most often conforms to the larger narratives created to sustain neoliberalism; thus, large scale critiques and public processes with a redistributive aim are quickly stopped. Despite this, Right of Return represents an important step up Arnstein's ladder towards citizen control (Arnstein, 1969).

Chapter 7

Recommendations

The results from my research suggest that Right of Return in the Regent Park Revitalization Plan allowed the majority of residents to return because the policy had an articulated framework which ensured that TCH would be externally accountable and tenants' rights were taken seriously. This framework emerged from the ideas and opinions of a variety of stakeholders in the redevelopment. The Right of Return policy was designed to ensure that tenants impacted by the redevelopment would have the choice to return to their community after redevelopment was complete. In order to improve the policy, my research has found areas that could be improved, based on the findings. The following recommendations will first be aimed at the future phases of the Regent Park Revitalization Plan, phases 3 to 5. The recommendations will focus on improving the process of Right of Return by centring on the implementation process. Also, I will touch on the importance of community involvement, policy monitoring, and plan evaluation. This chapter will also provide recommendations that will hopefully influence community redevelopment policy and housing regeneration taking place across North America.

7.1 Improving Communication

Communication emerged as a key factor which impacted how tenants viewed the Right of Return and the redevelopment as a whole (CLE1, CP1). The majority of problems in phase 1 were the result of poor communication and confusion. In order to combat the spread of rumors and misinformation, it is essential to work with the community to better discuss the caveats of Right of Return. When communication is done effectively, the literature suggests it is a contributing factor to tenants being able to make informed housing choices (Joseph & Chaskin, 2012). The communication between tenants and TCH is improving as TCH becomes more familiar with the redevelopment process. Communication during the relocation and return process improved but it could be further improved (PC1). In order to improve communication, I recommend a few changes. One key issue in Regent Park was that

misinformation often was passed through informal networks in the community, leading to confusion among tenants.

- A change that I would recommend, is that tenants in the community who have been through the process of redevelopment participate in a formalized focus group to liaise with residents who will be participating in future phases of redevelopment. This can allow tenants who are hesitant about relocation to talk to residents who have been through the process of relocation and return. This can help clear up misconceptions and potential rumours in the community. Talking with one's friends and neighbours can also help disseminate this information in informal social networks.

- Residents who have been through the process (relocation/return) would work as a bridge between TCH and the community. The use of community animators in Regent Park was seen as a good start to improving communication. Expanding this would help expand participation in the whole process of revitalization.

7.2 Evaluation and Monitoring

An important aspect of any large scale planned intervention, or community redevelopment, is ensuring that goals and objectives are being achieved. In projects such as these, the reason for redevelopment and intervention is the need to improve the community. As a result, the community should have a larger role in keeping planners and housing authority accountable to the initial goals of the redevelopment. These goals are often designed to improve community so it is important to properly monitor and document the progress. Furthermore, the social goals and economic goals need to be measured. The nature of the Regent Park Revitalization Plan is focused on improving the physical and social elements of the community. It is important to have an interim evaluation of the redevelopment as a whole. A key part of this evaluation should focus on the relocation and return processes used to move residents through redevelopment.

The evaluation and monitoring of residents' experiences needs to be shaped through a collaborative process with the community. Factors such as tenant choice, and the process of implementation, were a part of the criteria that should define the success of the Right of Return policy. This would be an important recommendation because it would help TCH see what has been working in redevelopment and what have been the impacts on tenants' lives. Allowing the community to take ownership could help bolster citizen participation in the redevelopment. Citizen participation was missing in early housing redevelopments and it has been recognized by key informants in my research that participation needs to be a part of redevelopment. The incorporation of participatory evaluation would help empower residents and ensure that citizen participation is a facet throughout redevelopment as opposed to just the planning process.

In order to better understand tenants' decisions and perceptions throughout the relocation and return process, an evaluation in which tenants have a stronger role is required. In order to achieve these objectives, it is essential that evaluation be a participatory evaluation. Participatory evaluation is an evaluation framework in which the program creators (City of Toronto), implementers (TCH) and beneficiaries (tenants) work together to create an evaluation framework which takes the voices of all stakeholders involved. The key benefit of the participatory evaluation is that participants are involved in the planning, designing, and implementing of the evaluation. This can allow capacity building and ownership among the tenants in the community (USAID, 1996).

