Philosophy

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This is the collection for the University of Waterloo's Department of Philosophy.

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On Culpable Ignorance: Answering the Debate between Epistemic Vice and Internalism
(University of Waterloo, 2025-09-05) Zhu, Cathy
Imagine I invite you over for tea. I ask you if you want any sugar in your tea and you say “yes, please!” So I take the sugar bowl out of my cupboard and spoon some sugar into your tea. Little do I know, someone had snuck into my house in the middle of the night and switched out the sugar in my sugar bowl with arsenic. You drink the arsenic tea and fall deathly ill. By putting what I think is sugar into your tea, I cause you to fall ill and potentially cause your death. But all along, I had no idea that the contents of my sugar bowl was arsenic, not sugar. Am I blameworthy for poisoning you? The topic of when an agent can be held responsible, or culpable, in cases where they did not know what they were doing has gained attention in recent years. The field of culpable ignorance aims to look at when agents are culpable for unwitting wrongful acts performed from ignorance, and what criteria must be fulfilled to judge an agent as morally responsible for her wrongdoing. I am to defend a version of what is called the Epistemic Vice View held by William FitzPatrick, which states that normative ignorance can be culpable if it is a result of epistemic vices such as arrogance, laziness, or dismissiveness, given that the agents could have reasonably remedied their ignorance had they not exercised such epistemic vice. However, it has been met with critique. I focus on Neil Levy’s Internalist critique, which states that what an agent can reasonably know and have done is a state internal to the agent herself. I argue that Levy is incorrect in his internalism because his theory is founded on two false assumptions. In doing so, I hope to defend FitzPatrick’s Epistemic Vice View. I argue that the Epistemic Vice View captures our intuitions about blameworthiness, while also avoiding the extremes of both excusing all ignorance and condemning all unwitting wrongdoing. My defense contributes to the broader debate by offering a nuanced standard for culpable ignorance, one that preserves the integrity of moral responsibility without requiring radical revision of our practices of blame. In the first chapter, I introduce the topic of culpable ignorance, and delineate the main ways theorists aim to solve the issue. In the second chapter, I outline the debate between William FitzPatrick and Neil Levy. Finally, in the third chapter, I pose critiques to Levy’s internalist position.
Growing Beyond Fiction: Solarpunk as an Ethos of Care
(University of Waterloo, 2025-09-04) Woodend, Kyra
This thesis explores the intersection of care theory, a branch of feminist ethics that emphasizes relationality, responsiveness, and the moral significance of care, with the emerging aesthetic and political movement of solarpunk. Care theory challenges traditional ethical frameworks by focusing on interdependence, context, and the transformative role of emotions. Meanwhile, solarpunk, originating as a science fiction subgenre and expanding into a broader social imaginary, envisions sustainable futures grounded in environmental stewardship, technological innovation, and post-capitalist forms of cooperation. I argue that solarpunk not only embodies the central themes of care ethics but also extends them by offering a practical, imaginative, and mobilizing ethos for contemporary political and environmental challenges. Through an interdisciplinary methodology, this project demonstrates how solarpunk’s narratives and practices can respond to critiques of care ethics. Finally, by analyzing the figure of the cyborg as developed in feminist theory and reinterpreted through solarpunk, I contend that the cyborg operates as a metaphorical caregiver—dissolving boundaries between human, technology, and environment—thereby expanding the ontology of care itself. In doing so, this thesis positions solarpunk as a vital and actionable framework for imagining and enacting a livable, care-centered world.
Consent of the Governed and Other Fables
(University of Waterloo, 2025-08-27) Hughes, John
The consent of the governed plays a pivotal role in liberal philosophy. From Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, through to Kant and modern theorists such as John Rawls and Jeremy Waldron, consent has been the primary means by which the authority of the state gains legitimacy. We rarely think authoritative institutions need the actual consent of all those over whom they rule. Agents of the state cannot go around asking each individual person if they consent to each individual law, for example. For pragmatic reasons, the focus is on hypothetical consent – that is to say, if a reasonable person would consent to an authoritative institution, that institution is legitimate without needing to attain actual, direct consent. However, what you imagine a reasonable person would hypothetically consent to rests on what you believe about a variety of empirical facts about human history and human psychology, i.e. on what you believe about “human nature”. In this thesis I argue that most political philosophers do not seem particularly well-informed about these topics, often forming beliefs based on an outdated and/or false understanding of what human beings are like, or have historically been like, laying an epistemically unreliable foundation for political beliefs and leading liberal philosophers to regularly misunderstand the implications of the principles they advocate for. I further argue that there are good reasons to think that the kind of society which best instantiates liberal principles looks very different than what most people imagine.
