Philosophy

Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://uwspace.uwaterloo.ca/handle/10012/9888

This is the collection for the University of Waterloo's Department of Philosophy.

Research outputs are organized by type (eg. Master Thesis, Article, Conference Paper).

Waterloo faculty, students, and staff can contact us or visit the UWSpace guide to learn more about depositing their research.

Browse

Now showing 1 - 7 of 7

Collaborative Scientific Knowledge and Testimonial Justification
(University of Waterloo, 2019-01-23) Yamamoto, Angella; Marino, Patricia
Is it possible to gain justified scientific knowledge from the testimony of a collective of scientists? In this thesis, I discuss whether or not it is possible to use current theories of testimonial justification for collective scientific knowledge. Our current theories on testimony and testimonial justification give us the conditions for when it is justified to acquire knowledge from someone or something else. However, these theories on testimonial justification focus on instances of testimony between individuals. That is, current theories on testimony explain when there is testimonial justification for knowledge that passes from one individual testifier to an individual recipient. In collective scientific knowledge, I describe two kinds of testimony. There is not only testimony by the collective but testimony within the collective. My discussion comes to the conclusion that while current theories on testimonial justification could be used to describe the kinds of testimony in collective scientific knowledge, there is still more work to do. Current theories of testimonial justification do not account for the interaction between the kinds of testimony.
Ethical Pluralism and Informed Consent in Canadian Health Care: Exploring Accommodations and Limitations
(University of Waterloo, 2017-09-26) Hershey, Samantha; Marino, Patricia
Vibrant and evolving diversity has become an integral part of Canadian identity. Communities are experiencing an enrichment of new ideas, and unique opportunities to learn about those with whom we share the world. At the same time, we are witness to emerging tensions and value conflicts - especially in the health care system. This has given rise to what some have termed the problem of pluralism: the challenges associated with formulating public policy and shaping health care practices for parties who have deep moral disagreements. It has been proposed that the practice of informed consent in health care is an effective solution to the problem of pluralism, as it allows individuals to make decisions according to their own moral commitments and control the care they receive. In this thesis, I argue that informed consent is not a value-neutral practice. Rather, it is grounded in particular values and beliefs, and reflects a particular understanding of health and illness. Consequently, I argue that the practice may not be able to fully address the problem of pluralism. I begin by exploring the dynamics of ethical pluralism and the structure of the health care system in Canada. I focus, specifically, on the challenges that arise from this complex intersection of ethics and health. Next, I establish the ways in which the practice of informed consent is embedded with particular values. Finally, I discuss strategies for making the practice of informed consent more accommodating of diversity. I argue that there are, however, limits to the possible accommodations that can be made, due to the complexity of the issues and the structure of the health care system in Canada.
Fractional-Reserve Banking and the Double-Title to Property Problem
(University of Waterloo, 2020-09-11) Allison, Andrew; Marino, Patricia
This thesis discusses the legitimacy of fractional-reserve banking under the title-transfer theory of contract. Fractional-reserve banking is the practice of banks lending out some of the money that is deposited with them. This can be contrasted to a 100% reserve system in which all deposited funds are held by the bank at all times. The title-transfer theory of contract posits that all contracts are the exchange of title to some piece of property and that all title to a particular piece of property can only be held by one individual at a time. Fractional-reserve banking appears to create a problem for the title-transfer theory of contract since it seems that both the depositor of money and those who borrow money from the bank have title to the money that was originally deposited. This is what is known as the double-title to property problem. Essentially, this thesis dissolves the double-title to property problem by offering a conceptual understanding of bank deposits as a form of call loan in which bank depositors give up title to money they deposit thus never creating an instance in which two titles to the same piece of property arises in the practice of fractional-reserve banking. This conceptual understanding of bank deposits describes fractional-reserve banking in a way which is ultimately different from how some who oppose fractional-reserve banking have described it. The call loan understanding views banks as debtors and depositors as their creditors who hold debt which is callable at any time. This understanding can be contrasted to the view that banks offers warehouse services that protect deposited money and bank depositors are people who seek to have their money protected and safeguarded by the bank. This thesis then explores some of the practical implications of conceptualizing bank deposits as call loans. While some have argued that banks must be bound by different rules when it comes to treasury management, bankruptcy, and contract formation, this thesis explores how banks can operate just like any other business that must practice debt management while dealing with uncertainty. This analysis engages with existing criticisms which posit that business practices for fractional-reserve banks must be different from other businesses in order to protect creditors from conditions which critics claim do not appear in other industries. This thesis argues that any such concerns regarding the treatment of creditors by fractional-reserve banks can already be addressed by existing business ethics literature that applies generally to all industries.
