Philosophy

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This is the collection for the University of Waterloo's Department of Philosophy.

Research outputs are organized by type (eg. Master Thesis, Article, Conference Paper).

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Now showing 1 - 4 of 4

All the World's a Stage: Fictionalism, Metaphysics, and Truth
(University of Waterloo, 2020-12-22) Beriault, Phillipe; DeVidi, David
Fictionalism has been an appealing position for many philosophers seeking to avoid controversial ontological commitments implicit in certain kinds of discourses, while also trying to account for the usefulness of those discourses. While fictionalists with respect to various domains have made impressive attempts to explain how something can be both fictional and useful, extant fitionalist views retain one problematic commitment: that there are no substantively true assertions made within such domains. My dissertation attempts to develop and defend a semantic anti-realist account of fictionalism which does not share this commitment to error theory. Diagnosing the source of the residual commitment to error theory as arising from a commitment to a particular picture of meaning, I propose that fictionalism can provide an alternative semantics that grants that such assertions can be successfully truth-stating. I begin by describing a general framework for understanding debates between realists and anti-realists in various domains - derived primarily from the work of Michael Dummett and Crispin Wright - according to which realism for a domain roughly boils down to the view that (a) our assertions in that domain, if true, represent a mind-independent reality; and (b) that we can make true assertions in that domain. The fictionalist's aversion to the ontological commitments of realism for particular domains requires a rejection of either (a) or (b). My suggestion is that fictionalists are mistaken in giving up (b), and that the work they have done to bolster their views instead provide us with the tools we need to reject (a). I consider two particular examples to illustrate my case. First, I look at Mary Leng's and Stephen Yablo's respective developments of mathematical fictionalism, both of which make important use of Kendall Walton's theory of make-believe. Contrary to Leng's and Yablo's own views, I present a case for the view that by recognizing mathematics as a sort of make-believe, fictionalism can instead be used to fashion an alternative semantics for mathematical claims, and so provide grounds for rejecting the mathematical realists' commitment to (a). Using lessons derived from the mathematical case, I develop an account of modal fictionalism that similarly outlines modal discourse as a kind of make-believe which provides an alternative, anti-realist semantics for possible worlds discourse. I conclude by moving away from particular instances of fictionalism to consider some potentially controversial consequences of my approach to fictionalism, defending the commitments to alethic and logical pluralism implicit in my view.
Knowledge, Justice, and Subjects with Cognitive or Developmental Disability
(University of Waterloo, 2019-09-20) Klausen, Catherine; DeVidi, David
This thesis includes four research papers, each devoted to a topic in philosophy of cognitive disability and its intersection with other areas of philosophy. Three focus on issues of cognitive or developmental disability and epistemic injustice, drawing from theories by Miranda Fricker, Rebecca Mason, and José Medina. The fourth argues that attention to people with communication disability has important implications for our understanding of human rights. Specifically, distinguishing one’s right to communicate from one’s right to freedom of expression. Lessons are drawn along the way for our understanding of philosophically difficult concepts like identity, decision making, social capital, inclusion, and ignorance. Throughout, the philosophical approach involves attending to the lived experience of people with communication, cognitive, or developmental disability as a way to test the suitability of philosophical theories developed with other people in mind, and as such can be described as a project in Applied Philosophy.
Mathematical Actualism: An Alternative Realist Philosophy of Mathematics
(University of Waterloo, 2022-09-23) Freiburger, Troy; DeVidi, David
The present thesis argues for a philosophy of mathematics, herein dubbed Actualism, which is contrasted with several existing views on the philosophy of mathematics. It begins with a brief introduction to the classical (Platonist) view on the philosophy of mathematics and examines some of the major problems with the account. Thereafter, two alternative philosophies of mathematics (mathematical Constructivism and mathematical Finitism) are examined. Constructivism is detailed in the first chapter through the work of Brouwer and Dummett and, in the second chapter, a description of Finitism is provided through the work of Dantzig and Mayberry. In the final chapter of the thesis, the underpinnings of mathematical Actualism are articulated. The central motivation behind Actualism as an alternative philosophy of mathematics arises from the desire to restore a realist thesis to mathematics that is consistent with the semantics of our modern scientific discourse, or else, with a naturalistic worldview.
Skeptics and Unruly Connectives: A Defence of and Amendment to the Non-Factualist Justification of Logic
(University of Waterloo, 2018-10-04) Oxton, Oliver; DeVidi, David
This thesis attempts to positively solve three problems in the foundations of logic. If logical connectives are defined by their introduction and elimination rules, then how might one prohibit the construction of dysfunctional rules, i.e. rules which let us infer anything from anything else? How might one be held accountable to the consequences of those logical rules that they accept in an argument? And, how might one who, for whatever reason, doubts those logical rules regularly taken for granted, be convinced to adopt deductive ‘best practices?’ A variety of positions in the foundations of logic are reviewed, but it is found that each either fails to answer all questions together, or leads one to troubling epistemic conclusions. This thesis attempts to draw broad lessons from those positions otherwise found wanting, and then builds on the seemingly most plausible perspective; namely, non-factualism. Particularly, it is argued that non-factualism fails to distinguish between epistemic values and epistemic domains, and that the consequence of this distinction allows one to effectively compare the success of their deductive practices with the skeptic.

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Browsing Philosophy by Author "DeVidi, David"