How Could I Have Known? How Undiagnosed ADHD Instantiates Hermeneutical Injustice
(University of Waterloo, 2025-08-13) Ralph, James
In this thesis, I argue that some people with undiagnosed ADHD face hermeneutical injustice in light of their missed diagnoses. Drawing upon Miranda Fricker’s account of hermeneutical injustice, José Medina’s contribution to Fricker’s original account, Gaile Pohlhaus’s account of willful hermeneutical ignorance, Kristie Dotson’s concept of pernicious ignorance, Jon Leefmann’s concept of epistemic self-trust, and a variety of empirical sources, I explore the particular kinds of harm undiagnosed ADHDers face and explain why their marginalization is also wrongful, not just harmful. Using Fricker’s account, I aim to demonstrate how their inability to participate in meaning-making practices results in a lack of accurate hermeneutical resources within the dominant sphere and perpetuates their marginalization. Additionally, I rely on Pohlhaus’s account of willful ignorance as a framework for understanding how this hermeneutical marginalization is wrongful; although accurate resources about ADHD exist, they are often willfully ignored and excluded from dominant resources. In light of their unjust lack of hermeneutical power, I argue that we ought to consider undiagnosed ADHDers victims of hermeneutical injustice.
Understanding Dependency in the Work of Eva Feder Kittay and Alasdair MacIntyre
(University of Waterloo, 2025-07-16) Bachiochi, Anna
This thesis offers a systematic exploration of Eva Feder Kittay’s and Alasdair MacIntyre’s perspectives on dependency, primarily through a comparison of their work in Love’s Labor and Dependent Rational Animals respectively. While Kittay and MacIntyre share what I call a “care concern” (namely, an understanding of the importance of the reality of dependency in human lives), their differing ethical frameworks of a care-ethics-informed liberalism and Aristotelian-Thomistic virtue ethics lead to different conceptions of dependency and different recommendations for responding to that reality. In Ch. 1, I compare Kittay’s and MacIntyre’s accounts of dependency from within their ethical frameworks and argue that their attempts to integrate care concerns into ethical frameworks which do not usually contain them leads to parallel sources of potential self-contradiction. In Ch. 2, I compare the two theorists’ large-scale recommendations for responding to dependency, highlighting the ways that their central disagreement about the merits of liberalism and liberal government paves the way for their differing recommendations, specifically Kittay’s focus on governmental monetary support for dependency workers and MacIntyre’s focus on mid-sized communities. In Ch. 3, I build a conceptual framework to highlight three shared concepts in Kittay’s and MacIntyre’s interpersonal ethics: 1) uncalculating care, 2) expanded (or community-based) reciprocity, and 3) the role of the emotions and desires in moral action. I argue that these similarities provide both Kittay and MacIntyre with robust interpersonal frameworks which are responsive to our moral intuitions about care relationships and so avoid some of the pitfalls of other ethical frameworks. In Ch. 4, I ask broader questions about collaborations between ethical frameworks, using my work in this thesis as a backdrop. I put forth and illustrate three models of collaboration: 1) the critique model, 2) the learning model, and 3) the hybrid model. Finally, I use the work of this thesis to enter into conversations about the relationship between care ethics and virtue ethics. I argue specifically that care ethics cannot be subsumed under virtue ethics without losing some of its central and unique features (namely, its focus on care as the central ethical concept and its relational ontology) and that we can turn to MacIntyre’s work on traditions to investigate the relationship between an ethic which has care concerns and a care ethic.