Table 8: Participatory Evaluation for Regent Park

1) Stakeholders (City of Toronto, RGI Tenants, TCH)
2) Developing, designing and planning evaluation: This should be shared among all stakeholder groups.
3) Indicators of programs progress: Tenants should have a strong role in forming the metrics of success because a large part of Right of Return emerges from the subjective experiences of tenants (PC1). TCH should use public meetings to help tenants formulate and articulate criteria of success.
4) Local leaders in the tenant community who have gone through earlier phases should have a leadership role in evaluation along with key bureaucrats
5) Findings should be collectively discussed and analyzed.
6) Consensus building should lead to recommendations and changes to policy.

See Appendix J for fully developed and detailed table

7.2.1 Monitoring

The Right of a Return is a choice, therefore keeping an ongoing dialogue with the tenants regarding their housing would lead to a better understand of tenants housing choices. The importance of choice was highlighted by key informants (PC1, TCHA, TCHS, LGP1). TCH should survey tenants prior to relocation in an attempt to set a baseline for tenant's preferences to return. Setting a baseline for tenant preferences can help compare the numbers of households who have returned to those who had indicated a preference. TCH will be able to understand what factors led to the households not wanting to return. This will help display problems with policy design or implementation impacting return to Regent Park. In order to develop an effective way to monitor and evaluate the following changes should be adopted:

- The housing choice survey could be similar to the one used by the CHA in the Plan for Transformation. This would be important to set up a baseline and allow TCH to measure and better understand the number of households who have been able to return.

- It is suggested that a longitudinal survey be adopted to see how tenants feel about their housing choices and the process of relocation and return. This survey would focus on a conversation with a relocation counselor in a one on one situation.

- In order to formalize the monitoring and evaluation the Housing Issues Report (2013) should have a section added focusing on tenant experiences with the relocation and return. TCH must provide a detailed account of tenants housing preferences, and experiences with relocation. This would allow TCH to be held externally accountable to the City of Toronto.

7.3 Recommendations for Housing and Community Redevelopment Policy:

Municipalities across Canada embarking on community redevelopment and public housing regeneration should consider the policy of Right of Return. The policy can only work if there is a policy framework put forth in which PHAs are held accountable for the relocation and return of residents. Redevelopments that are to happen in the future should have a strong plan outlining the relocation methods, with an emphasis on mitigating the hardships associated with potential displacement. When a future redevelopment is taking place, it is important to give a Right of Return. However, the policy cannot be a promise, it must be a well-articulated policy that is communicated effectively to tenants.

Furthermore, in this neoliberal era, limited funds have pushed many public bodies such as PHAs and local governments to pursue public private partnership. These relationships require that private actors work with public bodies to redevelop communities. The impact the private actors can directly impact tenants in redevelopment. When local governments and PHAs enter into these types of relationships they lose a degree of their power. In the first two phases of redevelopment key decisions such as the number of housing on-site vs off-site were influenced by the demands of the market. In order to ensure that tenants are not negatively impacted by public private housing and community redevelopments the following recommendation has been provided.

- The local government should have strict oversight over private developers that are rebuilding public housing communities. The City of Toronto had an excellent

framework of regulations which emerged from a variety of planning tools such as zoning by-laws and a Section 37 Agreement. Other municipalities should adopt a strong regulatory framework similar to the City of Toronto.

Chapter 8
Conclusion

This study aimed to develop a better understanding of how the Right of Return policy operated in the redevelopment of the first two phases of the Regent Park Revitalization Plan. The approach taken by the City of Toronto and TCH viewed the Right of Return as an essential policy that needed to have a strong framework, to give tenants a legitimate Right of Return. The unique policy adopted by the City of Toronto and TCH was an interesting case which had not been explored in-depth by the literature thus far. Through the literature review, it became apparent that there was a significant gap in knowledge regarding Right of Return in the Regent Park Revitalization Plan. As a result, I hoped to better understand the ideas and influences that shaped the adoption of Right of Return. Also, I wanted to understand the empirical rates of return for residents, while reflecting critically on the process of relocation and return. Finally, I focused on the metrics that are used to define success in Regent Park.