From the Standpoint of The Reasonable Person: Epistemic Ignorance, Culpable Dispositions, and the Objective Standard
(University of Waterloo, 2022-05-16) Sewell, Jamie; Marino, Patricia
The concept of reasonableness is both vital to the law and frustratingly vague. Efforts to articulate the concept often rely on “common sense” community-based notions of what counts as reasonable. While using common sense to determine reasonableness seems like a logical way to calibrate legal standards - most obviously because legal codes are meant to represent the values of the community served by them – doing so uncritically threatens the just application of the law. This is especially true where “common sense” represents the interests and perspectives of dominant groups, creating additional barriers to justice for marginalized litigants. Because of its widespread use, and its connection to important legal concepts like justice, rationality, deliberation, and fairness, we ought to wrestle reasonableness, as best we can, from the hardened grip of “common sense”. To control for problematic applications of reasonableness standards, some feminist and critical legal scholars have suggested applying subjective standards of reasonableness – calibrating what is reasonable against the capacities and knowledge of the litigants – to make the law appropriately sensitive to a wider array of reasonable behaviour. Others, like Mayo Moran in her 2003 book Rethinking the Reasonable Person: An Egalitarian Construction of the Objective Standard, have instead suggested that we maintain objective standards of reasonableness while identifying a different normative ground of reasonableness. Instead of appealing to common sense to determine what is reasonable, Moran suggests we appeal to the consideration one gives the important interests of others. In negligence law, where Moran’s work is focused, this makes unreasonably risky behaviour that which shows indifference to the important interests of others and deems reasonable behaviour as that which considers and responds to the important interests of others. Despite its value, an important limitation of her project is the difficulty in identifying when actions are borne of indifference to others’ interests. In this dissertation I argue that adding tools in epistemologies of ignorance helps address this limitation by offering ways of thinking about the underlying dispositions toward the important interests of others which can help identify contexts in which indifference to the interests of others is likely. Aside from being a good conceptual fit with existing legal mechanisms like inadvertence and offering clarity to the concept of reasonableness in general, adding considerations of ignorance allows us to ask different kinds of questions about what is reasonable and why, and allows us to connect moral responsibility to ignorance in more robust ways than we currently can.
Learning More and Knowing Less: Big Data, Spurious Correlations, and the Problem of Ignorance
(University of Waterloo, 2022-09-28) George, Stroubakis; Marino, Patricia
There are few things we can name that surpass big data’s boon for our empirical endeavours. Big data promises an ever-growing source of data that could be readily accessed by researchers in virtually any field of study. Data, as we know, are the rudiments of our knowledge claims about the world. Big data multiplied the number of data collected and stored to unfathomable numbers. But it is well known that our tools that help us sort through the datasets bring up spurious correlations. This project explores the implications of spurious correlations on our epistemic endeavours through the lens of ignorance. I will draw on recent scholarship in agnotology, the study of ignorance, namely by Nancy Tuana, Robert Proctor, and Nicholas Rescher. I will argue that spurious correlations, especially those that are less obvious to the epistemic agent can mislead the latter in forging false beliefs. In effect, big data, through the presence of spurious correlations can create ignorance. I will also argue that the epistemic agent shares in the responsibility of promoting and disseminating the ignorance that can arise from too much data. The promise of big data to provide the building blocks upon which only knowledge can stand is mistaken, for it also provides the building blocks for a new type of ignorance that is not an absence of knowledge, but the presence of something masquerading as it.
Professional Ethics for Economists: A Reflection on DeMartino's Oath
(University of Waterloo, 2024-02-16) Wass, Chris; Marino, Patricia