Injustices in the Hijab Debates: Orientalist, Ideological, and Epistemic Injustices in Dominant Hijab Discourse
(University of Waterloo, 2025-04-09) Alsayyed Ahmad, Tasneem
In this dissertation, I analyze epistemic injustices and ideological factors that block or obscure contemporary public discourse about the Islamic veil (or hijab) and contribute to the marginalization of Muslim women and all Muslims. I begin with an overview of Edward Said’s theory of Orientalism, and I include a focus on Orientalist myths and frameworks, including the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ and the more recent ‘War on Terror’. I zoom in on Orientalist examples that highlight the gendered dimension of colonial discourses and misrepresentations of the veil. In addition to Orientalism, I substantiate my analyses with the theory of Unknowability, mainly following Kristie Dotson and Kyle Whyte’s (2013) account. I utilize the framework of Unknowability to clarify the marginalization experienced by Muslims and Muslim women. I then move on to a deeper investigation of current discourse on the hijab, zooming in on the Orientalist myth that claims the veil is “unique to Muslim women,” and Martha Nussbaum’s (2012) pro-burqa ban arguments. In my analysis of this Orientalist myth, I demonstrate how both Western interests and the Islamic Right—via a flipped Orientalism—benefit from it. In examining Nussbaum’s arguments, I show that they reproduce many Orientalist and epistemic injustices long identified by feminist, decolonial, Black and Indigenous scholars, and other scholars of colour. As a result, her discussion dangerously serves the marginalization of Muslim women and Muslims more broadly. In the last two chapters, I shift my focus to the intra-Muslim context. I examine the hijab as a social practice embedded within cultural scripts and social structures by expanding on Fatema Mernissi’s (1991) account of the hijab and by utilizing Sally Haslanger’s (2017; 2018) account of social practices. Deconstructing the hijab in this way provides a framework for navigating the features and modalities of the hijab and makes clearer the potential weight the practice has for Muslim women. Lastly, I examine the hermeneutical impasse between Muslim feminist advocates of the hijab and Muslim feminists critical of the hijab, focusing on the global movements ‘World Hijab Day’ and ‘No Hijab Day’ to do so. I introduce the 3rd Party Impasse to capture this case, and I demonstrate that this hermeneutical impasse is caused by each group’s need to prioritize their resistance against different third parties.
The Philosophy of Reconstructions of Quantum Theory: Axiomatization, Reformulation, and Explanation
(University of Waterloo, 2025-02-18) Oddan, Jessica; Fraser, Doreen
The quantum reconstruction programme is a novel research program in theoretical physics aimed at deriving the key features of quantum mechanics from fundamental physical postulates. Unlike standard interpretations of quantum theory, which take the Hilbert space formalism at face value, quantum reconstructions seek to derive this formalism from axiomatic principles. Reconstructions represent a new shift in foundations of physics away from interpreting quantum theory and towards understanding its foundational origins. The reconstruction programme has been a major focus of research in physics, beginning with Hardy (2001)’s “Quantum Theory from Five Reasonable Axioms.” However, the quantum reconstruction programme has been met with very little interest in philosophy. The goal of this project is to situate the quantum reconstruction programme in a broader philosophical context, investigating themes such as scientific methodology, explanation, the applicability of mathematics to physical theories, and theory exploration and development in the philosophy of science. I argue that reconstructions demonstrate a contemporary application of axiomatization with significant points of continuity to historical axiomatizations. I also argue that we should best understand reconstructions as provisional, practical representations of quantum theory that are conducive to theory exploration and development. Further, I contend that reconstructions function as alternative formulations of quantum theory, which is methodologically advantageous. I discuss Bokulich (2019)’s “Losing the Forest for the Ψ: Beyond the Wavefunction Hegemony” which argues that the existence of alternative formulations of quantum theory undermines our ability to literally interpret a single formulation. I argue that Bokulich (2019)’s conclusions further support the reconstructionist’s rejection of the standard interpretative project. I also argue that reconstructionists have gone beyond Bokulich (2019)’s insistence on the consideration of alternative formulations to develop a methodology that systematically constructs alternative formulations of quantum theory. Additionally, I argue that reconstructions of quantum theory are genuinely explanatory as they answer Wheeler (1971)’s “Why the quantum?” question. I contend that reconstructions are explanatory in the same spirit as Bokulich (2016)’s account of explanation in “Fiction As a Vehicle for Truth: Moving Beyond the Ontic Conception” which focuses on patterns of counterfactual dependence that correctly capture underlying dynamics. However, in order to accommodate the reconstruction case, I expand Bokulich’s account to consider theories and models as well as representations that are neither fictional nor literal interpretations. Thus, I offer an account of explanation in the reconstruction programme that is noncausal and non–interventionist, utilizing w–questions a la Woodward (2003). I conclude that reconstructions of quantum theory give us genuine insight into the structure of quantum theory via the generalized physical principles which carry physical content.