Through my key informant interviews and document analysis, I found that Right of Return operated through an articulated policy framework that was heavily influenced by a variety of stakeholders. The stakeholders involved or impacted by redevelopment, had a diversity of views, but all felt that permanent displacement should be avoided. Despite a relatively strong policy framework, the implementation of Right of Return was problematic in phase 1. Scepticism within the community and poor communication led residents to question the legitimacy of the Right of Return. From phase 1 to phase 2, drastic changes were made. Through a collaborative process TCH was able to implement changes that better served tenants participating in revitalization.

This study also shows how contemporary housing redevelopments are influenced by a variety of internal and external factors. Internal factors such as policy implementation, policy feedback and organizational culture are key factors which can shape and influence housing policies such as Right of Return. As a result, organizations implementing policies need to facilitate an open dialogue with their tenants to help monitor and improve policies. When organizations actively work with tenants this can ultimately help implementation of policies

such as Right of Return. Ultimately changes made by TCH from phase 1 to phase 2 represented organizational learning which led to a better policy design.

In order to better understand the tenants 'perceptions of redevelopment, redevelopment research, and Right of Return, future research should attempt to understand the diversity of factors that impact how tenants' make housing decisions in the context of redevelopment. A statistical model used to understand complex behaviour would be the next step in building on my research. The choices that humans make are complex, and one limitation of my research is that I make assumptions regarding the choices that tenants make without consulting with the community extensively.

Understanding and improving the Right of Return policy will hopefully lead to better outcomes for residents involved in redevelopment. I hope my research will help inform policy that aims at limiting hardship that tenant's face in the redevelopment of their homes, as well as preventing unnecessary displacement caused by redevelopment.

Appendix A
Recruitment Letter

University of Waterloo

June 24th, 2014

Dear:

This letter is an invitation to consider participating in a research study that I am conducting as part of my Master's degree in the School of Planning at the University of Waterloo, under the supervision of Professor Dr. Laura Johnson. I would like to provide you with more information about this project and what your involvement would entail if you decide to take part.

The research will attempt to understand the policy provision of the "Right of Return" and its role in public housing revitalization. Little research has been done on this important policy. My research will examine the policy process touching three key areas: policy design, implementation and results of the first two phases. The primary data collection will be generated through interviewing key informants involved in the Regent Park Revitalization Plan such as yourself. The data generated will emerge from the expert experiences and opinions of key informants. Eventually, I hope this data will provide policy recommendations for phases 3 to 5.

Interviewing Planners who have expert knowledge on housing issues, official plans associated with the Regent Park Revitalization can offer valuable insight on "Right of Return". My research intends to looks at political, legislative and statutory origins of Right of Return. I believe that your expert knowledge would help me better understand the origins and formulation of Right of Return in the Regent Park Revitalization plan.

Participation in this study is voluntary. It will involve an interview of approximately 30 minutes in length to take place in a mutually agreed upon location. You may decline to answer any of the interview questions if you so wish. Furthermore, you may decide to withdraw from this study at any time without any negative consequences by advising the researcher. With your permission, the interview will be audio recorded to facilitate collection of information, and later transcribed for analysis. Shortly after the interview has been completed, I will send you a copy of the transcript to give you an opportunity to confirm the accuracy of our conversation and to add or clarify any points that you wish. All information you provide is considered completely confidential. Your name will not appear in any thesis or report resulting from this study. However, with your permission anonymous quotations may be used. Data collected during this study will be retained for 1 year in a locked office in my supervisor's lab. Only researchers associated with this project will have access. While I will work to protect your confidentiality, be aware that a motivated individual could work to ascertain your identity because there are few individuals who occupy your job.

