THE PHILOSOPHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF QUINE'S D-THESIS
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Date
2016-02-02
Authors
Munro, Bradley
Advisor
Minas, J.S.
George, Rolf
Van Evra, James
George, Rolf
Van Evra, James
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
University of Waterloo
Abstract
The philosophical significance of Quine's D-thesis is considered. The D-thesis - "Any
statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the
system? (W.V.0. Quine, From a Logical Point of View, p. 43) - named for Pierre Duhem, marked
a significant turning point in the evolution of Quine's thoughts on epistemology.
A brief survey of Quine's epistemological work is presented to show the evolution of his
thought.
Adolf Grünbaum's criticisms are examined and it is shown that the D-thesis can be defended
from Grünbaum's attacks. Writings of Harry Frankfurt and Philip Quinn are considered in this
context. Using some ideas due to Israel Scheffler, we are able to show that a D-theorist can avoid
the subjectivist's problems.
We conclude that the D-thesis is worthy of consideration as a possible basis for a philosophy
of science.
Description
Keywords
Quine, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, Logic