The Co-Participants Model for Fetal Involvement in Research
(University of Waterloo, 2024-09-16) Woodward, Leanne; Doucet, Mathieu
Research during pregnancy currently lags behind other types of research. Langston (2016) attributes a large portion of this issue to hesitancy by Research Ethics Boards (REBs) to approve research involving pregnant people because it is not always clear how the risks and benefits can be balanced between the parent and fetus when their interests may come in conflict. Authors such as Wild and Biller-Andorno (2016) have emphasized that one major reason that it is difficult to balance these risks and benefits is that the status of the fetus in research is unknown. By answering the question of the status of the fetus in various research contexts, we can reduce the hesitancy of researchers and REBs to pursue and approve research during pregnancy and fill in the gaps in medical knowledge in a safe, ethical manner. I argue that, based on conceptual understandings of terms like “subject” and “participant,” fetuses can fit the role of a research subject when their data is being analyzed for research outcomes, and can therefore be considered participants under the prominent Canadian guidelines known as Tri-Council Policy Statement for Research Involving Humans (TCPS2). Since fetuses are sometimes participants, we should acknowledge them as such when appropriate and take their interests into consideration, while also ensuring that pregnancy alone is not considered a reason to focus on fetal interests. This means protecting fetal interests through proxy consent when the consent process can increase clarity about which role the parent and fetus each play in research, improving respect for the pregnant parent, and welfare for the parent and fetus. I develop the co-participants model for viewing both the pregnant parent and fetus as individual participants who are inextricably linked. This allows researchers to have obligations to the fetus in the same way they would a born child, but to still take these obligations in conjunction with the pregnant parents’ interests and consider how these needs overlap. The co-participants model is preferrable to the “fetus as a patient” model by McCullough and Chervenak (1994, p. 96), and the “double unit” model by Wild (2012, p. 91) because those models use a medical practice definition of patient, and rely on a capacity view of personhood to define participation respectively. Neither model can capture a general descriptive account of what it means to be a participant of research, blurring what that would mean for the fetus. One major objection to the change in fetal status is the perception that it elevates the moral status of the fetus and could affect vital healthcare involving pregnancy termination. The benefit of my co-participants model is that it does not rely on any argument of moral personhood to determine which beings count as participants under the TCPS2. The obligations of the researcher to the fetus begin after the pregnant parent has committed their body to the growth and development of the fetus. In cases where fetuses are imminent to termination, the researcher does not have obligations to protect fetal interests and the fetus is not a participant. The co-participants model for fetal participation is one that can be easily applied to the TCPS2’s current structure and goals, clarifies the role of the parent and fetus in studies with various levels of fetal and parental involvement, and can increase the ability for prospective participants to make informed decisions that are in the best interests of themselves and their fetuses. By using a general definition of participation that does not rely on personhood, the co-participants model ensures that the research status of the fetus does not infringe on the pregnant parent’s autonomy while still ensuring that fetal interests are adequately protected.
The Price of Knowledge: Contributory Injustice Among Low-Income First-Generation Students in Higher Education
(University of Waterloo, 2024-08-29) Tronciu, Stella; Fehr, Carla
In this thesis, I argue that low-income, first-generation (LIFG) students experience epistemic injustice and oppression in higher education because of the inequitable distribution of hermeneutic and epistemic resources between LIFG and higher-income, continuing-generation students. I show that the alignment of continuing-generation and not LIFG students' resources within the academy results in institutional barriers to LIFG students' success and full membership in epistemic communities. Further, I develop the concept of “temporal epistemic injustice” to emphasize how temporal and financial constraints affect LIFG students' ability to engage fully in existing academic communities and contribute fully to knowledge production and dissemination activities. This discussion of contributory and temporal injustice is significant because it sets the stage for future work exploring how institutional and socio-economic barriers faced by LIFG students hinder their ability to impact the structure of the academy and, hence, function to maintain current unjust structures.