Economists and the discipline of economics occupy positions of immense institutional and intellectual authority in the world today. Decisions made based on the advice and expertise of economists influence the lives of millions of people. Economic ideas are leaned upon to shape government and corporate agendas the world over. But this influence on the world also carries with it the possibility that such ideas and actors can be the cause of significant harm. Despite these powerful positions that economists occupy and the possibility of being responsible for harming others, there has heretofore been very little serious or sustained discussion as to the potential ethical responsibilities that they might have as a profession. Over the last few years, several economists have taken note of this absence within the field and attempted to initiate a discourse about the types of professional ethical obligations that they might share as a group. One of the leading voices in this nascent discourse has been George DeMartino and his 2011 book The Economist’s Oath – which lays down many of the core assumptions and conceptual apparatuses that have guided the conversation thus far. In his book, DeMartino offers an overview of how he perceives the profession, the problems facing it, and he argues that a promising way to proceed would be to model Professional Ethics for Economists on the practices found in the medical profession. In this thesis, I critically examine the argument made by DeMartino in The Economist’s Oath and argue for some potential alternatives as to how the overall project might proceed. In Chapter 1, I lay out what I take to be the core of DeMartino’s position and identify a number of points upon which the discourse might be expanded. In Chapter 2, I offer one such expansion of the discourse on the specific topic of economic history and add additional details to some of the key historical events discussed by DeMartino. I argue that this additional context regarding the history of economics alters how they many central assumptions of DiMartino's enterprise are understood. In this chapter, I also introduce the recent development within the AEA, wherein they deviated from the historical trend of avoiding discussion of ethical topics and recently introduced a code of professional conduct for its members. I will discuss the ways that this new code does and does not address the concerns that DeMartino raises. In Chapter 3, I focus on one of the major themes of DeMartino’s book, his reliance on an analogy between economics and medicine. I argue that this analogy in DeMartino’s book – the comparison between the economic and medical professions – has fundamental limitations and that there are other established professional ethics literatures to which more fruitful comparisons can be made. In Chapter 4, I offer two such alternatives – accounting and engineering. The first alternative that I propose is accounting ethics and in particular its use of the concept of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. The second alternative explored here is engineering and the emphasis that that profession places on the principle of humility. I conclude, in Chapter 5, by applying some of these possible alternative frameworks to a selection of recent real-life examples of behaviour by economists to which such professional ethics ideas may have been usefully applied.
Sex, Dementia, and Consent
(University of Waterloo, 2018-08-01) Bianchi, Andria; Marino, Patricia
Sex and dementia is becoming an increasingly important topic in applied ethics. By the year 2030, more than 74.7 million people are expected to be diagnosed with dementia worldwide; many of these people may want to engage in sex. The question of how to manage cases of sex and dementia is occurring more frequently in practical cases because of our aging population. The primary reason that sex and dementia is ethically complex is because sexual consent is both legally and morally significant, yet many people with dementia may be unable to consent in accordance with current standards. In this dissertation, I introduce three frameworks that could be used to approach cases of sex and dementia. The first framework is that of relational autonomy and supported decision-making; this framework tries to enable people with dementia to make autonomous sexual decisions with support. The next approach is a framework of advance sexual consent, which considers the relevance of prior autonomous sexual decisions. The third framework focuses on prioritizing well-being above a person’s capacity to make autonomous decisions and to consent to sex. I assess each framework and consider their positive and negative nuances. The overall goal is to balance the right to sexuality while at the same time protecting people with dementia from undue harm. Ultimately, this dissertation shows that cases of sex and dementia ought to be managed on a case-by-case basis; one framework will not work for every context. In order to approach situations on a case-by-case basis, I contend that a process of weighing and balancing norms and principles is necessary. I use Beauchamp and Childress’s method of weighing and balancing to propose a systematic procedure. This process takes various factors into account in order to determine how to proceed in an ethically defensible manner. According to an approach of weighing and balancing, sexual acts would not be immediately barred based on a person’s inability to consent; rather, a person’s present convictions, the sexual activity to which they want to participate, the possibility of experiencing undue harm, their prior wishes and values, their capacity to make autonomous decisions with support, etc. would all be considered. Overall, this dissertation contributes to the complex topic of sex and dementia and offers a starting point for further discussion on how to approach these cases in practice.

Browse

Browsing Philosophy by Author "Marino, Patricia"