If you have any questions regarding this study, or would like additional information to assist you in reaching a decision about participation, please contact me (Navroop) at or by email at. You can also contact my supervisor, Professor

This project has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through a University of Waterloo Research Ethics Committee. However, the final decision about participation is yours. Participants who have concerns or questions about their involvement in the project may contact the Chief Ethics Officer, Office of Research Ethics at 519-888-4567, Ext. 36005 or maureen.nummelin@uwaterloo.ca. I hope that the results of my study will be of benefit to those organizations and individuals directly impacted by the redevelopment of Regent Park, as well as to the broader research community.

I very much look forward to speaking with you and thank you in advance for your assistance in this project.

Yours truly,

Navroop Tehara

Appendix B
Consent Form

CONSENT FORM

By signing this consent form, you are not waiving your legal rights or releasing the investigator(s) or involved institution(s) from their legal and professional responsibilities.

_____

I have read the information presented in the information letter about a study being conducted by Navroop Tehara of the Department of School of Planning] at the University of Waterloo. I have had the opportunity to ask any questions related to this study, to receive satisfactory answers to my questions, and any additional details I wanted.

I am aware that I have the option of allowing my interview to be audio recorded to ensure an accurate recording of my responses.

I am also aware that excerpts from the interview may be included in the thesis and/or publications to come from this research, with the understanding that the quotations will be anonymous.

I was informed that I may withdraw my consent at any time without penalty by advising the researcher.

This project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through a University of Waterloo Research Ethics Committee. I was informed that if I have any comments or concerns resulting from my participation in this study, I may contact the Director, Office of Research Ethics at 519-888-4567 ext. 36005.

With full knowledge of all foregoing, I agree, of my own free will, to participate in this study.

☐YES ☐NO

I agree to have my interview audio recorded.

☐YES ☐NO

I agree to the use of anonymous quotations in any thesis or publication that comes of this research.

☐YES ☐NO

Participant Name: _____ (Please print)

Participant Signature: _____

Witness Name: _____ (Please print)

Witness Signature: _____

 Date: _____

Appendix C

Key Informant Interview Guide

This interview is designed to ask you about the policy of right of return in the context of the first two phases of the Regent Park Revitalization Plan. I am particularity interested in your opinions in regards to right of return. Also, if for any reason you do not want to answer a question you may decline. This interview should last about 30 minutes.

What are the origins of Right of Return and ideas/ influences have shaped the policy of Right of Return?

  I.   What ideas shaped the policy of right of return?
  II.   What does right of return mean to you?
  III.   How was it incorporated in the official plan?
  IV.   What are your thoughts on giving a legal right of return to tenants?
  V.   Do you believe this policy has been effective?
  VI.   How important is it that community members return after redevelopment?
  VII.   Are policies such as these practical solutions to displacement or potential gentrification?
  VIII.   In Chicago where did this policy come from? Was it largely tenant driven?
  IX.   What ideas have shaped right of return? Is there some sort of legislative base in HOPE VI that requires housing authorities to give a right of return for tenants?

In Regent Park, What are the rates of return for phases 1 and 2?
  I.   How many households were able to return?
  II.   How does this number compare to expectations?
  III.   What changes if any were made after phase 1?
  IV.   It is my understanding that some residents from the first phase of redevelopment are being housed outside of the original footprint, why did this happen?
          • How does this fit in with the right to return and how was it received by residents?
  V.   From Phase 1 to Phase 2, have you noticed any different concerns in residents?
  VI.   What impacts has this had on the large scale redevelopment of Regent Park?

How does one way to evaluate right to return?
• What changes would could be made to potentially improve right of return?
• What defines success for Right of Return?
• How should right of return be evaluated?
• Why did the rates of return appear to be so low in some certain US sites HOPE VI sites? Are these numbers indicative of success of failure?