Matter & Space, Plato & Aristotle: The Receptacle of Plato’s Timaeus as Aristotelian Prime Matter
(University of Waterloo, 2024-08-22) Chow, James; Feke, Jacqueline
In the Timaeus, Plato presents his natural philosophy of the origins of the cosmos, space, and the four elements. In the ‘Receptacle passage’ of Timaeus 47e-53c, the eponymous speaker Timaeus affirms that the three underlying components of the cosmos are intelligible Platonic Being, sensible Becoming, and the Receptacle and that the Receptacle is space. In Timaeus 53c-57d, he proceeds to present a geometric construction of the four elements of air, fire, water, and earth from two basic triangles into four corresponding regular Platonic solids that constitute a corpuscle of each element. Based upon these passages, Aristotle interprets the Timaeus as presenting Plato’s theory of matter, where Platonic matter is space itself and matter is composed of geometric planes. In this thesis, I explore the function and role of the Receptacle and its relationship with the geometric construction of the four elements. I argue that the Timaeus presents an account of Platonic compounds (or elemental bodies), which are constituted by the Receptacle (as an underlying Platonic matter or substratum), Platonic Becoming, and images of the intelligible Platonic Being. I show that Aristotle’s characterization is true, Platonic matter is space, which is the Receptacle. My major finding is that the Platonic account of elemental bodies prefigures Aristotelian hylomorphism. The Receptacle is an Aristotelian prime matter and the images of Platonic Being are Aristotelian forms. However, since Plato and Aristotle have starkly diverging metaphysical accounts of change and Becoming, Platonic Becoming lacks a clear counterpart in Aristotelian natural philosophy.
The Literary Example as Philosophical Methodology: Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice and Arpaly’s Unprincipled Virtue
(University of Waterloo, 2024-08-16) Chernak, Ezri; Fehr, Carla
The question of the moral and cognitive content of literature has classical bona fides that imply it is a foundational question for philosophy, but philosophical interest in it has been narrow and intermittent. Conversely, narrative examples have been so ubiquitous in philosophy the methodologies underlying their use have seldom been made the center of philosophical inquiry. In this thesis, I make a comparative analysis of Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice and Nomy Arpaly's Unprincipled Virtue, arguing their use of literary examples both relies on the unique properties of the literary example, and is conceptually productive rather than merely evidentiary or illustrative.
The Inextricable Weed: Rawls and the Problem of Endemic Faction
(University of Waterloo, 2024-07-19) Brown, Curtis John Crandall; Lowry, Chris
John Rawls, over the course of his career, sought to construct a framework by which a liberal society could be envisioned in its ideal form which then, taken as a model, may illuminate a sure path for reform. His argument developed through three major works, A Theory of Justice, Political Liberalism, and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement contended with a plethora of objections and liberal alternatives ranging from Kantian deontology to the utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill. Yet, there is a notable omission, namely, the problem of faction. This oversight is in all probability due to the relative dearth of interest within philosophy since Rawls’s time. In recent years, however, there has been an increased interest in topics relating to faction within political science, sociology, and social psychology and as such, a philosophical treatment is well overdue. By conducting an analysis of the Rawlsian project with special attention to the political theory of David Hume and its emphasis on the importance of faction, it will be shown that when subjected to factional pressures, the integrity of the Rawlsian society is compromised. The definition of faction is itself contentious as many of the relevant authors offer their own bespoke definitions and exclusions which invariably influence their treatment of the subject. As my analysis hews fairly close to Hume, my definition of faction is derived from his work. A faction is a group bound together by a common identity which is understood as politically salient by the group members. factional members recognize a shared group interest and actively pursue the advancement of their group. Although factions are often organized, it is not strictly necessary as suggested by Will Rogers’s famous quip, “I am not a member of any organized party — I am a Democrat” (O’Brien 1935, 162). Not all groups are necessarily factional in character; for instance, the apolitical are excluded from factional membership given their political passivity. I will begin with a survey of some of the relevant political theorists who have developed a theoretical understanding of faction. The principal authors here considered are Aristotle who represents an early attempt to provide a systematic account of the relation between sect and politics, David Hume whose theoretic account of faction will be principally referred to, and finally, Hume’s American counterparts, particularly James Madison who refined and applied Hume’s theory in the construction of the American constitutional regime. In section two Rawls’s theory as presented in Political Liberalism and Justice as Fairness will be considered in depth with special attention given to his account of reasonable pluralism. In the final section, I shall provide a critical examination of the Rawlsian conception of reasonable pluralism, with the intent to illustrate that it is overly narrow and thereby excludes from Rawls’s politics potential allies of liberalism. Furthermore, I will endeavour to show the fundamental fragility that arises from an assumption of the inherent attractiveness of liberalism by considering its contingent and factional character. Although my principal concern is to illustrate this factional account and the difficulties it presents to Rawls, I shall also provide in the final section a preliminary account of what is minimally required for the success of a liberal political project namely, a policy of maximum inclusiveness such that both egalitarian and non-egalitarian liberals may recognize themselves as sharing a faction and which places this engorged liberal faction in opposition with its illiberal counterparts.
