Philosophy

Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://uwspace.uwaterloo.ca/handle/10012/9888

This is the collection for the University of Waterloo's Department of Philosophy.

Research outputs are organized by type (eg. Master Thesis, Article, Conference Paper).

Waterloo faculty, students, and staff can contact us or visit the UWSpace guide to learn more about depositing their research.

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Now showing 1 - 5 of 5

A Constructive Critical Assessment of Feminist Evolutionary Psychology
(University of Waterloo, 2017-12-21) Weaver, Sara; Fehr, Carla
In this dissertation, I develop an approach to philosophical critique of morally relevant science and apply this approach to a new branch of evolutionary psychology called “feminist evolutionary psychology.” Morally relevant science is science that produces knowledge that has the potential to risk harm to humans, non-humans, or the environment. For example, a science that produces claims about women that reinforce prejudicial beliefs about women is a morally relevant science. The approach I develop, what I call the “social-dimensional approach,” is designed to assess a science’s epistemic and ethical dimensions which makes it ideal for the assessment of morally relevant science. My development of the social-dimensional approach is informed by an analysis of the philosophy of biology literature on the criticism of evolutionary psychology (EP), the study of the evolution of human psychology and behaviour. I apply the social-dimensional approach to feminist evolutionary psychology and show that this new science has serious epistemic and ethical flaws. I address the implications of these flaws and offer recommendations for how feminist evolutionary psychologists can amend them. I argue the social-dimensional approach has use beyond evolutionary psychology and can be used for the assessment of morally relevant science more broadly.
A Social-Pluralistic View of Science Advising
(University of Waterloo, 2023-05-30) Freier, Blake; Fehr, Carla
In this dissertation, I bring together two disciplines: Science, Technology, and Society studies and the Philosophy of Science, to develop a social-pluralistic account of science advising. I use three prominent theorists in the philosophy of science to critique three prominent views in the science, technology, and society field relating to science advising. I argue that the science, technology, and society literature does not fully account for the value-ladeness of scientific research. To that end, I develop a social-pluralistic account of science advising: social, because advice should come from panels or institutions rather than individuals, and pluralistic, because we should assess the credibility of advice along several dimensions of objectivity. I then apply my view to two real world examples: first, an EPA report on the harmful effects of environmental tobacco smoke, which faced lawsuits from the tobacco industry, and second, the Government of Canada’s use of Roundup Ready canola, a biotechnology, as a “value neutral” policy response to avoid discussions about the socio-cultural impact of industrial agriculture. These examples help to demonstrate the usefulness of my view in responding to real-world situations. A social-pluralistic view of science advising helps ensure that the role of values in producing scientific knowledge and science advice are legitimate, helps ensure that diverse viewpoints are actively considered as part of the advisory process, and ensures that the resulting advice is independent of any one person’s views, beliefs, or values.
The Literary Example as Philosophical Methodology: Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice and Arpaly’s Unprincipled Virtue
(University of Waterloo, 2024-08-16) Chernak, Ezri; Fehr, Carla
The question of the moral and cognitive content of literature has classical bona fides that imply it is a foundational question for philosophy, but philosophical interest in it has been narrow and intermittent. Conversely, narrative examples have been so ubiquitous in philosophy the methodologies underlying their use have seldom been made the center of philosophical inquiry. In this thesis, I make a comparative analysis of Miranda Fricker's Epistemic Injustice and Nomy Arpaly's Unprincipled Virtue, arguing their use of literary examples both relies on the unique properties of the literary example, and is conceptually productive rather than merely evidentiary or illustrative.
The Price of Knowledge: Contributory Injustice Among Low-Income First-Generation Students in Higher Education
(University of Waterloo, 2024-08-29) Tronciu, Stella; Fehr, Carla
In this thesis, I argue that low-income, first-generation (LIFG) students experience epistemic injustice and oppression in higher education because of the inequitable distribution of hermeneutic and epistemic resources between LIFG and higher-income, continuing-generation students. I show that the alignment of continuing-generation and not LIFG students' resources within the academy results in institutional barriers to LIFG students' success and full membership in epistemic communities. Further, I develop the concept of “temporal epistemic injustice” to emphasize how temporal and financial constraints affect LIFG students' ability to engage fully in existing academic communities and contribute fully to knowledge production and dissemination activities. This discussion of contributory and temporal injustice is significant because it sets the stage for future work exploring how institutional and socio-economic barriers faced by LIFG students hinder their ability to impact the structure of the academy and, hence, function to maintain current unjust structures.
Toward the Interested Investigator: Examining the Epistemic Dimensions of Relational Theory in Zoology
(University of Waterloo, 2023-08-28) Anderson, Hannah Elise; Fehr, Carla
I argue in this thesis that a research approach that is based on a meaningful relationship between a zoologist and their study subject holds unique epistemic value. It has been well established by feminist and social epistemologists that the identity and interests of the knower significantly influence the way knowledge can be created. This has been applied in philosophy of science to recognize that the identity of the scientist significantly influences the way they create scientific knowledge. Relational theorists draw our attention to the uniqueness of relationships themselves. I seek in this thesis to draw our attention to the potential epistemic influence of relationships themselves in the creation of scientific knowledge in biology. I do this by bringing together relational theory and epistemologies of ignorance to understand how scientists might influence knowledge creation in biology. I do this with a specific focus on zoology. In Chapter 1, I perform a literature review of relational theory and its applications in the philosophy of biology. I argue here that relationality presents a fruitful axis for analyzing research and knowledge creation in zoology. Next, in Chapter 2, I present what I call a researcher’s “state of interest toward relationality”. I argue here that relational theory can be used to differentiate research approaches used by zoologists. I do this using two case studies: that of Jane Goodall’s research program with chimpanzees and Eugenie Clark’s research program with sharks. Finally, in Chapter 3, I use relational theory to analyze the creation of ignorance in zoology. I argue here that a research approach where a zoologist has a high state of interest toward relationality offers unique epistemic benefits by allowing zoologists to circumvent and/or respond to the creation of some forms of ignorance. I hope that by connecting relational theory with the epistemology of ignorance in biology, we may see ways that relationships can strengthen scientific research.

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Browsing Philosophy by Author "Fehr, Carla"