Green: asked to city officials
Grey: American housing expert

Appendix D

Policy Framework Flow Chart

Appendix E

Survey Prior to Redevelopment

When the reconstruction is <u>finished</u> in Regent Park would you prefer to: 2004*

- Return 79%
- Live Nearby 6%
- Live somewhere else in Toronto 7%
- unsure 7%

7

7

6

79

N= 229

Tehara, N (2015, Feb 5). Personal interview with PC1

Appendix F

## Unit Breakdown

Unit Breakdown: RGI subsidies/physical units

Before Redevelopment:

1) The subsidies and units were merged together, (**2083 units and 2083 subsidies** were given to residents to subsidize their rent)
2) When redevelopment was taking place (85% of the physical units needed to be in Regent Park 1771 units) and 65% of those units would accommodate RGI (**1150 residents**) the remaining buildings would housing residents that were classified as (affordable housing CHMC)
3) Downtown East (15% of the original were there (**312 units**) and (35% of the subsidies could go there (**730 residents**) = the addition of three extra buildings was designed to accommodate the excess people, and this was also taking attrition into consideration and seeing if some people did not want to come back
4) If more people wanted to come back TCH would have to convert affordable units or market units into social housing units. The City of Toronto stated that if more residents wanted to return
5) The numbers are able to work because there is a degree of expected turn over and attrition of the population.

# Appendix G
Phase 1 and 2 Map

Regent Park footprint

# Appendix H

Relocation and Return 10 Step System

Appendix I

Phase 1 and 2 Relocation Statistics

Relocation Statistics for Phase 1

■	Moved out of TCH
■	Waiting to Return
■	Waived
■	Returned

84 / 22%
18 / 5%
207 / 54%
73 / 19%

Phase 1: Numbers of Households Relocated= 381

Up to date as of November 19th, 2014

Source: **Toronto Community Housing (2014b) Regent Park Relocation Statistics**

Relocation Statistics for Phase 2

■	Moved out of TCH
■	Waiting to Return
■	Waived
■	Returned

19 / 4%
101 / 23%
287 / 65%
33 / 8%

Phase 2: Numbers of Households Relocated= 441

Up to date as of November 19th, 2014

Source: **Toronto Community Housing (2014b) Regent Park Relocation Statistics**

Appendix J

Participatory Evaluation Framework

Figure: PE Chart: Regent Park Redevelopment	Participatory evaluation	Rationale
Who drives evaluation	Community members, implementing staff, other stakeholders (plurality of stakeholders)	Tenants should drive evaluation because they are impacted by the redevelopment. TCH and the City of Toronto also have a stake in redevelopment so, a formal partnership is required.
Appropriate	Participatory evaluations are useful when looking at implementation and understanding the impacts on the beneficiary or target of the policy intervention	Heavy tenant involvement is seen as appropriate because key goals of the redevelopment are based on improving tenant community and lives. The social development plan state that improving the social fabric of community is important
Degree of collaboration	High degree of collaboration in comparison to traditional evaluation	The high degree of collaboration is justified because the revitalization was designed to improve the lives of existing tenants and the Right of Return is a policy designed specifically for the original tenants. It also allows us to understand the housing decisions made by tenants in the redevelopment.
Who determines the metrics used for evaluation?	Community members, implementing staff, other stakeholders (plurality of stakeholders),	The community and tenants should take a prominent role in defining the metrics regarding the relocation and return process. TCH should define the metrics in areas not related to tenants directly such as costs and operations. Also, TCH should help build capacity among tenants regarding plan evaluation
Benefits of Participant based evaluation	Local knowledge is uncovered and stakeholder can speak from themselves. Also, there is ongoing public participation. There is also the potential to build capacity among tenants.	Truly understand the factors that influence housing choices. It also to be a stakeholder in whole process, and allows for more public participation throughout the redevelopment.

Note

[1] A recent study in 2008, conducted by Ciseneros and Engdahl (2010) revealed that only 24% relocated as a result of HOPE VI have moved backed to HOPE VI mixed income communities. The rest have either accepted a rent subsidy, moved into other public housing or left public housing.

[2] Housing Authority in Toronto prior to 2003, when TCHC (now TCH) was created

[3] Roll back: Peck and Tickell (2002): dismantling regulatory regimes, and legislation.

[4] Rolling out: creating new institutions which embody values of neoliberalism, replace the old,

[5] The Plan for Transformation: this was a policy that was designed to recreate public housing in Chicago. The plan overlapped with the HOPE VI redevelopments and was very similar to the objectives of HOPE VI.

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