Professional Ethics for Economists: A Reflection on DeMartino's Oath
(University of Waterloo, 2024-02-16) Wass, Chris; Marino, Patricia
Economists and the discipline of economics occupy positions of immense institutional and intellectual authority in the world today. Decisions made based on the advice and expertise of economists influence the lives of millions of people. Economic ideas are leaned upon to shape government and corporate agendas the world over. But this influence on the world also carries with it the possibility that such ideas and actors can be the cause of significant harm. Despite these powerful positions that economists occupy and the possibility of being responsible for harming others, there has heretofore been very little serious or sustained discussion as to the potential ethical responsibilities that they might have as a profession. Over the last few years, several economists have taken note of this absence within the field and attempted to initiate a discourse about the types of professional ethical obligations that they might share as a group. One of the leading voices in this nascent discourse has been George DeMartino and his 2011 book The Economist’s Oath – which lays down many of the core assumptions and conceptual apparatuses that have guided the conversation thus far. In his book, DeMartino offers an overview of how he perceives the profession, the problems facing it, and he argues that a promising way to proceed would be to model Professional Ethics for Economists on the practices found in the medical profession. In this thesis, I critically examine the argument made by DeMartino in The Economist’s Oath and argue for some potential alternatives as to how the overall project might proceed. In Chapter 1, I lay out what I take to be the core of DeMartino’s position and identify a number of points upon which the discourse might be expanded. In Chapter 2, I offer one such expansion of the discourse on the specific topic of economic history and add additional details to some of the key historical events discussed by DeMartino. I argue that this additional context regarding the history of economics alters how they many central assumptions of DiMartino's enterprise are understood. In this chapter, I also introduce the recent development within the AEA, wherein they deviated from the historical trend of avoiding discussion of ethical topics and recently introduced a code of professional conduct for its members. I will discuss the ways that this new code does and does not address the concerns that DeMartino raises. In Chapter 3, I focus on one of the major themes of DeMartino’s book, his reliance on an analogy between economics and medicine. I argue that this analogy in DeMartino’s book – the comparison between the economic and medical professions – has fundamental limitations and that there are other established professional ethics literatures to which more fruitful comparisons can be made. In Chapter 4, I offer two such alternatives – accounting and engineering. The first alternative that I propose is accounting ethics and in particular its use of the concept of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. The second alternative explored here is engineering and the emphasis that that profession places on the principle of humility. I conclude, in Chapter 5, by applying some of these possible alternative frameworks to a selection of recent real-life examples of behaviour by economists to which such professional ethics ideas may have been usefully applied.
Genetic Renaissance: A Legal, Philosophical, and Ethical Examination of Consent Using Autonomy & Privacy in Genetic Testing
(University of Waterloo, 2023-09-28) Fedjki, Kawthar; Doucet, Mathieu
Genetic testing has gained traction in the media with the recent Pentagon ban and continuing increases in public consumption of at-home tests. Public discourse surrounding this technology prompts further exploration of the multifaceted parameters that govern its use. This thesis takes on the task of analyzing and dissecting these comprehensive features, with a specific focus on the legal, philosophical, and ethical aspects of the matrix of genetic testing. It aims to understand the application of these layers to the different contexts of genetic testing: the clinical and research contexts, as well as the direct-to-consumer context. By examining the process of genetic testing, from obtaining informed consent and collecting samples to the interpretation and communication of results, this project aims to understand all the dimensions involved. The most prevalent dimensions are autonomy, privacy, and ownership, and it is this trifecta which is most impactful on informed consent. The examination will begin by providing an overview of the technical science behind genetic testing, to better understand the uses of this biotechnology in each of the contexts (i.e. clinical, research, and direct-to-consumer). Understanding this will allow for a smooth transition into an extensive outline of the legal, philosophical and ethical concepts that are tied to informed consent. This thesis focuses on laws and policies that are applicable in the United States of America and Canada, although there are many international regulations that vary in severity and depth. These legal frameworks essentially delineate how persons should be treated across contexts, including specific regulations surrounding how informed consent must be obtained, how samples must be stored or retained, and how personal data (e.g. genetic testing results) can be used and protected. Following from this legal backdrop, a literary and historical evaluation of informed consent is outlined to establish just how foundational it is to bioethics. And essential to this are the philosophical principles of autonomy, privacy, and ownership. Although most of the thesis will focus on established frameworks, it will raise questions about the fundamental issues that plague these concepts, including the lack of consideration of collectives in consent and ownership, and the inconsistent protocols involved in direct-to-consumer testing that allow for major trespasses on personal rights by corporations that are not required to operate as healthcare institutions. In exposing these weaknesses, this thesis does not necessarily seek to provide concrete solutions for such large problems, but rather to suggest possible criteria for solutions going forward. The main point this thesis seeks to show is that despite the huge strides in biotechnology, there is still substantial space for improvement in bioethics, with specific focus on the development of policies and legislations that can capture the nature of consent across social and testing contexts. This kind of work towards ameliorating the essential legal, philosophical, and ethical aspects is essential for ensuring the protection and empowerment of individual and collective rights, especially in emerging fields such as genetic testing, where the current frameworks are inadequately suited for comprehensive coverage.
The Free Self: What Separates Us From Machines
(University of Waterloo, 2023-08-29) Ross, Mitchell; Eliasmith, Chris
Could a machine ever achieve consciousness? Will it ever make sense to hold a machine morally responsible? In this thesis, I argue that the architecture of SPAUN - the largest WIP functioning brain model currently in existence - makes it the most plausible contender for strong AI status, but that a hypothetically completed, future iteration of SPAUN is not guaranteed to possess qualitative experiences, consciousness, free will, or selfhood despite its biological plausibility; it therefore cannot be held morally responsible the way we are. To justify this position, I offer critiques of determinism, compatibilism, micro-functionalism, physicalism, and naturalistic accounts of the evolution of consciousness, as well as experiments in neuroscience that appear at first glance to disprove free will. In opposition to these views, I develop a novel form of dualism which posits the self as the free, non-physical, uncaused cause of its own actions, and provide arguments to justify this position. In essence, I propose - counter to Daniel Dennett - that selves are free to do otherwise (in the classical sense), that this is their purpose, and that naturalistic accounts of the existence of selfhood, consciousness, and qualitative experiences are inadequate because they lack a view to this purpose. I conclude that because SPAUN is a physically determined system, and its underlying substrate is distinct from our own, we should be wary of ascribing cognition and moral responsibility to it, since function alone does not guarantee cognition in this novel dualistic framework.
Toward the Interested Investigator: Examining the Epistemic Dimensions of Relational Theory in Zoology
(University of Waterloo, 2023-08-28) Anderson, Hannah Elise; Fehr, Carla
I argue in this thesis that a research approach that is based on a meaningful relationship between a zoologist and their study subject holds unique epistemic value. It has been well established by feminist and social epistemologists that the identity and interests of the knower significantly influence the way knowledge can be created. This has been applied in philosophy of science to recognize that the identity of the scientist significantly influences the way they create scientific knowledge. Relational theorists draw our attention to the uniqueness of relationships themselves. I seek in this thesis to draw our attention to the potential epistemic influence of relationships themselves in the creation of scientific knowledge in biology. I do this by bringing together relational theory and epistemologies of ignorance to understand how scientists might influence knowledge creation in biology. I do this with a specific focus on zoology. In Chapter 1, I perform a literature review of relational theory and its applications in the philosophy of biology. I argue here that relationality presents a fruitful axis for analyzing research and knowledge creation in zoology. Next, in Chapter 2, I present what I call a researcher’s “state of interest toward relationality”. I argue here that relational theory can be used to differentiate research approaches used by zoologists. I do this using two case studies: that of Jane Goodall’s research program with chimpanzees and Eugenie Clark’s research program with sharks. Finally, in Chapter 3, I use relational theory to analyze the creation of ignorance in zoology. I argue here that a research approach where a zoologist has a high state of interest toward relationality offers unique epistemic benefits by allowing zoologists to circumvent and/or respond to the creation of some forms of ignorance. I hope that by connecting relational theory with the epistemology of ignorance in biology, we may see ways that relationships can strengthen scientific research.
A Misleading Tendency
(University of Waterloo, 2023-08-28) Miller, Nadia; Saul, Jennifer
Communication is a powerful tool. We use it to share information, express how we feel, coordinate in cooperative endeavors, and so much more. However, we regularly use standard communicative devices like speech and gesture to piss each other off, to manipulate each other, and to cause harm; flipping you off or calling you by a slur is no less clear a way of sending you a message than is stating a simple fact. In roughly the last decade, philosophers of language have turned their attention away from idealized communicative contexts to develop new theories about non-ideal communication, which includes phenomena like lying, misleading, and deceptive speech. The philosophical study of lies and deception predates the discipline of philosophy itself, but contemporary theories place a special emphasis on their explanatory and moral applications in real-world social and political contexts. While care has been taken in this tradition to define lying speech, and to distinguish it from speech that is ‘merely’ misleading or deceptive, insufficient care has been taken to define and distinguish misleading speech as a distinctive communicative act. This gap in the literature overlooks a class of cases that are not captured by definitions of lying and deception and their unique moral significance. In this thesis, I defend the following, novel account of misleading: Misleading: A communicative act C is misleading iff C has a tendency to cause others to reason badly I argue that this definition of misleading is the best way to capture the fact that misleading does not necessarily cause anyone to form a false belief. My view challenges prior accounts of misleading in the literature which take this element to be necessary, and thereby fail to accommodate cases of misleading that are not successful or result in something other than a false belief.
Too Many Logoi: The Role of Logoi Within Proclus' System
(University of Waterloo, 2023-08-25) Paolini, Lucas; Feke, Jacqueline
The purpose of the present study is to understand the role of logoi within Proclus’ metaphysical system. Much of the scholarship on Proclus has largely left the topic of logoi to the side, leaving the understanding of the principle ambiguous. The study aims to show that to fully understand Proclus’ metaphysical system a better understanding of the logoi and their role within the system needs to be done. By showing how the logoi participate in the realms of Being and Becoming as well as showing their impact on causality and the World Soul, one begins to see the importance the principle has for Proclus’ epistemology and ontology. Without the logoi the metaphysical system of Proclus would be incomplete, making the principle integral to understanding Proclus.
A Social-Pluralistic View of Science Advising
(University of Waterloo, 2023-05-30) Freier, Blake; Fehr, Carla
In this dissertation, I bring together two disciplines: Science, Technology, and Society studies and the Philosophy of Science, to develop a social-pluralistic account of science advising. I use three prominent theorists in the philosophy of science to critique three prominent views in the science, technology, and society field relating to science advising. I argue that the science, technology, and society literature does not fully account for the value-ladeness of scientific research. To that end, I develop a social-pluralistic account of science advising: social, because advice should come from panels or institutions rather than individuals, and pluralistic, because we should assess the credibility of advice along several dimensions of objectivity. I then apply my view to two real world examples: first, an EPA report on the harmful effects of environmental tobacco smoke, which faced lawsuits from the tobacco industry, and second, the Government of Canada’s use of Roundup Ready canola, a biotechnology, as a “value neutral” policy response to avoid discussions about the socio-cultural impact of industrial agriculture. These examples help to demonstrate the usefulness of my view in responding to real-world situations. A social-pluralistic view of science advising helps ensure that the role of values in producing scientific knowledge and science advice are legitimate, helps ensure that diverse viewpoints are actively considered as part of the advisory process, and ensures that the resulting advice is independent of any one person’s views, beliefs, or values.
Towards a Cyber Jus ad Bellum: Bridging Legal Gaps within Cyberwar Governance
(University of Waterloo, 2022-11-24) Lukaszczyk, Artur; Orend, Brian
While the capabilities of cyberweapons surge forward, our ability to effectively evaluate and govern their deployment has lagged behind. There are presently no internationally binding laws of cyberwar. In their absence, early efforts towards cyberwar governance have revolved around extending existing laws of armed conflict into cyberspace, in hopes of establishing that such laws remained binding within the cyber domain. Although this approach has proven effective at governing cyber operations resulting in physically destructive harms, the decidedly kinetic lens of this approach limits its ability to evaluate the wider spectrum of cyber operations resulting in unfamiliar harms. The goal of this project is to offer a robust evaluative framework which encompasses not only cyber operations resulting in kinetic-analogous consequences, but also disanalogous cyber operations which nonetheless pose a clear and imminent threat to the security of states. I argue that a flexible moral framework built upon the six jus ad bellum principles of the Just War Theory tradition offers an avenue by which we may formulate a strong conceptual and ethical foundation for the evaluation of a fuller spectrum of cyber operations, as well as develop norms of best practice for state conduct within cyberspace.

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